Qatar: Terror Financing and Support of Terrorist Groups. January 13, 2017

“We have a very willing and capable partner in Saudi Arabia," Daniel Glaser, the assistant secretary for terrorist financing in the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, told an audience at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on Oct. 13. "Our goal is to see a similar evolution in Qatar and Kuwait," which he said had made some progress but not to the same extent as the Saudi government over the past decade. Glaser praised Saudi Arabia as the No. 1 U.S. partner in the region combatting terrorist financing.” --U.S. Treasury Official Praises Saudi Cooperation Against Terror Funding” (Al Monitor, October 14, 2016).

“German Development Minister Gerd Mueller accused Qatar on Wednesday of financing Islamic State militants who have seized wide areas of northern Iraq and have posted a video of a captive American journalist being beheaded. ‘You have to ask who is arming, who is financing ISIS troops. The keyword there is Qatar—and how do we deal with these people and states politically’ “ […]—“German Minister Accuses Qatar of Funding Islamic State Fighters”, Reuters, August 20, 2014.

““The US treasury believes countries such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have clamped down on jihadist financiers in recent months whereas Qatar and Kuwait have failed to tackle the issue — much to the frustration of Washington. The US has attempted to keep Qatar at arm’s length. It is wary about the Qatari government’s overt support for Hamas and also for the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that it insists is non-violent but has been blamed for stirring sectarian violence in Libya and elsewhere.”--Terror Financiers Are Living Freely in Qatar, U.S. Discloses”, The Daily Telegraph (UK), November 16, 2014.

“With every important case of suspected terror finance involving a Qatari national in past years, the government in Doha has refused to effectively crack down. The current crop of terror financiers appear to be operating with similar impunity.”— David Weinberg, The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “Qatar and Terror Finance, Part I: Negligence”, December 2014.

  1. Specific Documents/Citations
  1. The U.S. Department of the Treasury
  1. “Kuwait and Qatar have long been a key destination for officials in my office […] Notably, Qatar and Kuwait have recently shown a willingness to take enforcement action. However, both countries have a way to go.Each country still lacks the necessary political will and capacity to effectively enforce their CFT [Counter the Financing of Terrorism] laws against all terrorist financing threats regardless of organization or affiliation. And in both Kuwait and Qatar, we have seen progress building institutional capacity, but would like to see them take further enforcement actions against terrorist financing”-- Remarks of Acting Undersecretary Adam Szubin on Countering the Financing of Terrorism, at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies (U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 20, 2016)
  1. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on August 5, 2015, on Sa’d bin Sa’d Mohammad Shariyan al Ka’bi, a Qatari financier of Al-Qaida’s Syria-based affiliate Al Nusrah Front, and also on a Qatari Al-Qaida facilitator Abdallah Salih Muhammad al Kawari. Both were named Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. “As of early 2014, Al Ka’bi reported that he had set up donation campaigns in Qatar to aid with fundraising in response to a request from an ANF [Al Nusra Front] associate for money to purchase both weapons and food…Since at least late 2012, Al Ka’bi has provided support for to ANF in Syria. […] In early 2012, Al Kawari worked with Al-Qaida facilitators to coordinate the delivery receipts confirming that Al-Qaida received donor funding from Qatar-based extremists.”--“Treasury Designates Financial Supporters of Al Qa’ida and Al Nusrah Front” (U.S. Department of the Treasury August 5, 2015)

(This updated “Specially Designated Persons” list followed on the list below of Terrorist Fighter facilitators from September 2014.):

  1. “Treasury Designates 12 Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 24, 2014):

Tariq bin Al Tahar bin Al Falih al Awni al Harzi. One of the earliest members of Daesh/ISIL, “Al-Harzi worked to help raise funds from Gulf-based donors for ISIL. In September 2013, he arranged for ISIL to receive approximately $2 million from a Qatar-based ISIL financial facilitator, who required that Al-Harzi use the funds for military operations only. The Qatar-based ISIL financial facilitator also enlisted Al-Harzi’s assistance with fundraising efforts in Qatar.”

'Abd al-Malik Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman 'Abd al-Salam (AKA Umar al-Qatari): Umar al-Qatari’s support to ANF has been broad.In early 2012, he gave thousands of dollars and material support to a Syria-based al-Qaida associate intended for ANF operatives. Umar al-Qatari also facilitated extremist travel to ANF in Syria and specifically worked with Turkey-based Syrians who opposed the Syrian regime in an effort to recruit them to work with ANF.In early 2012, Umar al-Qatari, Qatari national Ibrahim al-Bakr, who has also been designated as an SDGT today, and their Lebanon-based associates agreed to procure and transport weapons and other equipment to Syria with the assistance of a Syria-based al-Qaida associate. Umar al-Qatari has a long history of raising funds for al-Qaida. As of early 2012, he raised and collected funding for al-Qaida from Gulf-based donors via the Internet. He coordinated the transfer of tens of thousands of euros from U.S. and UN-designated Qatari al-Qaida financier Khalifa Muhammad Turki al-Subaiy, which was intended to support al-Qaida and its senior leaders.

