Scenario 2 Inject 3 (FRAGO) Carana Scenario BN CPX

Task Force Headquarters(Sector 3)

United NationsAssistance Mission in Carana(UNAC)

Muka, Leppko, Carana

FRAGO 002 to OPORD 001-1

1. Background.

(a)Intelligence reports indicate a rebel splinter group has broken away from the ICSC, under the command of General Zed. This militia group, the Mouvement de Liberation de Carana-Sud (MLCS), says that the CDF still discriminates against the Tatsi population living in the south, that the spirit and the world of the Kalari Treaty is not being implemented and that the treaty is therefore invalid. Reports indicate that General Zed has called on all Tatsis to join his ranks and has begun forcibly conscripting Tatsi men and boys in areas under ICSC control. This has led to attacks on villages in the vicinity of Kika and Gachal, resulting in the displacement of large numbers of civilians who are fleeing from the area. Many of the displaced personnel are fleeing to Xalksa. And there is concern that violence in central Leppko will spill over and impact humanitarian access in eastern Leppko. News reports have picked up a statement by General Pea, a powerful local ICSC leader, describing General Zed as a ‘splitist traitor’ and sentencing him to death.

(b)General Pea and General Zed have a deep-seated intra-tribal/ethnic conflict that goes back approximately 20 years. Historical norms indicate a pattern of events which leads up to a significant clash between their forces, with large-scale loss of life and human rights violations (HRVs). The pattern usually begins with attacks on rival villages, characterized by ethnic massacres, torture, abductions, and sexual violence. This is typically followed by counter-attacks by rival militias. General Pea will typically use the media to great advantage. An indictment of General Zed in the medial is usually an indicator that a large-scale attack will occur within 72-96 hours. Attacks have been initiated by both sides, however, when attacks are initiated by General Zed, General Pea has used the attacks as an opportunity to build credibility with his followers by announcing counter-attacks purportedly to protect villages under his protection. He claims the moral imperative in the public arena (in regional and national level media) by specifically targeting the rival militia in his rhetoric. This gains him political credibility and standing, although in practice, the civilian population of the villages is targeted as well. The local population has become accustomed to the flow of events and typically will attempt to displace in advance of a large-scale clash between forces, returning within a week or two.

(c)The humanitarian situation remains dire throughout the province of Leppko, however, is exacerbated in Xalksa, which has not historically seen large numbers of displaced persons. Violent crime is widespread and includes attacks on humanitarian personnel and carjacking.The situation is exacerbated by the fragmentation of the Parties, the proliferation of weapons, and a reduction in humanitarian access.

2. Current Situation.

a. Conflict Parties.

(1)ICSC. General Pea, has a large and very loyal following with approximately 400 fighters, and is believed to operate from bases around Rumro. While reports of his tactics have involved significant violence, no human rights violations (HRVs) have been directly attributed to him. General Pea has been one of the foremost ICSC Tatsi leaders supporting the Kalari Treaty. General Pea and General Zed have a deep-seated inter-tribal conflict that goes back approximately 20 years.

(2)MLCS. General Zed, a Tatsi, leads a force of approximately 300 fighters who operates from an area in the region between Deli, Libol and Bokso.Immediately after the signing of the Karlani Peace Treaty, he agreed to merge his forces with the CDF. He used his position with the CDF essentially to consolidate control of the region in which his milita had been based and to carry out attacks on rival Tatsi and Falin. He has clashed with General Pea on multiple occasions, often resulting in huge numbers of civilian casualties. His militia group has been accused of carrying out ethnic massacres, torture, abductions, widespread sexual violence and forced recruitment of children. He has been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). By merging his forces with CDF, however, he had gained effective impunity for these crimes. He developed a fierce competition with the CDF commander at Lora which spilled into violence on several occasion, reportedly over resources. Over time, he became disenchanted with the CDF claiming that his soldiers had received no food, pay or provisions for months. When he was ordered to deploy his forces to western Carana, he rebelled, claiming to rejoin the ICSC. There is intelligence to suggest that Rimosa separatist elements are supporting General Zed and will be resupplying him via the airfield in Mia. Recent reports indicate that General Zed’s forces have split into small groups of 4-6 fighters that rarely use electronic communication and operate in across huge areas, often in dense bush and forests. This makes them extremely difficult to track. To survive, his forces raid villages for supplies; abduct young boys and men to become fighters and young girls to become sex slaves.

(3)CDF. CDF Battalions are located at Lufso and Lora.

b. Own Forces. No Change.

c. Co-operating and Neutral Actors. IOM is the cluster lead for issues associated with IDPs and is currently setting up a temporary office in Xalksa in response to the influx of IDPs.

d. Assumptions.

(1) Government of Caranais unable to execute the mission on its own.

e. Limitations and Constraints. No Change.

f. Strategic End State and Objectives.

(1) Mission End-state. No Change.

(2) Strategic Objectives. No Change.

3. Mission. No Change.

4. Execution

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) Commander’s Intent. No Change.

(2) Scheme ofManoeuvre. No Change.

b. Tasks.

(1)Battalion 1.

(a)Conduct peacekeeping operations in Leppko province.

(b)Deploy Mobile Operating Bases (MOBs) in the vicinity of Mia in order to deter violence and protect civilians

(c)Defend Mia airstrip from rebel forces and retain capability

(d)Support humanitarian assistance efforts in Xalksa.

(e)Be prepared to receive a platoon-sized Military Component reserve from Battalion 2 to support ongoing operations.

(f)Establish and maintain liaison with ICSC.

(2) Battalion2. No Change.

(3) Battalion3. No Change.

c. Co-ordinatingInstructions.

(1) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.No Change.

(2) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force. Provided separately. No Change.

Scenario 2 Inject 3 (FRAGO) Carana Scenario BN CPX

(3) Succession of command. No Change.

(4) Communications and Networks. Provided separately.

(5) Liaison and Co-ordination. No Change.

(6) Reports. Provided separately. No Change.

5. Integrated Support System. Annex R (Logistics) (provided separately). No Change.

Scenario 2 Inject 3 (FRAGO) Carana Scenario BN CPX

ANNEX A: Task Organisation

Military Component Sector 3

BDE HQ

Aviation Company (Corma)

Signal Company (-)

Supply Company (Maldosa)

Battalion1

BattalionHQ

Infantry Company (Xalksa)

Infantry Company (Maldosa)

Infantry Company (Muka)

Mechanized Company (Muka)

Transportation Company

Battalion2

Mechanized BattalionHQ

Infantry Company (Maui)

Battalion3

BattalionHQ

Infantry Battalion Infantry Battalion Engineer Company

Transportation Company