***Framework Cards
Should
Should means a policy recomendation
Carter, 02 (2/11/02, Rebecca S., “An Ordinance Concerning The Land Application Of Sewer Sludge In Buckingham County,” Red
"Should" means a recommendation.
Should means obligation – only predictable meaning
Collins English Dictionary, 03 (theFreeDictionary.com, “Should,” Red
should [ʃʊd]
vb
(Linguistics / Grammar) the past tense of shall:used as an auxiliary verb to indicate that an action is considered by the speaker to be obligatory (you should go) or to form the subjunctive mood with I or we (I should like to see you; if I should be late, go without me)
[Old English sceold; see shall]
Usage: Should has, as itsmost common meaning in modern English, the sense ought as in I should go to the graduation, but I don't see how I can. However, the older sense of the subjunctive of shall is often used with I or we to indicate a more polite form than would: I should like to go, but I can't. In much speech and writing, should hasbeen replaced by would in contexts of this kind, but it remains in formal English when a conditional subjunctive is used: should he choose to remain, he would be granted asylum
Should implies obligation
American Heritage Dictionary, 09 (theFreeDictionary.com, “Should,” Red
should (shd)
aux.v. Past tense of shall
1. Used to express obligation or duty: You should send her a note.
Resolved
Resolved implies legislation
Robert, 15 – general (Henry M., Roberts Rules of Order Revised, “Part I. Rules of Order, Art. I. How Business Is Conducted in Deliberative Assemblies,” Red
4. Motions and Resolutions. A motion is a proposal that the assembly take certain action, or that it express itself as holding certain views. It is made by a member's obtaining the floor as already described and saying, "I move that" (which is equivalent to saying, "I propose that"), and then stating the action he proposes to have taken. Thus a member "moves" (proposes) that a resolution be adopted, or amended, or referred to a committee, or that a vote of thanks be extended, etc.; or "That it is the sense of this meeting (or assembly) that industrial training," etc. Every resolution should be in writing, and the presiding officer has a right to require any main motion, amendment, or instructions to a committee to be in writing. When a main motion is of such importance or length as to be in writing it is usually written in the form of a resolution, that is, beginning with the words, "Resolved, That," the word "Resolved" being underscored (printed in italics) and followed by a comma, and the word "That" beginning with a capital "T." If the word "Resolved" were replaced by the words "I move," the resolution would become a motion. A resolution is always a main motion. In some sections of the country the word "resolve" is frequently used instead of "resolution." In assemblies with paid employees, instructions given to employees are called "orders" instead of "resolutions," and the enacting word, "Ordered" is used instead of "Resolved."
***Qritiq
Notes
You should probably refer to authors as ‘ze’ and use ‘per’ rather than his/her.
1NC
While the aff claims to transverse gender, they maintain the construct of sexual difference, which destroys agency and humyn freedom. The alternative is to embrace an ethic without sex and gender
Nicholas, 09 - research student in Humanities at Griffith University (Lucy, Thirdspace, “A Radical Queer Utopian Future: A Reciprocal Relation Beyond Sexual Difference,” vol. 8, is. 2, Red
***per replaces her/his, ***ze replaces she/he, ***humyn replaces human
Removing, transcending, or otherwise rendering voidor absent sex/gender as a central element of selfhood is an aim rarely pursued in theory or in activism concerned with deconstructing sex/gender.Even in queer and transgender theory that imagines alternative models or landscapes of identity or the self, sex/gender is usually merely adjusted, varied, and multiplied rather than rejected or transcended. The few visions of future landscapes of identity and sexuality in Western contexts that dare to imagine a selfhood without sex /gender, or at least without sexual difference, appear to be limited to a strain of 1970s utopian feminist science fiction and more recently among the theory and prefigurative practices of contemporary anarchist-queer communities.
This article views the current relationship between self and other as one that, in departing from the assumption of sex/gender, does not allow subjects to define themselves and others outside of it. In its place I propose an alternative way of being (ethics) derived from a social and intersubjective ontological basis that values reciprocal relations between subjects that are not reducible to antagonism or difference.
I will first survey some approaches that also deconstruct gender and view the current gender order as limiting but leave intact sex and, more specifically, sexual difference and wish to maintain some kind of gender as an aspect of identity. This helps me to refine my approach to a deconstruction of both sex and gender as socially created and maintained aspects of selfhood. I then draw on the few approaches that do not simply rearrange sex and gender as elements of selfhood but attempt to envisage selfhood or ethos (ways of being) – as well as ways of being sexual – without sex and gender as elements of selfhood. Drawing from science fiction and contemporary anarchist communities, I will emphasize elements of these approaches that are useful while noting their limitations. Especially useful for my purpose are the normative, ethical evaluations and their application to sex/gender made in sci-fi texts and in anarchist queer communities that valorize autonomy and reject behaviour that restricts autonomy. However, these approaches continue to rest on ontological foundations that rely on essential foundations, and they do not articulate a clear source of agency.
