SCHNITTJER v. DUBUQUE COUNTY/DUBUQUE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE
Page 1
before the iowa WORKERS’ COMPENSATION commissioner
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:
TABITHA A. SCHNITTJER, :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 5031336
DUBUQUE COUNTY/DUBUQUE :
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, :
: A P P E A L
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
IMWCA, : Head Note No.: 2301
:
Insurance Carrier, :
Defendants. :
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Claimant, Tabitha A. Schnittjer, appeals from a ruling granting summary judgment to defendants, Dubuque County/Dubuque County Sheriff’s Office and IMWCA, filed August 27, 2010. Claimant asserts on appeal that her common law claims included as a part of a federal civil rights complaint she has filed do not bar jurisdiction of her workers’ compensation claim filed with the Iowa Division of Workers’ Compensation. Defendants assert that summary judgment was proper as claimant’s pending federal claims bar claimant’s workers’ compensation claim.
The arguments and submissions of the parties are considered and this matter is considered on a de novo review of the record.
At issue is whether the Iowa Division of Workers’ Compensation has jurisdiction to decide the issues presented in claimant’s arbitration petition. Her petition filed with this agency on December 7, 2009 alleges an injury date of December 11, 2007 for an injury which occurred resulting from a sexual assault by a coworker [Dan Chapman]. In her workers’ compensation petition claimant seeks temporary and permanent disability benefits as well as medical and penalty benefits. Claimant had previously filed a ten count complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa Eastern Division. Claimant’s federal complaint was filed against Dubuque County, the Dubuque County Sheriff’s Department, the sheriff, other individuals and the alleged perpetrator of the sexual assault Dan Chapman. In that complaint claimant made the following claims:
Count I – Sex Discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 2003 et. seq. and 42 U.S.C. section 1983
Count II – Sex Discrimination in violation of Iowa Code section 216.6
Count III – Sexual Orientation Discrimination in violation of Iowa Code section 216.6
Count IV – Disability Discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 12101 et. seq. and Iowa Code section 216.6
Count V – Retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 2000e et. seq. and 42 U.S.C. section 12101
Count VI – Retaliation in violation of Iowa Code section 216.11
Count VII – Harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 2000e et. seq. and Iowa Code Chapter 216
Count VIII – Negligence against Defendant Dan Chapman
Count IX – Negligent Supervision against Defendants Dubuque County Sheriff’s Department, Dubuque County, Ken Runde, and Greg Egan
Count X – Battery against Defendant Dan Chapman
In her federal complaint claimant noted that the federal court had jurisdiction for her federal claims under various federal statutes, as noted above, and that jurisdiction also existed for her pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367. Only counts VIII, IX, and X of her petition are alleged to include any connection to her allegation of sexual assault which forms the basis of her workers’ compensation petition. Counts I through VII concern allegations of civil rights violations for discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. None of claimant’s complaints of discrimination, retaliation, and harassment (counts I through VII) allege any connection to her allegation of sexual assault. Rather counts I through VII relate to alleged denied promotions, disparate treatment, unreasonable discipline, and other disparate pay issues.
Defendants asserted in a motion for summary judgment that claimant does not have a viable workers’ compensation claim when, under the state or federal statutes, a viable claim for sexual harassment/discrimination exists.
The standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment are well settled in Iowa. Summary judgment should be rendered when the record before the court shows that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c); Kistler v. City of Perry, 719 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Iowa 2006). When confronted with a motion for summary judgment, the undersigned or agency is required to examine, in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the entire record before it, including the pleadings, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits, if any, to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact is generated thereby. Clay County v. Incorporated City of Spencer, 268 N.W.2d 493, 499-500 (Iowa 1978). A fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Henkel v. R. & S. Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 197-88 (Iowa 1982). If upon examination of the entire record the undersigned determines no such issue is present, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, entry of summary judgment is proper.
Summary judgment is a proper remedy in cases where its application advances its salutary objective of avoiding useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there exists no genuine, factual issue to be tried. Diamond Products v. Skipton Painting and Insulation, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1986); Neoco, Inc. v. Christenson, 312 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1981).
The presiding deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found that the moving party [defendants] had met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Iowa Division of Workers’ Compensation lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case, or whether claimant has a right to proceed with her workers’ compensation claim. In finding that the division lacks subject matter jurisdiction the deputy wrote:
What can be gleaned from Ottumwa Housing, Baird, and Cargill, above, is that a claimant cannot pursue a workers’ compensation action for an injury based on facts that also give rise to a cause of action for a civil rights complaint under state or federal laws. (Ottumwa Housing). If it is unclear that the same facts form the basis for both the workers’ compensation action and the civil rights action, summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not appropriate (Baird). Also, if a claimant has both a proper workers’ compensation injury that is not caused by the employer’s discriminatory conduct, and a civil rights cause of action that is caused by the employer’s discriminatory conduct, the portion of the workers’ compensation claim that is not caused by discriminatory conduct can go forward under the workers’ compensation statute (Cargill).
