Prevent Strategy and Action Plan 2015 - 18

Prevent Strategy and Action Plan 2015 - 18

Prevent Strategy and Action Plan

2015– 2018

Version Control Sheet
Version / 2.0
Date / April 2016
Owner / CONTEST Thematic Group

Section Contents Page

1. Introduction3

2. National Context3

3. Local Context4

4. Prevent5

5. Channel`7

6. Channel Panel Northumberland8

7. Safer Northumberland Partnership responsibilities8

8. The Mission Statement9

9. Delivery of the Strategy 10

10.Implementation and Execution of the Strategy11

11. Evaluation, review and adjustment to the strategy12

12.Outcomes12

Appendix 1. Terms of Reference Contest Thematic Group14

Appendix 2. Glossary of Terms 16

Appendix 3.Referral flowcharts – Channel recommended guidance

and Northumberland referral route18

Appendix 4aCHANNEL PANELInitial Meeting20

Appendix 4bCHANNEL PANEL REFERRALNotification Form24

Appendix 5.Northumberland Prevent Action Plan 26

1. Introduction:

1.1The Northumberland Prevent Strategy and Action Plan reflects the multi-agency partnership approach adopted within Northumberland to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks as defined by the Terrorism Act 2000, and in particular to prevent the radicalisation of vulnerable adults and children into extremism.

1.2The Action Plan will cover a period of three years, and will be refreshed annually. The Plan will align with the Safer Northumberland Partnership Plan, the business plans of the Northumberland Safeguarding Adults Board, the Northumberland Safeguarding Children’s Board and the Northumberland Local Area Agreement.

2. National Context

2.1 On 21st November 2015, the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 was published; Annex A summarises the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA). The original assessment was published in 2010 and refreshed in 2012 andthe full NSRA

is kept under regular review.

2.2. The 2015 the NSRA places the domestic and overseas risks faced by Great Britain into three tiers, according to judgement of both likelihood and impact. Tier One risks are the highest priority based on high likelihood and/or high impact. The 2015 assessment includes a greater number of Tier One and Tier Two risks than in 2012. This reflects both the impact of threats and hazards, and the development of risks since 2010.

2.3Over the next five years the following are judged to be the Tier One risks:

a) Terrorism: This will remain the most direct and immediate threat to our domestic security

and overseas interests. ISIL, Al Qa’ida and affiliates remain committed to attacking UK and

Western targets.

b) Cyber: The cyber threats to the UK are significant and varied. They include cyber

terrorism, fraud and serious and organised crime, espionage, and disruption of CNI as it

becomes more networked and dependent on technology, including networks and data

held overseas. Cyber risks underpin many of the other risks we face.

c)International Military Conflict: The risk is growing. Although it is unlikely that there will be

a direct military threat to the UK itself, there is a greater possibility of international military

crises drawing in the UK, including through treaty obligations. It is suggested that the ability to respondeffectively will be made harder by the growing use of asymmetric and hybrid tactics by

states, combining economic coercion, disinformation, proxies, terrorism and criminal

activity, blurring the boundaries between civil disorder and military conflict.

d). Instability Overseas: Since 2010 instability has spread significantly, especially in Britain’s

extended neighbourhood, to the south in the Middle East and northern Africa and to the

east in Ukraine.

e). Public Health: Disease, particularly pandemic influenza, emerging infectious diseases

and growing Antimicrobial Resistance, threatens lives and causes disruption to public

services and the economy. The UK’s vulnerability is increased by our large population and

open society.

f). Major Natural Hazards: Events such as severe weather and major flooding can cost

lives, cause disruption to Critical National Infrastructure and provision of essential services,

and have a significant economic cost.

2.4.In the longer termchanges in technology, the geopolitical and global economic context, and climate change are increasingly a risk to the UK, with the full effects on UK national security predicted to be seen after 2035.

2.5The Government uses all available intelligence sources to establish the current level of risk posed to the UK from terrorist attack. There are five levels:

1. Lowan attack is unlikely;
2. Moderate an attack is possible, but not likely
3. Substantial an attack is a strong possibility
4. Severe an attack is highly likely
5. Critical an attack is expected immediately

2.6The generic threat to the UK from International terrorism was raised to Severe in September 2014. The threat to certain specified groups was increased to severe in January 2015

3. Local Context

3.1The Counter Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP) confirms that young men and women from all over Britain are being radicalised and encouraged to travel to conflict zones by the material they are being exposed to on line. The number of individuals known to have travelled overseas (or expressed an interest in doing so) from the local area (including Northumberland) is very low.

3.2The national threat level of a targeted attack against a person or group deemed to have caused gross offence to Islam, and certain other specified groups was raised to severe (see below) early in 2015. This assessment by virtue of the generic risk also applies to the Northumbria Police force area.