Ibrahim ‘Isa Hajji Muhammad al-Bakr. Formerly Qatar-based, Al-Bakr provides financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of al-Qaida while based in Pakistan as a link to Gulf-based al-Qaida donors. “As of mid-2012, al-Bakr had worked for al-Qaida and had been responsible for collecting money for both al-Qaida and the Taliban. In this capacity, he served as a link between Gulf-based al-Qaida financiers and Afghanistan. As of early 2006, he played a key role in a terrorist cell that was plotting to attack U.S. military bases and personnel in Qatar. At the time of his arrest in Qatar in the early 2000s for his involvement in a jihadist network, al-Bakr was working to raise money to support terrorism.Al-Bakr was subsequently released from prison after he promised not to conduct terrorist activity in Qatar

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  1. “But distressingly, Iran is not the only state that provides financial support for terrorist organizations. Most notably, Qatar, a longtime U.S. ally has for many years openly financed Hamas, a group that continues to undermine regional stability. Press reports indicate that the Qatari government is also supporting extremist groups operating in Syria. To say the least, this threatens to aggravate an already volatile situation in a particularly dangerous and unwelcome manner”--Remarks of Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen Before the Center for a New American Security on Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 4, 2014).
  1. The Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Al-Qaida supporters based in Qatar and Yemen, Abd al Rahman bin Umayr al Nu’aymi and Abd al Wahhab Mohammad abd al Rhman al Humayqani were named as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. “Nu’aymi is a Qatar-based terrorist financier and facilitator who has provided money and material support and conbeyed communications to Al-Qaida and its affiliates in Syria, Somalia and Yemen for more than a decade. He was considered among the most prominent Qatar-based supporters of Iraq-Sunni extremism. Nu’ayami served as interlocutor between Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) leaders and Qatar based donors [and] reportedly oversaw the transfer of over $2 milion per month to AQI for a period of time. --Treasury Department Designated Al-Qaida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen (U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 18, 2013.
  1. The United Nations Sanctions List—Qatar.
  1. The following list concerns Qatari facilitators of terror funding of Daesh/ISIL, Al Nusrah Front and Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI). It was obtained from The United Nations Security Council List of Designated Individuals”, updated June 13, 2017. Some of the details pertaining to the individuals below have been edited for clarity, highlighting only Qatar national identity and/or residence, and terror-financing activity.
  1. Abdl Malik Muhammad Yusuf Uthman abd al Salam, national identification: Qatar; National identification no: Qatar 28940000602, issued in Qatar. Facilitator who provides financial, material, and technological support for Al-Qaida. On INTERPOL Special Notice. (
  1. Ashraf Muhammad Yusif Uthman abd al Salam. National identification no: Qatar 28440000526, issued in Qatar. A member of Al-Qaida as of 2012 and a fighter in the Syrian Arab Republic since early 2014. Provided financial, material, and technological support for AlQaida, Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant and Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). On INTERPOL Special Notice.
  1. The following listconcerns terrorist funding of Al Qaeda and the Taliban was obtained from: The United Nations Security Council “Reports from Member States Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1455, adopted on January 17, 2003:
  1. Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka'bi was listed on September 21, 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 ofresolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant.
  1. Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-Kawari was listed on September 21, 2015 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” Al-Qaida.
  1. 'Abd al-Malik Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman 'Abd al-Salam was listed on January 23, 2015pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of”, “supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to”, “recruiting for” or “otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant
  1. Khalifa Muhammad Turki al-Subaiy was listed on October 10, 2008 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1822 (2008) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of”, “recruiting for” and “otherwise supporting the acts or activities of” Al-Qaida and its senior leadership.
  1. U.S. Department of State
  1. “Overall, Qatar’s security services workforce was reliant on manpower from third countries to fill rank-and-file law enforcement positions. This limitation applies across the board with all Qatari government institutions (except for the Qatar State Security and elite units of the Ministry of Interior’s internal security force), and is commensurate with the demographics of the nation. Lack of capacity and to some extent the lack of advanced training of non-Qataris contributed to a lack of effectiveness in basic police operations”. “Qatar”: U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015. [The year 2015 is the latest edition available for this report].
  1. “Despite [counterterrorism efforts], entities and individuals within Qatar continue to serve as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent extremist groups, particularly regional al-Qa’ida affiliates such as the Nusrah Front. Qatar has made efforts to prosecute significant terrorist financiers.” – “Qatar”: U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015.
  1. Think Tank Studies and Journals: Qatar and Terror-Financing; Qatar and Support for Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood.

“Qatar is unquestionably engaged in international terrorist financing. According to the U.S. Treasury’s division for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, “Qatar, a longtime U.S. ally, has for many years openly financed Hamas.” From: The Institute for Contemporary AffairsFounded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation. September 23, 2014.

