[Editors’ Introduction]
Situating Theory: International Relations’ Disciplinary Narratives
Christian Bueger
According to Joseph Rouse, scientific disciplines are narrative configurations. Scientific practices and achievements are intelligible if they have a place within enacted narratives that constitute a developing field of knowledge. Narratives give coherence to a practice by giving meaning to action, providing a connection between the past, present and future, and offering an interpretative template for adjusting to new situations. They reduce complexity by giving a general outline of how things hang together. Narratives also provide a moral compass and induce standards of evaluation. They are means of distinguishing path-breaking academic products from those to be refuted, and the upcoming star from the dead duck. Narratives are continuously re-written, they develop and transform, and there is an ongoing struggle over them. What is common among researchers is a field of interpretative conflict rather than any uncontested commitments about beliefs, values, standards, or meanings.
Drawing on such an understanding of disciplines as narrative, in this contribution I reconstruct the development of core narratives of the discipline. Drawing on a narrative analysis of core IR texts I show how over time different imaginaries of the discipline have prevailed. I investigate what the place of “theory” within these imaginaries is. The analysis reveals how the disciplinary understanding of what a theory is and what it is for has gradually changed. The contemporary situation is characterized by a multiplicity of different narratives, which conflict and overlap. In summary the contribution provides a new matrix of what the discipline is and where it is developing.
IR’s Limited Sociological Imagination: Disciplinary Blocks on Interdisciplinarity
Jonathan Joseph
This contribution looks at the troubled relationship IR has with the wider social sciences, and in particular, with arguments from sociology and philosophy of social science. Why it is that IR borrows from the other social sciences, but has hardly any influence of its own? This contribution argues that IR needs to confront its own weaknesses and insecurities, and suggests that while these are partly attributable to the discipline’s brief history, they remain evident even in more radical forms of contemporary IR. The piece traces these problems to the discipline’s own self-consciousness, and argues that IR has always been marked by a sense of inferiority and a lack of confidence in its own distinctiveness. These problems are addressed through a focus on three particular issues: the hindrance of IR’s own internal history; the desire to assert IR’s scientific credentials; and the desire of opponents to appear more sociologically and philosophically sophisticated.
The first two problems are well known, but nevertheless ongoing issues. IR is a recent discipline that lacks the firm foundations and classical heritage of other social sciences. This would not be a problem if IR was comfortable playing an auxiliary role to political science. But its main advocates have instead insisted on its distinctiveness at the cost of disembedding it from a wider political and social context. The consequences of IR’s desire for scientific respectability are also well known. The desire for scientificity, combined with the desire for disciplinarity has resulted in the mystifying levels of analysis problem and the stultifying system-unit dichotomy that are unable to account for the ebb and flow of the social world.
If all of this makes IR less sociological, then the third problem lies with those who would wish to bring the social back in. The attempt to import new ways of thinking under the banner of postpositivism has had an interesting impact on IR, but without many consequences beyond the discipline. Indeed, it could be argued that the main effect of the postpositivist turn has been to reinforce IR’s self-consciousness rather than challenge it. The attempt to appear more sociologically or philosophically sophisticated might have irritated some of the mainstream theorists, but has done little to catch the attention of those beyond the boundaries of the discipline. IR’s turn to philosophy and sociology has been founded on embracing approaches that are already well established elsewhere. Unfortunately their advocates do the sociological turn little favours with an often instrumental use of imported work. At the same time, IR has proved unable to make much of a contribution to major sociological debates in those areas where it should have more to say.
It is easy to blame the lack of sociological thinking on the discipline’s history and its striving for scientificity, but in doing so such criticisms run the risk of contributing to, rather than challenging, the discipline’s introspection. An alternative approach would be to start with the awareness that the failings of IR are as much a consequence of the failings of our own sociological imagination.
