The New York Times, July 8, 2001 P11(L) Col 02 (26 Col In)

The New York Times, July 8, 2001 p11(L) col 02 (26 col in)

Fictions About the Failure At Camp David. (Editorial Desk)(Op-Ed) Robert Malley.

A year ago this week, President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel and the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat gathered at Camp David for what, in retrospect, many consider a turning point in Israeli-Palestinian relations. From right to left, hawks to doves, comes unusual harmony of opinion both here and in Israel: Camp David is said to have been a test that Mr. Barak passed and Mr. Arafat failed. Offered close to 99 percent of their dreams, the thinking goes, the Palestinians said no and chose to hold out for more. Worse, they did not present any concession of their own, adopting a no-compromise attitude that unmasked their unwillingness to live peacefully with a Jewish state by their side.

I was at Camp David, a member of the small American peace team, and I, too, was frustrated almost to the point of despair by the Palestinians' passivity and inability to seize the moment. But there is no purpose -- and considerable harm -- in adding to their real mistakes a list of fictional ones. Here are the most dangerous myths about the Camp David summit.

Myth 1: Camp David was an ideal test of Mr. Arafat's intentions.

Mr. Arafat told us on numerous occasions that he had not wanted to go to Camp David. He thought that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators had not sufficiently narrowed the gaps separating their positions before the summit, and once there, he made clear in his comments that he felt both isolated from the Arab world and alienated by the close Israeli-American partnership. Moreover, the summit occurred at a low point in Mr. Arafat's relationship with Mr. Barak -- the man with whom he was supposed to strike a historic deal. A number of Israeli commitments, including a long-postponed Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and the transfer to Palestinian control of villages abutting Jerusalem, remained unfulfilled, and Mr. Arafat believed that Mr. Barak was simply trying to skirt his obligations. It also took a genuine leap of faith -- for Mr. Barak as for the United States -- to imagine that the 100-year conflict between Jews and Palestinians living in this region, with roots going back thousands of years more and tens of thousands of victims along the way, could be resolved in a fortnight without any of the core issues -- territory, refugees, or the fate of Jerusalem -- having previously been discussed by the leaders.

Myth 2: Israel's offer met most if not all of the Palestinians' legitimate aspirations.

Yes, what was put on the table was more far-reaching than anything any Israeli leader had discussed in the past -- whether with the Palestinians or with Washington. But it was not the dream offer it has been made out to be, at least not from a Palestinian perspective.

To accommodate the settlers, Israel was to annex 9 percent of the West Bank; in exchange, the new Palestinian state would be granted sovereignty over parts of Israel proper, equivalent to one-ninth of the annexed land. A Palestinian state covering 91 percent of the West Bank and Gaza was more than most Americans or Israelis had thought possible, but how would Mr. Arafat explain the unfavorable 9-to-1 ratio in land swaps to his people?

In Jerusalem, Palestine would have been given sovereignty over many Arab neighborhoods of the eastern half and over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. While it would enjoy custody over the Haram al Sharif, the location of the third-holiest Muslim shrine, Israel would exercise overall sovereignty over this area, known to Jews as the Temple Mount. This, too, was far more than had been thinkable only a few weeks earlier, and a very difficult proposition for the Israeli people to accept. But how could Mr. Arafat have justified to his people that Israel would retain sovereignty over some Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, let alone over the Haram al Sharif? As for the future of refugees -- for many Palestinians, the heart of the matter -- the ideas put forward at Camp David spoke vaguely of a ''satisfactory solution,'' leading Mr. Arafat to fear that he would be asked to swallow an unacceptable last-minute proposal.

Myth3:ThePalestiniansmadenoconcessionoftheirown.

