The Ethics of Arming the Rebels

THE ETHICS OF ARMING THE REBELS

James Pattison

I. INTRODUCTION

The arming of rebels in states where there is severe oppression, low-level conflict, or civil war is one of the most notable ways that states attempt to realise their foreign policy goals. This was particularly patent during the Arab Spring. After the uprising in Libya in 2011, various states provided lethal and nonlethal arms to the forces opposed to Gaddafi’s regime. This included material and financial support from the Libya Contact Group, as well as arms from France, Qatar, and the UK.[1] In Syria, the arming of the various parties by external actors became one of the central dynamics of the conflict. It was reported that, on the one hand, Qatar and Saudi Arabia (and others) supplied arms to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the UK and France provided it with ‘nonlethal support’, and the US and Turkey facilitated and coordinated the supply.[2] On the other hand, Russia and Iran supplied weapons such as missile systems, mortars, and rockets to the Assad regime. In 2012, the UK even secretly drew up plans to train and equip a 100,000-strong Syrian rebel army abroad, which would then strike at Assad in a manner similar to the ‘Awe’ and ‘Shock’ strikes on Iraq in 2003.[3] And, in September 2014, the US Congress approved President Obama’s plan to train and to equip ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels.[4]

There appear to be two notable attractions of arming the rebels for states, compared to undertaking direct military action. First, it is often far less costly for the sending state, both in terms of the lives of military personnel and financial resources.[5] In short, sending arms rather than troops does not risk soldiers coming home in body bags. Soldiers also do not have to be transported to the conflict zone and then sustained with military and financial resources. To that extent, arming the rebels has been characterised as ‘intervention-lite’.[6] Second, arming the rebels can more easily be carried out covertly, that is, out of the public gaze and without the widespread knowledge of the international community. The upshot is that states have often supplied arms to rebels, most infamously under the Reagan Doctrine. Notorious examples include the US arming, training, and financing of the Nicaraguan Contras against the Sandinista government (including the covert funding of the Contras without Congressional Approval in the ‘Iran-Contra Affair’); the British arming, in contravention of a UN arms embargo, of Sierra Leone through Sandline, a UK-based private military and security company (the ‘Arms-to-Africa Affair’); and Russian supplying of arms to various pro-Russian separatist rebels in former Soviet states (e.g. Ukraine). There have also been numerous cases of the arming of rebels in potentially more morally justifiable cases. These include the supply of arms by the US and Islamic groups to the Bosnian Muslims during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet and Cuban military support for anti-apartheid forces in South Africa.

Despite the centrality of the arming of rebels as a foreign policy option, there is very little, if any, detailed engagement with the ethical issues surrounding this option.[7] There is a growing literature on the ethical issues surrounding civil wars and, more specifically, the conditions for engaging in just rebellion.[8] The focus of this literature, however, is largely on the question of the justifiability of the rebelsengaging in civil war and their conduct when doing so, rather than the permissibility of the arming of rebels by other agents.

This article therefore considers the ethics of arming the rebels. Overall, it argues that arming the rebels should be generally eschewed, but may be occasionally morally permissible. More specifically, the article seeks to establish that arming the rebels is (a) exceptionally morally permissible, even when the rebels are engaged in unjust wars, but (b) generally impermissible. The former, far more permissive claim will be established in the first part of the article. The latter, more restrictive claim will be established in the second part of the article.

Before beginning, some clarifications are necessary. First, by ‘arming’ rebels, I mean the provision of military equipment to rebels. There may be different issues when states train and finance rebels, but space precludes considering these. In addition, I will consider not simply the supply of small arms, but also the supply of major conventional weapons, such as aircraft, missile systems, and artillery, which are often used during civil wars.

Second, by ‘rebels’ I mean those who are in armed opposition to their established government and possess political objectives. These objectives may be to supplant the current government (such as the various uprisings during the Arab Spring) or to secede from their state (such as the Kosovo Liberation Army’s attempt to secede from the former Yugoslavia). Other objectives, which all take the form of resisting or challenging the government, include securing a (potentially greater) role in a power-sharing agreement, achieving changes in particular government policy, and improving the human rights situation (such as the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico). Accordingly, rebels may sometimes seek self-determination, but this is not a necessary feature of rebellion. Rebels may, for instance, attempt to secure their or others’ protection against threats, improve their states’ compliance with international human rights standards, promote their material self-interest, or simply gain power. I will not consider, however, arming rebels in cases of foreign occupation. Resisting foreign occupation is best seen as a war of liberation, rather than rebellion, given that those resisting are not opposing the established, national government.[9]

