Reading List Property Rights

Reading List Property Rights

Part 1: Theory

Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem:Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics.Journal of Comparative Economics 31: 620–652

Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Johnson. 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy 113 (5): 949-995.

Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.2006. The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Pres.

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail. New York: Crown Publishers.

Barzel, Yoram. 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson. 1996. Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies. Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 243-276.

Cooley, Alexander and Sharman, J.C., 2015.Blurring the line between licit andillicit: transnational corruption networks in Central Asia and beyond. Central Asian Survey, 34 (1): 11-28, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2015.1010799

Dawisha, Karen, Putin’s Kleptocracy, Simon&Schuster, New York 2014.

Dekker, Henri A. L. (2003), Property Regimes in Transition: Land Reform, FoodSecurity and Economic Development: A Case Study in the Kyrgyz Republic,Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Dixit, Avinash K. 2004. Lawlessness and Economics.Princeton University Press.

Dowding, Keith and Martin Van Hees. 2003. The Construction of Rights, American Political Science Review 97 (2): 281-293.

Fernandez, Raquel and Dani Rodrik. 1991. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual- SpecificUncertainty, American Economic Review 81(5): 1146-1155.

Ganse-Morse, Jordan. 2017. Property Rights in Post-Soviet Russia. Violence, Corruption, and the Demand for Law. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gans-Morse, Jordan. 2017. Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case ofPost-Soviet Russia. Forthcoming in: American Political Science Review.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2007. Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Soviet Democracies. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Guriev, Sergei, Anton Kolotilin and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector:A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization27 (2): 301-323

Guriev, Sergei, Konstantin Sonin. 2009. “Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights.” Journal of Public Economics 93: 1-13.

Hartwell, Christopher A. 2016. “Determinants of Property Rights in Poland and Ukraine: The Polity or Politicians?” Journal of Institutional Economics: 1-28.

Harvey, Alan. 1989. Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900-1200, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hoff, Karla and Joseph Stiglitz. 2004. After the Big Bang?Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Lawin Post-Communist Societies. American Economic Review 94: 753-764.

Hohfeld, W., Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judical Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913)

Kramer, Mathew H., N..E. Simmons and Hillel Steiner (eds). 1998. A Debate Over Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lipton, Michael. 2009. Land Reform in Developing Countries: Property Rights and Property Wrongs. London and New York: Routledge.

Macey, David A. J., William Pyle, Stephen K. Wegren (eds). 2004. Building Market Institutions in Post-communist Agriculture: Land, Credit and Assistance, Lexington Books.

McCloskey, D. 1991. “Open Field System”, in: The World of Economics, ed. by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman, Palgrave MacMillan.

Myerson, Roger B. 2008. “The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State.” The American Political Science Review 102: 125-139

North, Douglas C. and Robert P. Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Olson, Mancur. 2000. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books.

Ostrom, Elinor and Charlotte Hess. 2010. Private and Common Property Rights, in B.Bouckaert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Pech, G. 2009. Rationality and the Legal Order, in: Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy, ed. by Tom Boylan and RuvinGekker, Routledge.

Polishchuk, Leonid and GeorgiySyunyaev. 2015. Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights, Public Choice162(1): 159-182

Schlapentokh, V. and Joshua Woods. 2007. Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society. Palgrave-MacMillan

Sholk, Dena. 2016. Kazakhstan’s Land Reform,The Diplomat, 15 June 2016.

Sonin, Konstantin. 2003. “Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights.” Journal of Comparative Economics 31: 715-731.

Sonin, Konstantin. 2008. “State Capture and Corruption in Transition

Economies.” The New Palgrave of Economics, 2nd ed.

Svensson, Jakob, Eight Questions about Corruption, Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (3), 2005: 19-42.

Thomas, Jonathan and Thomas Worrall. 1994. Foreign direct investment and the risk ofexpropriation, Review of Economic Studies 61: 81-108.

Umbeck, John. 1977. “The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights.” Explorations in Economic History 14: 197-206.

Varese, Francesco. 2001. The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Other sources

Kazakhstani Law on Consumer Cooperatives (ЗаконРеспубликиКазахстанот 8 мая 2001 года № 197-IIО потребительскомкооперативе)