SURROGATE ACTORS AND FORCES IN INTERNAL WARFARE.[1]

In December 2007 US, British and Afghan National Army (ANA) troops fought a week-long battle to recapture the town of Musa Qala from the Taliban. The initiative from this operation came from the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, who claimed to have been in contact with a local Taliban commander. ‘Mullah Salaam’ promised to desert to the government side along with a substantial force of tribal fighters, so Karzai decided that a Coalition/ANA offensive was required to support him. However, by the time US and British troops went into combat on 7th December, Salaam’s anti-Taliban rising had failed to materialise, and the mullah even refused the assistance of a small militia that the Afghan President had raised on his behalf. The debacle surrounding Mullah Salaam’s abortive defectionshows how governments fighting insurgencies – whether on their own soil or in a colonial or intervention scenario – continually attempt to recruit indigenous support and ‘turn’ erstwhile adversaries. It also demonstrates that these efforts can go awry.[2]

One perennial feature of military history is the ability of states waging wars of territorial or imperial aggrandisement to recruit conquered peoples to fight in their armies, as demonstrated by the Indian Army of the British Raj.[3] Colonialism is an anathema in Western societies today, but in the context of US-led intervention missions in Afghanistan (2001 onwards) and Iraq (2003-2011) the importance of raising or re-establishing effective local security forces has been of paramount importance for the occupiers; indeed, one of the contributory factors to the outbreak of insurgent violence in post-Baathist Iraq was the decision by the US occupation authorities to disband the army in May 2003.[4]Both American and British military doctrine on counter-insurgency (COIN) and ‘stabilisation’ stresses the vital importance of training and equipping indigenous armies and constabularies so as to enable interventionist forces to progressively disengage from COIN operations and to eventually withdraw.[5] The UK’s occupation of Southern Iraq (2003-2009) – and the contentious circumstances behind the British Army’s withdrawal from Basra and handover to the Iraqi Army (2007-2009) – shows that this process is often a convoluted and difficult one to manage.[6]

Yet the establishment of regular security forces by an interventionist state or coalition can be undermined by the weakness of the host nation government (which is often dependent on foreign aid, and which can be afflicted by corruption, factionalism and other debilitating problems) and its security forces. In Afghanistan, the national police (ANP) areprone to drug abuse, predatory behaviour against the civil population, and also collaboration with the Taliban. The ANA is reported to have a better reputation, although in its operations in the Pashtun South it is hampered by its dominance by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, and is therefore as ‘foreign’ to the local populace as any NATO contingent.[7] Some analysts have therefore argued that the best means of combating the Taliban is to rely on traditional tribal security structures, in particular the community defence forces (arbakai) that traditionally kept the peace in Pashtun areas under the Afghan monarchy.[8] Following the apparent success of the ‘Al Anbar Awakening’ and the creation of the ‘Concerned Local Citizens’ self-defence groups in Iraq, US military officials clearly hope that a similar approach can be employed to stabilise Afghanistan.[9]

Yet for critics of Western interventionism (notably the US academics within the ‘Network of Concerned Anthropologists’), the enlistment of indigenous forces in COIN – whether regular or auxiliary – is at best a pretext for legitimising military operations against weaker states and their citizenry, and at worst a means of promoting vicious internecine conflicts.[10] With reference to the Iraq war, there is also a tendency amongst opponents of Operation Iraqi Freedom to treat any indigenous collaboration with the American and British forces as ‘collaboration’, with all the hostile connotations associated with this phrase.[11]Even in less contentious operations, the decision to arm local auxiliaries can be criticised on ethical grounds. In contrast with the Iraq war, the British military intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 received widespread international and indigenous support. However, human rights campaigners were perturbed by the fact that the British were arming pro-government formations which included child soldiers.[12]

The aim of this chapter is to examine the employment of surrogates in COIN and other internal conflicts. They are defined here as third parties (either individual actors or paramilitary units) that are not formally part of the government side’s security forces, but are nonetheless assisting them either directly in combat operations, or indirectly (most notably through the provision of intelligence).[13] While surrogates have been employed by governments waging their own campaigns against domestic terrorism and insurgency, this chapter focuses on cases where external powers are supporting a third-party against indigenous armed opposition, or where states are involved in COIN or counter-terrorism within their own borders. While most of these examplesdiscussed in this chapter involve Western countries, some are takenfrom semi-authoritarian states (such as Russia and Turkey) and also the racial oligarchies of apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia, as they demonstrate potential problems involved in employing surrogate forces. Surrogates have been employed by the government side in ‘imperial policing’ and wars of decolonisation during the 19th and 20th centuries, Cold War interventions (such as the USA in Vietnam from the early 1960s to 1973, or the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1989), and the current campaigns associated with the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ or ‘long war’. The author defines the roles that surrogates perform in such conflicts, and discusses both their utility for the governments and security forces that employ them, but also the potentially negative political, strategic and ethical implications associated with their use.

