Social Security in Nepal
As defined by the International Labour Organisation(ILO) (2015), “Social security systems provide for basic income in cases of unemployment, illness and injury, old age and retirement, invalidity, family responsibilities such as pregnancy and childcare, and loss of the family breadwinner”. Nepal has numerous different social transfer programmes which as Raj Kumar Pokharel of the Ministry of Health and Population states in his presentation can be broken down into five different types:
- Cash transfers and social protection programmes
- Free social services
- Poverty reduction and social empowerment
- Pensions and social insurance
- Labour market interventions.
These five different types contain many different grants. The ILO (2012, p.20-23) provide a more detailed description of the various grants along with their objectives, coverage and their distribution mechanisms. Similarly, a presentation from the World Bank (2011, p.13) highlights who receives which social programmes.
Research conducted by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (2014, p.9) studies the general coverage of social protection in Nepal. Their regression analysis suggests that social protection programmes are generally well targeted. The paper also finds that 38% of households have received at least one social protection programme in the last year. However, they also find that those who have experienced a greater number of shocks in the last 3 years are less likely to have accessed social protection. In terms of beneficiaries, Ghanashyam Niroula cites a table from the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development for 2014/2015:
Beneficiaries types / Number of beneficiaries / Percentage (%)Widow / 417201 / 19.30
Senior Citizens others / 716785 / 33.17
Senior Citizens dalit / 234634 / 10.85
Single women / 231352 / 10.70
Fully disable / 27203 / 1.25
Partially disable / 6375 / 0.29
Endangered / 20308 / 0.93
Dalit Children / 506718 / 23.45
Total / 2160576 / 100
This paper also discusses the movement to branchless banking for the social security allowance to overcome the issues with issuing cash directly which can be insecure. Once their details are verified the recipient receives a smartcard, speeding up the process.
The children protection grant aims to address child malnutrition by providing NR 200 a month per child for Dalit children under 5 and children in the region of Karnali. It was originally conceptualised as a universal child grant, however, given budget constraints it was decided to be limited (Gabriele Koehler, 2011, p.12). Work from UNICEF (2015) found that the child grant was effective in terms of its coverage, reaching 80 percent of the desired beneficiaries, and increasing the number of birth registration to 90 percent, compared to the national average of 42 percent. Likewise, research from ODI (2014) found that the first three years of the child grant had a small effect. There was an increase in diet diversity and it enabled some beneficiaries to purchase more food which fits with the objective of the grant. On the other hand no significant impact was found on household expenditure, access to healthcare, education and economic opportunities. Both studies found a limited impact of the grant, citing the low value, limited distribution and implementation bottlenecks.
Nepal also has a Public Work Programme involving cash, food and assets for work, which is discussed by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (2012, p.2). They find that the project has been successful according to the beneficiaries, reaching households with food deficits and helping to alleviate food shortages. The Karnali Employment Programme, modelled on the Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India, offers 100 days unskilled employment on government infrastructure projects (Gabriele Koehler, 2011, p.12).
The World Bank (2011, p.22-23) listed the financial and administrative challenges that Nepal’s social protection faces. There are large costs associated with most universal programmes, for example, if all families of children 0-4 were given the child allowance this would cost 1.6 percent of GDP. With respective to administrative challenges, different programmes have different eligibility criteria, which coupled with many programmes trying to achieve the same objective leads to a large administrative load. This paper from Development Pathways (p.5) suggests that the movement towards a more universal targeting is likely to best serve the interests of the poor and the nation as it would be more likely to receive a larger budget and greater public support.