Inglorious Discipline: Un-authentic Theorizing, or the Art of Problematizing Xavier Guillaume
IR theory seems to suffer from at least two potentially terminal illnesses. On the one hand, it does not seem to generate and influence reflections in other disciplines and should thus ask itself the question of its relevance (Buzan and Little). On the other, it lives under the nostalgic illusion of a past better health when there were Debates, the contemporary absence of which is a sign of an ever declining health, the harbinger of its own end (EJIR panels at the ISA 2012). These different diagnoses start from the (epistemic) assumption that IR theory, and theory in general, is limited to its constitutive role in defining a discipline. This has a double consequence. On the one hand, it leads to a (de)limitation of (sound) theoretical knowledge production to an ability to generate clearly demarcated boundaries between proponents and opponents of specific theoretical frameworks competing for the explanans championship. On the other, IR is supposed to produce an authentically IR knowledge that, though partly influenced by non-IR sources, should gain a form of autonomy from other disciplines, and thus a form of legitimacy, in order to become an independent form of knowledge production: a discipline. This contribution argues on the contrary that IR theory can potentially be a vibrant endeavour in producing a cross-fertilising field of knowledge production precisely because it should not seek to ossify (anymore?) along disciplinarian front lines and because it should seek to expand the problematizations linked to the international beyond the (de)limitations imposed by the logics behind the establishment of these front lines. IR theory's ability to borrow, to cross-fetilize, to be un-authentic, should on the contrary be celebrated.
This contribution thus starts by highlighting the problems identified by those harbingering the death or the end of IR theory and locates their epistemic stance regarding the importance of discipline for IR theory. It then turns to a discussion of discipline in terms of sociology of knowledge and how IR theory should rather be understood as participating in a field of knowledge production. It finally ends on the necessity of theory to principally be an endeavour of cross-fertilisingproblematizations rather than one of authentic apocriticality (Meyer): that is to participate in a form of knowledge production that seeks to resolve questions by suppressing them.
“For Someone and For Some Purpose” – Round Two: IR Theory as Situated Political Praxis
InannaHamati-Ataya
The latest round of disciplinary discussions about the status of IR Theory has revealed a generational gap between the initiators of the various post-positivist “turns” in the discipline and their inheritors among the youngest generation of IR scholars engaging theory at different levels. Against the ever-confident position of their opponents in the positivist camp, the pioneers of critical IR display a certain pessimism and defeatism, whichseem to be the product of a paradox: the requirements/achievements of “theory-as-understanding”are still assessed according to the standards/expectations of “theory-as-explanation.” Moreover, the engagement with the “knowledge-power nexus” has merely exacerbated everyone’s awareness of the discipline’s own permeability to the political, therebyundoubtedly leading it to better metatheoreticalproblematisations, but without significantly empowering it as a meaningful social endeavour. Post-positivists’ problematic relation to the reality of power is visible in their recurrent frustrated acknowledgments of the persistent dominance of their intellectualopponents in both the academic and policy-making realms. What is incomprehensible, however,is why they, of all scholars, should expect the discipline, and the world, to behave in any other way.
This paper therefore argues that despite an intense engagement with the knowledge-power problématique, a certain naiveté still plagues our understanding of knowledge and“theory,” and that the praxical function of “critical” theory has steadily been diverted from the realm of social action to the realm of disciplinary opposition/debating.This scholastic enactment of the critical ethos has diffused and diluted the political meaning of theory, and is only worsened by two additional disciplinary processes: the co-optation of “dissident” theories as “legitimate contenders” in the field, and the recent calls for a disciplinary “pluralism” that annihilates the critical project by incorporating it into the neat, depoliticised categories of textbooks and analytical thought.
The paper suggests, then,that “dissident” IR has only addressed half the problem that a critical engagement with power brings forth: what theory is, but not what it does. It shows, firstly, that a praxeological approach to theory (theory-as-practice) takes Cox’s proposition to its logical and empirical consequences, by revealing how theories have different political meanings and effects for different peoples in different socio-historical contexts; and consequently, that theory should necessarily be understood as a form of situated political praxis whose realm of action – the world and the discipline – is ultimately governed by purpose (values) and conflict, rather than neutrality/consensus and peaceful coexistence.
