Processing and Experienced Duration 1

Processing and Experienced Duration 1

Running Head: PROCESSING AND EXPERIENCED DURATION

The Effects of Conscious Information Processing on the Subjective Experience of Time

Michael J. Walk

University of Baltimore

Abstract

This study tested Flaherty’s (1993) model of time perception, which proposed that retrospective perceptions of duration are affected by the level of conscious information processing (CIP) occurring within an individual during that duration. This study also tested the theory that the number of memories associated with a duration will mediate the relationship between level of CIP and time perception. The level of CIP was manipulated by increasing the participant’s emotional and cognitive involvement with a web-browsing task. After the task, they were asked to estimate the length of the duration. The low CIP condition mean estimate was significantly lower than both the moderate and high CIP condition mean estimates; the moderate and high CIP condition means were not significantly different. Number of memories was not found to be a mediating variable. Results and limitations are discussed.
The Effects of Conscious Information Processing on the Subjective Experience of Time

The subjective experience of the passing of time is affected by a variety of factors. Researchers have found that mood (Hornik, 1992), motivation (Conti, 2001), cognitive resources (Mantel & Kellaris, 2003), self-regulation (Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003), stimulus complexity (Lomranz, 1983), internal tempo (Boltz, 1994) and even psychopathology (Rabin, 1957) all influence the subjective experience of time. Gender has also been found to interact with both mood (Kellaris & Mantel, 1994) and self-regulation (Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003).

Several researchers have proposed models to explain the variation in the human experience of time and the diverse scientific results in the study of temporality. Hogan (1978) proposed a u-shaped relationship between stimulus complexity and the experience of time. He argued that when a person experiences a duration in the presence of a stimulus of either low or high complexity, that duration will seem relatively longer than a duration in the presence of a stimulus of moderate complexity. This model has been substantiated by research (see Lomranz, 1983); however, as Flaherty (1993) suggested, it does not fully deal with the variation of duration experience. The complexity of an encountered stimulus is unimportant if that stimulus is not attended to or experienced. Therefore, time perception is not only affected by the type of external stimulus but also by the subjective events occurring within the individual in response to that stimulus, for example: mood, motivation, and other internal factors (Conti, 2001; Flaherty, 1993; Hornik, 1992).

In order to accurately account for these diverse findings in time perception, Flaherty (1993) proposed an s-shaped model in which the subjective experience of time is dependent upon the level of conscious information processing (CIP) occurring within the individual. Relative to objective time (as measured by clocks in standard temporal units—hours, minutes, and seconds), subjective time can either be compressed, synchronous, or protracted. Temporal compression (i.e., the sensation that a duration is shorter than it actually is) occurs when an individual is participating in a habitual activity with low emotional concern and low cognitive involvement and therefore is engaging in a low level of CIP. “This results in a lower than normal density of experience per standard temporal unit” (p. 403). Synchronicity (i.e., when experienced duration approximates actual duration) occurs when an individual is acting in an unproblematic situation with moderate emotional concern and moderate cognitive involvement and therefore is engaging in a moderate level of CIP. “This results in the typical and consequently familiar density of experience per standard temporal unit” (p. 400). Finally, protracted duration (i.e., the sensation that a duration is longer than it really is) occurs when an individual is acting in an unusual situation that is extremely eventful or uneventful and the individual has high emotional concern and high cognitive involvement and therefore is engaging in a high level of CIP. “This results in greater than normal density of experience per standard temporal unit” (p. 401). Flaherty’s model is supported by much of the previously mentioned research on subjective duration as well as by Avni-Babad’s and Ritov’s (2003) research on routine tasks. They found that participants made shorter retrospective duration estimates for routine tasks than for non-routine tasks.

To summarize Flaherty’s (1993) model, the subjective experience of time is regulated by the amount of CIP that is occurring within the individual at any given time. The higher the level of processing, the longer the event seems in retrospect. The lower the level of processing, the shorter the event seems in retrospect. When the level of cognitive processing is moderate, the subjective experience of time is relatively equivalent to objective time.

Flaherty (1993) makes a few suggestions as to the causes of this differential experience of time; however, a complete and thorough understanding is far from achieved. For example, the key concept in Flaherty’s model is what he calls “density of experience” (p. 400).While physical density is the amount of matter per unit of volume, density of experience is the amount of experience per unit of time. The greater the amount of experience perceived during a temporal unit, the higher the density of experience. Flaherty assumes that individuals develop a sense of what constitutes average experience density. It is this average experience of density that allows us to accurately estimate the passing of time. When estimating a duration retrospectively, a person recalls the number of experiences related to that duration. When the number of experiences is large, the duration length is assumed to be large as well. When the number of experiences is small, the duration length is assumed to be small.