ManyhavecometobelievethatthePalestinians'rejectionoftheCampDavidideasexposedanunderlyingrejectionofIsrael'srighttoexist.Butconsiderthefacts:ThePalestinianswerearguingforthecreationofaPalestinianstatebasedontheJune4,1967,borders,livingalongsideIsrael.TheyacceptedthenotionofIsraeliannexationofWestBankterritorytoaccommodatesettlementblocs.TheyacceptedtheprincipleofIsraelisovereigntyovertheJewishneighborhoodsofEastJerusalem--neighborhoodsthatwerenotpartofIsraelbeforetheSixDayWarin1967.And,whiletheyinsistedonrecognitionoftherefugees'rightofreturn,theyagreedthatitshouldbeimplementedinamannerthatprotectedIsrael'sdemographicandsecurityinterestsbylimitingthenumberofreturnees.NootherArabpartythathasnegotiatedwithIsrael--notAnwarel-Sadat'sEgypt,notKingHussein'sJordan,letaloneHafezal-Assad'sSyria--evercameclosetoevenconsideringsuchcompromises.

Ifpeaceistobeachieved,thepartiescannotaffordtotoleratethegrowingacceptanceofthesemythsasreality.

Thefactsdonotindicate,however,anylackofforesightorvisiononthepartofEhudBarak.Hehaduncommonpoliticalcourageaswell.ButthemeasureofIsrael'sconcessionsoughtnotbehowfarithasmovedfromitsownstartingpoint;itmustbehowfarithasmovedtowardafairsolution.

ThePalestiniansdidnotmeettheirhistoricresponsibilitiesatthesummiteither.IsuspecttheywilllongregrettheirfailuretorespondtoPresidentClinton--atCampDavidandlateron--withmoreforthcomingandcomprehensiveideasoftheirown.

