SIGNIFICANT REPORTED CRIMINAL DECISIONS OF
THE MAINE LAW COURT
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
JULY 1, 2010 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2011
STATE V. ABODA,8 A.3d 719, 2010 ME 125
Statutory Interpretation; “Compulsion”
The defendant was convicted by a jury of gross sexual assault by compulsion. The defendant appealed, arguing that the statute defining “compulsion” is unconstitutionally vague, because it allows for a finding of compulsion when the victim is “unable to physically repel the actor” but imposes no duty on the victim to resist. The defendant argued that one cannot know that the victim is unable to repel the actor if the victim does not resist enough to convey a lack of consent.
The Law Court affirmed, holding that:
(1)The statutory definition of “compulsion” is neither ambiguous nor internally inconsistent. “Focusing on the acts of the perpetrator, a person reasonably can be expected to understand the degree of force he or she is asserting, and to know when that force is sufficient to physically overpower the other person.”
(2)The statutory definition of “compulsion” was not unconstitutionally vague. The statutory language was sufficiently clear to give the defendant adequate notice that his conduct was prohibited.
STATE V. BOUTILIER, 12 A.3d 44, 2011 ME 17
Fourth Amendment; Franks Hearing; M.R.Evid. 509
The defendant was charged with unlawful trafficking in drugs and marijuana cultivation following the execution of a search warrant on his property. He appealed the denial of his motions to disclose the identity of a confidential informant who provided information recounted in the search warrant affidavit as well as his motion for a Franks hearing.
Affirming, the Law Court held that:
(1) Disclosure of the informant’s identity was not required under M.R. Evid. 509. The defendant failed to establish that the informant had relevant knowledge of the crime charged that could assist in his defense at trial. Further, the State did not intend to call the informant as a witness as trial.
(2) The defendant failed to establish a legitimate question as to the search warrant affiant's credibility in order to justify disclosure of the CI’s identify pursuant to a Frank’s request;
(3)The court did not err when it found that a Franks hearing was not warranted. The defendant failed to make substantial preliminary showing that the warrant affiant misstated facts with reckless disregard for their truth, and the defendant failed to establish that the allegedly false statement in warrant affidavit was necessary to a finding of probable cause.
STATE V. COOK,2 A.3d 333, 2010 ME 85
“Structure”; Sufficiency of the Evidence
The defendant and two others were charged with various property crimes stemming from a series of break-ins at seasonal camps. The defendant wasconvicted after trial of 25 counts of burglary, theft, criminal mischief and unlawful possession of a firearm. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to each conviction.
The Law Court affirmed 18 of the 25 convictions, finding that:
(1)The evidence was sufficient to support burglary convictions based upon accomplice liability for those counts where co-defendants crawled under camps to steal copper piping. The area underneath the seasonal camps was a “structure” within the definition of 17-A M.R.S. §2 (24) as it was a “place designed to provide protection for persons or property against weather or intrusion”.
(2)The mere presence of a stolen item in a common area of the defendant’s home, without evidence of control by the defendant, was insufficient to support conviction for theft by unauthorized taking.
(3) Insufficient evidence was presented to support conviction on certain charges of criminal mischief and burglary.
STATE V. COOK, 2 A.3d 313, 2010 ME 81
Sufficiency of the Evidence; Accomplice Liability; Joinder
The defendant and two others were charged with various property crimes stemming from a series of break-ins at seasonal camps. The defendant’s case was joined with that of one co-defendant. A second co-defendant pled guilty and testified at the defendants’ trial. The jury was instructed on principal and accomplice liability. The defendant was convicted after jury trial and appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the joinder of the cases.
Affirming in part, vacating in part and remanding, the Law Court held that:
(1)The evidence was sufficient to support conviction for burglary of a structure as an accomplice;
(2)With regards to one count, the evidence did not support conviction for theft by unauthorized taking as an accomplice. “The State presented no evidence showing that Cook had been present at the camp during the theft, nor did the State present any evidence that on this occasion Cook had assisted in the commission of the crime or even knew that this particular camp had been burglarized.”
(3)The joinder of defendant's trial withthat of the co-defendant was appropriate. Because the prosecution against the co-defendants involved many of the same witnesses and evidence, joinder promoted judicial economy and efficiency “without substantial prejudice” to the right of the defendant to a fair trial.
STATE V. CARON, 10 A.3d 739, 2011 ME 9
Expert Witness Qualifications and Opinions
The defendant crashed a truck, leaving his passenger paralyzed. At trial, the State and defense had dueling experts offer their opinion on the identity of the driver at the time of the crash. The defendant was convicted following jury trial of aggravated assault and aggravated operating under the influence and appealed.