Therefore, durations of higher-than-average experience density are experienced as temporally protracted. Because there is so much information being processed during a time interval, the mind interprets the interval as longer than it actually is in order to reconcile that particular interval’s experience density with the common or average density of experience. Durations of lower-than-average experience density are experienced as temporally compressed. Since there is so little information being processed during a time interval, the mind interprets the interval as shorter than it actually was.

Flaherty’s (1993) model may sound somewhat similar to Ornstein’s (1997; as cited in Flaherty, 1993) model, known as the storage size hypothesis; however, it is quite different. Ornstein suggested that retrospective time estimates are constructed by the mind’s searching for memories associated with the duration to estimate. For example, if the reader were asked to estimate how long he or she has been reading this article, he or she would quickly search through the various memories associated with the article up to the present moment and generate an estimate of passed time based on the number of memories. The more memories, the longer the amount of time that must have passed. This seems, at first, commonsensical; it takes longer to read more paragraphs–therefore, the more paragraphs, the more time. However, several researchers have shown this model to be inadequate (see Flaherty, 1993; Mantel & Kellaris, 2003).

Particularly, Ornstein (1997) suggested that the number of memories created during a duration is a direct function of the complexity of the stimulus encountered during that duration. The more complex the stimulus, the more memories that would be created; therefore, retrospective time estimates would be longer. However, as Flaherty (1993) argues, the stimulus itself does not determine the density of experience. Density of experience is a function of the individual’s subjective encounter with the external stimulus. Also, as Mantel and Kellaris (2003) have found, retrospective time estimates are not simply a function of the gross number of memories created during a duration; they are a function of the net number of memories that are associated with the duration and not with other, previous experiences.

In Mantel and Kellaris’s (2003) study, participants listened to radio ads. Participants who could report more factual information from the ads also provided longer duration estimates. Participants also reported the thoughts they experienced while listening to the ad. However, participants with more thoughts during the duration did not have longer duration estimates (contrary to what Ornstein’s (1997) model would suggest). Mantel and Kellaris summarize their findings with this simple statement, “The more one remembers from and associates with a past event, the longer that event seems in retrospect” (p. 537).

Theoretically, Flaherty’s model encompasses these research findings. The level of CIP occurring within an individual causes the level of retrospective experience density which is a function of the number of duration-relevant memories created within that duration. While the model attempts to explain the variations in subjective duration experience in everyday life, most time perception research has been conducted using experimental tasks that are far-removed from everyday activities.

In order to understand and test Flaherty’s (1993) theory in a more realistic setting, this study will attempt to examine the effects of different levels of CIP on subjective duration while participating in an internet-browsing task. The goal of this study was to alter temporal perceptions of participants, not by manipulating the complexity of the external stimulus, but by manipulating particpants’ engagement with a stimulus of consistent complexity. Based on Flaherty’s model, I expect that activities that induce low (L) levels, moderate (M) levels, and high (H) levels of CIP will create the sensation of temporal compression, synchronicity, and protracted duration, respectively. (See the following methods section for the procedures that will be used to determine appropriate activities for the three conditions.) That is, I predict that L CIP duration estimates will be significantly smaller than both M CIP and H CIP (H1). I also suspect that H CIP and L CIP duration estimates will significantly deviate from actual clock time and that M CIP duration estimates will not (H2). Finally, I expect that the number of recalled task-relevant memories mediates the effect of CIP such that the level of CIP affects task memory generation and recall which affects retrospective duration estimation (H3).

