Case 1: ROBIN HOOD
This case is a fun vehicle for introducing the basic concepts of business strategy and structure, and relationships between values and strategy. It should be used early in a business policy course—perhaps even on the first day, for it can easily be read and analyzed in class. It allows the professor to begin the class—and the course—with a discussion orientation yet obtain rather complete closure on complex organizational issues: how to manage growth in size and how to cope with an increasingly hostile environment.
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Case 2: astral records, LTD., NORTH AMERICA
This case gives a good flavor of the challenges in acting as general manager, in particular when one is new to the job. The case explores the “parachuting in” of Sarah Conner, a venture-capitalist (BLL, 60% owner of Astral) employee, to take over the running of Astral (North America) following the sudden death of its long-time president (Maxwell). Astral is mostly a manufacturer of CD records for other labels, though Maxwell has expanded its own recording business (10% of revenues) across a range of musical genres. Astral has established a name for quality and innovation, but generally-available technology has become so reliable that quality no longer really serves as a differentiator in the industry.
Conner, though young, has a good music background and several years operating experience at BLL, where she has risen fast. Unsurprisingly, she faces a stack of issues calling for her attention at Astral (see the various Case exhibits). Given the high involvement and sudden departure of Maxwell, not least among these issues for Conner will be getting Astral employees to assume more decision-making power, while she comes to grips with the business. This will involve trying to quickly plumb the motives and ability of the various influential individuals (e.g., Alexander, Exhibit 2).
In such a situation, Conner should likely maintain certain symbolic roles played by Maxwell, especially those that served to communicate with employees (e.g., the “high teas”, as indicated in the case exhibits). Other aspects of his schedule should be chosen more judiciously—Conner should be careful in assuming she can simply “show up”, as some of these events will require background knowledge. Moreover, she will also want to begin to put her own stamp on things. In particular, she will need to negotiate a relationship with Count Smirnov, Astral’s founder who, as Case Exhibit 4 indicates, may be overbearing. Other more narrowly operational matters demanding her attention include the resin supplier and the interview with Billboard magazine: Exhibits 7 and 8 respectively. The resin is an especially pressing matter and indicates the importance of prioritizing issues to be dealt with.
Astral Records
Case 3: Macarthur and the Philippines
Overview
This case offers an excellent opportunity to integrate three aspects of the strategy formulation and formation process. It deals with the strategists themselves, dominantly MacArthur and Roosevelt. There are definite aspects of strategy formulation. However, the famous island hopping strategy actually emerges from a series of decisions and interplays between various powerful forces. Hence, the case allows one to raise the key issues of power and politics in strategy. The case deals with the way in which the most spectacular strategy of World War II, island hopping in the Pacific, was simultaneously developed and implemented.
It allows the professor to bring out many of the classic principles of strategy as they emerge from the military/diplomatic field and suggests how they can be used to evaluate strategies. Executive audiences find this case very powerful. They tend to empathize with the kind of thinking that goes into strategies on this scale and see the business utility of military strategy concepts. The case, based on William Manchester’s book, American Caesar, debunks many of the myths about MacArthur, offering a further opportunity to query students or executives about their own perception screens concerning MacArthur as a leader. Their initial views are often distorted by myths, misinformation, hearsay, etc. The case goes well with readings on the strategist, strategy formulation, strategy formation, power, bureaucratic strategies, and evaluation of strategies.
Session Structure
We usually begin this session by asking the students to define in their own words what the Allies’ strategy was in World War II. This allows the professor to introduce different levels of strategy: global grand strategy, U.S. political strategy, and the Pacific campaign strategy. The Allies’ global strategy was to first concentrate on what was the greatest perceived threat, Nazi Germany, and destroy that force. In the meantime, sufficient forces were deployed to Southeast Asia to “contain” the Japanese threat. Then, after the defeat of Germany, all forces were to be concentrated in the Pacific area to finish off Japan. The Allies hoped to form a more stable post-war world based upon more democratic governments in all of the areas conquered by Germany and Japan. The conflict in goals between the Western Allies and Russia—and the need to compromise goals and strategic thrusts to accommodate these differences—can be brought out in the discussion, as can the trade needs and aspirations of each party in the post-war world. This provides a broad framework for the overall Pacific campaign strategy.
