Strategic Value of the Confederate Ironclad Virginia in the American Civil War

3

Mouse

Candidate Number 001796-023

Extended Essay: History

Strategic Value of the Confederate Ironclad Virginia in the American Civil War

Minnie Mouse

Candidate Number 001796-000

Supervisor: Mr. Ezekiel Mouse

International School of Latvia

May 2013 Session

Word Count: 3412

Abstract

The Confederacy’s first ironclad, theVirginia, was built to compensate for the Confederacy’s lack of a navy. During the American Civil War, both the Union and Confederate governments considered the Virginia as a dangerous machine of war that was capable of drastically affecting the course of the war. However, modern interpretations suggest that theVirginia‘s impact on the American Civil War was negligible. In order to study theVirginia‘s significance to the war in an in-depth manner, this essay will examine the question:to what extent did the ironcladVirginiabenefit the Confederacy by achieving strategic goals?

Answering this question requires a thorough examination of the Confederacy’s vital strategic goals: the destruction of the Union blockade, the collapse of the Peninsular Campaign and the defence of the naval shipyard at Norfolk. Primary sources, such as the United States government’s official records of the war, are used to discover how theVirginiawas originally perceived during wartime. Moreover, secondary sources are examined critically to study interpretations about theVirginia‘s strategic role. The research focuses primarily on theVirginia‘s operational phase during the year of 1862, which includes the historically significant Battle of Hampton Roads.

Thorough analysis and evaluation of the strategic goals mentioned previously shows that theVirginiawas unable to accomplish any of the goals outlined to any satisfactory extent. The Union blockade was not broken, the Peninsular Campaign still happened, and Norfolk was surrendered to the Union. Although the ironclad attempted to accomplish the aforementioned strategic goals, she was continually thwarted by the Union and rendered ineffective. The unsatisfactory performance of theVirginiaallowed the Union to maintain its naval advantage, which continued to affect the Confederate war effort adversely. In essence, the ironclad was of negligible strategic value to the Confederacy.

Word Count: 293

Table of Contents

Abstract...... 2

1. Introduction...... 4

2. The Blockade...... 5

2.1 The Battle of Hampton Roads...... 6

2.2 Strategic Analysis...... 8

3. The Peninsular Campaign...... 10

4. The Defence of Norfolk...... 12

5. Conclusion...... 14

Works Cited...... 16

Appendix 1 – Map of the Area Around Hampton Roads...... 18

1. Introduction

On April 12th, 1861, the American Civil War began when Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter. This war would eventually produce “more carnage than any other war in American history, before or since” (Brinkley 399). In this bloody conflict, the sea soon became a contested area, primarily because the Union quickly blockaded Confederate ports. However, both the United States of America and the Confederate States of America struggled to create wartime navies at the beginning of the conflict. The Union Navy had only twelve vessels available for immediate use, whereas the Confederacy had virtually none (Commager 796). To combat this disadvantage, Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory developed an audacious plan.

His radical plan involved the construction of powerful armoured warships, known as ironclads. Soon after Fort Sumter, he wrote:

I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity. Such a vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent all blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire navy . . . But inequality of numbers may be compensated by invulnerability; and thus not only does economy but naval success dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron against wood. (qtd. in Beringer 145-46)

Mallory believed that it would be a strategic move to build a small fleet of ironclads instead of a navy of wooden ships because of the invulnerable nature of the ironclad. Shortly after Mallory’s remarks, the Confederates enacted this plan by converting theMerrimack, a captured Union vessel, into the ironclad Virginiaat the Gosport Navy Yard in Norfolk, Virginia (“Lincoln and His Admirals” 132).

TheVirginiawas evidently a critical naval strategic asset for the Confederate war effort, and thus had many expectations. These expectations naturally took the form of important Confederate strategic goals. This leads to the question: to what extent did the ironcladVirginiabenefit the Confederacy by achieving strategic goals?

Although she was a remarkable vessel, theVirginiawas ultimately unsuccessful in her quest to benefit the Confederacy strategically. She failed to achieve three vital strategic goals: the destruction of the suffocating Union blockade, the suspension of McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign, and the defence of the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk. Despite her efforts, the blockade fleet still remained at Hampton Roads, McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign still occurred, and the Union still managed to capture the shipyard at Norfolk. In essence, this ironclad was unable to make any significant difference in the war. Because she was unable to achieve the aforementioned strategic goals, theVirginiawas of little strategic use to the Confederacy.