3.3Remote radicalisation and social media, and individuals travelling to and from conflict zones(who may go on to return to radicalise others) remain the primary ongoing national risk and need to be considered locally in risk assessments and action plans.

3.4The static nature of the population in Northumberland, and the area’s level of deprivation make it a good target for long term counter radicalisation measures. The CTLP identifies domestic extremism as an area for consideration, e.g. the extreme right wing, animal rights groups and environmental campaigners. Cognisance must be given to the fact that many protest groups are legitimate. It is their democratic right to protest. The Prevent programme will only focus on extreme members within such groups who seek to achieve their aims by adopting unlawful methods.

3.5 Whilst there is no legal definition for domestic extremism, the term is generally used to describe the activity of individuals or campaign groups that carry out criminal acts of direct action in furtherance of a campaign. These people and activities usually seek to prevent something from happening or to change legislation or domestic policy, but to do so outside of the normal democratic process. The term does not apply to the majority of people who protest against issues in a peaceful manner, and whose activities are not considered to be outside of the law.

3.6 Domestic extremism is most commonly associated with ‘single issue’ protests, such as animal rights, environmentalism, anti-globalisation or anti-GM crops. Crime and public disorder linked to extreme left or right wing political campaigns is also considered domestic extremism.

3.7The tactics used by extremists vary and are ever-changing. Incidents have included public disorder offences, malicious letters and e-mails, blackmail, product contamination, damage to property and occasionally the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Domestic extremist campaigns rarely cause a danger to life, but in some cases the aim is to create a climate of fear.

3.8Nationally, the lead for preventing domestic extremism is the National Co-ordinator of Domestic Extremism (NCDE), on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM). NCDE works across police force boundaries. Providing specialist advice and expertise and promoting co-ordinated responses to domestic extremism.

3.9The CTG will ensure national intelligence is communicated to a local level, and this information is understood by those leading delivery of the Action Plan. In particular it will be necessary to establish:

• The primary international and national grievances which may impact locally and regionally
• Any specific local grievances
• If the grievances are genuine
• Can any known grievances be addressed

3.10Particular risks might include:

• Migrant worker groups
• Animal rights activists (animal testing establishments)
• Environment Action Groups (power stations)
• Impact of employment and economy issues
• Extreme Right and Left Wing activists
• Links with community integration
• Local Vulnerability (institutions / individual)

3.11There will be on-going assessment of risk in HMP Northumberland and other key identified institutions, for example Northumberland College.

4. Prevent

4.1In July 2011 the Government published the third version of the United Kingdom’s counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The strategy sets out the priorities for dealing with the impact of terrorism until 2015. Of the four strands of CONTEST;

4.2 All four strands are inextricably linked to the functionality of Northumberland County Council (NCC) and the Safer Northumberland Partnership (SNP). This strategy focusses on the Prevent strand, though references other areas of local authority work relating to “Protect” and “Prepare”.

4.3 Legislation such as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004,the Joint emergency interoperability principles (JESIP) and the recommendations from the 7/7 Bombing Inquest in July 2011 place strong emphasis on emergency services and other key partners working more effectively and efficiently together when responding to an emergency. The recommendations from the inquest included the development of joint operating principles, training and exercising and interoperability between organisations to deliver a better joint response to any major incident. The NCC Recovery and Restoration Plan published in April 2013 reflect some of these aims and currently rest with Northumberland Fire Service. This strategy will seek to support and integrate existing work in terms of planning and service delivery.

4.4 The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTS Act) became law on 16th February 2015. It gives the UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies the powers they need to deal with the increased terrorist threat in light of ISIS activities in Syria and Iraq and far-right extremism in the UK

4.5 Extremism is defined in the government’s Prevent strategy as:

“Vocal or active opposition to fundamentalBritish values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.

4.6 The government PREVENT strategy published in June 2011 places emphasis on Local Authorities to deliver tangible results from PREVENT projects. The ‘emphasis’ has now become statutory ie. Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 26 of the Act , places a statutory duty on ‘specified bodies’ including local authorities, schools, including academies and independent schools, further and higher education colleges, health, justice bodies and the police to pay due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.

4.7This is known as ‘The Prevent Duty’and became law on1st July 2015. Government guidancestresses this does not confer new functions on specified authorities. Instead specified bodies must pay ‘due regard’, or place an appropriate weight on preventing people from being drawn into terrorism.

5.Channel(see also Appendices 3, 4, 4a and 4b)

5.1 There is nosingle way of identifying who is likely to be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Factors that may have a bearing on someone becoming vulnerable may include: peer pressure, influence from other people or via the internet, bullying, crime against them or their involvement in crime, anti-social behaviour, family tensions, race/hate crime, lack of self-esteem or identity and personal or political grievances

.

5.2Channel forms a key part of the Prevent strategy. The process is a multi-agency approach to identify and provide support to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism.