However, it is also worthwhile to note the dominant influence of U.S. political strategies—especially the need for Roosevelt to be re-elected and the fear that MacArthur’s popularity would make him an overwhelming opponent in such an election. The visions and conflicts of Roosevelt, MacArthur, Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff may also provide an interesting focal point. This level of strategy can be brought out as an adjunct to the discussion of the Pacific campaign strategy, if so desired.
Defining Strategy Itself
Rather than providing a canned definition of strategy, it is useful to have the students define in their own words what the strategy in the South Pacific really was. As the description comes forward it will contain several major goals, i.e., to capture a series of key islands as stepping stones; free the Philippines to avoid being flanked in any attack on the main Japanese islands; neutralize the Japanese fleet by a steady war of attrition; control the air above all major military action areas; cut off the supply lines of the Japanese in the south, capture weak areas and use these to sortie against the Japanese supply lines; obtain bridgeheads close enough to the Japanese mainland to launch a full-scale bombing attack; weaken Japan's production capabilities so that an invasion could occur; and obtain unconditional surrender.
A series of major policies (rules or limits) will also tend to fall out of the discussion. Chief among these policies are: concede the Asian land mass to the Japanese; bypass the Japanese great strengths on the mainland and in their own most fortified island strong points; avoid massive frontal attacks; move rapidly to avoid exposure during movement; sacrifice materiel not men; utilize the overwhelming production capabilities of the United States to produce materiel; never leave air cover unless absolutely necessary; form coalitions with liberated governments in order to avoid having to leave strong occupation forces behind; and so on.
Finally, there is a rather distinct sequence, which develops in the strategy. This sequence includes delaying the Japanese advance during an initial fall back to gain time enough to bring superior air and naval forces to bear; regroup using Australia as a base and begin moving north, bypassing Japan's concentration of strength on the mainland; stop the Japanese advance at sea; capture a few key islands; cut the supply lines of the Japanese; starve and isolate the remaining troops; create forward bases at the Philippines and at Okinawa nearer to Japan; soften up Japan through bombing; obtain a Russian coalition to force Japan to fight on two flanks; invade Japan; achieve total victory; and be magnanimous in victory.
Sources of This Strategy
One can ask what were the determinants of this strategy? Clearly, the U.S. value system influences many choices, notably the belief in the value of human life; the capacity to squander material resources; the belief in the superiority of the U.S. cause; the confident outlook of U.S. leaders; etc. Next, of course, are the leaders' (Roosevelt's and MacArthur’s) own values and power needs as highly charismatic leaders. MacArthur had seen the dreadful waste of life in the stalemated trench warfare of World War I and was determined to avoid such a situation in the Pacific. He felt a moral obligation to return to the Philippines and liberate them. He was knowledgeable about the Japanese situation and felt he could make more sensible choices than those leaders isolated from the Far East. Political needs clearly determined the strategy. Roosevelt and MacArthur both constantly balanced the amount of action given to the different services, making sure each had a high enough profile role to maintain their morale and political support. Roosevelt needed to show concrete progress before an election. MacArthur had to deal with the realpolitik in the United States. MacArthur undoubtedly saw himself as a political candidate for the presidency and worked his public relations skills to maintain a high profile. This also allowed him flexibility for action in the field. MacArthur also understood his opponents’ political situation in Japan and was able to modify the overall strategy to accommodate this, moving rapidly and flexibly at the end of the war to save lives and resources on both sides. Politics and strategy are intimately intertwined.
Situation Analysis—Strengths and Weaknesses
Beyond these more qualitative points, one can analyze the relative strengths and capabilities of the Japanese vs. the United States. The key weaknesses of Japan were its necessity to import all raw materials; the sheer number of people in the combined armies of the Allies; the extensive land mass Japan was trying to control with a relatively small army; their less extensive and more vulnerable production facilities; their inability to modernize their aircraft and ships as rapidly as the United States; the fact that the United States could read all of the Japanese codes and know their major alignments; etc. The strengths of the Japanese situation lay in their control of extensive areas with key resources (like tin and rubber); their highly disciplined culture and armies; their experienced field commanders; the attacker’s advantage of surprise; some excellent equipment designs; the population intensity and loyalty of its citizens if Japan itself were attacked; a number of forward bases from which to attack to the South and East; and so on.
