SECURITY PHASE:FOURSUNSET: 1915 Hrs

10 May 2007

SECURITY PHASE:FOURSUNSET: 1915 hrs

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

Security clearances:

Security clearances will only be granted if the visit is ‘critical to the delivery of humanitarian, emergency or security operations’.

Under the Accountability and Responsibility framework of the UN Security Management System, Heads of Agency are responsible and accountable for making the decision on critical program operations.

B4 hardened vehicles are NOT suitable for use in Gaza and should not be used to carry International staff. B6 standard hardened vehicles should only be used.

KIDNAPPING THREAT

It is now 59 days since BBC journalist Alan Johnston was kidnapped, we all hope for a safe outcome and the return of Alan soon. This is the longest kidnapping of an International in Gaza.

There is a VERY HIGH kidnap threat for ALL Internationals especially American and British nationals in Gaza. Missions to Gaza should only be for CRITICAL reasons and this advice is given also to all NGOs and IGOs and other colleagues working in Gaza.

International and National Staff are to take extra care and remain vigilant when visiting locations against the kidnap threats in Gaza and abide by the mitigating measures. Predictable routes are a danger and extra caution should be taken and movement should be restricted wherever possible.

1. AREA SUMMARY (24 hours)

1. RAFAH:

NTR

2. KHAN YUNIS:

9 May/1540 hrsA demonstration is held in front of PalTel office by Barbak family. 2 PALTel vehicles damaged by fire, stones are thrown at the office. Also see update for area North.

3. MIDDLE:

9 May/1515 hrsExchange of fire between Blue Police and Abu Haj’s family in Nuseirat camp. The fight erupted when the police attempted to recover a vehicle allegedly stolen before by members from Abu Haj’s family. The police succeeded to take the vehicle. No injuries reported.

9 May/2140 hrsIslamic Jihad organized a military show in Deir Balah city to solicit support for their cause and to show their power. About 100 militants participated.

4. NORTH:

9 May/0130 hrsAn IED detonated at the entrance gate of the residence of a Senior officer in the National Security in Shejaeia. The IED was placed by unknown attackers. No injuries reported.

9 May/0705 hrs1 HMR fired from Beit Hanoun towards Sderot.

9 May/0900 hrsIDF incursion with bulldozers and ground troops into the area North of Beit Hanoun. Search operation. Penetration of about 100m from the Green line.

9 May/1110 hrsThe IDF OP South of Karin opened fire at people who were in a distance of about 50 m to the green Line. 2 injuries reported.

9 May/1305 hrsA Security guard at PalTel shot and injured a customer who came from Gaza to settle an issue. As a result of this the issue extended to Khan Younis where members of the family retaliated against PalTel.

9 May/1430 hrs2 HMRs fired from North of Beit Lahia towards the Green line.

10 May/0025 hrsHundreds of PA Security forces spread in the Northern region to implement the Security Plan of the MOI.

The incidents reported are not all confirmed and are circulated to assist your own safety and security. The information should not be disseminated outside the circulation list or used for any other purpose.

1. INCIDENT STATISTICS

Incidents Gaza / Number
Suicide Attacks
Targeted killing
Kidnapping
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) / 1
Indirect fire attack
Armed Incidents / 2
Demonstrations / 1
Physical Detention
Burglary
Theft
Vehicle accidents
Search operations
Home Made Rockets / 3
RPGs (Rockets Propelled Grenades, Anti tank rockets) fired
IDF Shelling attacks
IAF air strikes
IDF Incursion / 1
IDF Firing (into the Gaza strip, e.g.: across the Green Line) / 1
Fatalities and Casualties / Number
IDF operations (shelling/air strike/shootings) / 2 wounded
Shootings originating other than IDF / 1 wounded
Explosion
Demonstrations
Natural Disaster

1. Operational Procedures

The majority of Security Operational Procedures are contained in the Gaza Security Plan (held by all agencies)

The IDF announced on 26 Nov06 a cease fire but they will continue to target militants firing HMRs. Staff should not approach the border area within 300m without coordination with the IDF as they may shoot from observation points at any person within this exclusion zone.

There is confirmation of large numbers of unexploded shells in the border areas.

General:

Staff are to minimize movement. Only critical program related moves in liaison with the FSCO are acceptable.

International staff must move in clearly marked UN hardened vehicles.

Nosingle-vehicle movement of International staff permitted. All UN vehicle movements of International staff will have to be in convoy, accompanied by armed security forces. This is also applicable for the Rimaal area/within the security triangle.

