Tate/Gannon/Fisher/Lee Advantage Answers Toolbox

Northwestern Debate Institute 20101

Tate/Gannon/Fisher/LeeAdvantage Answers Toolbox

***SOUTH KOREA***

1NC NK Aggression Adv.

Ext – US Presence Solves War

Ext - Unification Good

Ext - North Korea Not Aggressive

1NC Demining Adv.

1NC Demining Adv. - Impact Turn

1NC Demining Adv. – Impact Turn

Ext - North Korean Conflict Destroy Econ.

Topicality - South Korea Demining

1NC Prostitution Adv.

Ext - Status Quo Solves

1NC South Korea Economy Adv.

Ext – Status quo Solves

Ext – China Solves

Link - W/Drawal = SK/China Alliance

***TURKEY***

1NC TURKEY ADV FRONTLINE – US/TURKEY RELATIONS

US/TURKEY RELATIONS EXTS - #1 – ALTERNATE CAUSALITIES

1NC Turkey Adv Frontline – Turkey/Iran Relations

Turkey/Iran Relations Exts – #1 economy

Turkey/Iran Relations Exts – #1 oil

Turkey/Iran Relations Exts – #1 refugees

Turkey/Iran Relations Exts – #1 construction

Turkey/Iran Relations – Turk Nuke Turn

Turkey/Iran Relations Nuke Turn - #1 exts.

Turkey/Iran Relations Nuke Turn - NPT

Turkey/Iran Relations Nuke Turn - NATO

Turkey/Iran Relations Nuke Turn - EU

Turkey/Iran Relations Turkish People Turn

Turkey/Iran Relations People Turn – exts

***aFGHANISTAN***

1NC AFGHANISTAN ADV FRONTLINE – OPIUM

OPIUM EXTS - #1 - STATUS QUO SOLVING……………………………………………………………………………………...41

OPIUM EXTS - #1 – STATUS QUO SOLVING

OPIUM EXTS - #2 – FARMING INEVITABLE

OPIUM EXTS - #3 – NO TALIBAN FUNDING

OPIUM EXTS - #4 – POVERTY

1NC AFGHANISTAN ADV FRONTLINE – HUMAN RIGHTS

HUMAN RIGHTS EXTS - #1 – US NOT EFFECTIVE SIGNAL

1NC AFGHANISTAN ADV FRONTLINE - SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

SCO COOPERATION EXTS - #1 – COOPERATION NOW

***IRAQ***

1NC IRAQ ADV FRONTLINE – HEG/OVERSTRETCH

HEG/OVERSTRETCH EXTS - #1 – REGIONAL POWER VACUUM

HEG/OVERSTRETCH EXTS - #3 – IRAN AGGRESSION

1NC IRAQ PMC ADV FRONTLINE – IRAQ INSTABILITY

PMC IRAQ INSTABILITY EXTS - #3 – PMCs PREFERABLE

PMC IRAQ INSTABILITY EXTS – EXTS #3 - PMCs PREFERABLE

PMC IRAQ INSTABILITY EXTS - #4 – PMCs INEVITABLE

1NC Iraq Advantage Frontline – Green Energy transition

1NC IRAQ ADVANTAGE FRONTLINE – GREEN ENERGY

1NC IRAQ ADV FRONTLINE – GREEN ENERGY

GREEN ENERGY EXTS - #1 – US NOT DEPENDENT

GREEN ENERGY EXTS - #4 – IRAQI ECONOMY TURN

GREEN ENERGY EXTS - #6 - ENVIRONMENT TURNS

Green Energy Exts: AT: Resource Wars – Oil

***japan***

1NC Japan Environment Adv

Ext - Environmental decline inevitable

1NC Japan Rape/Crime Adv.

1NC US-Japan Security Alliance Adv.

1NC Japan Missile Defense Adv. 1/5

1NC Japan Missile Defense Adv. 2/5

1NC Japan Missile Defense Adv. 3/5

1NC Japan Missile Defense Adv. 4/5

1NC Japan Missile Defense Adv. 5/5

Ext - Missile Defense Good

Ext – Status Quo Solves

Ext – Impacts Non-Unique

1NC JASA Adv.

