The Institute of English Studies UW
The Institute of English Studies UW
Course 2657 Understanding utterances
Course instructor: Ewa Mioduszewska-Crawford
www.rrt2.neostrada.pl/ewamioduszewska.htm
elearning: http://rrt2.neostrada.pl/mioduszewska/
mail:
Course aims: Answering the question ‘How we understand utterances?’ by introducing and discussing the principle of relevance, which determines this understanding. While communicating, we often understand more, less or something different from what we say (e.g. A. Are you hungry? B. I’ve had breakfast (at 9 am we understand that B is not hungry, at 7 pm we understand that he is hungry)). D. Sperber and D. Wilson’s model of ostensive-inferential communication explains why and how it happens.
Topics:
Class 1 Understanding utterances: the problem (analyzing examples I)
Class 2Understanding utterances: analyzing examples II) follow-up 1
Class 3 Relevance: explicating the term
Class 4 The development of relevance theory
Class 5 Relevance theory as communication theory
Class 6 Ostensive-inferential communication: explicatures and implicatures
Class 7 Midterm test
Class 8 Ostensive-inferential communication: ad hoc concepts
Class 9 Intended obscurity in utterances
Class 10 Unintended obscurity in utterances
Class 11 The guru effect
Class 12 Analyzing examples. Follow-up 2
Class 13 Final test
Class 14 Signatures
Reading: (obligatory reading in bold)
1. Mioduszewska, E. 2006, „Teoria relewancji”, [in:] Metodologie językoznawstwa, ed. P. Stelmaszczyk, Łódź, p. 155-174.
2. Mioduszewska, E. 2008, „Relewancja w językoznawstwie”, [in:] Studia Logopaedica II, eds. J. Ożdżyński, T. Rittel, Kraków, p. 9-19.
3. Mioduszewska, E. 2008. “On relevance of non-communicative stimuli”, [in:] Relevance Round Table I, eds. E. Mioduszewska, A. Piskorska, WUW. Warszawa, p. 67-77.
4. Mioduszewska, E. 2006, “The Guru effect and sophisticated understanding”, [in:] Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny 4(202), WUW. Warszawa, p. 181-191.
5. Sperber, D. 1994, „Understanding verbal understanding”, [in:] What is intelligence? ed. J. Khalfad, Cambridge.
6. Sperber, D. 2006. “The Guru effect”, internet.
7. Sperber, D., Wilson, D. 1986, 1995, Relevance: communication and cognition, Oxford.
8. Wilson, D. , D. Sperber, 2004. „Relevance Theory”, [in:] Handbook of Pragmatics, eds. G. Ward, L. Horn, Oxford.
Credit requirements
follow up exercises 2x5 points
mid-term test 40 points
final test 40 points
attendance 7 points
activity 3 points
§ grading policy:
100 - 90 points 6
89 - 80 points 5
79 - 70 points 4
69 - 60 points 3
0 - 60 points 2
Class 1 Understanding utterances: the problem (analyzing examples I)
Examples
1. A. Are you hungry? B. I’ve had breakfast.
Context 1. It’s 8 am.
Context 2. It’s 8 pm.
2. A. Nice day!
Context 1. At a bus stop. Small talk.
Context 2. A leaves the house after an argument with his family.
3. A. Do you like Mary? B. I like her dog.
Context 1. No special assumptions.
Context 2. B likes only people who have dogs which he likes.
4. A. Would you have some coffee? B. I am tired.
Context 1. Coffee keeps B awake and he has a lot of work to do.
Context 2. Coffee keeps B awake while he wants to have a rest.
5. A. Where are you going? B. To the bank.
Context 1. There are no banks (financial institutions) in the place where A and B are talking.
Context 2. A knows that B has no money with him but needs it.
6. A. And Jeremy? B. Jeremy is a lion.
Context 1. In the Zoo.
Context 2. At work.
7. A. Let’s go to the cinema. B. There is a class test tomorrow.
Interpretation 1. They will go to the cinema.
Interpretation 2. They will not go to the cinema.
Interpretation 3. They hesitate.
8. A. What’s on your mind? B. It’s a hot potato.
Interpretation 1. Literal
Interpretation 2. Idiomatic
9. A. What will you have? B. The usual
10. “You can never tell your love, love that never told can be.”
Class 2 Understanding utterances: the problem (analyzing examples II)
1. A. Are you hungry? B. I’ve had breakfast.
Context 1. It’s 8 am.
Explicature: John Brown has said that he had breakfast in the morning of April 18th 2009
Implicated Premises: If people eat their breakfast they are not hungry for several hours. John Brown has eaten breakfast.