Staff are to continue to report all moves to the radio room by mobile phone unless accompanied by the Golf Team in the Rimmal area.

Vehicles parked over night outside UN installations must be parked securely. All UN 4 x4 vehicles must be parked securely overnight in a garage, securely behind closed doors or left in UN compounds.

No UN vehicles will be used and parked outside residences.

• 2 vehicle principle applied also for national staff, when possible

All International residences will be guarded by armed security forces.

Movements of International staff to restaurants and after sunset to locations other than to residences and offices must receive prior authorization from the FSCO.

Rimaal area in GazaCity:

All movements of International staff will have to be in convoy and using hardened vehicles with armed police escorts, either accompanied by the Golf team or any other UN vehicle.

All movement to be coordinated with the radio room.

North of GazaCity (including Erez):

Moves to the northern areas (less Erez) must be confirmed as critical to program delivery by the head of agency.

Hardened vehicles with armed police escortsmust be used for all moves.

Staff members should contact the radio room and ask for an update prior to leaving with the escort from/to Erez. If necessary departure must be delayed to ensure the route is safe to travel on.

No travel to and from Erez after sunset unless coordinated by FSCO

Southern Areas:

Staff are to move only in hardened vehicles and armed police escorts.

Moves to the southern areas must be confirmed as critical to program delivery by the head of agency.

1)Staff remaining in Gaza:

a)Communications:Every move is to be reported to the radio room by mobile phone. Inside the Rimmal area the Golf team will report on Channel 10.

b)UN Staff in GazaCity:

i)Accommodation:A team of UN guards (Golf Team)is patrollingaccommodation buildings.

ii)Movements in GazaCity: Internationals will be escorted by armed police.

2)Visits to Gaza – Non Gaza Based Staff.Security clearances will only be granted if the visit is ‘critical to the delivery of humanitarian, Emergency or security operations’. Under the Accountability and Responsibility framework of the UN Security Management System, Heads of Agency are responsible and accountable for making the decision on critical program operations.

3)Buffer zone around Gaza:UN Staff travelling from Israel to enter Gaza at Erez Crossing and into the buffer zone should make contact with the Gaza Radio Room by VHF radio channel 16 or telephone 08 2863202 upon reaching Asquelon. The FSCO Gaza will advise on the security situation at Erez Crossing and vicinity as to whether it is safe to continue travelling to Erez and Gaza or into the buffer zone. Staff members not required for duty purposes avoid the Gaza border areas inside the buffer zone.

The SMT decision of Friday 24 Nov 06 regarding the HMR/ Qassam rocket threat from Gaza into Southern Israel, and the decision that all UN missions in the affected area come under the security management of ASC Gaza, refers.

The border of the buffer zone is on approximately the range of the Qassam rockets, but also on (potentially) identifiable features. This includes all travel on Route 232 to Route 4 junction to Ashqelon (city and route included).

The Security Measures for all UN staff who want to enter this area, and that are implemented with immediate effect, are:

a)All UN staff travelling to the area (as described above) will fall under the security management and coordination of the ASC Gaza.

b)Security clearance to enter this area is required from FSCO Gaza a day in advance of the planned mission.

c)Before entering this area a mobile phone contact has to be made with the Gaza Radio Room on 082863202 to obtain final clearance and an update of the known security situation.

d)VHF Radio contact has to be maintained with the Gaza Radio Room whilst in this area. UNRWA Area Operations Officers (AOOs) provide as in-time information as available on the VHF system on home made rockets (HMR) being fired, and this has to be monitored. If a launch of a HMR or the explosion of a HMR is observed, it should be reported to the Gaza Radio Room.

e)When the Israeli Early Warning system is activated, UN staff in this area must react to ensure their safety.

f)Visits and meetings in Sederot must be in hardened vehicles.

g)When an alarm is activated, or a HMR launch is reported during travel, remain in the hardened vehicle and drive out of the area unless otherwise advised by the FSCO.

h)When an alarm is activated, or a HMR launch is reported during meetings or static programme activities, go into nearest bunker or remain in the hardenedvehicle unless otherwise advised by the FSCO.

i)UN staff in this area must report their presence, location and planned movements.

j)Consideration given to using unmarked UN vehicles to avoid antagonizing the residents.

1. EREZ CROSSING PROCEDURES

Staff are reminded that we can only coordinate movement of UN staff across Erez.

Details for Erez crossing notifications for Friday, Saturday and Sunday need to be to the FSCO by 1100hrs on Thursday.