Finally,CampDavidwasnotrushed.Itwasmanythings--inadequatelypreparedfor,perhaps;tooinformal,possibly;lackingproperfall-backoptions,withoutadoubt--butprematureitwasnot.Bythespringof2000,everyseriousIsraeli,PalestinianandAmericananalystwaspredictinganoutbreakofPalestinianviolenceabsentamajorbreakthroughinthepeaceprocess.TheOsloprocesshadrunitsnaturalcourse;ifanything,tacklingthesensitivefinalstatusissuescametoolate,nottoosoon.
Theglossthatisputonthepastmatters.Thewaythetwosideschoosetoviewyesterdaylargelywilldeterminehowtheychoosetobehavetomorrow.And,ifunchallenged,theirrespectiveinterpretationswillgraduallyhardenintodivergentversionsofrealityandunassailabletruths--thatYasirArafatisincapableofreachingafinalagreement,forexample,orthatIsraelisintentonperpetuatinganoppressiveregime.AsthetwosidescontinuetodebatewhatwentwrongatCampDavid,itisimportantthattheygetthelessonsright.
ArticleCJ76376116
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TheNewYorkTimes,July11,2001pA16(L)col05(3colin)
CampDavid:RuinsontheGround.(EditorialDesk)(LettertotheEditor)
FullText:COPYRIGHT2001TheNewYorkTimesCompany
TotheEditor:
RobertMalley(Op-Ed,July8)hasfailedtodispelthewidelyheldimpressionofPalestinianunwillingnesstolivepeacefullywithIsrael.TherealityisthatPalestinianleadershaverefusedtoenunciatetheconcessionsthatMr.Malleyhasdetailedasfacts,andinparticularhaveneverrefutedtheconclusionthattheirright-of-returndemandisbutaeuphemismfortheeliminationoftheJewishstate.
PeacewillcometotheMiddleEastwhenPalestinianleadershavethecouragetoacceptaJewishstatepublicly,andwhenapologistsrealizethatthereisnofinessingthat.
CHARLESS.HEXTER
Rehovot,Israel,July8,2001
ArticleCJ76456779
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TheNewYorkTimes,July11,2001pA16(L)col04(4colin)
CampDavid:RuinsontheGround.(EditorialDesk)(LettertotheEditor)
FullText:COPYRIGHT2001TheNewYorkTimesCompany
TotheEditor:
RobertMalley'sassessmentoftheIsraeliofferbyEhudBarakandthepositionofthePalestiniansatCampDavidlastsummermakessenseonlyifoneworkswiththeassumptionthatthePalestiniansarebasicallyentitledtoeverythingtheyaskfor,nomatterhowoutrageous(Op-Ed,July8).
ItisnoaccidentthatwelearnedafterCampDavidthatMr.BarakhadbeenforthcomingandMr.Arafatnot.OnJerusalem,onrefugeesortheterritories,Mr.Arafatbudgedlittle,ifatall,fromthehistoricdemandsofthePalestinians.Meanwhile,Mr.BarakriskedhispoliticalstandingbygoingfarbeyondanymeasurableIsraeliconsensusonwhatconcessionsareacceptable.
EDWARDMINOR
DAVIDKIPPER
NewYork,July9,2001
Thewritersareco-chairmen,MiddleEasternAffairs,Anti-DefamationLeague.
ArticleCJ76456777
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TheNewYorkTimes,July11,2001pA16(L)col04(5colin)
CampDavid:RuinsontheGround.(EditorialDesk)(LettertotheEditor)
FullText:COPYRIGHT2001TheNewYorkTimesCompany
TotheEditor:
Re''FictionsAbouttheFailureatCampDavid,''byRobertMalley(Op-Ed,July8):
TheCampDavideffortlastyearmaynothavebeeneverythingitisbeingtoutedas,andtheconcessionsmayhavebeentoomuchforYasirArafattoaccept.Butthatdoesnotjustifytheresurrectionofmurder,suicideattacksandmassdestructionthatcameimmediatelyafterward.
ThefailureofCampDavidisthefailureofOsloandtheentirepeaceprocess.Itisnotthattherehasbeennoresolutionyet,butthatMr.ArafatandtheextremistArabgroupsstillbelievethattheroadtopeaceandconcessionsispavedthroughbloodandnotthroughhonestdialogueandthebasicacceptanceofIsraelasaJewishhomeland.ThatamajorityofPalestinianspolledbelievethatbloodshedistheironlyhopemakesuswonderifanythinghasbeenlearnedbetweenOsloandCampDavid,andwonderifhopeisstillanoption.
JUDAS.ENGELMAYER
NewYork,July9,2001
ArticleCJ76456775
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TheNewYorkTimes,July14,2001pA14(L)col06(4colin)
MideastBottomLine.(EditorialDesk)(LettertotheEditor)
FullText:COPYRIGHT2001TheNewYorkTimesCompany
TotheEditor:
Re''FictionsAbouttheFailureatCampDavid''(Op-Ed,July8):
RobertMalley'spositionisessentiallythatitdoesn'tmatterhowfarIsraelhasmoved,becauseitisonlyfairforthePalestinianstodemandwhatwastheirsbefore1967.Itisaviewthatdefeatsthewholepurposeofnegotiations.
CampDavid,Osloandeveryeffortbeingmadenowtoachievepeaceareestablishedonthebasisoffairconcessionsandfairnegotiationsthatconsiderthepastaswellasthepresent.
TherealitythatPalestinianschoolbooks,TVbroadcastsandnewspaperspraisethekillingofIsraelisandcallforthedeathofIsraeldemonstratesthatevenifIsraelaccepted100percentofeverythingnowbeingdemandedofit,thePalestinianswouldstillhavegivennothinginreturn,includingtheguaranteethatIsraeliscouldlivepeacefullyinaJewishhomeland.