Concepts as Causes?
Felix Berenskoetter
Starting from the Kantian position that our mental frames give meaning to the world around us, and assuming that despite post-(positivist,modern, colonial, etc) interventions concepts remain indispensabletools for analyses, this contribution explores how and in what sensethey (can) have ‘causal’ effects.
The paper first lays out different understandings of ‘cause’, a trickyconcept in and of itself, reflected in attempts to make a distinctionbetween ‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’, or ‘constitutive’ and‘explanatory’ theorizing. Next, it turns to the idea that concepts are notone-dimensional but can have multiple meanings, as expressed in W. B.Gallie’s notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’. Consequently,deciding on a particular reading and drawing conceptual boundaries inone way rather than another is a constitutive act. On this basis, Ilook at three ways in which concepts can be seen as having causal(explanatory) effects.
First, there are concepts whose meaning is intrinsically linked to thenotion of ‘cause’. Here the paper focuses on the concept of ‘power’,a concept that on the most basic level refers to the ability to make adifference. The interesting observation in this example is thatdifferent conceptualizations of power seem to carry differentconnotations of ‘cause’.Second, I discuss the role of concepts in theories beyond theirfunction as a heuristic device. While it is the theory that linksconcepts into an argumentative causal chain, our understanding of aparticular concept has significant implications for how the argumentunfolds. This is exemplified by looking at the concepts of war/peacein the ‘democratic peace’ debate.Third, I engage the view that some concepts are logically more‘fundamental’ than others and, hence, require analysts to take astep back in the causal chain. One concept for which such a claim hasbeen made is ‘identity’, which according to the constructivist mantra of the 1990s, precedes and therefore can be used to explain interests. Iwill critically interrogate this claim to suggest that it is flawed.
Overall, the discussion stresses that concepts also inform practicalreasoning and decision-making and, hence, that the effects discussedplay out not just on an academic level but also in the world ofpolicy-makers. I conclude by reflecting on whether it is ethicallypreferable to precisely define concepts or to leave them sufficientlyvague.
Living in the End of (Theory) Times? IR Theory and the Pluralist MoodVassilisPaipais
Recent meta-theoretical and historiographical work in IR theory has raised serious objections about the utility of theoretical labels, such as realism, liberalism, constructivism and so on, around which the discipline has been traditionally organised. After the rise of the revisionist disciplinary historiography we have come to realise that at worst they function as disciplinary tools of distributing authority within the discipline and at best they operate as pedagogical devices, ideal-types that have to be used with caution but never taken to reflect coherent theoretical categories. What one sees here arising very clearly is a feeling of frustration with reification of canonical works, with the extremism that the attachment to traditions as actual theories breeds and with the fanatical search for theoretical purity that turns research traditions from being useful organising devices to secular theologies. A form of Nietzscheanperspectivism seems to be the order of the day operating as the hallmark of scientificity in late- or postmodernity. Bracketing foundationalist claims is inaugurated as the only viable and democratic solution to the irresolvability of competing ontological and epistemological positions. Since access to the validity of foundationalist claims is impossible, the argument goes, the best one can do is adopt a pragmatic view that enables us to get on with our research while isolating any debilitating or contentious philosophy of science debates that cannot be authoritatively decided. However, the problem with that view is that, in principle, it still allows for the possibility of any particular foundationalist claim being ‘correct’ or ‘real’ in some deep ontological sense even though that ‘knowledge’ is inaccessible to our cognitive capacities (in other words, this is not pluralism but relativistic agnosticism).
This paper argues that we need to think harder about the philosophical grounds of this ‘new pluralism’. It starts with a discussion of recent ‘pluralist’ work in IR and then investigates the philosophical grounds of such pluralism. By way of contesting the consistency of its post-foundationalism it offers a diagnosis and a warning. The fact that foundationalism is under attack is a sign for optimism not anxiety. However, we still have to be wary of the complacency leading to another (liberal) orthodoxy in the making appropriate to our late modern sensibilities.