Applying those principles to this case, it is found that claimant’s workers’ compensation petition is based on facts of an alleged sexual assault on December 11, 2007, and an alleged resulting psychological injury. It is also found that those same facts are the bases for three counts of claimant’s pending civil rights action in federal district court. Claimant’s entire workers’ compensation claim is based on the alleged assault; she has no physical or other psychological injuries. Her petition is based on the December 11, 2007, incident. Those same facts, if found to be true, constitute sexual harassment and sexual discrimination in violation of state and federal civil rights law. Claimant’s remedy for that injury is properly pursued in a civil rights action, which she has done. Under Iowa law, she cannot also pursue a workers’ compensation action based on the same facts that form the basis for her discrimination claim. To allow her workers’ compensation action to go forward would be to subject the employer to both that claim and a civil rights claim based on the same acts, and the employer would thereby lose the immunity from suit contemplated by the Iowa workers’ compensation statutes. That would violate the holding in Ottumwa Housing Authority.
(Ruling, pages 5-6)
Following consideration of the well-reasoned arguments of both parties it is concluded that the proper issue for consideration on appeal is whether counts VIII-X of claimant’s federal court complaint result in loss of jurisdiction of this agency over claimant’s workers’ compensation petition. Counts VIII-X of claimant’s federal complaint are non-civil rights claims. Those three claims are common law claims for negligence and battery – two of which do not directly involve the defendant-employer in the pending workers’ compensation petition. Those claims do allege as a part of damages that claimant suffered psychological injury, the need for medical care, and other losses. Claimant seeks those damages in her pending workers’ compensation claim. Those three non-civil rights claims were made a part of claimant’s federal civil rights claim through supplemental jurisdiction granted within 28 U.S.C. section 1367. Those claims are not independently under the jurisdiction of the federal court system. It is therefore necessary to determine whether attaching non-civil rights claims through use of supplemental jurisdiction with civil rights claims results in loss of jurisdiction as envisioned by the Iowa Supreme Court in Ottumwa Housing Authority v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1993).
As noted by the deputy commissioner in his ruling on summary judgment, under the holding in Ottumwa Housing a claimant cannot pursue a workers’ compensation action for an injury based on facts that also give rise to a cause of action for a civil rights complaint under state or federal laws. The deputy found that the alleged sexual assault also gave rise to a cause of action for sexual harassment and sexual discrimination in violation of state and federal civil rights law. (Ruling, p.6) That finding was in error as claimant specifically pled her federal complaint to make the alleged sexual assault form the basis of only the negligence and battery claims. As was noted in Baird, the quid pro quo is gone when a sexual discrimination claim under state or federal statutes is available for the same acts alleged in the workers’ compensation proceeding. Baird v. Ottumwa Community School District, 551 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Iowa 1996). It is concluded that claimant’s complaint with the federal district court alleging violations of sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation are for acts not made a part of her pending workers’ compensation petition. Claimant’s pendent matters in the federal claim, which may or may not violate the exclusive remedy provision of Iowa Code section 85.20, are not based on facts that gave rise to claimant’s assertions of civil rights violations. These pendent claims are not a basis to deny this agency jurisdiction over claimant’s petition. It is therefore concluded that summary judgment must therefore be denied.
Further, this agency has previously concluded that the Workers’ compensation commissioner’s authority to adjudicate a claim for mental injury is not preempted by the employee having made a civil rights claim that alleges the same or similar facts. Preemption occurs only when illegal discrimination is established. SeeDoolin v. IES Utilities, File No. 5003461 (Appeal Dec., December 31, 2003). In this matter the record establishes that defendants have denied claimant’s allegations made in her federal court complaint. Those allegations have not been proven by claimant. As the agency noted in Doolin, summary judgment would have been proper only if illegal discrimination had been established (something the employer denies), and if it were proven that no other stressors existed that could be attributable to anything other than illegal discrimination (something that is not established by the employer in its motion for summary judgment).
As summary judgment is denied, this matter shall be directed to the hearing administrator and set for hearing. Within 20 days of the date of this decision the parties shall jointly contact the hearing administrator and set this matter for a primary hearing date which shall occur within six months.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ruling on summary judgment is REVERSED and this matter shall be set for hearing as ordered herein.
Signed and filed this ___27th______day of September, 2011.
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CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSIONER
Copies To:
Mr. Michael A. McEnroe
Mr. Erin Patrick Lyons
Attorneys at Law
PO Box 810
Waterloo, IA 50704-0810
Ms. Jane V. Lorentzen
Attorney at Law
2700 Grand Ave, Ste 111
Des Moines, IA 50312-5215