Implicated conclusion: B is not hungry
Context 2. It’s 8 pm.
Explicature: John Brown has said that he had breakfast in the morning of April 18th 2009
Implicated Premises: If people eat their breakfast they are not hungry for several hours but later they are hungry. John Brown had breakfast in the morning. Now it is evening. More than several hours have passed.
Implicated conclusion: B is hungry.
2. A. Nice day!
Context 1. At a bus stop. Small talk.
Explicature: John Brown has said that it is a nice day now at the bus stop on Aril 18 2009 at 10 o’clock.
Implicated Premises: There is a social convention that people exchange insignificant remarks with acquaintances or even strangers to be friendly. Talking about the weather is such a remark. John Brown knows this social convention.
Implicated conclusion: John Brown is being friendly to the people at the bus stop (+ weak implicatures)
Context 2. A leaves the house after an argument with his family.
Explicature: John Brown has accusingly exclaimed that the day was nice.
Implicated premises: When people are angry they shout and display anger. John Brown shouts and displays anger. When people are angry they don’t have a nice day.
Implicated conclusion: John Brown is angry and it is not a nice day for him (+special account of irony)
3. A. Do you like Mary? B. I like her dog.
Context 1. No special assumptions.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that he likes Mary’s dog.
Implicated premises: When people are asked a question, they answer it. When people express their feelings towards others, they try to be polite. Being polite means not saying negative things about others.
Implicated conclusion: John Brown answers the question. He wants to be polite. He doesn’t want to express negative feelings. He doesn’t like Mary.
Context 2. B likes only people who have dogs which he likes.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that he likes Mary’s dog.
Implicated premises: When people are asked a question, they answer it. John Brown likes only people who have dogs which he likes. Mary is a person who has a dog which he likes.
Implicated conclusion: John Brown likes Mary.
4. A. Would you have some coffee? B. I am tired.
Context 1. Coffee keeps B awake and he has a lot of work to do.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that he is tired.
Implicated premises: When people are tired they can’t work. When John Brown is tired, he can’t work. He has a lot of work. When people are tired and can’t work, coffee may help them regain energy. John is one of such people.
Implicated conclusion: John would have some coffee.
Context 2. Coffee keeps B awake while he wants to have a rest.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that he is tired.
Implicated premises: When people are tired they want to go to sleep. When people drink coffee they can’t sleep. John is one of such people.
Implicated conclusion: John wouldn’t have any coffee.
5. A. Where are you going? B. To the bank.
Context 1. There are no banks (financial institutions) in the place where A and B are talking.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that he is going to the bank.
Implicated premises: There are no financial institutions called banks at the place where A and John are talking. There is a bank of the river in the place where they live and it is called the bank in the neighborhood. (grounds for disambiguation).
Implicated conclusion: John Brown is going to the bank of the river known as the bank in the town.
Context 2. A knows that B has no money with him but needs it.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that he is going to the bank.
Implicated premises: There is one financial institution called ‘bank’ in the town where A and John Brown live. People take their money from the bank. John has no money on him but needs it. He is one of the people who take money from the bank.
Implicated conclusion: John Brown is going to the local bank (financial institution) (disambiguation)
6. A. And Jeremy? B. Jeremy is a lion.
Context 1. In the Zoo.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that Jeremy (the name used by John in previous discourse) is a lion.
Implicated premises: In the Zoo there are animals. A and John Brown are watching animals.
Implicated conclusion: The name Jeremy refers to a lion.
Context 2. At work.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that Jeremy (their mutual boss’ name) is a lion.
Implicated premises: Jeremy is A and John Brown’s boss. As a human being he is not a lion. Lions are dangerous and courageous. (metaphor)
Implicated conclusion: Jeremy is dangerous and courageous (+ special treatment of metaphors)
7. A. Let’s go to the cinema. B. There is a class test tomorrow.
Interpretation 1. They will go to the cinema.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown warns that there is a class test on physics in their class the next day.
Implicated premises: A and John are very bad students. They would not pass the test. If they fail they will have to leave school. They don’t know what to do about it.
Implicated conclusion: OK.
Interpretation 2. They will not go to the cinema.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown reminds A that there is a class test on physics in their class the next day.
Implicated premises: A and John are very good students. They always study hard before tests. If people want to study, they can’t go the cinema.
Implicated conclusion: Better not.
Interpretation 3. They hesitate.
Explicature: As an answer to A’s question John Brown states that there is a class test on physics in their class the next day.
Implicated premises: A and John are average students. They don’t know it they want to write the test or play truants.