II. THE EXCEPTIONAL PERMISSIBILITY OF ARMING REBELS

In this section, I will focus on the exceptional permissibility of arming the rebels. I will argue that it is currently feasible that there are instances where arming rebels is permissible. This position can be contrasted with a contingent pacifism (of arming the rebels), which generally holds that “the possibility of a just war is conceded but not under present circumstances”.[10]

The right to rebel

Why might it be exceptionally justifiable to arm rebels? Most straightforwardly, the rebels may be engaged in a justifiable enterprise—that is, a just rebellion—and providing them with arms may enable them to be successful in this enterprise. To put this another way, the rebels may possess the right to rebel and arming the rebels may help them to realise this right.[11]

Against a right to rebel, however, it might be claimed that permitting the taking up of arms by rebels could lead to severe instability. One worry in this regard is that various rebels will engage in numerous insurrections in response to both just and unjust causes, with the result of many bloody civil wars. In addition, it might be claimed that, even when fighting for genuinely just causes, rebellions are often unlikely to succeed given the frequently superior resources of states. Instead, they result in an even worse situation for the suffering population as repressive governments crack down on groups seen as supporting the rebels (such as the response by the Assad regime to the uprising in 2011) and there may be a subsequent spiral of violence. On this reasoning, then, the state should always retain the monopoly on the authorisation of force in order to maintain the status quo; a right to rebel is too dangerous.

However, these concerns do not foreclose the occasional permissibility of rebellion. What they point to, rather, is the need for the rebellion to meet several exacting conditions. This is so that these concerns become redundant or are reduced and therefore can be outweighed by the potential benefits of a rebellion.Thus, I will now offer a brief outline of the conditions that govern the right to rebel.[12]

To start with, the rebellion needs to be proportionate—it needs to be likely to do more good than harm. This should be measured according to the likely effects of the rebellion on the enjoyment of individual basic human rights, compared to the counterfactual of no rebellion.[13]Rebellions that are likely to lead to an even worse situation in terms of the enjoyment of basic human rights should not be launched, such as if there is likely to be severe instability in the region or a very harsh governmentalattack on innocent civilians in reply.

As in cases of humanitarian intervention, the likely positive effect on several individuals’ basic human rights is what provides the justification for rebellion. For instance, rebellion may overthrow a brutal dictator that is killing thousands of his or her population; the effect of the rebellion on the enjoyment of human rights within this state is what renders it permissible. However, rebellion should not be undertaken in response to more minor cases of oppression. This is because considerations of proportionality provide reasonto hold high the bar for just cause.[14] That is to say, rebellion is generally permissible only in response to situations where there is ongoing or impending large-scale violation of basic human rights and the government is unable or unwilling to protect the threatened population. As Allen Buchanan notes, “[r]evolution is highly risky business, not to be undertaken except in extreme cases of bad government and strong evidence that the government is not liable to reform”.[15]Accordingly, the bar for just cause should be high because of the various risks of rebellion, such as the potential for rebellion to lead to backlashes against the population noted above, as well as unintended innocent casualties and damage to vital infrastructure. The rebels need to be responding to a situation in which they have the opportunity to do enough good—i.e. tackling or reducing the ongoing or impending large-scale violation of basic human rights—to outweigh the harm that the rebellion is likely to cause.[16]

It also matters that the rebels do not simply fight in order to promote their own self-interest, such as to secure power and financial interest. Rather, they need to intend to advance the ends of justice and, more specifically, be predominately motivated by the aim of promoting the enjoyment of basic human rights.[17] This aim may take several forms, such as to secede, overthrow the government, secure a power-sharing agreement, or simply decrease the extent of the governmental oppression.

To what degree do the rebels need to represent those whom they are trying to protect? As Buchanan argues, the rebels need not be fully legitimate—that is, democratically organised with clear lines of representation to those whom they are attempting to assist—because the chaos of civil wars means that this is difficult to achieve.[18] This is further exacerbated by the fact that rebels often lack sufficient political and economic means when they launch their rebellion to put in place such as system. When more formal systems of representation are not feasible, the rebels should neverthelessattempt to represent the views of those affected. They should look to other, perhaps less accurate determinants of their views, such as by speaking to local leaders and civilians on a more ad hoc basis, and estimating what the local population would request if asked. When doing so, the rebels should not simply consider locals’ opinions on whether there should be rebellion, but also on how the rebellion is conducted. This is important since the local population may support a rebellion, but oppose a particular tactic, such as rebels’ non-wearing of uniforms that exposes the civilians to greater risks. The need for rebels to be representative stemsfrom the potential, first, for a government backlash on the civilian population that the rebels are supposedly representing (and other, innocent bystanders) and, second, that the civilian population may be more pacifistic or not want in insurrection to be carried out in their name. As such, their views should be respected, first, because they may face significant burdens and, second, because of the anti-paternalist value of individuals having autonomy over the major decisions that affect them.[19]