2. The Blockade

The destruction of the blockade quickly became a vital strategic goal for the Confederacy. The Union Navy’s blockade of Confederate ports had the potential to devastate the Confederate war effort. During the spring of 1861, General-in-Chief Winfield Scott developed a plan to slowly suffocate the Confederate States through a naval blockade, which would later be known as the “Anaconda Plan” (J. McPherson 334). On April 19th, 1861, one week after Fort Sumter, the Anaconda Plan was partially adopted by the Union when President Abraham Lincoln officially blockaded all ports in the Confederate States (E. McPherson 149). This theoretically prevented the Confederacy from importing or exporting any goods, which allowed the Union to exploit its advantage in industrialization.

The South was far behind the North in terms of industrialization. In terms of manufacturing establishments, the South possessed a mere 18,026, while New York State alone possessed 23,236 (Blair 25). The Union factories were also more efficient than their Confederate counterparts; the factories in NewYorkState alone produced about four times more manufactured products than the entire Confederacy (Paludan 105). The disparity between Union and Confederate factories in terms of quantities and efficiency naturally limited the amount of weapons that the South could produce. One county in Connecticut, for example, produced more firearms than the entire Confederacy (Paludan 105). Compared to the North, the South evidently lacked the necessary infrastructure to conduct warfare in an effective manner. Therefore, the Confederacy needed to trade with foreign countries to counter the Union advantage in industrialization. Hence the destruction of the blockade was a vital objective for the South.

In order to achieve this goal, the Confederacy turned to theVirginia. As mentioned in the introduction, Secretary Mallory believed that an ironclad could “prevent all blockades” (qtd. in Beringer 145-46). To accomplish this goal, theVirginiastarted by attacking the Union blockade fleet at Hampton Roads, which was fairly close to theVirginia‘s home base at Norfolk (see Appendix 1 for a map). In essence, Hampton Roads was a trial for theVirginia, since the outcome of the battle would demonstrate the power of ironclad ships. Despite Secretary Mallory’s faith in ironclad ships, theVirginiafailed to achieve the strategic goal of the destruction of the blockade; she did not succeed at the Battle of Hampton Roads.

2.1 The Battle of Hampton Roads

Hampton Roads was home to a Union blockade fleet (Simpson 58), which made it extremely attractive for theVirginiato attack. Before theVirginiasteamed towards Hampton Roads, Captain Franklin Buchanan sent a message to Secretary Mallory that read:

“I contemplate leaving here to appear before the Enemy’s Ships . . . I feel confident that the acts of theVirginiawill give proof of the desire of her officers and crew to meet the views of the Department as far as practicable.” (qtd. in Konstam 137)

Evidently, the goal of theVirginia‘s attack on the ships at Hampton Roads was to demonstrate her potential by destroying the Union blockade fleet there, which would meet the expectations of the Department of the Navy. Although theVirginiainitially experienced success at the Battle of Hampton Roads, she was ultimately unable to achieve the strategic goal of the destruction of the blockade; the strategic situation remained unchanged in the end.

On March 8th, 1862, theVirginiasteamed towards the Union fleet anchored in Hampton Roads. A telegram from John Wool, a Union general in the region, to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton succinctly described the grim events of that day:

TheMerrimack[the Union designation for theVirginia] came down from Norfolk to-day, and about 2 o’clock attacked theCumberlandandCongress. She sunk theCumberland,and theCongress surrendered. TheMinnesotais aground and attacked . . . theSt. Lawrencejust arrived and going to assist . . . Probably both will be taken . . . It is thought theMerrimack. . . will pass the fort to-night.

(“Official Records” 4-5)

Although the telegram presents the battle from a Northerner’s perspective, the telegram appears to be fairly objective. The facts of the battle are presented in a relatively neutral fashion, which makes it an intriguing piece of historical evidence in the aftermath of such violence, especially since it was among the first telegrams sent to the Union government in regards to the devastation at Hampton Roads.

As illustrated by the telegram, the situation was evidently grim: theVirginiarouted Union forces at Hampton Roads on this day. However, the telegram mentions that theMinnesotawas only aground, and not destroyed. Thus, theVirginiawould have to return on the following day to complete her destruction of the Union blockade fleet stationed at Hampton Roads. Overall, the day appeared to have ended on a strongly positive note for the Confederacy; theVirginiawas one step away from destroying the Union blockade.

