Se(k)urity 1.0 7 Week Juniors
1/228
Final security 7week juniors
***1NC***
1NC
***LINKS***
***AFGHANISTAN***
Afghanistan “Solutions”
Burqa/ women
Imperialism
“Saving” Afghanistan
Terrorism
***IRAQ***
Deterrence/ military cred
good/evil dichotomy
geopolitical identity
Liberalism
Marginalization
Multilateralism
Orientalism
Peace-building
Savior
***IRAN***
Friend-enemy dichotomy
Proliferation
***JAPAN***
geography
Imperialism
Orientalism
Relations
***KOREAS***
Assumes Dependence
Cold War Conceptions False
Differential Culture
Neocolonialism
Orientalism
Realist understanding of Asia
Stabilization Rhetoric
Theorization/Historization Necessary
Western World Order
Westernized Hierarchy
***TURKEY***
East/West reps
Geo-strategic discourse
geopolitical identity
Foreign policy objective
Military state
Orientalism
Relations- contextual
“Sick man”
Turkish national security
Westernization
***GENERIC LINKS***
Asian Growth “Threat”
Causality
Capitalism/Economy
China Threat
Civilization Discourse
Coerced consent
Cost Benefit Analysis
Cyber-terrorism
Democracy
Dividing the World
Economics
Economic Security
Failed states
“Foreign” language
Hegemony
Humanism
Humanitarianism
Identity Politics
Impact Discourse
Islamic Terrorism
Kagan/Unilateralism/Hegemony
Masking - linguistics
Masking – ideological banners
North Korea – rogue state
OMNIPOTENCE
POWER-KNOWLEDGE
Political Economy
Policy-making
Rationality
Sex Trafficking
AT: Sex trafficking is bad/threat real
Soft Power
States-System
Strategic Understanding
Super-Terrorism
Support for Allies
Terrorism and rogue states
“the homeland”
Threats by fear/bias
Universal Norms
US = the best
War
Western superiority
World Order
***ALTZ***
Alt Solves – Crises
Alt Solves – Diplomacy
Alt Solves – Emancipation
Alt Solves – Exclusionary Citizenship
Alt Solves – Error Replication/Real World
Alt Solves – Exclusion of the Other
Alt Solves – Global Problems
Alt Solves – Reps
Alt Solves – VTL
Alt Solves – War
Alt Solves
***FRAMEWORK***
F: Discourse matters
F: Discourse first
F: Discourse key to truth/knowledge
Discourse shapes reality
Reps Key
F: Language shapes policy
F: Identity key to foreign policy
F: Epistemology
A2: State key
***IMPACTS***
Individual Freedom
State Violence
Structural Laundry List
Violence
No change
Brutal control
Self-fulfilling prophecy
Friend/Enemy
Domination
Humanitarian Wars
Replicates Harms
Violence
Fascism
War
Wars/ Famine
Racism
Terrorism
Oversimplifies
Cooperation possible—science
Rational actor theory wrong
AT: Thayer / biology
AT: Thayer/Biology
AT: waltz
AT: structural realism
AT: behavioralism
AT: game theory
AT: neo-realism
AT: Popper
AT: psychology
domestic problems
***IMPACTS***
ethnic cleansing
nukewar
nukewar, oppression
War
***AFF
Perm Solvency
Perm Solves-Realism
Perm Solves- Realism
Perm Solves
AFF—perm
AT: Perm Still Links
Pragmatism good
2AC Alternative
ALT FAILS- OTHER COUNTRIES
ALT FAILS- IMPLEMENTATION
Just Rejection Fails
AT: deligitimize war alt
AT: Realism Socially Constructed
AT: Realism Cannot Explain Non-State Actors
AT: The K Agrees with Realism
Reps not First
AT: root cause
Aff fwk
Iran is an objective threat
Indo-Pak War is an objective threat
Russia is a threat
China is a threat
Water Wars Can’t be Ignored
Oil/Gas Security is a Major Threat
Economic Growth is a Security Concern
Terror and Rogue States ARE the biggest threat
AT: Failed States and terror are constructed
Threat of Al’Qaida Justifies Pre-emption
WMDs mean weak and rogue states are a threat
Weak State Prolif MUST be checked
AT: WALKER
CONSEQUENCES/ FUTURISM OUTWEIGHS
NUCLEAR UTIL GOOD
West K2 All People
AT: West=exclusionary
West is Self Correcting
West Good: Need to defeat Islamism
Western Way of Life Broadly Accepted
A2: K of Crisis – Must Act Now
Iraq Invasion Ethical
Pre-emption ethically necessary
Pre-emption doesn’t violate I-Law
***1NC***
1NC
The 1AC's realist logic is founded upon genocidal exclusion- their descriptions are not neutral and objective, but are instead political and contingent.
