STORIES FROM PIPA BILL

THE PEVERILLS AND THE AUTOMOBILE

IOWA’S LARGEST AUTOMOBILE DISTRIBUTOR 1906 – 1952

“Ask The Man Who Owns One”

The twentieth century began in Iowa with two auto-significant pairs of brothers -- the Duesenbergs, immigrants but raised in the State of Iowa, and the Peverills, born here. They would make an indelible impact on the infant but burgeoning automobile industry. For a time, their enterprises would coincide.

The Duesenbergs, mechanical masterminds, built their first automobile in Des Moines; it was named the Mason (for its financial supporter). Production was transferred to Waterloo, Iowa, when the company was bought by Fred Maytag. Before its demise, the Mason was distributed by Peverill Motor Sales, then a Waterloo company. The Duesenbergs moved to Indianapolis where the Duesenberg Automobile and Motors Company was established in 1920. There they built high performance racing cars which won several Indy 500 races and set speed records. Their custom-built autos were considered the finest cars in the world. Among car collectors, the “Duesey” is a legend. Financially, the company failed in 1937, five years after Fred Duesenberg died in a crash driving one of their cars, but not before producing some of the most expensive cars in automobile history.

From 1910 to 1915, U.S. automobile registrations leaped from 458,000 in 1910 to 2.3 million in 1915 and to over 8 million in 1920. Truck registrations exploded even faster: from 10,000 in 1910 to more than 1 million in 1920. It seems only logical that horse transportation, indeed the horse population, must have declined substantially. We easily forget that smog is the price of freedom in our streets from manure, flies and disease. Imagine the result if horses were used for the transportation provided by the motor vehicle.

In 1905, there were 799 motorcars in Iowa. By 1915, Iowa ranked first in the nation in the number of automobiles per capita (147,078 registered vehicles). A recent census – 2003 – determined that Iowa still (or again) ranked first. By 1927, there was one motor vehicle for every 3.31 persons (over 700,000 vehicles) and automobiles were responsible for 85 per cent of total highway traffic in the state. In Iowa, as everywhere, the automobile determined where we lived, how we lived, even if we lived.

The Peverill family forte was distribution, and they became Iowa’s largest automotive enterprise whose reputation extended beyond Iowa’s borders. Its parts business reached an international market.

My grandfather, William J. Peverill, and my Uncle Julian A. (J.A.) Peverill entered the motorcar business in Waterloo, Iowa in 1906 and were distributors for Glide, Regal and, for a time, Mason automobiles. First known as the Glide Auto Company, the name was changed to Peverill Motor Sales in 1908. In 1910, it became the Iowa Dodge dealer for eight counties. During 1913, the company contracted with Hudson to be distributor for northern Iowa.

Following World War I, J.A. became a partner, President and General Manager in Des Moines of the Hudson-Jones Automobile Company and merged Peverill Motor Sales into Hudson Jones, creating a statewide Hudson distributorship. In 1924, he acquired the company from G. W. Jones. Peverill Motor Sales was revived in 1932 to be the distributor for Packard automobiles and White trucks.

Hudson Jones was first located at 12th and Locust, a building torn down in 2002 to make room for the new library. In August 1929, Hudson Jones purchased the building (actually a long-term lease; Hubbells owned the building) at 1408 Locust Street from David Kruidenier Sr., then the Cadillac dealer, Kruidenier must have had a certain amount of economic clairvoyance; Sixty days later, the stock market crashed. Just across the street, the Engman family was making its beginning as auto parts distributors and manufacturers. (Note: In 2004, the building served the ill-starred purpose of Howard Dean’s campaign headquarters where Dean screamed his way to defeat. In 2005, the building became the “canvas” for infamous nude graffiti, see description.)

My father, Harry Peverill, joined the company in the late 1920s. He became General Manager just before the beginning of the war. He was fifteen years younger than J.A. (Some thought they were father and son). Each will be discussed later.

