RANGE OF MORAL THEORY
In mathematics the range of a function consists of the kinds of results we get out of a function; for example, a function may be designed that tells us whether a number is "odd" or "even". We put a number into the function, do some manipulation, and out comes the answer: “odd” or “even,” and perhaps no other answer.
A similar things happens in ethics: we consider things in a domain and evaluate them. The moral range is the kinds of evaluation we may make. For example, we may decide that the domain is restricted to individual actions and that we will simply attempt to determine whether some action is moral obligatory; the range then consists of two judgments: "obligatory" and "not obligatory."
Some moral theorists have argued that the moral range is simple, containing only one or two possible types of judgments. For them the only proper moral evaluations claim either that something is obligatory or that something is permitted. If we are only dealing with actions, this isn't too far-fetched, but I think incorrect. But if the domain contains character traits, the claim that traits are obligatory seems awkward. (Think about it. Do you agree?) For example, we do not claim that being courageous is obligatory because courage is something we cannot fully control. (Think about that as well.)
We will present some other possible members of the range of moral inquiry, the kinds of moral judgments we can make. Although the list is not complete, you can see that people make many different types of moral claims. Again, we can judge a theory by whether it has a rich enough range.
Obligation and prohibition
We frequently hear that people have moral a obligation to keep their promises, to tell the truth, to take care of their children, to respect their parents. People also proclaim that many actions are prohibited: to steal, to murder, to harm without good reason, to neglect parents. Some theories only support judgments about what is obligatory or permitted.
Permission
An action may be judged to be permitted but not obligatory. Most of us would judge that we are morally permitted to skip lunch, but that we are not obligated to skip lunch. Some moral theories have no room for permissions and are thus criticized as overly constraining. (Think about that as we go through theories. Can you imagine a theory doing that?)
Recommendation
It is a little strange going through all of these things on a web course knowing that many philosophers would disagree with me. If we were in a class, you might raise you hand and object to what I’m saying, and then I could try to defend myself. You could write an email.
A theory may hold that some actions are recommended, but not obligatory. This is different from being merely permitted. We might be morally neutral about permitted actions but not about recommended actions. When something is morally recommended but not obligatory, it is considered morally better than at least some of its alternatives.
Many actions are recommended but not in a moral sense. An adviser may recommend that a student seeking a job go to a convention. This sounds like a prudential recommendation, not a moral one. Prudential recommendations often involve individual interests, which some philosophers exclude from the moral realm. Nevertheless, the person doing the recommending believes that going to the convention makes it more likely that the student will get a job, and for this reason going is better than not going. Though we judge that going to the convention is good, we might not think the person deserves moral praise for doing so.
A morally recommended action, similarly, is thought to be better than other permissible actions. If a person does a morally recommended action -- say giving to charity -- then we may think that the person deserves moral praise.
Moral superiority
We often judge things in relation to each other. Donna is a better designer than Mark. Jimi is a better guitar player than Stevie Ray. These are not moral comparisons, but they are similar to moral comparisons. Democracy is considered morally superior to dictatorship. Volunteering at a shelter is typically morally superior to going to the circus. Maybe lying is morally superior to giving insult. People make such claims, sometimes incorrectly, and we may look to theory to provide guidance about which are proper.
Morally ideal
Though ideal situations may never exist, we might find it helpful to know what an ideal case would be like if it did exist. If we know what the ideal parent is like, this knowledge might help us to become better parents. A moral theory might help us to decide whether a particular characterization does indeed represent an ideal case.
We shall turn to a different topic, but one that is related.