The Allies aligned their strategies much more carefully to the opportunities the post-war world offered in former colonial countries. The Allies for the most part very carefully targeted their propaganda and political approaches to the most important emerging trends in the worldwide political scene. Chief among these were the emergence of nationalism, anti-colonialism, a deep resentment of the cruelties of the Japanese, the disintegration of the European economic dominance, empires, and colonial “special concessions" or areas of influence in the Far East. The United States in particular recognized the emergence of Russia as a dominating world power, the importance of high technologies (air, chemical, and nuclear) to nations with small manpower bases, the importance of developing countries as sources of raw materials and as possible future markets, the need to neutralize possible communist expansion, etc.
It is very useful to show how the strategy was influenced by the dominating perceptions of these various factors in the United States at the time. A most significant weakness of the strategy was the failure to see the people of emerging countries and their political needs as coequal with those of the Western nations. Perhaps most poignant was the willingness of the United States and the Allies to write off China as a desirable focal point for direct military or political energies. Instead, China was handled through a weak coalition partner, not having a strong popular base, and the U.N. was conceived as a bastion for maintaining existing power arrangements in the post-war world.
Evaluation of the Strategy
After describing the strategy and classifying its components in a fashion, which helps the professor, develop his or her particular view of strategy, it is desirable to ask, “Why was this an effective strategy? What are the characteristics of an effective strategy? What can we learn by looking at this most successful strategy of World War II?” Perhaps the following are the things that stand out most strikingly:
A.U.S. leaders had a relatively clear vision of the post-war world they wished to achieve and the role of the United States in that world.
B.The goals of the strategy were clear and decisive.
C.There was a careful evaluation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
contending parties.
D.There was a careful and constant evaluation of the enemy's changing potentials and its leaders’ intentions.
E.The United States extended its own resource capabilities by forming coalitions with China, the occupied countries, and the other Allies.
F.The strategy was based on the careful use of intelligence derived from reading the
Japanese codes, local native guerrillas, and formal intelligence gathering bodies.
G.Much attention was paid to the full logistics (oil, ammunition, food, etc.) necessary to support the advance.
H.Careful attention was given to the motivation and morale of the troops and supporting groups in Japanese-occupied countries.
I.When the organization was unified, the results were much more effective; however,
unification of command was not always achieved.
J.Communications among the services and the Allies were a constant challenge. While it worked amazingly well between the Allied countries, this aspect of the strategy was not always well carried out between the U.S. services themselves.
K.The strategy used the overwhelming U.S. strengths of its undiminished production base, its constantly strengthened Navy, its capacity to out-produce Japan's aircraft industry, its better command of high technologies, the capacity for mobile fast striking forces, independent action, etc.
L.Strategy offset weaknesses of the United States, particularly in numbers of troops, which could be committed in the Southeast Asian sector.
M.The strategy used surprise and speed of movement to leverage resources and obtain
higher impact with limited resources.
N.The strategy protected the flanks of the advance, thus avoiding the Japanese cutting off the supply lines of the United States.
O.The strategy attacked the weaknesses of Japan (i.e., places where there was local
guerrilla activity, command or small garrisons, etc).
P.The strategy used minimum resources (particularly human lives) to achieve its goals.
Q.The strategy was internally flexible to changes in the environment, notably in its
decisions concerning the attacks on Formosa and Luzon.
R.The urgencies of timing were constantly kept in mind (both at the political level and in the need to arrive at the Philippines before the Japanese could reinforce them).
S.Concentration of overwhelming resources at chosen points (the 700 ship Armada was the largest ever assembled in the Far East).
T.The use of synergy (i.e., the additive effects of air, land, and sea forces when
coordinated).
U.The strategists anticipated the opponents’ moves. MacArthur worked back and forth in his own mind the various “what if” contingency plans until he had thought through all major alternatives.
V.The strategy split opponents’ strengths and enabled the Allies to attack key points
piecemeal.
W.The Allies were able to maintain the initiative and thus leverage their own resources by making the Japanese respond at points selected by the Allies.
The main weaknesses of the strategy were:
A.Key leaders did not really understand their opponents.
B.There were misassessments of various environments (the weather and soil conditions in the Philippines).
C.There were communications breakdowns especially in the Navy's handling of the battle of Luzon and the Surigao Straits.
D.There were intelligence failures in understanding the internal collapse of Japan's military and economy.
E.Periodically, the Allies would attack strong positions unnecessarily (e.g., Buna and
Okinawa).
F.Because of MacArthur’s ego needs, he sometimes announced victories prematurely or misassessed the situation.
G.MacArthur periodically exceeded his authority—which could have been disastrous if a failure had occurred.