Hudson Jones built its business with Hudson and beginning in the early 1930s with Packard as well, two of the greatest cars of the twentieth century. If the century had ended mid-term (1950), each was arguably in its own sphere, the greatest. From 1930 until World War II, Packard was the foremost luxury automobile, not only in America but internationally as well. The high performance of Hudson from its beginning trumped that of any other automobile; in its final years, from 1951 to 1954, the Hudson Hornet overwhelmingly dominated the NASCAR races. A discussion of these two auto marques will follow.

In 1928, the year I was born, Hudson’s production was just behind Ford and Chevrolet. Hudson Jones’s statewide marketing franchise, somewhat unique then and non-existent in today’s marketplace, enabled the company to become Iowa’s largest distributor. It operated both as a wholesaler and retailer and performed both a financial and marketing function. The company carried a substantial inventory of automobiles and parts (For example, in 1929, Hudson launched a color campaign, and Hudson Jones was the first distributor in the nation to capitalize on the availability of 176 color combinations. See article, “Color Went Wild in late ‘20’s”.) It distributed cars usually to small town America. The dealer would bring his customer from, say, What Cheer, Iowa and make a selection and purchase here. The dealer would provide the ongoing service.

The inventory of parts was also considerable (a far cry from today’s practice where the customer pays in advance, then waits sometimes weeks for commonplace items). The company had worldwide recognition; it was not unusual for H-J to ship parts, for example, to Australia for, say, an exhaust pipe for a 1926 Essex or a running board for a 1932 Terraplane. But while the parts inventory was a contrast with today’s practice (incidentally, it was quite profitable), one aspect of the business has never changed: I can remember my father’s remark, “Those young punks from Detroit with their slide rules (the then current symbol of advanced technology) think they can create success by analysis when this business is really won or lost on the used car lot.” And this is as true today as it was then.

Surprisingly, Packard and Hudson disappeared during the greatest car-buying spree America had ever seen. And each of these companies had adapted and managed, one way then another, to survive the economics of a national depression. Theories about their demise abound and will be discussed as we review the products themselves. But at least one factor was that of the manner in which each company tampered with its distribution.

Shortly after the war, first Packard, then Hudson, closed down their distributorships and through zone offices went direct from factory to dealers. Was this a good decision? Many of Hudson’s 102 distributors, including Hudson Jones (Hudson Brace in Kansas City also comes to mind) could be characterized as follows: They had been in business for a couple decades (in HJ’s case, almost four), during that time they had acquired product and marketing knowledge and the survival skills and finances to weather serious economic storms such as the depression of the 1930s. (See HJ’s financial statements of 1931).

Almost universally, these distributors were also strong retail dealers in the metros where they were located and also everywhere after the war, even after the loss of the distributorships, they were enormously profitable. What happened quite generally, these dealers simply “cashed in their chips,” large stacks of them. A few became dealers for one of the “big three.” My dad said he could even be satisfied as a metro dealer if he could retain the parts distributorship; Hudson would make no compromise and said no. My dad became semi-retired. He was 50.

The economics of scale would forever work against the independent manufacturers: it costs as much to re-tool for 100,000 new cars as for 1,000,000. The same logic applies to advertising. Multiplant locations provided the majors with lower transportation costs. Moreover, there were some product challenges that we will discuss that worked against both Packard and Hudson. The independent manufacturer could seldom afford mistakes.

But to my view, the elimination of the distributors was the major mistake and James Nance who became Packard President from 1952 to 1956 fully concurs. Hudson and Packard “threw out the baby with the bath water.” They eliminated strong metro dealers as they dissolved the distributors. In the case of Hudson-Jones, gone was the oldest Hudson dealer in the United States.

The Hudson dealership was liquidated. The Packard dealership was sold; my father estimated it would last only six months, but it only took four, its owner losing several hundred thousand dollars, mostly due to too generous trade-ins. The White truck business was continued under Claude Rudy and was successful. It continued to supply the Ruan Company with trucks. The 1408 Locust building was sub-leased to Orville Lowe (Mid-Town Motors – Lincoln/Mercury).

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