To remedy these limitations, I look to ontological ethical theory from Simone de Beauvoir’s so-called moral period and JudithButler’s later, more ethically engaged, period – to develop a foundation for an ethos beyond sexual difference.This work articulates an ethical basis of the valorization of freedom, understood as transcendence of imminence (in Beauvoir’s terminology), and a rejection of ways of being that prevent the transcendence of others. This idea can be usefully applied to sexual difference – understood as a socially and intersubjectively maintained phenomenon that prevents transcendence and renders subjects imminent. Beauvoir’s and Butler’s emphasis on the social and intersubjective in subject formation forms the basis for a humyn-created and argued-for ethics of reciprocity.[1] A situated ontology that perceives self as always self/other/situation also affects the ways that agency and resistance are possible, thus refining the extent to which, and how, subjects can act towards a chosen ethos.
This discussion of agency, then, leads to a discussion of how a reciprocal ethics of a subjecthoodwithout sex/gender, given this refined ontology and agency, can be put into practice. I will draw on anarchist approaches to education as paradigmatic, but not exhaustive, examples of a fostering of capacities that may offer a way to argue for this ethos and create a context conducive to a reciprocal ethos, while staying true to the principles of the ethos that it could be used to foster.
Link: Sex/Gender
The aff fails – their analysis of gender categories reproduces the notion of gender and prevent us from overcoming the binaries they qritiq
Nicholas, 09 - research student in Humanities at Griffith University (Lucy, Thirdspace, “A Radical Queer Utopian Future: A Reciprocal Relation Beyond Sexual Difference,” vol. 8, is. 2, Red
***per replaces her/his, ***ze replaces she/he, ***humyn replaces human
Many queer theory and transgender textsfocus ondeconstructing gender, assuming that while gender may be variable sex, or more specifically sexual difference, is a given. The sex/gender divide allowed feminists to argue that although sex was a biological category, gender was a separate and social, and therefore not essential, category. This divide gained salience after Ann Oakley used it in Sex, Gender and Society in 1972 and this way of thinking has undoubtedly helped feminists to further the notion that gender is social and, therefore, not fixed. However, critics have argued that this analysis limits the diagnosis of the causal relationship between sex and gender,and many theorists (Butler, Gender Trouble; Fausto-Sterling; Gatens; Hird; Hood-Williams; Hubbard) theorize that it is gender that precedes sex:
There is no recourse to a body that has not always already been interpreted by cultural meanings; hence, sex could not qualify as a prediscursive anatomical facticity. Indeed, sex, by definition, will be shown to have been gender all along. (Butler, Gender Trouble 12)
These theorists suggest that the time has come to deconstruct the circular thinking that allows for the naturalization of sex by gender and of gender by sex,by deconstructing thesocially constructed binary difference at the root of both categories and perceiving them as co-constitutive.
Paradigmatic models that rearrange the binary variables of feminine/masculine and male/female to deconstruct gender but fail to transcend the difference that underpins them are found in well-known queer and transgender texts such as Judith Halberstam's Female Masculinity and Leslie Feinberg's Trans Liberation, which critique the current gender order and sketch out alternative visions or models. Halberstam's project, although a great deconstruction of the idea that masculinity is inherently linked to maleness and challenging "the permitted parameters of adult male and female gender" (5-6), is more limited in its brief imagining of alternatives and its reliance on the idea of female and male as fixed sex categories as it seeks to multiply gender. Halberstam asks, "Why do we not have multiple gender options, multiple gender categories?" and seems to build per ideal model for gender on a perceived actuality of gender as really a continuum from which to choose gender (20). Feinberg's model is similarly articulated as "hues of the palette" (1). Hausman has noted that reliance on an alternative essentialism and a voluntarism about gender's mechanism are both aspects of many transgender texts, which often contain the idea that the mind contains the "'true being' of that subject" (191) in the form of gender and "the idea that the subject has a voluntary or entirely self-willed identity" (196). Indeed, both models cited above multiply the relationship and the area between the polesand, by focusing only on social gender, implicitly leave biological sex unscathed. Through these models, they tacitly reproduce the premise not only that identification to some kind of gender is imperative to selfhood but also that choosing is a simple subjective act. These formulations fail to transcend the binaries that are the focus of their critique because their modest aim is to rearrange the binary variables of male/female, masculine/feminine.
The discontinuity between sex and gender that the above texts advocate is, however, still a disruption of traditional perceptions, and it has made life more liveable for large numbers of transgender people. Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna identify the sex/gender distinction that allows for an incongruence between sex and gender as the second use of the word ‘transgender’ (after the first use, which they define as transition) and describe its valuable but limited challenge as “a previously unthinkable combination of male and female” (Kessler and McKenna, “Who Put the ‘Trans’” para. 2). This approach, however, is limited for my purposes because it maintains binary understandings of both sex and gender.[2]
Kessler and McKenna suggest that there is a third use of ‘transgender’ that represents not only a discontinuity between sex and gender but also perceives the ‘trans’ to be a transcendence, a description of a person “who has gotten through gender, beyond gender” (Kessler and McKenna, “Who Put the ‘Trans’” para. 2). This is one of the only examples in academia of a use of ‘gender’ that implicitly includes sex as social and that envisages the possibility of selfhood beyond or without these categories. This is a useful place to begin thinking about the possibility of selfhood and desire without sexual difference.
