The Kerry-Lugar Bill –

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009

A New Strategy for Pakistan

by Josh Mador, The Eurasia Center

Words and labels routinely used to characterize Pakistan’s political situation would be that it is “corrupt”, “unstable”, “a failed state”, and “ungovernable” among other not so endearing descriptions. More disheartening is that the situation in Pakistan seems as if it is deteriorating. This is due to a number of reasons, including economic instability already exasperating abysmal poverty levels, non-state actors working against the state and political deadlock coming from shady old time politicians.[1] All of these factors add to instability which should be a major concern for the United States as Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal and is a major source of violent Islamic radicalism.[2] While the U.S. since the Zia days has opted for stability in Pakistan by bolstering the military through aid, this has been an insufficient strategy.

The problems affecting Pakistan run throughout its society and can not simply be solved by having more Pakistani soldiers with bigger guns, (chances are they would be faced towards India anyways) as has been the solution for most of the U.S. and Pakistan’s relationship.[3] A change has become necessary as both the army and civilian government have come under increasing attack from militant organizations they used to have close partnerships with.[4] Recently the Kerry-Lugar bill or officially known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 was passed which gives an unprecedented 1.5 billion dollars a year for five years in non-military aid to Pakistan.[5] While much has been said about what additional steps need to be taken to ensure success in the region, I argue that the Kerry-Lugar bill is a good piece of legislation that seeks to utilize soft power to quell real threats to both America and Pakistan. By looking critically at how this bill is different from past aid packages we can possibly come away with a slightly more optimistic view of a rapidly failing country.

One of the most important parts of the bill is in Section 205. This section states that funds can only be given to a civilian government in Pakistan.[6] This is a radical departure from traditional U.S. policy as the U.S. has normally funded almost exclusively the military and has had no problem supporting and working with military regimes.[7] This bill makes the military accountable in that there are massive repercussions if there is a military coup of the civilian government.[8] The U.S. is also held accountable. In the past the U.S. has opted for the stability, with only half-hearted calls for democracy.[9] This bill firmly states that for America, democracy is the name of the game in Pakistan. This is something that past American actions have contradicted.

Another reason this bill is a change for the better is that contrary to any assumptions, most aid to Pakistan prior to this bill were primarily for non-development purposes. Approximately 15% went to security assistance (which have been spent on large-scale weapons not useful for counter-insurgency operations), 60% for people displaced by terrorism, 15% direct payments to Pakistan (which clearly has been ineffective in providing basic services to its people or economic stability) and 10% humanitarian purposes. As can be seen there is almost no money for long-term development in regards to either the building of institutions, infrastructure or human capital.[10]

By far the most important part of the bill however is the “performance clause” or Part D of Section 102. In this clause it states that if there is an improving political and economic climate, Congress can continue the bill for an additional five years.[11] Combining this with credible oversight and consistent political rhetoric should create a situation where Pakistani leadership should feel pressure to properly use this money for the Pakistani people. U.S. officials now believe that good performance has a tangible reward.[12] This allows Pakistani leaders to throw off their “rentier state” mentality, in that they assume because they are in a favorable strategic position they will get aid.[13] This gives Pakistan the opportunity to be rewarded for meaningful development in institutions, infrastructure and human capital instead of just being given money for no reason or with no incentive to properly govern and help its people.

The other positive aspect of this clause is it is an important gesture to the Pakistani people that the United States is committed to Pakistan’s long term not simply because it is geopolitically relevant at the moment. Many in Pakistan feel as the U.S. presence and aid will shrivel when they leave Afghanistan. By constantly reminding both the Pakistani leaders and its people that this is a not a quick fix but a plan for long term development, this partnership can serve as hope for Pakistanis and can be a reason to demand accountability from their leaders.[14]

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 has some interesting parts that make it a dynamic piece of legislation. It asks for the money to be spent on many different projects representing the full range of development -practices such as microfinance, education and infrastructure development.[15] While if implemented successfully all these projects would help the Pakistani people; successful implementation will be extremely difficult due to deteriorating or non-existent rule of law in many areas of Pakistan. The successful implantation of this aid package will ultimately depend on the people and government of Pakistan. If former civilian governments are any sign of things to come, (which they should be saying it is essentially the same people in power) leaders will be corrupt and personalize power.[16] This will continue to hurt the development of democratic institutions and weaken the rule of law, two major cornerstones of this Act. Another reason that it might fail is the military.