George ’94(Jim, Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, “Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” p. 11-13, AM)
This is the general context on which an emerging critical social theory literature in International Relations has focused regarding the historical and philosophical circumstances that saw positivism emerge as the foremost articulation of the Enlightenment pursuit of a rational-scientific foundation for modern human life. Hence the increasingly critical response to the dichotomized crudity of International Relations scholarship that, in the face of generations of counterargument and vibrant debate in other areas of the humanities, continues to represent its theory and practice in universalist and essentialist terms—as "corresponding" to an (anarchical) and unchanging reality—detached from and largely irrelevant to the complexities of domestic theory and practice. Hence also the growing frustration with the tendency within the discipline to fail to seriously confront the simplicity of its approach to fundamental analytical issues concerning, for example, the relationship of "knower" and "known" and the nature of individuality, of (rational) choice, of reading history, of power, and of change. Hence the attempts, in the 1980s and 1990s, to speak in a more sophisticated and insightful manner about givens such as the sovereign state, the utilitarian nature of the (anarchical) state system, and the overall closure of an approach to theory and practice rendered static by an uncritical adherence to Western, post-Renaissance historical and intellectual experience.21The major target of critical social theory has been an International Relations orthodoxy—most influentially manifested in the scientific neoRealism of (mainly) U.S. scholarship but also in its (mainly) BritishTraditionalist counterpart—that continues to represent as the reality of International Relations a narrow, self-affirming, and self-enclosed image of the world "out there."22 On this basis, a complex, ambiguous, and heterogeneous matrix of existence has been reduced, in International Relations intellectual and policy circles, to a simplistic, universalized image of the "real" world, which is fundamentally detached from the everyday experience of so much of that world. I will argue here, however, that, contrary to any Realist doctrine, reality is never a complete, entirely coherent "thing," accessible to universalized, essentialist, or totalized understandings of it. Nor can the question of reality be exhausted by reference to the facts of the world or any simple aggregation of them, because reality is always characterized by ambiguity, disunity, discrepancy, contradiction, and difference. An adequate political realism, consequently, is one that above all recognizes its limitations in this regard and acknowledges its partial, problematic, and always contestable nature. Inadequacy, 'n this sense, is the representation of a partial, particularistic image of reality as (irreducible, totalized, and uncontestable) reality itself. The problem, as R. N. Berki suggests, is that it has been precisely this inadequate and "primitive" representation of reality that has dominated within the Anglo-American intellectual community, particularly that sector of it concerned with International Relations. As a consequence, two rather primitive subthemes have become integral to the question of political reality in International Relations. The first projects reality as existing "out there" and is articulated through the language and logic of immediacy.Reality, on this basis, is a world of "tangible, palpable, perceptible things or objects. . . . It is material and concrete."24The real world, consequently, is that which is immediately ,"there," around us and disclosed to us by sensory information. Realism in International Relations thus becomes the commonsensical accommodation to the tangible, observable realities of this (external) world. At this point the second, primitive, Realist theme reaffirms the first and, by its own logic at least, grants it greater legitimacy. This is the necessity theme, which confirms the need for accommodation to the facts of reality but accords them greater historical and philosophical facticity. Reality now becomes "the realm of the unchangeable, inevitable and in the last resort inexorable occurrences, a world of eternity, objectivity, gravity, substantiality and positive resistance to human purposes."25In this manner, Realism is imbued with moral, philosophical, and even religious connotations in its confrontation with the real world "out there." It becomes moral in that it observes certain rules of conduct integral to the reality of human behavior. It can take on a religious dimension in that reality is understood as an accommodation to an inexorable destiny emanating from the realm of ultimate "necessity." Its philosophical status is established as Realists, acknowledging the need for accommodation, representtheir understanding of reality in the serious, resigned manner of, for example, the scholar-statesman contemplating the often unpalatable "is" of the world. The knowledge form integral to this Realist philosophy is that concerned, above all, with control.More precisely, the knowledge form integral to a Realism of this kind is positivism; its philosophical identity, as a consequence, is marked by dualism and dichotomy. At its most powerful (e.g., during the Cold War), this