Published by the WW II History Roundtable

December 2001

Volume 10 Number 4

Published by The WW II History Roundtable

Edited by Jim and Jon Gerber

Welcome to the December meeting of the Dr. Harold C. Deutsch World War Two History Roundtable. Tonight’s topic is about the attack on Pearl Harbor and commemorates the sixtieth anniversary of the attack and America’s entry into the Second World War. We are privileged to have some veterans with us tonight that experienced the attack first hand. We look forward to their stories.

Cancel the Attack?

The Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff, under Admiral Osami Nagano, opposed Admiral Yamamoto’s plan to attack Pearl Harbor as being too risky and continued to question Yamamoto up to the very last minute as to whether he could be sure the US fleet would be there. It was the powerful and confident personage of Yamamoto himself that conquered any fears and managed to get the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff to permit executing the attack. However, this was all predicated upon the fact that Japan continued to get assurances from its consulate in Oahu that the fleet remained stationed there. When the US government ordered all twenty-four German consulates in the US closed, plus all Italian consulates, during June, 1941, Japan feared that as a member of the Tripartite Pact it would also face similar closures. It is believed that under such conditions (the lack of espionage revealing the presence of the US fleet) the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff may well have canceled Yamamoto’s plan to attack Pearl Harbor. However, for several political reasons, the US government did not close the Japanese consulates.

War Games

On May 12, 1941, some seven months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the US Army and Navy held what were described as “the greatest war drills ever staged” in the Hawaiian Islands. Army bombers “attacked” enemy aircraft carriers several hundred miles at sea just as one carrier was preparing to launch planes against the islands. In an ironic note a formation of twenty-one B-17’s landed on Oahu from the mainland while the “attack” was under way. The war games contained many phases and options and continued for two weeks, with the US forces gaining the upper hand. The Navy held similar games involving a Pearl Harbor attack by enemy aircraft carriers in 1933 and in 1939. In the 1939 exercise, aircraft from the carrier USS Saratoga succeeded in a surprise attack on a Sunday morning. The attacking aircraft “sank” several ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor and attacked Hickam, Wheeler and Ford Island airfields before returning safely to their carrier.

A Novel

In the 1925 novel The Great Pacific War, author Hector C. Bywater detailed a fictitious account of a Japanese surprise attack against the US fleet at Pearl Harbor. The novel was reportedly used in the Japanese Navy War College.

Public Opinion

The American opinion of the Japanese prior to, and even after, Pearl Harbor, saw them as a backward, ignorant race. However, it was not commonly known that several leading Japanese officers had attended some of the finest universities and colleges in the US. Some Ivy League participants in the Pearl Harbor attack included Yamamoto and Nagano(Harvard); Yamaguchi(Princeton); and Arima(Yale). Likewise, in Europe, a number of German generals had studied at Oxford and other English schools.

Missed Chance?

On December 2, 1941, Lieutenant Ellsworth A. Hosner and another staff member of the 12th Naval District Intelligence(San Francisco) Office detected radio signals in the Pacific that they thought could be from the Japanese fleet, which had been missing since late November. Their commander, Captain Richard T. McCollough, a friend of President Roosevelt, was advised. They continued to track the signals and on December 6 established that the position was about 400 miles north of Oahu.

The Martin-Bellinger Report

The Martin-Bellinger Report was a joint Army-Navy plan that would be used in the event of an attack on Oahu or US fleet ships in Hawaiian waters. Among the highlights of the report are the following observations:

A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long time.

It appears possible that Orange (the US code for Japan) submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers.

A declaration of war might be preceded by: A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. A surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack...such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force.

In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise.

Upon seeing the US fleet all lit up at Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6, 1941, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short said, “What a target that would make”.