Definitions:

For the purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined as the use of lethal violence by an armed irregular group which is intended to intimidate its target(s) (a government, a collection of states, or a particular national or ethnic community) into acceding to its political demands. Terrorism can be employed as part of a wider tactic of insurgency, namely a paramilitary and subversive campaign waged by one or more irregular armed factions to overthrow a state’s government, to effect territorial secession from a state, or even (in the case of Hamas and other Palestinian rejectionist groups against Israel) to destroy a state. Insurgencies can also be fought to liberate a nascent state from colonial rule, in response to the seizure of power by a radical or revolutionary regime (such as revolt against the Afghan Communists following their coup d’etat in April 1978), or to expel a foreign military occupation.[14]

In a variety of campaigns imperial powers, superpowers, emerging states, democracies, dictatorships and weak states have all employed surrogates to augment their military and police forces in COIN and counter-terrorism.[15] Surrogates have featured in a variety of non-conventional conflicts waged by Britain, France, Portugal, Germany, the USA, the USSR (against the Central Asian Basmachi guerrillas in the 1920s,[16] as well as the Afghan mujahidin seventy years later) andRussia (during the Second Chechen war from 1999 onwards),[17]Israel, the self-declared state of Rhodesia (1965-1980), Turkey (in its response to the PKK insurgency), South Africa and Spain.These scenarios range from comparatively low-intensity counter-terrorist operations (such as in Northern Ireland, the Basque province, and the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) to major civil wars. In all these cases, the surrogates can be subdivided into actors– individuals who offer specific services to police, military and intelligence services – and forces– armed groups acting as auxiliaries, rather than enlisting in indigenous security forces (although these formations may wear uniforms or other similar insignia). They can be further sub-categorised as follows. Actorsincludeinterpreters, trackers, informants and agents.Forcesincorporatehome guards, militias, counter-gangs and pseudo-gangs.[18]

The conceptual challenge of COIN and counter-terrorism:

COIN theory stresses that in essence there are two approaches by which a state (and its external supporters, if it has any) contend with any armed indigenous opposition. The enemy-centric response treats insurgents and terrorists as foes that should be destroyed militarily. Such adversaries are often indistinguishable from the civilian population, and as a consequence the government side and its security forces (indigenous or foreign) adopt overwhelmingly coercive and draconian tactics which incorporate curfews, population control, extensive ‘cordon and search’ missions, the internment and detention of suspected terrorists and insurgents, and punitive measures such as the destruction of property. At their most extreme, an enemy-centric strategy can lead to systematic human rights abuses, massacres, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. The most egregious examples include Nazi Germany’s Bandenkrieg against partisans in occupied Europe during the Second World War;[19] the Soviets in Afghanistan;[20] Baathist Iraq’s onslaught against the Kurds in the late 1980s (Operation al-Anfal);[21] and the mass eviction of Kosovar Albanians by the Serbian security forces in March-April 1999.[22] Yet even democracies have succumbed to the temptation to wage enemy-centric campaigns against insurgents and terrorists. Notable examples include France and the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962);[23]Britain in Kenya (1952-1957),[24] and the early phases of both the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)[25] and the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland (1969-1998);[26] and the USA in the first years of the occupation of Iraq.[27]

In contrast, the population-centric response stipulates that the ‘population is the prize’. Theorists and practitioners expounding this approach stress that the priority of the security forces is the protection of the civil populace. Armed forces should (1) be subordinated to civilian authority, (2) act in accordance with the legal framework, and (3) also employ ‘minimum force’, exercising the utmost discretion possible to ensure that military actions do not cause unnecessary civilian casualties or destruction of the local infrastructure. The population-centric approach also stipulates that military and police operations support socio-economic and political reforms aimed at alleviating popular grievances which insurgents and terrorists use to rally support for their cause.[28] Such theories also incorporate efforts to seek a compromise with those that David Kilcullen terms ‘accidental guerrillas’. In Afghanistan and Iraq these include indigenous fighters who are not necessarily motivated by Islamist extremism or fanatical support of Osama bin Laden’s goals, but by more parochial concerns (such as resentment over disenfranchisement, poverty or corruption) and indignation over the presence of ‘infidel’ troops in their country. The COIN effort should therefore incorporate measures to persuade ‘accidental guerrillas’ to change sides, and to reconcile themselves with the new political order that Western forces are attempting to establish.[29] While this proposition sounds naïve, historical experience demonstrates that Western militaries and their indigenous allies from Oman in the 1970s to al-Anbar thirty years later have been able tosuccessfully ‘turn’ the bulk of their fighters and persuading them to align with the government of the host nation.[30]