positivist-Realist identity is represented as the opposition between the forces of rationality, unity, and progressive purpose and an anarchical realm of danger and threat in permanent need of restraint. A genuine (positivist) Realist, in this circumstance, is the observer of the world "out there" aware, above all, of the need for the law and order proffered by the sovereign state in a post-Renaissance world of states. The Realist, accordingly, remains "heroically pessimistic," trusting only in the forces of "law and order, and their maintenance by force, as a permanent and ever precarious holding operation [understanding] peace, tranquility, prosperity, freedom [as] a special bonus, accruing to people as a result of living in a well ordered society."26As Berki suggests, this Realist approach represents logical and analytical inadequacy in that in detaching itself from theory and interpretation it effectively detaches itself from the (historical, cultural, and linguistic) context of everyday human existence—from the social and intellectuallifeblood of reality. Even in its most sophisticated form (e.g., Popperian/ce. Lakatosian), a positivist-Realist approach represents an anachronistic residue of the European Enlightenment and, in general, mainstream Western philosophy, which continues the futile_guest for a grand(non) theory of existence beyond specific time, space, or political purpose. More immediately, it stands as a dangerous source of analytic/policy paralysis, in 'the face of the extraordinary events associated with the end of the ColdWar and in the face of widespread recognition that it is seemingly incapable of moving beyond its primitive intellectual agenda.27Realism in International Relations, accordingly, constructs its explanatory agenda upon one variant or another of a "spectator" theory of knowledge, in which knowledge of the real world is gleaned via a realm of external facts (e.g., of interstate anarchy) that impose themselves upon the individual scholar-statesman, who is then constrained by the analytic/policy "art of the possible." In its (mainly) North American variant, infused with (primarily) Popperian insight and behavioralist training rituals since the 1960s, this has resulted in a Realism set upon the enthusiastic invocation of falsificationist scientific principles. The (mainly) British alternative, meanwhile, has invoked a species of intuitionist inductivism often more sensitive in tone to the various critiques of positivism but ultimately no less committed to its perpetuation. As a consequence, the questions asked and (historicophilosophical) issues raised by International Relations scholarship have been severely limited,to the extent that complex epistemological/ ontological debates over knowledge, meaning, language, and reality—the issues of how we think and act in the world—have been largely confined to the primitive Realist framework described earlier.
1NC
Realism secures its place as the hegemonic understanding of the world through violence- the claim to intellectual mastery is the root cause of conflict
Jim George, Senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 1994 (“Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations,” p. 140-141, AM)
The critical social theory challenge to orthodox theory as practice has centered generally on the proposition that there are major silences and dangers inherent in the way that we ask our questions of the modern world and construct our (rational-scientific) answers.Examples of this critical perspective have come from a whole range of intellectual locations in recent years. The two examples to follow have particular thematic significance in a critical social theory context, given their explicit concern with the crisis of modern thought and post-Enlightenment political practice.The first comes from Robert Bellah, who in 1985 spoke of some of the paradoxes of modern life, in these terms:There is a widespread feeling that the promise of the modern era is slipping away from us.A movement of enlightenment and liberation that was to have freed us from superstition and tyranny has led in the twentieth century to a world in which ideological fanaticism and political oppression have reached extremes unknown in previous history. Science, which was to have unlocked the the bounties of nature, has given us the power to destroy all life on earth. Progress, modernity's master idea, seems less compelling today when it appears that it may be progress into the abyss. And the globe today is divided between a liberal world so incoherent that it seems to be losing the significance of its own ideals, an oppressive and archaic communist statism, and a poor, often tyrannical third world reaching for the first rungs of modernity.1These themes have been taken up even more profoundly by Jane Flax, who has captured the sense of the critical social theory challenge to modernity with her proposition thatsomething has happened, is happening to Western societies. The beginning of this transition can be dated somewhat arbitrarily from after the First World War in Europe and after the Second World War in the United States. Western culture is in the middle of a fundamental transformation: a "shape of life" is growing old. The demise of the old is being hastened by the end of colonialism, the uprising of women, the revolt of other cultures against white Western hegemony, shifts in the balance of economic and political power within the world economy, and a growing awareness of the costs as well as the benefits of scientific "progress." [Moreover] Western intellectuals cannot be immune from the profound shifts now taking place in contemporary social life.2For Flax this is a crisis of contemporary society that reflects a growing recognition that the Enlightenment dream is over, that peoples everywhere are becoming increasingly awakened to the dangers of the Enlightenment narrative of reason, knowledge, progress, and freedom. This is an importanttheme in a critical social theory context concerned to open up closed theory and practice, in that it allows for (effectively) silenced voices to be heard again, including those associated with anti-Enlightenment sentiments, such as Nietzsche. It is important also because it connects the broader social theory debate starkly and directly to an International Relations context. It does so when the progressivism of the post-Enlightenment period is confronted with some of its more sinister dimensions, concerning, for example, the connection between the rational modern subject and the experiences of Hiroshima and Auschwitz.The point here, of course, is that a celebration of the age of rational science and modern technological society cannot simply be disconnected from the weapons of mass slaughter and the techniques of genocide. Nor can the language and logic of liberty and emancipation be easily detached from the terror waged in their names by, for example, the major Cold War foes, each proclaiming itself the natural systemic heir to the Enlightenment dream. And while many in the 1990s celebrate the end of the Cold War—as the victory of one Enlightenment-based economic doctrine over another—the other side of this particular coin must also be confronted, in the poverty of so much of the world and in the growing underclasses in First World societies, where neoclassical and neo-Marxian "scientific" approaches have dominated the economic debates.It is worth pondering, too, in this context, that the issue of ethnic cleansing, rightly condemned by the Western powers in the 1990s (and resisted in the 1940s), is an integral part of modern Western history, particularly via its Realist narrative, which celebrates the process of state making, of the triumphant march of modern, rational man. Ethnic cleansing is in this sense an integral feature of the story of modernization and Western triumph over "traditional" ignorance. Even a rudimentary appreciation of silenced histories implies as much—the histories of, for example, the Huron, the Oglala, the Mandika, and the Pitjantjatjara, all victims of ethnic cleansing for the greater good of a unified, homogeneous state system and the eradication of (anarchical) difference.
1NC
Voting negative "forgets" the dominant IR framing of the 1AC. This approach is capable of overcoming the structural inertia of dominant geopolitics
Bleiker 1
[ES1](Senior lecturer and co-director of Rotary centre of International studies in Peace and Conflict resolution, Ronald, “The Zen of International Relations”, edited by Stephen Chan, Peter Mandeville, and Ronald Blieker,pg 38-39)
The power to tell stories is the power to define common sense. Prevalent ire stories have been told for so long that they no longer appear as stories. They are accepted as fact for their metaphorical dimensions have vanished from our collective memories. We have become accustomed to our distorting IR metaphors until we come to lie, as Nietzsche would say “herd-like in a style obligatory for all. As a result dominant ir stories have successfully transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the realist one, into reality per se. Realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectified world view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Steve Smith argues, 'is the ultimate act of political power.’8 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path. The prime objective of this essay is to challenge prevalent ir stories. The most effective way of doing so, the chapter argues, is not to critique but to forget them, to tell new stories that are not constrained by the boundaries of established and objectified IR narratives. Such an approach diverges from many critical engagements with world politics. Most challenges against dominant IR stories have been advanced in the form of critiques. While Critiquing orthodox IR stories remains an important task, it is not sufficient. Exploring the origins of problems, in this case discourse ow power politics and their positivist framing of the political practice, cannot overcome all the existing theoretical and practical dilemmas By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR theory, the impact of critical voices remaitns confined within the larger discursive boundaries that have been established through the initial framing of debates. A successful challenge to orthodox IR stories must do more than merely critique their narrow and problematic nature. To be effective, critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object of critique, of theoririzing world politics beyond the agendas, issues and terminologies that are prest by orthodox debates. Indeed the most powerful potential of critical scholarship may well lie in the attempt to tell different stories about IR, for once theres stories have become validated , they may well open up spaces for a more inclusive and less violence prone practice of real world politics.