Ext – China hates JASA

Ext – Alt Cause

Ext – SQ solves

Ext – No Impact

1NC Japan Econ Adv.

Ext – Base Key to Okinawa Econ

Ext – Econ Collapse Inev

Link - North Korea Aggression

Politics Link

***kuwait***

1NC KUWAIT ADVANTAGE FRONTLINE – OVERSTRETCH

1NC KUWAIT ADVANTAGE – WESTERN IMPERIALISM

1NC KUWAIT ADV FRONTLINE – WESTERN IMPERIALISM

IMPERIALISM EXTS - #2 – GULF WAR INTERVENTION JUSTIFIED

1NC KUWAIT ADVANTAGE FRONTLINE – IRAQ WAR BAD

IRAQ WAR BAD EXTS - #1 – TURKEY KEY

1NC NK Aggression Adv.

US military presence in South Korea deters North Korean aggression

Jackson, Major, United States Air Force Director of Operations 5th Reconnaissance Squadron Osan AB, Republic of Korea, 10/9/2008

Although experts believe Korea will eventually unite into a formidable regional power, the peninsula seems likely to stay politically divided for some time. A more stable relationship between North and South Korea suits the short term interests of the international economy. Peace on the peninsula, no matter what form it takes, relieves some of the tension in the region and allows the economic markets to continue their unprecedented growth. Under the umbrella of U.S. diplomatic agreements and security promises, North and South can participate in a constructive dialogue that is beneficial for both nations. In the broader scheme of international relations, the Korean conflict can only be resolved through inter-Korean cooperation. In order to facilitate a North-South normalization process, North Korea must maintain some semblance of a viable nation-state. North Korea's future in the short term depends on whether Pyongyang can achieve a degree of international recognition. Mimicking the unification rhetoric, Pyongyang finds itself in a position to obtain economic assistance long enough to stabilize its failing regime, a condition essential to maintaining the current peninsula balance of power. Establishing economic ties with non-communists nations, similar to the Chinese model, offers Pyongyang the benefits of foreign capital investment, technology exchange, and exportation of weapons technology, critical to obtaining needed revenues and rebuilding the DPRK's economy. An important criterion to prepare the way for normalization is the success of Kim JongIl's political and economic reforms. Without some type of reform, it is doubtful that the regime could survive the concessions the international community would demand in payment for recognition. The essential ingredient for maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is the "deterrent value" of combined U.S.-ROK forces. "This deterrent value of United States and South Korean military forces has maintained the peace on the Korean Peninsula for four decades and continues to maintain it today."(10) Without U.S. forces and the promise of an immediate retaliatory response to North Korean aggression, the ROK leadership would be reluctant to rely on DPRK compliance to any North-South agreement. Currently, North Korea is presenting itself to the international community as a cooperative and rational player in the peace process. Political maneuvering like the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Framework Agreement on nuclear programs makes it appear to the world that Pyongyang is moving toward normalization of relations with Japan and South Korea. However, with the recent events of failing communist regimes in Eastern Europe as an indicator, the leadership in Pyongyang has limited choices to secure their position on the peninsula. If Pyongyang rejects a North-South cooperative strategy, the DPRK will be condemned to continued isolation and economic hardship. Further international isolation will increase the pressure on an already crippled nation to the point of collapse, forcing Kim JongIl's hand. The result would most likely be the worst-case scenario: an immediate and violent response.

