History of how the de jure CaliforniaRepublic lost it’s sovereignty and became a federal instrumentality functioning under federal territorial municipal law

under Martial Law Rule Under Necessity

HOW THE ONCEGREATREPUBLIC OF CALIFORNIA LOST IT’ S SOVEREIGNTY AND BECAME A FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY FUNCTIOING UNDER MARTIAL LAW RULE UNDER NECESSITY

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM -Its Purpose and Functions," S. W. Adams, uses the Federal Reserve's own published figures to give us an example of how lucrative this no risk scheme is to the Federal Reserve: The pauper (The Federal Reserve System) with assets of only $52 billion with no productive know-how, with no productions of goods, and fewer than 100,000 stockholders, loaned (?) the rich man (The United States of America) with a trillion in productive capacity and know-how with well over $600 billion in assets and 170 million stockholders, including the aforesaid 100,000 bank stockholders, $250 billion to fight World War II.

Can you imagine the greatest corporation on earth, the Government of the U. S. with 170 million alert full-of-know-how stockholders, and assets running over $600 billion, turning to a small segment of its population, with fewer than 100,000 stockholders and assets of only $52 billion to borrow money?

Can you conceive of Rockefeller saying to his chauffeur, "Tom, I am transferring my personal bank account which is well over $1 billion, to your account. You may spend it as you please; provided as often as I ask for money, you will let me have it. Of course, I will give you my note for cash I receive, and try to rustle from my children enough money to pay you interest on the borrowed money." Well, that is exactly what Congress did in 1913 when it passed the Federal Reserve Act.

To fight World War II, we gave the bankers of the United States $250 billion in U. S. Bonds that we might use our own, the Nation's credit. By using the reserve multiplier, this gave them $1 trillion 250 billion bank credit. What an unearned bonanza for the banksters! Credits are to the ankers what your deposits are to you. They can lend them, or use them to buy investments - it is cash to the bankers!

So, by adding the $250 billion in U.S. Bonds we absolutely gave to them their $1 trillion 250 billion bank credit, and we find that the bankers (the then paupers) came out of World War II $1,500 billion richer, and the (then rich man) the United States Government came out $250 billion in debt to the bankers (the paupers) thanks to the stupidity and/or venality of our Congressmen, newspapers, journals, and educated people of the nation. Clearly, by their own testimony, the Federal Reserve, as a maritime lender or insurer, not only has nothing at risk (i.e., nothing to lose in the maritime venture for profit) --but can only gain on a scale that is almost inconceivable, just like the tontine insurance schemes, and just like the George Rapp Harmony Society.

The significance of this will become very apparent when we apply the law to the fact. These same people who were given control of our public money system, for the ostensible purpose of evening out the economy, using Professor List's formula for a "National Economy", caused a recession in 1921 -- and precipitated the crash of `29 by increasing the member bank reserve requirements from 15% to 20% -- thereby forcing a huge liquidity squeeze. This set the stage for what was to follow in 1933 by way of bankrupting the treasuries of the States and Federal governments -- they could no longer pay their debts at law to the Federal Reserve -- drastic measures were obviously necessary -- we had a"National Emergency"on our hands!

In March of 1933, President Roosevelt had Congress pass an Emergency Measures Act. The text used in this act was the "Trading With The Enemies Act" of 1917 which revoked the constitutional rights of Germans and allies of Germany living in the USA. These people were forbidden to carry on trade with Germany and were subject to fines and/or imprisonment for showing any anti-USA sentiment. The Emergency Powers Act of 1933 eliminated section five of the Trading With The Enemies Act. This section exempted US citizens from the act. THUS THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES WERE PUT ON STATUS AS ENEMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

This allowed the President to rule by decree (executive order) as under marshall law rule. On April 5, 1933,President Roosevelt issued an executive order calling for the return of all gold in private hiding to the Federal Reserve by May 1 under the pain of ten years imprisonment and $10,000 fine. Hoarders were hunted and prosecuted, Attorney General Cummings declared: "I have no patience with people who follow a course that in war time would class them as slackers. If I have to make an example of some people, I'll do it cheerfully."

On May 12, 1933, the California Assembly and Senate adopted Assembly Joint Resolution No. 26. This resolution stated in part: "Whereas, it would appear that, with proper use and control of modern means of production and distribution, it would be possible for practically all persons to have and enjoy a fair share of material goods in return for services; and whereas, such use, control and appropriate economic planning are not feasible except through the direction and supervision of a single, centralized agency and the removal of certain constitutional limitations; now, therefore be it resolved by the Assembly and Senate, jointly, that the Legislature of the State of California hereby memorializes the Congress to propose an amendment to the constitution of the United States reading substantially as follows:

"The Congress and the several states, by its authority and under its control, may regulate or provide for the regulation of hours of work, compensation for work, the production of commodities and the rendition of services, in such manner as shall be necessary and proper to foster orderly production and equitable distribution, to provide ruminative work for the maximum number of persons, to promote adequate compensation for work performed, and to safeguard the economic stability and welfare of the nation;' "resolved, that the Legislature of California respectfully urges that, pending the submission and adoption of such amendment, the Congress provide for such economic planning and regulation as may be necessary and proper under present economic conditions and legally possible under the existing provisions of the Constitution;

And be if further Resolved, that the chief clerk of the Assembly is hereby instructed forthwith to transmit copies of this resolution to the President of the United States, and to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of t he House of Representatives and each of the senators and representatives from California in the Congress of the United States." May 12, 1933."

THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE FEDS. THE FEDS KNEW IT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY OFJUNE 5, 1933 ]HJR 192] AND ALL THE STATES WOULD FALL UNDER FEDERAL MARTIAL LAW RULE UNDER NECESSITY. RULE OF THE PRESIDENT

[This was finalized in California when it adopted the UCC in 1963 by creating a defacto CommercialFederalState in a once dejure Constitutional State.

If you signed a contract in a dejure state all the material facts had to be presented.

Under the UCC contracts did not have to protect the consumer. The consumer was presumed to know the law and by not stating his rights to contract, the contract was based on the consumers silence as to the terms and conditions of the contract. If the consumer didn’t claim his common law rights under the UCC for Common Law rights, then the contract was presumed to be made under territorial law [municipal law of WashingtonD.C.] bringing federal law into the states. UCC 3-603, If you remained silent the contract was presumed to be made under territorial law, and the Judge would rule in EQUITY rather than Common Law, which is what all Constitutions were written under, which protected you from third party taxing. This was your way of volunteering to use FRN’s [STATORY LAW] without understanding what you were agreeing to.

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE

CAVEOT EMPTOR

THE USE OF THE MONEY DTERMINED THE LAW

Administrative Notice of California law applicable to government waiver of sovereignty.

Official Notice Requested (West's Ann.Cal.Gov. Code (2004), § 11515)
JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUIRED (West's Ann.Cal.Evid. Code (2004), §§ 451, 453, 459).

Declarant is a competent witness over the age of 18 years, has personal knowledge of the stated facts, and does Solemnly state that:

1.a. I am a natural born, adult white Woman, one of the People of the constitutional Republic, the United States of America, and one of the People of the CaliforniaRepublic created under the Constitution of 1849.

1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney. I do not "represent" myself; of necessity, I am acting at all times within my fundamental right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (2004), Art. 1, Sec. 1 (from [as of April 23, 2004]):

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

2. I rely upon the same materials as are available to attorneys and the court at or through the local law library. I present the results of my research concerning the status of California government here.

3. The "GENERAL INTRODUCTION", by Charles J. Williams, in West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), Vol. 1. pp. XLIII-XLV, reads (in part):

A bill to enact the Uniform Commercial Code in California was introduced in the California Legislature first in 1951 and subsequently at each regular session of the Legislature in the years 1953, 1955 and 1957.
In 1960 the California Commission on UniformState Law started a drive for the adoption of the Code at the 1961 Session. ...
...
In 1962, New York adopted its version of the Code....
In August, 1962, Senate Preprint No. 7 was prepared for introduction at the 1963 legislative session....

At the 1963 Legislative Session, Senate Bill No. 118 was introduced. This bill as introduced was adopted with one minor amendment as Chapter 819, Statutes of 1963.

4. Stats. 1963, ch. 819, p. 1849 reads (in part):

An act to establish a Commercial Code, thereby consolidating and revising the law relating to certain commercial transactions in or regarding personal property and contracts and other documents concerning them, including sales, commercial paper, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, other documents of title, investment securities, and secured transactions, including certain sales of accounts, chattel paper, and contract rights; providing for public notice to third parties in certain circumstances; regulating procedure, evidence and damages in certain court actions involving such transactions, contracts or documents; to make uniform the law with respect thereto; amending certain sections of the Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, Corporations Code, Financial Code and Vehicle Code, to make them consistent therewith; adding Chapter 12.5 (commencing with Section 560) to Title 13 of Part 1 of the Penal Code, relating to crimes involving bailments; and repealing legislation inconsistent therewith.

[Approved by Governor June 8, 1963. Filed with Secretary of State June 8, 1963.]

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The Commercial Code is enacted, to read: . . .

5. Santa Clara Lawyer, V. 5, No. 1, p. 81-82 (Fall1964), "Governmental Liability for Torts of Employees - The End of Sovereign Immunity in California", James V. Arnold, reads (in part, footnotes are partially reproduced interlineally in square brackets, emphasis added):

In 1963 the California Legislature enacted the first general law dealing with the liability of governmental entities for the torts of their employees. [1 CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 810-895.8] ... It is the purpose of this article to examine those provisions of the 1963 enactment which bring to an end the doctrine of sovereign immunity in California. [4 Other bills passed in Stats. 1963 include: Chapter{s} 1715 ... 1682 ... 1683 ... 1684].