Following more changes by the IDF and discussions with UNSCO and UNRWA, on the discrimination between UN Staff and the information being requested, the guidance for crossing Erez is now:

Entry to Gaza:

On arrival at the first check point hand over passports for checking and the passport will be handed back with a white piece of paper (vehicle gate pass).

Drive to the car park outside the new terminal building and then walk to the VIP lounge through the first door of the new terminal building and turn left.

Hand over passports for processing and they will be returned with the white piece of paper.

Drive to the checking area near to the dog search area and walk to the booth hand over passports and white piece of paper.

The passports will be returned and then drive into Gaza.

Exit from Gaza:

The normal procedure takes place at Hamsa Hamsa (The IDF will at this stage confirm to the civilian crossing company that the person to cross holds a yellow MFA Card which may initially cause a delay)

The passport is handed back

UN Staff drive to the ‘red hand’ stop sign 20 metres from the 1st blue barrier and stop.

Walk to the civilian guard at the box and present both the UNLP passport and their Yellow MFA Card which are checked and handed back with a white piece of paper.

UNLP blue passport holders with no MFA card may be asked to walk through the last part of the tunnel through the side door. If they are driving the UN vehicle sometimes this can be avoided.

International Staff with a National Passport and a Service visa but no MFA card will be required to walk through the last part of tunnel via the side door.

Staff return to their vehicle and drive the vehicle through the 1stblue barrier stopping in the white square to the left and switch the engine off.

An external dog check is carried out around the vehicle (the staff member remains in the vehicle and the dogs do not enter the vehicle. No bags are checked, there are no vehicle checks and there is no requirement to walk through a metal detector)

The staff member drives through the second barrier to the new terminal building and parks in the car park and walks to the first access door and turns left to the new VIP lounge. The passport procedure is completed the staff member is handed back the passport and white piece of paper.

The staff member then drives to the last barrier at the exit and hands over the white piece of paper and entersIsrael.

Notes:

International staff members:

All International Staff holding UNLPs and an Israeli service visa should, on their first entry to Gaza, apply 5 days in advance for Erez clearance. The details required are:

• Name: Date of Birth: Nationality: Place of Birth: D/UNLP number: D/UNLP expiry date: IL service visa number: IL service visa expiry date:
• Contact Major Peter Learner IDF Erez on for further assistance.
• It is not the responsibility of the FSCO Gaza to apply for IDF clearance; it is an individual / agency responsibility. On receipt of the UN security clearance form the FSCO Gaza will co-ordinate with the IDF at Erez.

Prior coordination for Blue LP holders (of the vehicle and drivers/passengers) remains a requirement at least 24 hrs before actual travel. (on Thursday for travel on Friday, Saturday and Sunday).

Short term UN staff and contractors with no MFA Card:

can cross with MFA card holders or Red LP holders but they will be required to remove their baggage from the vehicle for checking.

National Staff :

Permits are required prior to National staff crossing Erez. It will take about 7 working days for the issuing of Permits. The permits may be issued for up to 3 months depending on the requirement or justification.

For Gaza national staff the agency can apply direct to Major Peter Lerner (Fax 08 6741669). The details required when applying for the permit are: Name: ID Number: DOB: Position in Agency: Where Staff are Going: When Staff need to travel: How long are they travelling for: Why they are travelling:

1. Kits

1. PEP (Post Exposure Preventive Treatment) Starter kits are available at the JSCO, in Jerusalem and with all the International UNDSS Security Officers in I/WB/G. These kits provide emergency medical prophylaxis for UN staff exposed to the HIV virus either through sexual assault or occupational accidents.

The treatment should ideally be initiated within two hours and not later than 72 hours following the exposure. The UNDSS Gender Focal Point, Ms Chandana Tiwari, FSCO, Jerusalem (Area Two), is available to facilitate the process.

All information and documentation regarding sexual assault or occupational accident will be kept strictly confidential.

1. BIRD FLU UPDATE

No new cases of Avian Flu in birds have been reported and no Human cases have been confirmed so far in OPt and Israel.

FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE AVIAN INFLUENZA PLEASE READ CAREFULLY ALL THE MATERIAL IN THE WEB LINK.

Key information on Avian Influenza is now available on-line in English and in Arabic. Please visit and look for: AVIAN INFLUENZA

Radio Room
VHF Channel 16, Call Sign: 'Sierra base,
Tel. 08 282 2622 / 08 286 3202 MIRS 309 / Security Clearances
Fax 08 67 77444
FSCO Mick Scannell
Call sign: GS01,
Work 08 677 7362Jawwal 0599 413827, / LSA- Hamdan Hamdan
Call Sign: GS02,
Work 08 677 7261Jawwal 0599 411984.

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