Rule-Utilitarianism & Some Comments

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Rule-Utilitarianism & Some Comments

Rule-utilitarianism & some comments

Some utilitarians accepted the force of the counterexample arguments. They responded by developing rule-utilitarianism, so that instead of evaluating particular cases of slavery or punishing the innocent, rules about these things need to be evaluated. The individual case is not judged: that is too impractical and too susceptible to counterexamples.

By judging general issues, the rule-utilitarian believes that both problems, impracticality and counterexamples, can be solved. The act-utilitarian rejects this approach. If happiness counts as the main value, it is immoral rule worship to accept a less happy outcome in an individual case merely because the general application of a rule results in greater happiness. Also, utility calculations made about a rule may be even more difficult than those made about a particular action. After all, we are closer to the current circumstances than we are to actions done in the future, or in far-away places, under a rule.

It is somewhat interesting that John Rawls, a critic of utilitarianism, helped to advance rule-utilitarianism in his paper, “Two Concepts of Rules,” published in 1955 in The Philosophical Review. In that paper, Rawls claims that some things we consider rules, maybe like the rule to use a hammer when you want to nail something, are rules of thumb. They give us an indication of the right thing to do, but sometimes we may break the rule. Under some circumstances it might be better to use a rock. Other rules are different. They are practice rules. These rules define what it is to do something; the rules of chess define what it is to play chess. You really can’t break the rules and still say you are playing chess, as when we play “chess” to teach a young child how to play. But we can change the rules. For example, in basketball, a while ago, you only got two points for making a basket. Now you can get three.

Suppose you are a utilitarian basketball referee and the home team is losing by lots of points. You might decide it would be a better, more interesting game to let the home team have 3 points for every successful shot. That is a way to improve utility for the fans, and it is also a way to generate interest in basketball by leveling out the teams. Isn’t that what goes into the choice when governing bodies change the rules? Maybe. But that isn’t the choice of the referees. That is a choice that establishes the rules and once they are established, changing them in a particular circumstance is not allowed. This use of rules is the way rule-utilitarians seem to want it.

The debate between act-utilitarians and rule-utilitarians may be mediated. Perhaps we should have rules, but allow exceptions.

Rules may serve especially well in institutions, like the government, bureaucracies, or the law, but perhaps in family life actions should not come under binding rules, so that in many cases happiness may be the main consideration. In more local environments we know more about those involved, and so we can calculate happiness or preference satisfaction more directly, even if only approximately. If this observation is correct, then utilitarianism must more carefully specify the domain over which calculations are made. Over broader domains, say those involving governmental action, a rule orientation may be more appropriate, while in a narrower domain such as family activities, covering actions affecting fewer people, a more direct, act-approach may be in order.

Utilitarianism, somewhat paradoxically, is a somber or demanding theory. This is paradoxical because it begins by supporting the production of happiness. We are always obligated to do the action that, of all our choices, produces the most happiness for everyone. Even though this is the case, the utilitarian places extreme burdens on us all. Whether you should be reading these lines now, or helping a friend or a family member, or working, or studying biology, should be determined by the amount of happiness such actions produce. The American philosopher Shelly Kagan challenges us to consider whether what we are doing now actually does produce the most happiness. If I go to a movie, couldn't the eight dollars I spend do more good if I gave them to UNICEF? In fact, wouldn't it be better yet to dedicate my life to some social cause designed to save lives? The reply -- that demands about my life, how I spend my money, or what I do, are unfair, and may make my life miserable -- doesn't hold status in the utilitarian calculation; if giving money to charity creates more good than going to a movie, this is what I must do. The initial enthusiasm of the appeal to happiness soon results, at least according to Kagan, in a somber commitment to universal, or near universal, sacrifice. You should do the action that produces the most happiness for the greatest number of people, no matter what that action is and no matter how much it hurts to do it.

In calculating utility your own happiness doesn't count more than the happiness of anyone else. Everyone's happiness counts equally. The main question is about how much happiness is produced. So if I give my money to a good cause, the unhappiness that the loss of money causes me doesn't count for any more or less than the unhappiness avoided by the charitable gift. Your actions probably affect you, and those close to you, more than others. Those you cannot affect don't count in your calculations, but those close may gain or lose happiness depending on your actions. So in this sense we may believe that by getting a good grade in a course, or learning ethical theory, we are doing the best thing possible. But this is doubtful. Given the misery around the world, Kagan might be right that utilitarianism demands that we all become totally devoted ourselves to the demands of a very rigorous moral theory.