LECTURE 10
OBEDIENCE ENTIRE
The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to
the law of God.
But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever
called in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though
apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may reasonably
excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine-tenths
of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments that
are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. They
maintain that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that there
is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law of God; that all
Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not
one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in short, that God accepts
as virtue that which, in every instance, comes short of obedience to
His law. And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of faith, that
obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence of a change of
heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they will brand as a heretic,
or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to obey the law; and
maintain that men may be, and are pious, and eminently so, who do
not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which every one knows to be
generally held by those who are styled orthodox Christians, must
assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty, besides the moral
law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply obedience to any
law. In this discussion. I shall:
1. Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the
moral law; and,
2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this
law, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as
virtue or true religion.
There can be no rule of duty but the moral law.
Upon this proposition I remark:
(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the
law of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of
God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the
course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and
relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature and
relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But if
this is right, nothing else can be right If this course is obligatory upon
us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly
be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature and
relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or less, can be right.
If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no such truths.
(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should He
do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in His
arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can He alter it, or introduce any
other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything else
right than to love Him with all the heart, and our neighbor as
ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of
faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is
not made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from
its very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and
love or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been
said on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can
be, obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his
nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this.
Nor call any being render anything more than this obligatory Indeed,
there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law.
There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions,
and in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings us
to the consideration of the second proposition, namely:
That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral
law.
That, every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law,
will appear, if we consider:
(1.) That virtue is identical with true religion:
(2.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than
the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:
(3.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the
law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God.
"Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law" (Romans 13:10). "Though I
speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity
(love), I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And
though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and
all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove
mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow
all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be
burned, and have not charity (love), it profiteth me nothing" (1 Cor.
13:1-3). Love is repeatedly recognized in the Bible not only as
constituting true religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every
form of true religion is only a form of love or benevolence.
Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of
selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to
obedience to it.
Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and
the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ.
Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when we
come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God is
love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love, or
the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of Him and of us.
Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all holy beings.
Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only benevolence
viewed in particular relations.
Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands.
That is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense,
virtue.
A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to
God by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's
account, is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of
full or entire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow
brought men, that is, Christians, into such relations, that God really
accepts from them an imperfect obedience, something far below what
His law requires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they
render at best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less
at every moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as
can well be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct
inquiries:
(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to
disobey, the moral law at the same time?
(2.) Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present
and full obedience to the moral law?
The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding
lecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral
law cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey,
and partly disobey, at the same time. We will now attend to the
second question, namely:
Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and
full obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can He accept
anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full
obedience, or all that the law requires?
The term justification is used in two senses:
(a.) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:
(b.) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has
sinned, as if he had not sinned.
It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that
Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and accepted,
and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by coming short
of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do
not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at
every moment condemns them for present sin; but that they are
justified by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and
personally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts,
and in this sense justifies them when they are in the present
commission of an indefinite amount of sin; that grace accounts them
righteous while, in fact, they are continually sinning; that they are fully
pardoned and acquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by
coming entirely and perpetually short of the obedience which, under
the circumstances the law of God requires. While voluntarily
withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted, and the
sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the
sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he voluntarily withholds.
This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, precisely what many
hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose for discussion the
following inquiries, as of fundamental importance.
1. How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every
moment, come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be
accepted and justified?
This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully
withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how
great a part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all
our hearts, and our neighbor less than ourselves, and be accepted,
how much less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our
neighbor, will be accepted?
Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our
neighbor will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our
neighbor? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not
what is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted,
then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be
accepted. We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be
in a state of acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our
neighbor a little, and ourselves more than we love God and all our
neighbors, and yet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God
must be loved supremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme
love a loving with all the heart? But this is full and not partial
obedience; yet the latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or
is supreme love, not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree
of love than we exercise toward any other being? But how much
greater must it be? Barely a little? How are we to measure it? In
what scale are we to weigh, or by what standard are we to measure,
our love, so as to know whether we love God a little more than any
other being? But how much are we to love our neighbor, in order to
our being accepted? If we may love him a little less than ourselves,
how much less, and still be justified? These are certainly questions of
vital importance. But such questions look like trifling. Yet why should
they? If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must not
only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer. The
advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them. And if
they cannot, it is only because their theory is false. Is it possible that
their theory should be true, and yet no one be able to answer such
vital questions as these just proposed? If a partial obedience can be
accepted, it is a momentous question, how partial, or how complete
must that obedience be? I say again, that this is a question of
agonizing interest. God forbid that we should be left in the dark here.
But again,
2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which
would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do
not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which
we are forgiven?
The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this
world, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always
withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the very
act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God
and their neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services, fully
forgives and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present and
pertinacious rebellion? Receiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch!
Forgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in! Yes, this
must be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present full
obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents
God as receiving to favor a rebel who has one hand filled with
weapons against His throne.
3. But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe,
by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be
honored by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear,
and honor God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself