Constitution for Effective School Governance

http://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentId=16715

Economics is the current metaphor for educational reform. Schools must be more “accountable” in a bottom line sense of improvements in educational achievement. Teachers are assessed for their value added to student achievement and are given economic incentives to do so. Charter schools are established partly in the name of creating competition for public schools.

But the economic metaphor is not the only one applicable to schooling. Indeed in 2009 Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson shared the Nobel prize for economics by challenging the competitive marketplace as the primary mechanism and metaphor applying to human behavior– Williamson for characterizing how transactions are more efficient within organizations and Ostrom for addressing collective action problems of shared natural resources in small communities. Each of these could be applied to schools which as organizations reduce transaction costs among teachers allowing them to act collectively to share knowledge and information to produce outcomes.

Having grown up in Michigan, I think of attention to collective action and shared resources as the Magic Johnson effect. During his time at Michigan State, Earvin “Magic” Johnson scored an average of 17 points. Good, but many others have had higher averages. Yet I would want him on my team because he made everyone around him better. In this sense, the best teachers may be those that make everyone around them better, a characteristic that is not currently the focus of value added models driven by the metaphor of the marketplace. Indeed there is increasing evidence that teachers are motivated to perform well and to help their colleagues do so, regardless of immediate economic incentives.

A spirit of collaboration among teachers can be cultivated by attending to school governance. Schools face competing demands from different sets of parents, community members and other stakeholders. In order to adjudicate these demands, schools must systematically improve their approach to governance. Failure to do so will allow intense internal conflict to create challenges for teacher collaboration, leading to teacher burnout and attrition – fundamental problems that underlie the blight in many schools.

Here I propose a set of guidelines for school governance in the form of a constitution, inspired by national constitutions that have proven valuable for navigating competing interests through representation and checks and balances. The articles of the constitution do not concern themselves with specific matters of leadership, pedagogy, teachers’ practices or curriculum. Instead, the articles pertain to governance as it relates to practices for adopting and implementing changes in policies, practices, and personnel.

Article 1: Adoption of Reforms, New Policies & Practices

No school-wide reform, or change in policy or practice may be implemented unless two thirds or more of the teachers in the school approve the change. This is the practice used by programs such as “Success for All” as well as many comprehensive school reforms. It allows teachers to make decisions for their school as a collective based on their assessments of how a reform meshes with their existing practices, commitments, student composition, etc.

Article 2: Community Expectations

The effects of any change in practices or policies on student achievement should not be expected for three years.

It takes teachers time to learn about a reform, adapt the reform to their collective contexts, and then reestablish coordination with each other (Cook et al., 2000; Zhao and Frank, 2003). Pushing for results before three years have lapsed can generate superficial change or exert counterproductive pressure on teachers and the relationships among them.

Article 3: Community to School Link: Governing Board.

The school shall be governed by a board composed of at least 50% of community members. The board can replace a principal by a vote of two thirds or more.

Many small school districts effectively have this policy as the school board is the governing board for a single high school (Bryk et al., 2010; Ravitch, 2010). But article 3 extends the policy to urban districts and even elementary schools giving them the localized school decision-making typical of suburban districts. Critically, the board can direct policy through their latent and manifest power to appoint the principal.

Article 4: Removal of Teachers

A principal can use a streamlined procedure to remove not more than 5% of the teachers in a given year.

This gives the principal the capacity to exert influence over the teachers. Note that it does not support a wholesale replacement of teachers, but a streamlined procedure for a select number of teachers. For example, in an elementary school of twenty teachers the principal can use the streamlined procedure to replace not more than one per year.

Articles 5: Removal of Principal

A principal can be evaluated for replacement if more than 20% of the teachers in the school request transfer or leave in a given year (excluding planned retirements).

This gives the teachers, as a collective, influence over the principal. If a modest sized group of teachers opposes the principal strongly enough to request a transfer then the principal is vulnerable to losing her position.

Together these articles create a series of checks and balances as outlined below. Articles 1 and 2 provide the school with a check against community pressures, while article 3 provides the community a check on the school. Article 4 provides the principal a check on the teachers and article 5 provides the teachers a check on the principal. Thus as a set the articles provide a framework for schools to govern themselves internally while negotiating complex external demands.

Figure: Checks and Balances of Articles for School Constitution

Article 6 : Adoption of this Constitution

This constitution and amendments should be adopted based on articles 1 & 2.

Article 7 : Other Policies

All other policies not directly addressed by the articles in this constitution should be determined by district personnel and school faculty in accordance with existing labor agreements, and district, state, and federal policies.

Each of these articles will have opponents. Reformers and parents may feel obstructed by the need for a two-thirds vote of faculty and may not want to wait three years for improvement in the education of their children. Principals may not want to be vulnerable to a vote of a local lay board or to the career decisions of teachers. Teachers and their unions may resist “subjective” decisions of principals.

But the key to the constitutional framework is that the set of articles must be taken as a whole, protecting the interests of each set of stakeholders through a series of checks and balances. For example, community members may not like articles one and two, but they have enormous power to shape school policy through article 3 (see the Figure).

Do not expect that adoption of this or any similar constitution to create short term dramatic improvements in educational outcomes. Instead a constitution should give a school a stable and strong social foundation to implement current and the inevitable future reforms while cultivating collective action and support among school staff.

Think of it as laying the groundwork for the social infrastructure of the school that will serve the community for generations. Or perhaps longer.

Berry, B. and Exkert, J. 2011. Creating Teacher Incentives for School Excellence and Equity, by Barnett Berry and Jonathan Eckert: http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/creating-teacher-incentives.

Borman, G., & Hewes, G. (2002). The long-term effects and cost-effectiveness of Success for All. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 24 (4), 243-266.

Bryk, Anthony S., Valerie E. Lee, and Peter B. Holland. 1993. Catholic Schools and the Common Good. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bryk, Anthony S., Pennie B. Sebring, David D. Kerbow, Sharon S. Rollow, and John Q. Easton. 1998. Charting Chicago School Reform: Democratic Localism as a Lever for Change. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cook, Thomas D., Murphy, Robert F., and Hunt David H. 2000. “Comer's School Development Program in Chicago: A Theory-Based Evaluation” American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2, 535-597.

Ravitch, D. 2010. Why Public Schools Need Democratic Governance Kappan V91(6): 24-27

Zhao, Y. and Frank, K. A., 2003. “An Ecological Analysis of Factors Affecting Technology Use in Schools.” American Educational Research Journal, , 40(4): 807-840.