BARRYY.GREENBERG
NewYork,July10,2001
ThewriterisamemberoftheAmericanJewishCongress'sExecutiveCommittee.
ArticleCJ76525729
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#RobertMalleylooksbackatCampDavid
ByEllisShuman July20,2001
RobertMalleywasspecialassistantforArab-IsraeliaffairstoU.S.PresidentBillClintonfrom1998to2001.HewasamemberoftheAmericanpeaceteamatthetalksheldatCampDavidinthesummerof2000.MalleyisjoiningtheCouncilonForeignRelationsasaseniorfellow.
InanarticlepublishedinTheNewYorkTimesatthebeginningofJuly,MalleyconsidersthefailureoftheCampDavidtalks.ThoughMalleywas"frustratedalmosttothepointofdespairbythePalestinians'passivityandinabilitytoseizethemoment,"hestillfeelsthatcertainmythshavearisenaboutthetalks,consideredinIsrael,inhisopinion,as"atestthatMr.BarakpassedandMr.Arafatfailed."
MalleyreturnstothethemeofthecollapsedCampDavidtalksinanupcomingarticle,duetobepublishedintheNewYorkReviewofBooks.HereMalleydisputestheviewthatYasserArafatwasthesoleculpritresponsibleforthetalks'failure.
FictionsaboutthefailureatCampDavid
IntheNewYorkTimesarticlepublishedonJuly8,Malleypresents"themostdangerousmythsabouttheCampDavidsummit."FirsthequestionswhetherCampDavidwastheidealtestforArafat'sintentions.Malleyfeltthatitwouldtakea"agenuineleapoffaith…toimaginethatthe100-yearconflictbetweenJewsandPalestinians…couldberesolvedinafortnightwithoutanyofthecoreissues--territory,refugees,orthefateofJerusalem--havingpreviouslybeendiscussedbytheleaders.
NextMalleyconsidersIsrael'sfar-reachingterritorialoffer."Itwasnotthedreamofferithasbeenmadeouttobe,atleastnotfromaPalestinianperspective,"Malleywrites.AndfinallyMalleyconfrontsthemyththatthe"Palestiniansmadenoconcessionsoftheirown."MalleydefinesmajorPalestinianconcessions,includingtheacceptanceofbordersbasedonthelinesofJune4,1967andthereadinesstoacceptIsraeliannexationoverJewishsettlementblocs,includinginEastJerusalem."NootherArabpartythathasnegotiatedwithIsrael…evercameclosetoevenconsideringsuchcompromises,"Malleywrites.
MalleyapplaudsBarak'sforesight,visionanduncommonpoliticalcourage.ButMalleyfeelsthatthe"measureofIsrael'sconcessionsoughtnotbehowfarithasmovedfromitsownstartingpoint;itmustbehowfarithasmovedtowardafairsolution."
AsforthePalestinians,they"didnotmeettheirhistoricresponsibilitiesatthesummiteither.IsuspecttheywilllongregrettheirfailuretorespondtoPresidentClinton--atCampDavidandlateron--withmoreforthcomingandcomprehensiveideasoftheirown."
ClintonexasperatedwithBarakduringpeacetalks
InanupcomingarticleintheNewYorkReviewofBooks,tobepublishedAugust9,MalleyandcoauthorHusseinAgha,whofrequentlyadvisesthePalestinianleadership,sayBarak'smistakesatCampDavidcontributedtothebreakdownofthetalks.Evenso,theAmericanpeaceteambelievedthatBarakwantedtoreachahistoricfinaldealandthereforeoverlookedBarak'sfailings.
Inapreviewofthearticle,theWashingtonPostreportsthattheauthorssay"BarakhelpedsetthestageforfailurebyrefusingtocarryoutsomeearlieragreementswiththePalestinians,includingacommitmenttoturnoverWestBankland,expandingJewishsettlementsintheoccupiedterritoriesandthenpushingArafattoreachanall-or-nothingpeacedeal."
ThisraisedArafat'ssuspicions,andreinforcedhisreluctancetoacceptnthekindofhistoricdealthatBarakwasoffering.AccordingtoMalleyandAgha,Arafatspentmostofthesummitattemptingtoavoidatrapratherthanseekingpeace.
MorerevealingishowPresidentClintonviewedBarak'snegotiatingpositions.Malleyrecallsthepresidentventinghis"accumulatedfrustrationsafterBarakretractedsomenegotiatingpositions."ThearticlequotesClintonastellingBarak:"Ican'tgoseeArafatwitharetrenchment!Thisisnotreal.Thisisnotserious."
MalleyreportsthatClintonwasalsotroubledbyPalestinianunwillingnesstorespondtosomeofthefar-reachingideasheandBarakputonthetable.TheAmericanswerewaitingforArafattooffercounterproposals,but"Arafatandhisadviserswereparalyzedbytheirfearofbeingtricked,aswellasbydivisionsandintriguewithintheirteam,"accordingtothearticle.
AccordingtotheWashingtonPost,ArafatreportedlyagreedtogototheCampDavidsummitonseveralconditions.Oneapparentlywasthathewouldnotbeblamedifthenegotiationsfailed.MalleyandAghawritethatClintonvolunteeredthattheUnitedStateswouldremainneutralinthecaseofafailure.Intheend,ClintonlenthissupporttoBarak,whosepoliticalfootinginIsraelwasshakyduetotheoffershehadmadetoArafat.