Even in virtual worlds, where anything is potentially possible, users’ imaginations are restricted almost entirely by an attachment to gender, usually binary gender,but certainly to the compulsarity of having some kind of gender as a central marker of identity. Additionally, gender is usually expected to be congruent with the real life biological sex of the participant. An illustrative example is the 2007 book Alter Ego: Avatars and Their Creators (Cooper), which presents a useful data set of sixty-six avatars – “computer generated visual representations of people or bots” (Nowak and Rauh para. 2) – alongside portraits and stories about their creators that demonstrates “the imaginative poverty of virtual reality” (Braidotti para. 49) in relation to gender. Within this varied and international collection of participants in virtual worlds, an overwhelming fifty-six are gender referential in that the apparent gender of the avatar is continuous with the gender of the creator. Additionally, although six avatars are entirely non-humyn, five of them are anthropomorphized and gendered, a fact that suggests that having a clear gender is considered an integral part of self-representation. Only one avatar is non-humyn and non-gendered. None of the avatars are gender ambiguous. Additionally, research by Kristine Nowak and Christian Rauh further demonstrates the intersubjective imperative of gender. They discovered that the more androgynous and less humyn avatars are, the more difficult people find it to communicate with them:
The responses to the images were consistent with what would be predicted by uncertainty reduction theory. The results show that the masculinity or femininity (lack of androgyny) of an avatar, as well as anthropomorphism, significantly influence perceptions of avatars. (para. 1)
Uncertainty reduction theory demonstrates that the more familiar and understandable the other person is in an interaction, the more likely we are to trust and like them. The above research demonstrates that this holds true for online interaction, and that placing gender is an integral part of placing someone in familiar terms. This research challenges early futurological predictions of the Internet as a space in which traditional identity would be challenged by demonstrating that the same rules of social interaction apply in virtual contexts as in real life, limiting the qualitative possibilities of self-presentation and of intersubjective understanding.[3]
Likewise, the queer theory I refer to tends to negate the extent to which sex/gender, and indeed subjectivity itself, is intersubjective and social,and that its subversion cannot be an individual choice.For example, by imagining an alternative gender system in which sex no longer dictates gender, Halberstam suggests that all one must do is to choose one’s gender from the selection and come out:
This project on female masculinity is designed to [...] argue for a concept of 'gender preference' as opposed to compulsory gender binarism [...] A system of gender preferences would allow for gender neutrality until such a time when the child or young adult announces his or her or its gender [...] people could come out as a gender in the way they come out as a sexuality. (27)
This voluntarism belies the more complex analyses of subject formation that I believe are implicitly present in many of the illustrations and practices that I will explore in the first section of this paper and explicitly present in the theories of subject formation of both Beauvoir and Butler that I will draw on in the second part.
My project, then, departs from the premise that gender alone is an incomplete focus of critique for those whose aim is to eradicate the inequalities that it seemingly generates and that the aim of undermining it would be better served by shifting to the ontological premise of sexual difference that underpins both sex and gender. In the following sections, I explore normative values that could justify this type of project, and I develop ontological premises that could underpin it.
Link: Fem Sci-Fi
Feminist science fiction reifies gender by valorizing femininity
Nicholas, 09 - research student in Humanities at Griffith University (Lucy, Thirdspace, “A Radical Queer Utopian Future: A Reciprocal Relation Beyond Sexual Difference,” vol. 8, is. 2, Red
***per replaces her/his, ***ze replaces she/he, ***humyn replaces human
By maintaining that this non-exploitative, reciprocal ethic is a feminine ethic, however grounded in social or psycho-social conceptions of femininity/masculinity, the approaches of these feminist utopias still do not go far enough in fully transcending the sex/gender dualisms that are, after all, symptomatic of the very self/other dualism that such a reciprocal and nurturing ethic seeks to reject.Whitbeck claims that the feminine ethic is available to both men and women and that “people may become convinced of the superiority of a particular ontology and seek the relationships and practices consistent with that view. (Theory may guide practice!)” (60). However, ze maintains a special access to this ethic for women by stating that men’s “ways of acquisition are necessarily different from our’s” (60). The approaches of Le Guin, Whitbeck, and others who valorize the feminine ethic did, indeed, emerge out of their involvement in 1970s feminism and, thus, from a movement that, owing to its context, sought to strategically valorize the female sphere.[4] It is my contention, however, that contemporary anarcho-queer ethics, along with a theoretical ontological ethics developed from the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Butler, is able to reach similar ethical conclusions without recourse to sex/gender hierarchy inversion.