Implicated conclusion: Let’s think it over.
8. A. What’s on your mind? B. It’s a hot potato.
Interpretation 1. Literal
Interpretation 2. Idiomatic
9. A. What will you have? B. The usual
10. “You can never tell your love, love that never told can be.”
Follow-up 1: Give your own example of utterance comprehension
Class 3. Relevance: explicating the term
Termin relewancja/relewantny pochodzi z łaciny relevare – podnieść, ulżyć; relevans/relevantis – podpierający (Kopaliński 2003: 429). Definicje słownikowe sprowadzają definicje tego terminu do rozumienia potocznego:
Relewantny (językoznawstwo) – cechy, opozycje istotne dla funkcji komunikacyjnej języka (Szymczak 1978: t.3, 42);
Relewancja (psychologia, socjologia, językoznawstwo) – związek, zwłaszcza logiczny, z rzeczą, o którą chodzi. Relewantny – pozostający w (logicznym) związku z, odnoszący się do, stosujący się do, dostarczający dowodu słuszności albo niesłuszności sprawy, istotny dla (Kopaliński 2003: 429).
W badaniach naukowych pojęcie relewancji jest znaczące (i to już od Starożytności, a w czasach współczesnych od lat czterdziestych XX wieku), a często podstawowe w filozofii (problemy epistemologii), socjologii (zasada organizacji wiedzy potocznej), logice (definicja implikacji ścisłej/semantycznej i konstrukcja systemów logicznych z nią związanych) i informacji naukowej (zasady organizacji informacyjnych systemów wyszukiwawczych). Doskonały przegląd zastosowań i prób definicji relewancji w tych dziedzinach można znaleźć w drugim rozdziale książki E. Artowicz (1997).
Językoznawcza teoria relewancji w wersji książkowej pojawiła się w roku 1986. Wtedy to właśnie Dan Sperber i Deirdre Wilson wydali Relevance: Communication and Cognition [Relewancja: komunikacja i poznanie. Wszystkie tłumaczenia EM]. Jej założenia poznawcze i językoznawcze sytuują ją w nurcie szeroko rozumianego językoznawstwa kognitywnego i pragmatyki językoznawczej. Kognitywne umocowanie teorii relewancji wynika z założeń poznawczych przyjętych i rozbudowanych przez autorów, a związek z pragmatyką językoznawczą wynika z faktu, że teoria relewancji daje podstawę takiej pragmatyki, rozwijanej tak przez jej twórców (Wilson 2004, 2004a), jak i przez innych teoretyków relewancji (Carston 2003, Blakemore 1987, 2002).
Założenia poznawcze teorii relewancji to przede wszystkim przyjęcie hipotezy o modularności umysłu (Fodor 1983, 2000, Sperber 2003, Sperber i Wilson 2002, Wilson i Sperber 2003) i o zdolności umysłu do metareprezentacji (Sperber 2000, 2000a, Wilson 2000, Noh 2000).
Według pierwszego z tych założeń, istnieją w umyśle moduły wyspecjalizowane w poszczególnych zadaniach. Tak jak Chomsky, Sperber i Wilson zakładają istnienie peryferyjnego (tzn. przetwarzającego dane zmysłowe na reprezentacje mentalne) modułu dekodowania wyrażeń językowych, działającego automatycznie i poza naszą świadomością, który przekształca sygnały dźwiękowe wypowiedzi w reprezentacje mentalne, co jest warunkiem wstępnym procesu rozumienia.
Sam proces rozumienia angażuje centralne, tzn. mające dostęp do wszystkich reprezentacji mentalnych, moduły teorii umysłu, rozumienia i wnioskowania. Wszystkie te trzy moduły zakładają ludzką zdolność do metareprezentacji.
Według teorii umysłu (Sperber et al. 1995, Sperber i Wilson 2002, Wilson i Sperber 2003, Carruthers i Smith 1996), potrafimy przypisywać innym stany i intencje, dzięki czemu możemy przewidywać i tłumaczyć ich zachowanie. Według Sperbera i Wilson, w ramach modułu teorii umysłu rozwinął się wyspecjalizowany pod-moduł interpretacji zachowań komunikacyjnych.
Cognitive Principle of Relevance
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 7).
Communicative Principle of Relevance
Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 9)
Relevance-theoretic Comprehension Procedure
In searching for relevance of an ostensive stimulus, the hearer/reader uses the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, which reads
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects. Test interpretive hypotheses […] in order of accessibility; (b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 13).
Sub-tasks in the overall comprehension procedure
(a) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (in relevance-theoretic terms, EXPLICATURES) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment processes.