Why Does (IR) Pluralism Matter?
Daniel LevineandDavid McCourt
IR is deep in the throes of a reflexive turn. The theory/practice nexus and the role played by IR scholars in the construction and constitution of world politics are ubiquitous themes. IR theorists have drawn in invaluable ways on the sociology of science and the sociology of knowledge in this task, much enriching the field’s reflexive imagination and conceptual vocabulary. Implicit in much of this work, however, is the idea that IR should be more pluralistic: that is, that the predominance of any one form of knowledge has negative consequences for the theory and practice of international relations. While common, this presumption has largely escaped scholarly scrutiny. Does the theoretical and empirical make-up of IR in different national contexts actually have any effect on policy-making? Just as importantly, is pluralism to be defended only on the grounds of more policy-useful research? Why does pluralism matter?
This paper therefore has two elements. It first addresses the question of why pluralism matters from empirical, theoretical, and ethical perspectives. It asks how the relationship between theory and practice could be tested and understood, in empirical and theoretical terms. The very form the question takes suggests a positivist methodological approach: to systematically relate academic pluralism or its absence to public policy. But is such an approach justified? Could the relationship be more diffuse than it might gauge? Secondly, and consequently, the paper asks does it matter whether (IR) pluralism matters? Is there not still an ethical imperative for IR theorists to “chasten” their knowledge claims, even if they might never have a significant impact on policy-making?
Graffic Responses: Beyond IR’s ‘Understanding’ of Resistance
Sarah Jamal
Furthering a post-positivist logic, this paper proposes the necessity of ‘queering’ academic work through upsetting the theory/case binary divide.This piece comes from locating my own work on the Palestinian graffitimovement as a way to theorize resistance in a department of InternationalRelations. Questioning my own relationship to the discipline of IR throughmy work on graffiti, this piece is about the need to look at politicalphenomena differently, in a way that upsets and complicates the way we‘do,’ teach, and think about theory.
Using concepts from graffiti, Ahmed,Deleuze, Butler, and Segwick, I ask whether academia can bere/oriented or ‘queered’ in a way that allows a consideration andincorporation of visual mediums, providing new avenues for social scienceresearch and pedagogy in a way that addresses the ineffectiveness of IR toprovide a mechanism or space for social change, activism, or politics inscholarship and the classroom. How critical can teaching, research andthought be when it is structured (and thereby disciplined) in our currentmodel of academia? One that is inherently oriented in a particular waythat privileges not only certain ways of teaching and learning but alsoways of thinking. Can academia be queered in a way that alters thediscipline at its foundations; or to put it differently, can we queer theway we ‘do’ and teach theory through alternate methods and presentations ofthought?
Do Our Theoretical Endeavours 'Impact'? Academic Capitalism and IR's Research Impact
Helen Louise Turton
Numerous discussions have taken place recently concerning the status of IR’s theoretical endeavours, which have once again raised questions about the status of the discipline as a whole. This paper seeks to situate these claims within the changing academic climate and assess them through the lens of ‘impact’. According to Ole Wæver, there is an academic hierarchy within IR and the sub-field of IR theory is at its apex, suggesting that IR’s theories and the body of work produced by theorists ‘impact’ upon the discipline more than other sub-fields, due to their high citation rates. However, given the current academic climate where terms such as ‘academic capitalism’ and the McUniversity feature prominently in discourse, can we still claim that our theories hold an academic premium and ‘impact’ more than other categories of IR scholarship? This paper aims to unpack the buzzword of impact and to look at the effects that the drive for ‘impact’ is having on the discipline as a whole. It addresses whether indicators of academic success (e.g., Journal Impact Factor and H-index) continue to recognize theoretical work to a greater degree, or whether scholars are being encouraged to focus more explicitly on certain empirical sites in order to have a greater ‘impact’ upon policy-makers. The paper will also critically assess how certain indicators are being formulated and question whether they are stifling innovation and marginalizing certain forms of scholarship.