Reduction of troops from South Korea destroys US credibility and bolsters North Koreas Nuclear program

Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project, June 8, 2004

Jon Wolfsthal , “US Troop Reductions Risk War in Korea,”

The security situation in Iraq is bad and continues to worsen. While the recent appointment of interim leaders in Iraq is a positive political step,it is increasingly clear that the United States has mismanaged its occupation of Iraq and that the prolonged post-war chaos shows no signs of improving any time soon. The need for additional US troops in Iraq has become so acute that the United States has announced the reduction and transfer of US troops from South Korea to Iraq.While the realignment of US forces in South Korea has been a joint goal for the US and the Republic of Korea for several years, the timing and decision to redeploy those troop directly to Iraq sends the wrong signal to US allies and enemies in the region and raises questions about the willingness of the US to stand by its friends in East Asia. In fact, the US should be looking to increase its military capabilities in the region, not reduce them.The decision to move 3,600 support troops out of South Korea does not directly affect the ability of the United States to help defend South Korea from any attack by the North. Moreover, it is not clear that the troops add any significant capability to US forces in Iraq. By some estimates, many tens of thousands of additional troops are needed in Iraq to secure cities and borders with neighboring countries. But the symbolism is clear around the world - the US is in trouble in Iraq and appears to be scavenging troops from anywhere and everywhere to bolster its position in the Middle East. If troops had to be removed from South Korea, they should have been rotated back to the United States or better yet on temporary assignment to Japan. The events in Iraq, however, are not the only reason the timing of this move was a mistake. The continued progress of North Korea' nuclear program that may now include up to 9 nuclear weapons has influenced the way the troop realignment may be seen on Pyongyang and elsewhere. While it is always difficult to understand North Korean perceptions, it is possible that Pyongyang will interpret the US troop move as a sign of weakness and further embolden Kim JongIl to advance his nuclear program as a way of encouraging further US military reductions. The current US administration has approach on North Korea's nuclear program has failed. Pyongyang's capabilities have increased in the 3 plus years this administration has been in office with no real progress in site. It is time to face the increasingly realistic possibility that North Korea may never give up its nuclear program -or may never be offered a deal attractive enough to tempt it to do so. The United States, South Korea, Japan and China must quickly begin to make adjustments in its political and military positions to ensure that North Korea is deterred from taking any provocative military action and that the alliances between the ROK, Japan and the United States are reinforced. To ensure the future credibility of US security commitments to both South Korea and Japan, the United States should consider increasing, not decreasing, the level of troops in the region as well as continuing to enhance regional military capabilities. This would send a clear signal to North Korea that its continued nuclear efforts are worsening its security situation, while reassuring US allies that Washington remains committed to their protection. Lastly, it is time for the United States to communicate a new set of messages or red lines to North Korea, including what North Korean moves the US would consider so dangerous as to warrant military action. Among these are any attempt by North Korea to export any nuclear materials and any moves to conduct a nuclear weapons test. Most importantly, the US should make it clear to Pyongyang that any signs that North Korea is preparing to launch a long-range ballistic missile would be interpreted as possible preparation for a nuclear attack against the United States or one of its allies.

Ext – US Presence Solves War

United States military maintains peace throughout Korean Peninsula

Jackson, Major, United States Air Force Director of Operations 5th Reconnaissance Squadron Osan AB, Republic of Korea, 10/9/2008

There is widespread resistance in nations throughout the world to incurring large costs, military or otherwise, to deal with threats that do not seem immediately serious to vital national interests (an understandable position considering that nations act to ensure their own security). Henry Kissinger asserts that a vital national interest is "a change in the international environment so likely to undermine the national security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears."(7) Relating Kissinger's definition of vital national interest to U.S. East-Asian security strategy, the uncertainty of a change in the political environment in Korea is likely to undermine the security of the Asia-Pacific region which is a direct threat to America's national security. Viewpoints vary, but the general consensus of national security analysts is that the stability of the East-Asian littoral and western Pacific region is linked to a strong U.S. military presence which discourages rivalries from escalating or a single power with regional hegemonic desires from asserting itself. Notwithstanding a more vibrant multilateral and regional security architecture through collective security arrangements, an important role remains for the armed forces of the United States forward deployed in Korea. Today, the DPRK is in the midst of a political, economic, and military decline with little expectation of recovery. North Korea's deteriorating situation threatens the peace and stability of the peninsula with the promise of an uncertain future. The North's unremitting decline provides the conditions for three possible geopolitical scenarios to emerge, each posing a different set of challenges for U.S. strategists: reunification of the Korean peninsula; a more stable relationship between the two nation-states; or resumption of the Korean War.(8) Forward deployed forces in Korea ensure a rapid and flexible response capability and enhance America's ability to influence events across the spectrum of confrontation.