Moreover, theVirginiawas barely damaged, which reinforces Secretary Mallory’s claims that ironclads were invulnerable. Despite the intense battle that had happened at Hampton Roads, shots fired from Union ships and shore batteries rebounded “from her iron sides as if they had been of india (sic) rubber” (Rhodes 112). Thus, Secretary Mallory’s dream of ironclads destroying the Union fleet appeared to be coming true. In fact, only crew exhaustion and the falling tide prevented theVirginiafrom finishing off theMinnesotaon that day (“Decision at Sea” 117). TheVirginiawas ostensibly close to achieving her strategic goal of decimating the Union blockade at Hampton Roads.

However, the Union also had an ironclad, which had the potential to counter the Confederacy’s perceived advantage in the aftermath of Hampton Roads. TheMonitorarrived at Hampton Roads around 11 P.M. (Commager 806), just in time to see theCongressexplode (“Decision at Sea” 117). The Union ironclad would undoubtedly serve to protect theMinnesotaand the remaining remnants of the Union fleet from theVirginia, because the Union could not afford to let the Confederacy seize a massive strategic victory by annihilating an entire Union blockade base.

On the following morning, theVirginiareturned to Hampton Roads to finish her mission. She soon found the “queer-lookingMonitorguarding the stranded frigate [Minnesota]” (qtd. in Scharf 167). Despite the presence of theMonitor, theVirginiastill intended to destroy theMinnesota. However,neither ironclad was able to inflict serious damage on the other. Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles received the following telegram from his subordinate, G.V. Fox, which describes the battle in a concise manner:

TheMonitormet them at once and opened her fire, when all the enemy’s vessels retired, excepting theMerrimack. These two ironclad vessels fought part of the time touching each other, from 8 a.m. to noon, when theMerrimackretired. Whether she is injured or not it is impossible to say . . . TheMinnesotakept up a continuous fire and is herself somewhat injured.

She was moved considerably to-day, and will probably be off to-night. TheMonitoris uninjured and ready at any moment to repel another attack.

(“Official Records” 6)

Like the previous telegram, this one is also from a Union perspective, and is also included in the U.S. government’s official records of the war. However, this telegram also appears to be a valid historical resource, since the facts given are consistent with facts mentioned in secondary sources, such as the bookDuel of the Ironclads. The historical significance of the second day of the Battle of Hampton Roads is the shattered image of theVirginia’s invulnerability, which casts doubt on the strategic effectiveness of the ironclad.

In the end, the tactical picture was fairly impressive. TheVirginiamanaged to destroy the USSCumberlandand USSCongress, damage the USSMinnesota, and inflict an estimated 409 Union casualties, according to the Battle Summary page by the American Battlefield Protection Program. With these losses in mind, the Virginiaremained the cause for the worst day in the history of the United States Navy until Pearl Harbor in 1941 (qtd. in Holzer and Mulligan 147). However, tactical success did not necessarily translate into strategic success, since the Union retained control of the region.

2.2 Strategic Analysis

The strategic picture was relatively unchanged after the battle. TheVirginiawas unable to complete her destruction of the blockade fleet, since theMinnesotastill remained at Hampton Roads, and the arrival of theMonitoressentially replaced the tactical role of the two Union warships that were sunk on March 8th. Essentially, theVirginiawas unable to destroy the Union blockade fleet at this important Union base, which meant that she was unable to achieve her strategic goal. However, there is another historical interpretation of the events that transpired during this battle.

E. Merton Coulter, Professor of History at the University of Virginia, asserts that “the Confederacy gained potential control of [Hampton Roads and the surrounding] Bay and even theoretical control of the high seas” because theVirginiawas “impervious to the most terrific punishment the Federal wooden ships could inflict” (306). This interpretation appears to exaggerate some aspects of theVirginia‘s capabilities. For instance, it claims that one ship—theVirginia—controlled the area around Hampton Roads because it was essentially invulnerable. However, this interpretation fails to account for the innate weaknesses of theVirginia. Lieutenant Jones, a member of the crew, wrote about theVirginia‘s condition prior to battle:

The lower part of her shield forward was only immersed a few inches instead of two feet as intended, and there was but one inch of iron on the (lower) hull . . . TheVirginiawas unseaworthy; her engines were unreliable, and her draft, over 22 feet, prevented her from going to Washington . . . (qtd. in Konstam 139)