‘Turning’ insurgents and ‘hearts and minds’ operations do have their limitations – the latter are futile if the government side lacks the military and police forces needed to protect the civilian population from insurgent violence, while even if some insurgents can be persuaded to defect the ‘true believers’ will invariably fight to the bitter end.[31]Yet overwhelming power in the absence of indigenous support is not necessarily a guarantor of success, particularly for a liberal democracy. Kilcullen points out that in Cyprus (1955-1959) the British Army and colonial security forces outnumbered EOKA insurgents by 110:1, far exceeding the usual force ration (10:1 against the insurgent) deemed necessary for victory in COIN. Yet the British still lost, because the majority of Greek Cypriots supported EOKA.[32] Indigenous support, in particular from surrogates, is therefore important for the following reasons:

Intelligence – a general rule of COIN is that the side which dominates in human intelligence (HUMINT) terms has an overwhelming advantage over its adversary. The British theorist and practitioner General Frank Kitson noted that for any government pitted against terrorist or insurgent groups ‘the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him’. The challenge for the government side is to identify the personnel, organisation and aims of the adversary; to understand the political and cultural characteristics of the indigenous society (particularly important for any external military personnel involved in COIN); and – most importantly – ensuring that insurgents and terrorists are not able to penetrate your own security forces. One problem evident in both colonial-era cases and also current operations is the ability of insurgents to infiltrate indigenous militaries and constabularies, and to recruit spies within their ranks.[33]

Force numbers – COIN and counter-terrorism is often labour intensive. In Northern Ireland from the mid-1970s onwards the Provisional IRA (PIRA) consisted of a mere 300-400 active members, but it required around 10,000 British troops and a further 15,000 local security force personnel (in both the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment, or UDR) to suppress PIRA as well as other Republican and Loyalist groups. In cases where insurgents possess more substantial numbers it is often necessary to recruit auxiliary forces to perform low-level tasks (such as neighbourhood patrolsand check-point duties) that enable better-trained troops and police to conduct more offensive operations.[34]

A political solution – if the government side can persuade substantial numbers of its foes to change sides, this can foster the prospects of reconciliation, particularly if the former fulfils is promises regarding offers of an amnesty, or of socio-economic reform and employment of defectors. In the Philippines during the 1950s the Defence Minister Ramon Magsaysay and his US military advisors rewarded Hukbalahap guerrillas who voluntarily surrendered by giving them land to farm. In Oman after June 1970, Sultan Qaboos bin Said gained considerable popular goodwill by pledging to spend oil revenues hitherto hoarded by his father on social development programmes. His offer of an amnesty also split the insurgent movement (PFLOAG) in Dhofar, which was already divided between tribal traditionalists and hard-line Marxist-Leninists.[35]

Surrogate actors:

Given the paucity of Arab, Dari and Pashtun linguists amongst Western forces, interpreters proved to be of crucial importance for Coalition troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly in terms of basic interaction with local civilians. Trackers have traditionally been employed as guides in rough terrain, notably the Sarawak Rangers enlisted by the British during the Malayan Emergency. Even in an age where the counter-insurgent has GPS, satellite reconnaissance and unmanned aerial vehicles to aid him, indigenous expertise can still prove essential. When a patrol of British soldiers was captured by the ‘West Side Boys’ in Sierra Leone in August 2000, kamajor hunters helped locate the hostages and their captives, thereby facilitating the rescue mission mounted by the British on 10th September 2000.[36]

For any insurgent or terrorist group, informants (civilians prepared to provide tip-offs to the police or army about forthcoming attacks, or the locations of weapons caches or safe-houses)and agents (security force spies within an insurgent/terrorist group) represent a mortal threat, which explains why these individuals are subjected to savage violence if they are compromised. PIRA’s internal security cell (dubbed ‘the nutting squad’) was notorious for torturing and murdering with any of its ‘volunteers’ – as well as civilians –suspected of providing intelligence to the British Army, the RUC Special Branch, or MI5.[37]

Surrogate forces:

Home guard formations are usually recruited from the local adult male population for the static defence of villages, hamlets, or urban neighbourhoods. The British recruited ‘town guards’ in the CapeColony during the Boer War of 1899-1902,[38] and also raised similar formations in Malaya and in Kenya (the Kikuyu Home Guard, or KHG).[39] The French established civil defence groups in Indochinaduring the war against the Viet Minh (1946-1954).[40] In South Vietnam during the early 1960s the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem raised a Self-Defence Corps, which the Americans equipped.[41] Its successor, the Popular Force, was augmented by the Combined Action Program (CAP) run by the US Marine Corps (USMC) between 1965-1971, which involved mixed platoons of marines and Vietnamese villagers. The effectiveness of such groups is variable. CAP platoons were particularly efficient – the USMC in Vietnam committed a mere 4% of its manpower to these formations, which inflicted around 30% of the Viet Cong’s losses during the war.[42]In contrast, many home guard formations have historically been poorly-armed, inadequately trained, andvulnerable to insurgent attacks. Furthermore – as both the Boer ‘town guards’ and the KHG demonstrated – recruits were often forced by the authorities to join these formations.