US military presence in South Korea prevents any threat of North Korean attack

Scobell, Dr Andrew Scobell is an associate research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and adjunct professor of political science, Sanford, U.S. Navy Captain, 2007

Andrew Scobell and John M Sanford, “North Korea’s Military THREAT: PYONGYANG’S CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, and BALLISTIC MISSILES,”

Over the past 2 decades, due largely to economic decline and lack of financial resources, as well as force improvements and urban build-up in South Korea and the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, North Korea’s conventional forces have become weaker, relative to those of South Korea and the United States. As a result, any North Korean option to invade South Korea has become less credible.5 While causing tremendous damage, a North Korean attack on South Korea would most likely be defeated by a U.S.–South Korean counterattack. Nonetheless, the credibility of North Korea’s conventional military forces remains largely intact in terms of their potential to defend the state and to inflict substantial damage on South Korea—especially Seoul—which remains hostage to North Korea’s artillery massed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).6By the same token, options for U.S. and allied forces to launch strikes against selected North Korean military targets are fraught with steep risks. The United States probably could destroy known nuclear and missile facilities in a preemptive strike, but not hidden facilities and weapons that would survive such a preemptive attack. In any event, Pyongyang would regard an attack on its strategic assets as a dire threat to its vital interests (i.e., regime survival) and could retaliate in ways that might escalate quickly to a wider conflict. The United States and South Korea would more than likely prevail in a full-scale war, but the human and material costs would be very high— even if unconventional weapons were not employed. In essence, the military standoff that marked the end of the Korean War prevails 50 years later.7

Ext - Unification Good

Unification of South Korea brings economic success to Korean penninsula

Thatcher, Based in Seoul since 2006, lead Reuters coverage out of the Korean peninsula, Sep 21, 2009

JohnathanThatcher,“United Korea economy could pass Japan: Goldman Sachs,”

(Reuters) - A united Korea -- combining Asia's fourth biggest economy with one of its poorest -- could surpass that of Germany or Japan in economic mightin the next 30-40 years, U.S. investment bank Goldman Sachs said on Monday. Though North Korea's planned economy system looks to be on the edge of collapse, it offers a large and cheap workforce, a wealth of minerals that the resource-poor South currently has to import to feed its industry and the likelihood of gains in productivity and its currency once economic reforms take hold."We project that a united Korea could overtake France, Germany and possibly Japan in 30-40 years in terms of GDP in U.S. dollar terms," it said in a report. The two Koreas have been separated for more than half a century and have yet to sign a peace treaty to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War. The Goldman Sachs report was published just as the communist North has shown signs of being willing to reengage with the outside world, from which it has been all but cut off after a series of nuclear and missile tests this year. It also comes as the conservative government in Seoul has turned increasingly hard-nosed in dealings with its prickly neighbor, ending years of aid until Pyongyang starts to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. The cost of reunification has long been seen as one of the biggest risks facing the South Korean economy. Many analysts warn the South's rise to an economic powerhouse in the region could be undone by the burden of absorbing its neighbor, whose per capita income is about 5 percent the size. But Goldman Sachs said it could be affordable by having the appropriate policies and by following the China/Hong Kong reunification model which allows two political and economic systems to co-exist, with limited inter-Koreanmigration. The report was written by the bank's South Korea economist, Goohoon Kwon, and included input from one of the economists who co-authored the bank's influential prediction earlier this decade that the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China -- the so-called BRICs -- would turn dominant by the mid-century. It argued that there remained a spirit of reconciliation despite the hardening in Seoul and that the political backdrop in the region was supportive of peaceful and gradual integration. North Korea's increasing lag behind other former planned economies, such as Russia, China and Vietnam, "could eventually spark powerful political and economic changes in North Korea which, with the recent political changes in the U.S. and Japan, could transform the nature and magnitude of North Korea risks".