Report on the 43rd meeting of AusCSCAP, Canberra, 16 October 2015

‘Regional Security Architecture and the role of Track 2’

The 43rd meeting of the Australian Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (AusCSCAP) was held on Friday 16 October 2015 at University House, Canberra, co-chaired by Professor Tony Milner (AusCSCAP) and Associate Professor Ron Huisken (SDSC, ANU). It was attended by roughly 35 participants, including currently serving and retired Australian government officials, guests from Singapore ( Ambassador Ong Keng Yong) and Laos (Mr SonexayVannaxay), and scholars and think-tank analysts. All contributed to a lively discussion on security architecture, held under Chatham House rules.

The program was conducted in five major parts. After a brief welcome and introduction by the co-chairs, the first session commenced with a discussion on current track 1 security architecture, followed by the role of track 2 During lunch, an Australian scholar (Professor Clive Williams) delivered a presentation on regional terrorism and its impact on Asian security, after which the program ended with a short AusCSCAP business report. As per normal AusCSCAP meeting formats, each session comprised informal and open discussion and exchange, rather than formal presentations with prepared papers etc.

The core themes animating discussion were-

(1) did the region have the multilateral machinery necessary to buttress other forces shaping the regional security scene-notably bilateral relationships, including alliances, and military forces; and

(2) whether Track 2 could and should do more.

Common ground amongst the participants included the view that ASEAN had performed an essential task in creating and managing regional securityprocesses, but that the regional outlook now urgently required a network of processes (sometimes also called ‘architecture’) with stronger congruence, greater authority and wider coverage.

The CSCAP co-chair summarized the work of a 2013-14 CSCAP working group on Regional Security Architecture (CSCAP memorandum No. 26, published June 2014), since this was based on a broadly similar assessment of the challenges to a rules-based order in the Asia Pacific. That Working Group concluded that the East Asia Summit(EAS) appeared to be the strongest candidate to be developed into an over-arching process capable of energizing and driving Asian congruence. The WG identified a cluster of practical improvements to the modalities of the EAS, and its arguments and recommendationshad attracted unanimous CSCAP support.

Participants were also made aware of an October 2014paper prepared by two Australian academics, Nick Bisley and Malcolm Cook, that addressed the same core issues and followed the CSCAP memorandum in identifying the EAS as the most promising agent of change, and offering similar recommendations on the way forward. The Bisley/Cook paper had a key additional recommendation- to create a new Track 2 network to support the EAS.

The discussion threw up a number of key perspectives, notably-

  • no architecture or network of processes can eliminate strategic competition; with ordered management of such competition the only realistic aspiration;
  • preserving ASEAN centrality remains a key objective, although ASEAN had clearly been prepared to relax on this point to secure the ASEAN plus 8 format for the EAS;
  • ASEAN scholars are beginning to think more deeply about the long-term benefits and risks of getting close to China; and
  • the PRC has a strong preference to see ASEAN processes stick to disaggregated, functional and bilateral agendas, eschewing big picture political/strategic issues. While the PRC is unlikely to risk confrontation; it could be a spoiler – resigned to stronger synergies between EAS, ARF and ADMM+, but hoping to delay and minimize the multilateral evolution inherent in these bodies.

At the time of these discussions, there were promising indications that the 2015 ASEAN Chair, Malaysia, would inject some of the recommendations from the CSCAP Working Group into official discussions on the evolution of the EAS. (This was subsequently done). That CSCAP WG therefore presented itself as a model for the development and presentation of ideas to be conveyed to Track 1.

A keyquestion was whether there were too many security cooperation mechanisms and organisations and just how successful they had been. As an extension, the sub-question becomes one of whether an ‘excessive’ number was distracting from achieving real, measurable, substantial and sustainable outcomes. For example-

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was argued by some as being unwieldy, with its 27 members distracting from a focus on achievable initiatives, and its over 1,000 meetings each year testing organisational and representational capabilities. Others however saw value in how the ARF had underwritten the political stability, economic viability and a secure regional environment of the past 20 years, something very much in Australia’s national interest. Its three prongs of confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution have seen some progress, particularly the first two. They claimed that the ARF was the logical development of the ‘good order’ that Australia strongly advocated, with ASEAN having achieved a ‘strategic depth’ that did not previously exist.

Whileclearly the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation’s (APEC) economic focus is fundamental to its rationale, some thought it failed to sufficiently take account that non-economic challenges are equally as significant to achieving its agenda. It was set up to drive trade liberalisation in the region, and has been slow to achieve this. APEC has achieved a degree of economic cooperation, so the challenge was seen by some as broadening that to recognise that political and security cooperationwas also needed to enhance economic benefit.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has a non-ASEAN and non-US focus, and has become something of a successful coordinating mechanism for non-Western States. It does provide an alternate view of what the major drivers and core values are in the region.

The major security focused organisation, the East Asia Summit (EAS)attracted debate. Some claimed it failed to have a clear purpose, with its meetings being too short and too driven by domestic issues identified by the chair nation of the day. Others felt that the EAS process has developed and improved over time, with a better planned Leaders' meeting (now ten years after the initial meeting), additional Secretarial support, and a greater degree of coordination and follow-up with other regional organisations. It was seen as a forum where track 2 could better offer its assistance.