The California Supreme Court decided two cases early in 1961 which evoked an immediate reaction from the California Legislature. In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District [5 55 Cal.2d 211...] the court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would no longer protect public entities from civil liability for their torts. ...Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District [6 55 Cal.2d 224...] stated that the doctrine of discretionary immunity, which protects publicemployees from liability for their discretionary acts, might not protect public entities from liability in all situations where the employees are immune. The Legislature reacted at once, passing Chapter 1404 of the Statutes of 1961, which suspended the effect of these decisions until the ninety-first day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Legislature. For the next two years the California Law Revision Commission studied the problem of sovereign immunity. It submitted proposals to the 1963 session of the Legislature, most of which were enacted into law with minor changes. [7 4 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep., Rec. & Studies Report, at 219-222 (1963).] ...

6.a. Within six weeks after the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the California Legislature adopted Stats. 1963, Chapters 1682, 1683, 1684, and 1715, which, when read together, seem to grant sovereign immunity to the public entities the statutes create.

6.b. Stats. 1963, Ch. 1681, p., entitled (in part, emphasis added), "An act to add Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810 to Title 1 of the Government Code, ... relating to liability of public entities and public officers, servants, and employees." [Approved by Governor July 15, 1963. Filed with Secretary of State July 17, 1963.] reads (in part, emphasis added):

SECTION 1. Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) is added to Title 1 of the Government Code, to read:

810. Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, thedefinitions contained in this part govern the construction of this division.
810.2. "Employee" includes an officer, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor.
...
811.2. "Public entity" includes the State, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision orpublic corporationin the State.

811.4. "Public employee" means an employee of a public entity.
...
811.8."STATUTE" MEANS AN ACT ADOPTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THIS STATE OR BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OR A STATEWIDE INITIATIVE ACT.
...
814. Nothing in this part affects liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than money or damages against a public entity or public employee.
...
815. Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
(b) The liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.
...
815.6. Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.

6.c. Stats. 1963, Ch. 1715, p. 3369, is entitled (in part), "An act to add Part 3 (commencing with Section 900), Part 4 (commencing with Section 940) and Part 5 (commencing with Section 965), to Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code as enacted by Senate Bill No. 42 of the 1963 Regular Session, ... relating to claims, actions and judgments against public entities and public officers, employees, and servants." and reads (in part):

SECTION 1. Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) is added to Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code as enacted by Senate Bill No. 42 of the 1963 Regular Session, to read (in part):
. . .
CHAPTER 2. ACTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC ENTITIES

945. A public entity may sue and be sued.

7.a.1. The Supreme Court of California has held:

12 Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 states that the writ may be issued to any "inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person." While it has been said that counties are not municipal corporations but are political subdivisions of the state for purposes of government (County of Marin v. Superior Court (1960) 53 Cal.2d 633, 638-639, [2 Cal.Rptr. 758, 349 P.2d 526]; County of Los Angeles v. Riley (1936) 6 Cal.2d 625, 627-628 [59 P.2d 139, 106 A.L.R. 903]; County of San Mateo v. Coburn (1900) 130 Cal. 631, 636-637 [63 P.78, 621]; Pritchess v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 653, 656-657 [83 Cal.Rptr. 41], counties have also been declared public corporations or quasi-corporations. (Pritchess v. Superior Court, supra; Whelan v. Bailey (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 334, 339 [36 P.2d 709], overruled on other grounds in Estate of Miller (1936) 5 Cal.2d 588, 591 [55 P.2d 491]; Smith v. Myers (1860) 15 Cal. 33, 34; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) § 2.46, pp. 496-497.) In view of Government Code section 23003, which provides that a county is "a body corporate and public," and section 23004, subdivision (a) of the same code, which states that counties may sue and be sued, we think that a county is sufficiently corporate in character to justify the issuance of a writ of mandate to it.
People ex rel Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971), 5 Cal.3d 480, 491, fnt 12, 96 Cal.Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193.

7.a.2. The Supreme Court of the United States held:

We do not lightly reject the Court of Appeals' previous conclusion that California counties are merely part of the State itself and as such are not citizens of the State for diversity purposes.[fnt 54] But in light of both the highest state court's recent determination of the corporate character of counties and our own examination of relevant California law, we must conclude that this County has a sufficiently corporate character to dictate that it be treated as a citizen of California under our decision in Cowles v Mercer County, supra.
Thus, we hold that petitioner Moor's state law claim against the County is within diversity jurisdiction.
Moor v. County of Alameda (1973) 411 U.S. 693, 36 L.Ed.2d 596, 616, 93 S.Ct. 1785.

8.a.1. The Supreme Court of the United States has further held (emphasis added):