METHOD

Designing the Experimental Tasks

In order to design an experimental task that was similar to tasks encountered in everyday life while avoiding valence and mood confounds (see Hornik, 1992), several different internet-browsing tasks were pilot tested. I selected three different business web-sites that I judged to be affectively neutral and free from significant threats to internal validity. These three websites were then tested on a group of 30 graduate students (15 male and 15 female). The 30 students were divided into three groups which each browsed the sites in different sequences. The students were told to navigate to the given website, browse that website at a leisurely pace, making sure to read most of the content on each page. After a period of 10 minutes, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire. The questionnaire contained three scales: valence, mood, and cognitive interest. Valence was assessed by two items: “I enjoyed browsing this site” and “I liked this website,” rated on Likert-type scale from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree—internal consistency ranged from  = .72 to .91. Mood was assessed by three items in response to the prompt, “This website made me feel …” The items were: “good/neutral/bad,” “pleased/neutral/displeased,” and “positive/neutral/negative” (items were based on Mantel & Kellaris, 2003, and responses were coded in descending numerical order from three to one). Alpha reliabilities ranged from .83 to .92. Cognitive interest was assessed by three items: “This website was very interesting,” “This website made me think,” and “My mind was engaged in this website,” rated on the same scale as the valence items. Alpha reliabilities ranged from .76 to .85. The web-browsing task with the highest reliability values and most neutral scores on the three scales was chosen as the experimental task. The chosen web-browsing task was to browse the website (C2-Education is a tutoring center for primary- and secondary-school students).

After the website was chosen, a separate group of 30 graduate students (15 female) were then used to pilot test the manipulations. It was the goal of this research to start with a relatively neutral task and then manipulate the experimental situation in order to induce specific levels of CIP. Manipulations were chosen for each desired level of CIP that were based on Flaherty’s model (1993). According to Flaherty, tasks that are relatively routine, induce a low level of emotional concern to understand the situation, and induce a low level of cognitive involvement with the situation should result in low levels of CIP. Tasks that induce a moderate level of emotional concern and cognitive involvement should result in moderate levels of CIP. Problematic tasks that induce a high level of emotional concern and cognitive involvement should result in high levels of CIP. I decided that the experimental situation most congruent with Flaherty’s theory for the low CIP condition was to have participants rate how much they enjoyed the website. For the moderate condition, participants were additionally informed that there would be a short test based on the material presented on the website. This was done to increase participants’ emotional concern and cognitive involvement with the experimental task. For the high condition, participants were asked to rate their enjoyment, take the test, and were told a passing score (85% correct) on the test would earn them a reward of $20. They were also informed that at the time of their participation in the experiment, 70% of the participants had obtained the reward. This information was added to make the goal appear obtainable, yet difficult to reach. A tabular presentation of the experimental manipulations is displayed in Table 1.

The 30 participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (L CIP, M CIP, or H CIP). After participating in the experimental task for 10 minutes, level of CIP was assessed by using a four-item Likert-type questionnaire on which responses ranged from (1) a small amount to (5) a large amount. The four items that made up the questionnaire were based on the prompt, “During the experimental task...”; the items were: “how much emotion (positive or negative) did you experience?,” “how much were you thinking about the task?,” “how much were you thinking about yourself? (reverse scored),” and “how much stress did you experience?” Scores on each item were summed to create a composite score of self-reported CIP. The alpha reliability for the questionnaire was .85. A main effect of condition on level self-reported of CIP was found using a one-way ANOVA, F(2, 27) = 9.30, p < .01. Mean CIP scores were in the predicted direction for the low, moderate, and high condition: 9.30, 11.78, and 14.18, respectively. The experimental manipulations demonstrated sufficient validity.

Experimental Procedure

A sample of N = 30 participants (15 female) were assigned to one of the three treatment conditions (low, moderate, or high CIP) using blocked random assignment in order to control for gender effects (which were found by Kellaris & Mantel, 1994; Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Each condition contained 5 females and 5 males. Participants scheduled appointment times and were tested individually in a computer lab. The computer lab wall clock and the clock displayed on the computer screen used by participants were removed prior to data collection. Experimenters were blind to participant conditions. Informed consent was obtained from each participant. Participants were told by the experimenter that the purpose of the research was to analyze different business websites for their degree of “user-friendliness”. They were also told that all participants would browse the internet site for a randomly selected duration less than 30 minutes. Participants were instructed to follow the directions presented on the computer screen and that the experimenter would stop them when their time was up—they would not be expected to commit more than 20 minutes to the task. Upon arriving at the computer terminal, each participant was presented with on-screen instructions commensurate with his or her experimental condition.

CIP was manipulated using the same experimental situations designed during pilot testing. Individual participants participated in their assigned experimental task for a randomly selected number of minutes (between 10 and 15, inclusive) when they were stopped and asked to estimate (without looking at their watch) the amount of time to the nearest minute that they had been engaged in the experimental task.Participants in all conditions were then given a 20-item test based on information presented in the website. A manipulation check was performed by asking participants, “On a scale of one to ten, rate how much of your total thinking was engaged in the experimental task (one being almost none and ten being almost all).” After all data were collected, participants were then debriefed, and each participant received $5 for their involvement.