The biennial meeting and expert working groups of theASEAN Defence Ministers’Meeting Plus (ADMM+)was considered to be the most useful and productive organisation, exploring topics such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, disaster management, peacekeeping operations and military medicine. ASEAN calls the ADMM Plus an `open and outward-looking' initiative;and although the organisation possesses strong potential, concern was raised around how it relates to other regional institutions, such as the ARF, the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, and the EAS. The ADMM+ has been able to blend military and developmental issues, and established hard linkages and standard operating procedures around HADR (something the ARF has not done). Thus, the narrower focus of the ADMM + has allowed some concrete successes in specific areas in expanding from purely military or defence issues, to broader whole-of-government issues. It must be remembered however that this is only a meeting of Defence Ministers.

The Shangri La Dialogue was felt to be more about being seen than actually doing anything of substance, and it was too dominated by the major players-described by one participant as a forum for multilateral ‘speed-dating’ for Defence diplomats.

Overall, some participants felt that these various institutions risked being dominated by larger powers such as the United States and China- yetat the same time, they very much relied on their engagement for relevance. The successes of these institutions were seen in their ability to provide a vision, and a process of gradual good order-building, rather than setting a formal and agreed instrumentality for State on State behaviour. Participants acknowledged that with liberal, order-building as their basis, these institutions are limited in their ability to either constrain actors or to be effective in hard power crises. There was also perceived by some to be a disconnect between Asian-style,consensus diplomacy (with its non-confrontational and avoidance of national sovereigntyand territorial issues), and resolving pressing issues such as tensions in the South and East China Seas, or disarming a nuclear North Korea.

While there was seen to be a need to engage the main Asia-Pacific powers diplomatically in order to attenuate the use of coercive behaviour, the multitude of multilateral fora could produce duplication. One view was that it would be better to develop mechanisms to create synergies between the fora. For instance, the chair of EAS could be afforded a greater role to direct intra-fora interactions such as sharing reports with the ARF. Another suggestion was the development of informal structures at forums so leaders had more time to talk frankly.

Perceptions of China’s attitude towards regional security architecture remain especially salient. According to one participant, ASEAN has come to the rational conclusion that larger multilateral fora dilute ASEAN centrality, but that it was imperative to engage the US institutionally to balance China. Other participants noted that China preferred ASEAN+3, because it was able to influence the behaviour of this smaller group. They claimed that China preferred smaller groupings, often just bilateral discussions, so that it could better influence outcomes and shape discussion. Nevertheless, there did appear to be a creeping expansion of the EAS in contrast to smaller, more exclusionary groups, and this was a win for multilateralism.

It remained unclear from the meeting whether existing security architecture could effectively respond to the developments in the South China Sea (SCS). One participant noted emphatically that what has taken place in the SCS (land reclamation activities including artificial island-building and the construction of both civilian and military assets on these land features) is irreversible. Some suggested that regional states must ‘deprive China of a long-term view’, and champion the fact that these waters are public goods by enforcing freedom of sea and air navigation rights. Other participants wondered whether Indonesia could spearhead further developments on negotiating the Code of Conduct in the SCS. Whether Indonesia (which on some projections could emerge by 2050 as the world’s fourth or fifth largest economy)saw itself as ‘beyond ASEAN’, or at best ‘primus inter paras’ in ASEAN, was debatable (it appeared reluctant to utilise ASEAN mechanisms to deal with its 2015 haze problem), and if so this would be reflected in its approach to the various evolving regional security architecture bodies.

Counter-terrorism and Track 2

In the lunch-time discussion on terrorism, ISIS was seen currently as the world’s most dangerous group based on a number of factors, with a formal structure expanded to include 35 wilayats(regional commands) spanning 11 countries. Thirty-eight groups from 17 countries so far have pledged allegiance to ISIS, including a number from the Indo-Pacific, and there are a number of ‘foreign brigades’ in Syria comprising foreign fighters with a common language. The rate, geographic scope and diversity of location of ISIS-inspired attacks are unprecedented.

In Southeast Asia, the latest terrorist attack on the Erawan Shrine in Bangkok is most likely linked to Thailand’s deportation of Uighurs back to China. Terrorist groups hold tenuous links to external organisations, with the insurgency in southern Thailand continuing to be led by Islamist extremists. In the Philippines, security issues predominantly relate to the activities of the left-wing New People’s Army (NPA), and the longstanding campaign for self-determination by the southern Moro people. The Abu Sayyaf Group pledged allegiance to ISIS in July 2014. In Indonesia, JAT and MIT have pledged allegiance to ISIS. A major security concern of the US, UK and Australia is the resumption of terrorist attacks against expatriates due to the growing influence of ISIS, but also a number of convicted terrorists will be released from prison, requiring an intensive counter-violent extremism approach there.

ISIS is expected to consolidate its hold on the Sunni areas in Iraq and Syria, and to continue to expand its international influence, including the Indo-Pacific region. Much of this influence is enabled by the proliferation of mobile devices and the internet used for recruitment, training, attack planning, propaganda, fund-raising and other related activities. On the effectiveness of track 2 engagement for counter-terrorism, some participants suggested that there was potential for cooperation, and the joint publication of books via CSCAP like Voice of Islam.

The meeting noted that there was a multitude of track 2 activities occurring at think-tanks and institutes in Australia and in the region, and there was a critical need to enhance relations between Track 1 and Track 2 processes. This was in particular a challenge for CSCAP.

The meeting affirmed that AusCSCAPshould continue to do what it can to support the Australian government’s track 1 efforts, and maintain ‘an Australian voice’ in CSCAP’s various working and study groups. The discussion at the meeting highlighted the need for CSCAP, as a regional organisation, to engage more vigorously with the new and broader security architecture, and the meeting chairs promised to urge the CSCAP leadership to initiate new efforts to achieve this objective.