Two additional conditions are worth briefly noting. First, the rebels need to respect the principles of jus in bello, such as by intending to use force against only those who are morally culpable and minimising any incidental harms to innocents. Second, the rebels need to use force as a last resort. This can be understood in this context as a general presumption against launching the rebellion and in favour of pursuing alternative means first that are less likely to directly harm innocents, such as the various other forms of civil disobedience, such as nonviolent protest.

When a rebellion meets these conditions, it will be justifiable and states do not retain the legitimate monopoly on the authorisation of force. The potential negative effects of rebellion will be not relevant or will be outweighed by the rebellion’s effect on the enjoyment of basic human rights. Thus, just as the worries surrounding the potential negative effects of inter-state war are widely not thought to not foreclose fully the permissibility of waging justifiable inter-state wars (such as NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Libya), so too the worries surrounding the potential negative effects of rebellions do not foreclose fully the permissibility waging justifiable intra-state wars (such as the rebellion in Libya). What matter is that rebellion meets the relevant conditions and, in doing so, does more good than harm.

The right to arm rebels

Having argued that there may be a right to rebel, let us now consider the right to arm the rebels. What justifies the (exceptional) right to arm the rebels is, similarly, the threat to the enjoyment of basic human rights. Arming rebel groups that leads to significant improvements in the enjoyment of basic human rights may be justifiable. Most clearly, this improvement could be achieved by assisting just rebels to achieve their aims, such as by helping rebels to overthrow an oppressive regime, secede from a repressive majority, or reduce the extent of government repression. (In addition, I will argue below that arming the rebels could improve the enjoyment of basic human rights even when the rebels are pursuing an unjust war.)

The import of maintaining state sovereignty, as traditionally conceived, does not provide sufficient reason to preclude the permissibility of arming rebels on occasion. To be sure, there are reasons to maintain generally principles of nonintervention in order to reduce international instability, which can undermine the enjoyment of basic human rights. Nevertheless, one of the central, and largely uncontroversial, claims of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine is that sovereignty implies responsibility for its population; if a state is manifestly failing to protect its population from mass atrocities, then the international community has a remedial responsibility to protect this population. As a corollary, humanitarian intervention is widely thought to be sometimes morally permissible—and even sometimes morally obligatory—because of the potential for intervention to do more good than harm, despite the various risks that humanitarian intervention poses to international instability and its seeming contravention of the principle of nonintervention. The same is true of arming the rebels: when understood as responsibility,sovereignty is not a bar to arming rebels if the state in question is manifestly failing to protect its population from mass atrocities. Worries about the effects of the violation of the principle of nonintervention by arming rebels may be outweighed. Arming the rebels may not lead to much international instability, may in fact improve stability by helping to put in place a more stable regime, or enable the rebels to achieve sufficient good (e.g. by tackling the mass violation of basic human rights) that outweighs any harms caused by international instability

Indeed, the case for arming the rebels is somewhat analogous to the case for humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention sometimes bolsters a particular side, albeit with the ultimate, predominant aim of improving the enjoyment of basic human rights in the affected political community. Bolstering a particular side, such as in the case of the 2011 intervention in support of the Libyan rebels, may be the best way of achieving the enjoyment of basic human rights. My point, then, is that, if one supports the permissibility of humanitarian intervention, which may require intervening in support of a particular side, thenthere exists a prima facie case for arming the rebels. Arming the rebels is simply another means by which those fighting for justice may be bolstered.

As for humanitarian intervention, there will need to be various conditions on the permissibility of arming rebels. I will not flesh out all the conditions for the permissibility of arming the rebels in detail here. They are similar to the well-rehearsed criteria found in the standard just war lists of criteria for engaging in humanitarian intervention, as well as the conditions for just rebellion outlined above. They include, most notably, just cause (rebels must be supplied arms only in response to situations of the ongoing or impending mass violation of basic human rights) and proportionality (arming the rebels must do more good than harm).