Affirming, the Law Court held that:
(1)The State expert's learning disability did not render him incompetent or unqualified to testify;
(2)The deputy medical examiner was qualified totestify regarding a person's original position in the vehicle; and
(3)The sentence was not illegally imposed or imposed in an illegal manner. The trial court did not punish the defendant for exercising his right to trial but “explained its reasons for considering his apparent refusal to accept responsibility for his criminal actions.”
COOKSON V. STATE OF MAINE, 17 A.3d 1208, 2011 ME 53
Post-conviction DNA Testing; Chain of Custody
In 2002, the defendant was convicted after jury trial of two counts of murder. Immediately after the verdict was returned, an individual named Vantol confessed to having committed the murders and brought law enforcement to the murder weapon. Days after the jury verdict but more than two years after the murder, Vantol provided law enforcement with damp, soiled clothing he claimed to have been wearing at the time of the murder. Vantol took a polygraph examination and failed and was later admitted to Acadia Hospital where he recanted his confession. Cookson filed a motion for DNA testing of an array of items, including the clothing provided by Vantol, pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§2137 & 2138. The motion was denied in large part.
The Law Court, upon grant to the defendant of a certificate of probable cause to pursue an appeal, vacated and remanded, finding that:
(1)§2138 requires the court to order DNA testing if the moving party presents prima facie evidence of five criteria. Remand was required for the trial court to make the required findings of fact on each of the five criteria set forth in the statute.
(2) Chain of custody includes any period of time during which contamination or tampering may have occurred.
(3) Under §2138(4-A)(B), the defendant had the burden to account for the clothing's chain of custody from the time of the murders to the present day.
STATE V. DALLI, 8 A.3d 632, 2010 ME 113
Sentencing
The defendant appealed his manslaughter sentence, arguing that the court erred in setting the basic period of incarceration and abused its discretion in determining the maximum sentence.
Affirming, the Law Court held that:
(1) The defendant’s conduct, in stabbing his victim deep in the chest, fell near the boundary between the upper limits of manslaughter and intentional or knowing murder so as to justify a basic sentence near the top of the permissible range for manslaughter, and
(2) There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and its arrival at a final sentence. The court did not penalize the defendant’s decision to go to trial by downgrading his remorse to a neutral factor, rather than a mitigating one. “When the court referred to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty as a ‘neutral fact’, it was commenting on his belated acceptance of responsibility, not his remorse.”
STATE V. DODGE, 17 A.3d 128, 2011 ME 47
State’s Appeal; Voluntariness
The defendant was interviewed by a MSP detective for approximately 1 ½ hours in the detective’s police cruiser outside the defendant’s residence. The defendant was told that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. During the course of the interview, the defendant preceded an admission with “between you and I”. Immediately after the statement was made, the detective responded with “Yeah”. Shortly afterward, the detective advised the defendant that the investigation would be made known to the DA’s office and that there was no “just between you and me”. The defendant acknowledged that he understood and went on to make additional admissions. The defendant later filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the detective made false promises of confidentiality. The court granted the motion, finding the statements to be involuntary. The State appealed.
Affirming in part, vacating in part and remanding, the Law Court held that:
(1)The defendant's initial admissions, which were made after the detective made an assurance of confidentiality and before correction, were involuntary.
(2)The detective’s initial misstatement was rectified and did not render inadmissible the subsequent statements. The purposes of suppression would not have been served by excluding statements after the defendant was advised that his conversation would not be confidential.
STATE V. DOMINIQUE, 12 A.3d 53, 2011 ME 18
Appellate Practice
The defendant was convicted of OUI after trial.In a per curiam decision, the Court dismissed his appeal because of his failure to timely prepare and file an appendix in compliance with M.R.App. P. 8.
STATE V. DUCASSE, 8 A.3d 1252, 2010 ME 117
Confrontation Clause; Certificate of Compliance in Blood Alcohol Test Kits
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and aggravated OUI after trial. A blood sample had been taken from the defendant two hours post accident. At trial, the State presented evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol level by presenting, in part, a certificate of compliance from the manufacturer of the blood collection tubes used in the blood alcohol kit. The certificate recited that manufacturing specifications required the presence of additives within the tubes, stated that the tubes are manufactured specifically for blood alcohol determination, and further stated that the chemical added “will not disturb the integrity of the blood sample relative to blood alcohol content”. The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission into evidence of the certificate of compliance violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, because it contained testimonial statements about the reliability of the test.