This report continues:

  • Qatar aids Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jabhat al Nusra, al-Qaeda affiliates, Libyan Islamists, and even ISIS.
  • The key Qatari link to the Muslim Brotherhood has been Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who broadcasts on Qatar’sal Jazeera. In 2002, his foundation was designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.
  • Through the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar has attempted to undermine Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
  • Qatar is also active in North Africa. The French press carried repeated reports that Qatar was financing jihadist elements in Northern Mali, including MUJAO (the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), Ansar Dine (affiliated with al-Qaeda), and even secularist Tuareg separatists belonging to the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad). There were also reports quoting the French Directorate of Intelligence (DRM) claiming that Qatar was financing AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb). Prior to the French intervention in Mali, its northern region was emerging as an African Afghanistan. Notably, the Qatari Red Crescent was the only humanitarian organization operating in Northern Mali after the Islamist takeover.
  • Qatar also has extensive ties to Islamist elements fighting in Libya since Qaddafi’s overthrow.6Sheikh Ali al-Salabi was a Libyan Islamist with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood who took refuge in Qatar in 1999 but later returned to Libya, where he served as a conduit for Qatari-supplied arms to Islamist forces. Indeed, after Qaddafi’s fall, Libya’s transitional prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, complained that Qatar was still arming extremist groups in Libya opposed to his leadership.
  • The most important Islamist connection for Qatar is the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar has not only backed its Middle Eastern activities, but it has also emerged as one of the largest institutional funders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.8Qatar has been accused of supporting a Muslim Brotherhood terrorist cell that was discovered in the UAE in 2012.
  • The key player in the Qatari link to the Muslim Brotherhood has been Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In 1961, he was sent by al-Azhar University in Egypt to head its Qatari branch. Since that time, he has emerged as a most important spiritual authority in the international Muslim Brotherhood movement. He also became the supreme religious authority for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch, Hamas. Through his fatwas, which were featured on Hamas’ website, he supported Hamas suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians; he also supported suicide attacks against US forces in Iraq. He established a global charity, known as the Union of Good, which served as a conduit for Hamas financing.

From: The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies: “Qatar and Terror Finance”, January 18, 2017. The following is from the Introduction to this report, available at:

“It is particularly vital to evaluate Qatar’s record on terror finance in light of the Nusra Front’s July 2016 decision to rebrand itself as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), which purports to have “no relationship with any foreign party.

According to sources cited by Reuters, Qatar led an effort starting in 2015 to bolster the Syrian opposition by persuading Nusra to distance itself from al-Qaeda.”

Reuters reported that intelligence officials from Qatar and other Gulf states met several times with Nusra’s leader around this period to suggest that his group could receive money, arms, and supplies after stepping away from al-Qaeda.

Yet the more JFS legitimates itself by integrating into the broader Syrian opposition, the greater the risk of a permanent al-Qaeda army on Europe’s doorstep. This report is Part Two of a three-part series on Qatar’s record dealing with terrorist finance and its practitioners. Part One outlined Doha’s dismal record at punishing funders of terror throughout Emir Hamad’s reign.

This document evaluates the publicly available evidence on Qatar’s record since then, focusing primarily on individuals sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2014 and 2015. All of these sanctions were imposed after Qatar agreed in September 2014, as part of a U.S.-led initiative called the Jeddah Communiqué, to bring terror financiers to justice. The cases should therefore be seen as a measuring stick for recent Qatari conduct.” See:

Elizabeth Dickerson, Foreign Policy Magazine “The Case Against Qatar”, September 30, 2014.

“On one hand, Washington hasn’t shied away from calling on Doha’s connections when it needs them. But that same Qatari network has also played a major role in destabilizing nearly every trouble spot in the region and in accelerating the growth of radical and jihadi factions. The results have ranged from bad to catastrophic in the countries that are the beneficiaries of Qatari aid: Libya is mired in a war between proxy-funded militias, Syria’s opposition has been overwhelmed by infightingand overtaken by extremists, and Hamas’s intransigence has arguably helped prolong the Gaza Strip’s humanitarian plight.

For years, U.S. officials have been willing to shrug off Doha’s proxy network — or even take advantage of it from time to time. Qatar’s neighbors, however, have not.

Over the past year, fellow Gulf countries Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have publicly rebuked Qatar for its support of political Islamists across the region. These countries have threatened to close land borders or suspend Qatar’s membership in the regional Gulf Cooperation Council unless the country backs down. After nearly a year of pressure, the firstAfter nearly a year of pressure, the first sign of a Qatari concession came on Sept. 13, [2014] when seven senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figures left Doha at the request of the Doha government. “

William McCants, “Islamist Outlaws: Saudi Arabia Takes on the Brotherhood”. Foreign Affairs, The Council on Foreign Relations, March 2014

This article stresses the terrorist threat that the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Qatar, poses upon Saudi Arabia—and has for decades

“On March 7, Saudi Arabia took the extraordinary step of declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, on par with Hezbollah and al Qaeda. The move came just two days after the kingdom, together with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, withdrew its ambassador from Qatar because of Qatar’s alleged support of Brotherhood interference in internal politics. Although Saudi Arabia’s dislike of Brotherhood political activities abroad is well known, for decades the kingdom has tolerated (and sometimes even worked with) the local Saudi branch of the Brotherhood. Its sudden reversal is an expression of solidarity with its politically vulnerable allies in the region and a warning to Sunni Islamists within its borders to tr]ad carefully” [...]