5.3The CTS Act is intended to secure effective local co-operation and delivery of Channel in all areas and to build on the good practice already operating in many areas. In practice, the legislation requires:

a. local authorities to ensure that a multi-agency panel exists in their area;

b. the local authority to chair the panel;

c. the panel to develop a support plan for individuals accepted as Channel cases;

d. the panel to consider alternative forms of support, including health and social services, where Channel is not appropriate; and

e. all partners of a panel (as specified in Schedule 7), so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable, to cooperate with the police and the panel in the carrying out of their functions.

5.4 TheChannel Duty Guidance 2015has been issued under sections 36(7) and 38(6) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the CTS Act) to support panel members and partners of local panels. Sections 36 to 41 of the CTS Act 2015 sets out the duty on local authorities and partners of local panels to provide support for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism

5.5Safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, young people and adults is everyone’s responsibility. Local authorities have a statutory duty to safeguard children, young people and adults in relation to their social services functions. Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 places duties on a range of organisations and individualsto ensure their functions (including any that are contracted out) to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

5.6 In England, Working Together to Safeguard Children 2015 sets out the legislative requirements and expectations in individual services to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Channel is referenced at paragraph 28

5.7 From April 2015, the Care Act 2014, placed adult safeguarding on a statutory footing. Local authorities are required to have Safeguarding Adults Boardsin their area, and to take the lead in safeguarding enquiries. The Board is expected to provide strategic leadership to the work of the local authority, and partner agencies, on the development of policy and practice designed to safeguard adults at risk. Radicalisation and exploitation are safeguarding issues, and Channel is just one mechanism that can be used to support people who may be at risk of being drawn into extremism.

5.8 Channel is a programme which focuses on providing support at an early stage (often referred to as the “pre-criminal space”) to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by:

a. identifying individuals at risk;

b. assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and

c. developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.

5.9 Channel may be appropriate for anyone who is vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism. Channel is about ensuring that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism, and before they become involved in criminal terrorist or extremist related activity.

5.10Success of the programme is very much dependent on the co-operation and co-ordinated activity of partners. It works best when the individuals and their families fully engage with the programme and are supported in a consistent manner.

5.11 The police co-ordinate activity by requesting relevant information from panel partners about a referred individual. They will use this information to make an initial assessment of the nature and extent of the vulnerability which the person has. The information should then be presented to a Channel panel.

5.12In the case of a child, there may be certain circumstances when a parent/guardian does not give consent for their child to be supported through Channel, particularly if some of the vulnerabilities present are in the home environment. If the child is thought to be at risk from significant harm , whether that is physical, emotional, mental, intellectual, social or behavioural harm (as defined by section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989), then social services for the relevant local authority area must be involved in decisions made about the child. There may be circumstances where the Channel panel and social services determine that a child is in need as defined by section 17 of the Children Act 1989 17. In such a case, statutory assessments may need to be carried out by a social worker under section 17, or section 47 if the child is thought to be at risk from significant harm.

6. Channel Panel Northumberland

6.1 Section 37(5) of the CTS Act requires Channel panels to be chaired by the responsible local authority (that is, the authority responsible for ensuring a panel is in place). Members of the panel must include the responsible local authority and the police for the relevant local authority area under section 37(1) of the CTS Act, and they have principal responsibility for Channel in their areas.

6.2There are currently two Local Authority Channel Chairs in Northumberland; the Operational Manager and the Strategic Manager of the Strategic Adult Safeguarding service. These chairs operate regardless of whether the referral relates to a vulnerable adult or a child.

6.3 The Local Authority Chair and the police will be present at each panel alongside other members, as determined by the panel (section 37(4)). Other members might include children and adults social care services, probation, community safety and the NHS partners depending on the circumstances of the case.

6.4 If the individual to be discussed is a child known to social services, or if there is a concern that a child might be at risk of significant harm, then the social worker relevant to that local authority should be present at the panel, and be involved in all decisions about the child.

7. Safer Northumberland Partnership responsibilities

7.1Specified bodies will be expected to establish or use existing partnerships, such as the Safer Northumberland Partnership (SNP) to take forward ’The Prevent Duty’.The Act stresses the need to adopt a risk based approach to this and the importance of collaborative working in the early detection of vulnerable children and adults at risk of radicalisation, identifying the pathways to radicalisation and working together to identify, detect and prevent extremism throughout our communities. The SNP isthe overarching organisation which will coordinate and support specified bodies to achieve the statutory requirements of ‘The Prevent Duty’

7.2 There are three themes throughout ‘The Prevent Duty’ guidance which SNP and specified bodies are required to both demonstrate and be inspected upon namely,

• Effective leadership,
• Working in partnership
• Having appropriate capabilities to tackle extremism

8.The Mission Statement