Affirming, theLaw Court held that admission of the certificate of compliance did not violate defendant's right to confrontation of witnesses. Like the issue presented in State v.Murphy, 2010 ME 28,(certificate from Secretary of State that the defendant had been sent notice that his operator's license had been suspended), “the certificate of compliance was “not a ‘sworn certificate[] addressing scientific analysis prepared for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.’” The certificate was a business record which outlined compliance with manufacturing specifications and was not created for the purpose of establishing or proving a fact at trial. Consequently, the statements in the certificate were non-testimonial and their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
STATE V. ERICSON, 13 A.3d 777, 2011 ME 28
Expert Testimony, Waiver of Right to Testify; M.R. Evid. 403 & 608
The defendant was convictedof gross sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, and sexual abuse of the minor. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in (1) excluding the testimony of his expert witness, (2) determining he had waived his right to testify, and (3) limiting the scope of his cross-examination of the victim.
Affirming, the Law Court held that:
(1)The proffered expert testimony of a licensed clinical psychologist, that the defendant did not evidence “deviant sexual preferences” on a specified test, was neither reliable nor relevant. The test had not been subjected to peer review, had a significant potential rate of error, and had only been taken by admitted sex offenders;
(2)The trial court could properly infer that defendant had intentionally waived his right to testify by his refusal to follow the court’s directives to limit his testimony to admissible matters after repeated inquiry by the court; and
(3)The trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim's allegation that her father had tied her to a pole. The court found it was not probative of credibility pursuant to M.R. Evid. 608 (b) as the victim had not admitted to the falsity of the statement. It was also properly excluded under a Rule 403 balancing analysis.
STATE V. FILLER, 3 A.3d 365, 2010 ME 90
Cross-examination; Relevancy
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for a new trial after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual assault and assault. The State appealed, and the defendant cross-appealed. At trial, the defense presented in its opening and closing statements its theory that the victim, the defendant’s wife, fabricated the allegations in order to gain advantage in an anticipated child custody dispute. The court excluded evidence about the victim’s efforts to obtain custody via divorce and protection from abuse channels which were undertaken after she made the allegations that led to the criminal charge. In the rebuttal argument, the prosecutor responded to the defendant’s claims of fabrication by stating, “I ask you where the evidence is to back up his statement that he stated in both his opening and his closing that this is a marriage that was ending…this was a first step in a child custody fight? Where is one piece of evidence about that?”
Affirming and remanding for a new trial, the Law Court held that the interests of justice required a new trial:
(1)The Court abused its discretion when it prohibited the defendant from cross-examining the victim as to what actions she took to obtain legal custody of her children. Such evidence was relevant in establishing a motivation to fabricate by the victim, and the victim’s credibility was central to the outcome of the case; and
(2)The prejudice resulting from the exclusion of the motive evidence was magnified by the prosecutor’s statements in rebuttal and the absence of a curative instruction.
STATE V. FLINT, 12 A.3d 54, 2011 ME 20
Probable Cause to Arrest
The defendant was charged with OUI and related crimes. Law enforcement had observed two motorcycles on the road and followed one. This driver was later determined to have been drinking and showed signs of impairment. The second motorcycle was found parked with the driver nowhere to be seen. Officers used a canine to track from the motorcycle to the defendant, who was found hiding in the woods. The defendant smelled of alcohol and was argumentative and unsteady on his feet. Once standing, officers handcuffed him for officer safety. The court denied defendant's motion to suppress, and defendant appealed, arguing that he was subjected to a de facto arrest without probable cause.
Affirming, the Law Court held that the police officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for OUI prior to placing handcuffs on him.
STATE V. GALARNEAU III, 20 A.3d 99, 2011 ME 60
Right to Counsel; Prior Conviction
The defendant was convicted, on conditional guilty plea, of Class C operating after habitual offender revocation. The charge was enhanced because of the defendant’s prior OUI conviction. The defendant argued that the enhancementwas illegal. He claimed that he had been denied counsel in that (1) he was represented by a lawyer of the day, rather than by an attorney assigned exclusively to him, at the time of his plea, and (2) the court did not inform him of his right to counsel. The defendant appealed the denial of his motion.
Affirming, the Law Court held that the defendantwas not denied his constitutional right to counsel. Further, the record reflected that the lawyer had informed the defendant of his rights.
STATE V. GRAHAM, 998 A.2d 339, 2010 ME 60
Discovery Violation
The defendant was convicted after trial of unlawful sexual contact and visual sexual aggression against a child. The defendant appealed, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support conviction and (2) the court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial as a sanction for discovery violations committed by the State. In one instance, the State had provided in discovery the substance of certain text messages. On the day of trial, the investigator produced photographs of the actual messages. The court prohibited the use of the photographs at trial. In another instance, a report relating to an examination of the victim was not prepared or provided until days into the trial.