Russia Working Group 10/22/2015

Notes

In consideration of the possibility of major change in Russia this year or next year, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Putin regime? How can we identify vulnerabilities?

  • Information control within the country is affected by the legacy of the Soviet Union
  • Soviet citizens were convinced that the KGB was listening to their telephone calls (“this is not a phone conversation” – and the expression is still used today)
  • Impact of Solzhenitsyn’s novel In the First Circle
  • It’s a real story – Solzhenitsyn changed all of the names except the name of the spy (who lived until 2006 – Putin declared him the most successful spy in Russian history)
  • Novel highlights the technology and different approaches used to identify speakers

System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM)

  • Designed in the late 1980s, implemented in the 1990s, and has been updated ever since
  • Standards for lawful interception in the United States involve two lines of communication; in Russia, there is only one line, and there is direct and unrestricted access at all times
  • The system is replicated all over the country, by every telecommunication company in Russia
  • SORM requirements were met with little resistance from the telecommunications industry (reflects the relationship between the government/security services and the telecommunications industry)
  • Negative implications for right to privacy, government oversight, and scrutiny standards within Russia
  • Warrants are technically required (but no one wanted to change the technical scheme of how the interception is committed) and they are not required to be shown before interception
  • The system is completely impenetrable to oversight (from the State Duma, the media, and the Kremlin)
  • The Soviet system of surveillance was not very sophisticated in terms of technology: the KGB could only tap about 300 phone lines at the height of its surveillance
  • Scope was not even remotely as large as East Germany – SORM was inspired by the East German Stasi
  • It was not necessarily used to “spy” on people, but rather to send a strong message of intimidation (very effective then – and SORM is effective now to create fear and intimidation within the country)

The 2012 Internet filter and how to address the new threats/challenges of social networks

  • The public mostly accepted the notion of Internet filtering and never tried to raise privacy issues
  • Not particularly effective (blocked websites can be accessed through proxy sites, and very few people have been sent to jail for expressing their opinions online)

The mood/climate/quality of online political debate has completely changed in the past few years: a post-totalitarian mentality (fear of what might happen again)

Any optimism for the system?

  • In the early 2000s, the Kremlin censored traditional media; Putin didn’t pay too much attention to the Internet initially because he considered it a tool of the intelligentsia (he also declared it a “CIA project” at one point)
  • After the Arab Spring, the Internet became the Kremlin’s main focus
  • Putin simply does not understand the nature of the Internet – he believes it is hierarchical and can be suppressed from the top

Ukrainian and Russian soldiers – and even those in Syria – are posting information about themselves

The Internet cannot ruin the dictatorship by itself: it is not a tool for making revolution, but it can be a useful tool for disseminating information in times of crisis

  • In times of stability, the message is under control

Russian Internet access & regular users: around 80 million, but most usage is for social networking and entertainment purposes (smartphones)

Is social media a source of strength or weakness for the regime?

  • Comparisons to Moldova – any concerns that there could be a similar movement to mobilize the population?
  • Social networks pose a threat – the Kremlin is very concerned about social media
  • The Russians have, thus far, been unable to develop a system for monitoring and managing large amounts of data
  • Government contracts for social network systems monitoring
  • Agencies do not coordinate with each other – a sign of weakness
  • Trolls are very effective inside Russia and disrupt discussion (they fail in the West because they are easily identified)
  • The Internet is really the only place where a free discussion can take place

Intimidation is working domestically; is it effective abroad?

  • 3 main lines of Russian propaganda:
  • Legacy of World War II (perpetuating national ideas (invented in the 1960s because people were unhappy with Communism))
  • Feelings of resentment and disillusionment with the West in the middle class (economic crisis in 2008 – the middle class felt betrayed by the West: no prosperity and no democracy, and the West exploits those feelings)
  • A fear of any kind of bloody revolution (an exploitation of insecurity – at least Putin provides political stability (a common, widespread sentiment also present in Ukraine))

Targeted surveillance – the regime is not totalitarian, but it is authoritarian

  • The Kremlin does not need to spy on ALL of the population, just some of them (less than 3%)
  • The Boris Nemtsov murder –a powerful message
  • Maxim Petlin in Yekaterinburg

The political culture and mood of political debate now that Putin has been in power for 15 years: there is so much corruption, but the Kremlin is aiming to expose the opposition leaders and their corruption (the security services are the sources of some of the leaked conversations)

Russia and the Internet’s international capabilities

  • Are the Internet and other information/communication technologies a positive for society?
  • Entertainment, distraction, a fantastic surveillance tool
  • Is any information of civic consequence being disseminated?
  • Civil society and political efforts are not the focus of Internetusers – why not?
  • Hackers (difficult to identify)

The Internet as a cultural phenomenon – a forum for discussing important information

Putin’s relationship with the FSB

  • The FSB is getting harder to manage (Putin is losing control)
  • Oversight mechanisms don’t exist
  • Generational crisis (the FSB is controlled by men Putin’s age – few opportunities for promotion)
  • Failed during the Ukrainian crisis

Russian internet/social media

  • LiveJournal – what happened to blogging?
  • The first victim to trolls (you can make comments anonymously, which reduces the space for real public debate)
  • Facebook is “safe” because you cannot comment anonymously
  • Stereotypically, Facebook is for the liberal intelligentsia; VK is for social purposes
  • Good content exists if you know where to look – if you are following the right people and the right conversations (but the quality of the discussion has diminished due to the online censorship of popular websites (March 2014))
  • There is a small community of independent websites
  • Blocking websites beyond Russian borders (Ukraine and Israel) – pressuring them into removing content, and the websites are complying (the situation is worsening)

Removing Russia from the Internet completely – a test balloon? Floating the idea to gauge international reaction? Do they actually have the capability?

  • Telecommunications structure within Russia is very centralized and there are very few internet exchange points
  • It’s not enough to control 80% of the traffic – they must control 100% of it
  • Impossible for them to stop information not under their control

Technology has changed, but the tactics have not

  • The Kremlin seeks to limit the flow of independent information and atomize society (a new iteration)
  • Cutting through the noise, trolls, and disinformation – the key for organizing is to stay courageous and make tools (like social media) available

Edward Snowden – status within Russia? Is he captive? Does he have the ability to communicate with others?

  • Could not be interviewed for the book
  • Cannot speak with any Russian journalists or international journalists based in Moscow
  • He would try to speak with some journalists but for some reason, nothing has worked out thus far
  • He has a lawyer, Kucherina, from the FSB – he is constantly monitored/followed
  • Russia is essentially a very comfortable, luxury prison for him

Russian television – is television still the most believable, accessible media to the Russian people?

  • Television is not in competition with the internet: it has changed in the past two years, and is now about an emotional message (rather than information dissemination)

What’s going on in Syria?

  • Played as proof that Russia is a world player – when the world says “you can’t do this,” the Russians stands up to prove otherwise

How do we win?

  • Colonizing the dark web
  • An interesting moment for Russian authorities – repressive legislation
  • Russian companies (not the government) censor the Internet
  • Dealing with users – we need a genuine technical solution (the ones that we’ve tried already have failed)