While the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act looks to rely on civilian organizations, the military will undoubtedly be a major player in implementing much of the legislation actually on the ground. The military as well has to realize that enriching themselves as they have sometimes been primed to do is also not in their best interest as they have been under attack from non-state actors.[17] Instead the military and the civilian government both need to realize that establishing the rule of law will be fundamental for this aid and eventually the country to really take off. The final reason this effort might fail is even if the government and the military actually do a good job it just might not be enough money to make a tangible difference. To put things into perspective Kerry-Lugar initiative is giving approximately 7.5 billion in aid for five years. The Marshall Plan, the most successful U.S. aid package ever given gave 13 billion dollars in 1945 (this comes out to approximately 100 billion today)[18]. This was done at a time when America enjoyed extremely high prestige and people were very receptive to American values and practices.[19] The situation in Pakistan is actually far worse. First, simply from a numbers perspective compared to the Marshall Plan (inflation adjusted) per capita development aid comes to $42 compared to in post war Europe where they received approximately $450 a person.[20] While the Marshall plan was to prevent the spread of communism into the minds of Europeans by rebuilding the economy, the situation in Pakistan is that violent Islamist ideology (that America had a hand in creating) has already corrupted the minds of many Pakistanis. This radicalism preaches against America, India and the West and serves to destabilize Pakistan.[21] If America is not able to significantly alter the minds of Pakistanis through a combination of propaganda, actual development progress and political decisions, the Kerry-Lugar initiative will prove to be another failed aid package.

As can be seen through a critical reading of the Kerry-Lugar legislation, America is actually well intentioned in their attempts to help the Pakistani people. This aid package tries to rectify negative aspects of American foreign policy in Pakistan in the past. However, anyone that thinks it will be easy to build good governance, a functioning economy and the rule of law in five years with limited funds is sadly mistaken. For the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act to be successful all parties involved need to realize that hard work, good faith and a lot of luck will be needed and even that might not be enough to completely right the ship with Pakistan. But if all sides realize that this is a first step in what needs to be a long relationship of working partners and that America is there for the right reasons this can go a long way in giving hope to Pakistanis. However, if the bill is not successfully implemented that will surely continue Pakistan along a scary path of instability, poverty and radicalism.

Works Cited

1.  Adamski, Michael J. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEOBAND MARDRASA NETWORK AND U.S. EFFORTS TO COMBAT MILITANT IDEOLOGY. Masters Thesis. Washington D.C.: George Washington University, 2009.

2.  Congress. Text of the Final Version of the Kerry-Lugar Bill: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. 2009 October 7. 16 July 2010 <http://pakistaniat.com/2009/10/07/full-text-kerry-lugar-bill/>.

3.  Diamond, Larry. "Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?" Plattner, Larry Diamond and Marc F. The Global Divergence of Democracy. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001. 356-359.

4.  Ellwood, David. "The Marshall Plan: A Strategy that Worked." 3 April 2008. america.gov. 17 July 2010 <http://www.america.gov/st/educ-english/2008/April/20080423213601eaifas0.2363535.html>.

5.  Farmer, Tim. "Marshall Plan Data Analysis." 2010. learningtogive.org. 16 July 2010 <http://learningtogive.org/lessons/unit231/lesson3_attachments/1.html>.

6.  Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier New America Foundation. Washington D.C., 6 16 2010.

7.  Kohen, Lawrence Korb and Arnold. "A Marshall Plan for the Third World." November 15 2005. Bostonglobe.com. 16 July 2010 <http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/11/15/a_marshall_plan_for_the_third_world/>.

8.  Nelson, Matthew J. "Pakistan in 2009: Tackling the Taliban?" Asian Survey 50 (2010): 112-126.

9.  Pakistan. 24 June 2010. 16 July 2010 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.

10.  Robert B. Oakley, T.X. Hammes. "Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia." June 2010. ndu.edu. 15 July 2010 <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/SF%20256%20(2).pdf>.

11.  Siddiqa-Agha, Ayesha. Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy. London: Pluto Press, 2007.

12.  Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.

[1] (Nelson)

[2] (Robert B. Oakley)

[3] (Adamski)

[4] (Gul)

[5] (Congress)

[6] Ibid

[7] (Adamski)

[8] (Congress)

[9] (Robert B. Oakley)

[10] (Adamski)

[11] (Congress)

[12] (Robert B. Oakley)

[13] (Zakaria)

[14] (Robert B. Oakley)

[15] (Congress)

[16] (Diamond)

[17] (Siddiqa-Agha)

[18] (Kohen)

[19] (Ellwood)

[20] (Farmer) and (Pakistan 2010)

[21] (Adamski)