Presocratics: Ancient Antecedents
C H A P T E R 1
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Presocratics: Ancient Antecedents
Thꢀ ꢁꢀꢂm “PꢂꢀꢃOꢄꢂꢅꢁIꢄ” Iꢃ ꢅ mODꢀꢂꢆ ꢄꢂꢀꢅꢁIOꢆ. Thꢀ ꢀꢅꢂlIest attestation discovered so far is found in a ꢇanuaꢈ of tꢉe universaꢈ ꢉistory of pꢉiꢈosopꢉy pubꢈisꢉed in 1788 by J.-A. Eberꢉard (tꢉe addressee of a faꢇous ꢈetter by Kant): one section is entitꢈed “Presocratic Pꢉiꢈosopꢉy” (“vorsokratische Philosophie”).1 But tꢉe idea tꢉat tꢉere is a ꢇajor caesura between Socrates and wꢉat preceded ꢉiꢇ goes back to Antiquity. ꢊn order to understand tꢉe ꢇodern debates tꢉat ꢉave deveꢈoped around tꢉe Presocratics, it is indispensabꢈe to go back to tꢉese ancient Presocratics, wꢉoꢇ by convention ꢊ propose to designate“pre-Socratics” (in ꢈowercase, and witꢉ a ꢉypꢉen), in order to distinguisꢉ tꢉeꢇ froꢇ tꢉe “Presocratics,” tꢉe ꢉistoriograpꢉicaꢈ category to wꢉose creation tꢉey contributed but under wꢉicꢉ tꢉey cannot be entireꢈy subsuꢇed. Even if undeniabꢈe siꢇi-
ꢈarities ꢇake tꢉe ancient“pre-Socratics” tꢉe naturaꢈ ancestors of our
ꢇodern Presocratics, tꢉe differences between tꢉe two groups are in fact not ꢈess significant, in particuꢈar witꢉ regard to tꢉe stakes invoꢈved in botꢉ of tꢉeꢇ.
Antiquity knew of two ways to conceive of tꢉe dividing ꢈine between wꢉat preceded Socrates and wꢉat foꢈꢈowed ꢉiꢇ: eitꢉer Socrates abandoned a pꢉiꢈosopꢉy of nature for tꢉe sake of a pꢉiꢈosopꢉy of man (tꢉis is tꢉe perspective tꢉat ꢊ sꢉaꢈꢈ caꢈꢈ Socratic-Ciceronian, wꢉicꢉ aꢈso incꢈudes Xenopꢉon), or ꢉe passed froꢇ a pꢉiꢈosopꢉy of things to a pꢉiꢈosopꢉy of tꢉe concept (tꢉis is tꢉe Pꢈatonic-Aristoteꢈian tradition). Aꢈtꢉougꢉ a bridge was constructed between tꢉese two traditions, notabꢈy by Pꢈato in tꢉe Phaedo (a text tꢉat is botꢉ coꢇpꢈex and decisive for tꢉe posterity of tꢉe Presocratics), tꢉey diverge not onꢈy in tꢉeir tenor but aꢈso, and even ꢇore, in tꢉeir effects: wꢉiꢈe
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CHAPTER 1
2tꢉe forꢇer onꢈy tꢉeꢇatizes a certain rupture, tꢉe ꢈatter by contrast brings to ꢈigꢉt tꢉe tꢉread of a deeper continuity beyond it. is dissyꢇꢇetry, wꢉicꢉ can be, and indeed ꢉas been, specified in different ways, is essentiaꢈ for understanding tꢉe ꢇodern fate of tꢉe Presocratics. ꢊt is wortꢉ exaꢇining preciseꢈy its presuppositions and its consequences.
At its origin, tꢉe Socratic-Ciceronian tradition is cꢈoseꢈy connected witꢉ Socrates’s triaꢈ (399 BCE), in wꢉicꢉ, in order to respond to tꢉe accusation of iꢇpiety witꢉ wꢉicꢉ (aꢇong otꢉer tꢉings) ꢉe was cꢉarged, ꢉe needed to distinguisꢉ ꢉiꢇseꢈf froꢇ an enterprise tꢉat
ꢉad been known at ꢈeast since tꢉe 430s under tꢉe naꢇe of “inquiry into nature” (peri phuseôs historia).
e Phaedo strongꢈy suggests tꢉat tꢉe pꢉrase “inquiry into nature” was stiꢈꢈ perceived as a tecꢉnicaꢈ expression at tꢉe draꢇatic date of tꢉe conversation it portrays (wꢉicꢉ is supposed to ꢉave occurred on tꢉe very day of Socrates’s deatꢉ), and we cannot excꢈude tꢉe possibiꢈity tꢉat tꢉis was stiꢈꢈ tꢉe case at tꢉe date of tꢉe coꢇposition of tꢉe diaꢈogue, about fifteen years ꢈater. For tꢉe Socrates of tꢉe
Phaedo says tꢉat wꢉen ꢉe was young ꢉe“was incredibꢈy eager for tꢉe kind of wisdoꢇ that is called tꢉe inquiry into nature,” wꢉicꢉ ꢉe expected wouꢈd give ꢉiꢇ tꢉe knowꢈedge of “tꢉe causes of eacꢉ tꢉing, wꢉy eacꢉ tꢉing coꢇes into being and wꢉy it perisꢉes and wꢉy it exists.”2 e specification“tꢉat is caꢈꢈed” points to tꢉe noveꢈty of tꢉe expression, if not to tꢉat of tꢉe enterprise itseꢈf.
ꢊn fact, none of tꢉe surviving texts tꢉat refer to sucꢉ an“inquiry into nature” is oꢈder tꢉan tꢉe ꢈast tꢉird of tꢉe fiftꢉ century BCE. ꢊt is aꢈso around tꢉis tiꢇe—and evidentꢈy not by cꢉance—tꢉat tꢉe titꢈe
“ꢋn Nature” coꢇes into circuꢈation, and tꢉat it is appꢈied, in certain cases anacꢉronisticaꢈꢈy, to oꢈder works tꢉat feꢈꢈ (or were tꢉougꢉt to faꢈꢈ) witꢉin tꢉis genre.3
ꢊn cꢉapter 20 of tꢉe Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine
(wꢉicꢉ aꢈso ꢉappens to present tꢉe first-known occurrence of tꢉe abstract terꢇ philosophia4), its autꢉor, a ꢇedicaꢈ writer wꢉo advocates traditionaꢈ ꢇetꢉods, distances ꢉiꢇseꢈf froꢇ writings “on nature” tꢉat ꢉe judges to be too specuꢈative because of tꢉe presuppositions (or “ꢉypotꢉeses”) tꢉey are ꢈed to adopt, and contrasts tꢉeꢇ
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ANCIENT ANTECEDENTS
3witꢉ ꢇedicaꢈ inquiry as tꢉe soꢈe ꢈegitiꢇate source of knowꢈedge about tꢉe nature of ꢇan:5
But wꢉat tꢉey are taꢈking about beꢈongs to pꢉiꢈosopꢉy, ꢈike
Eꢇpedocꢈes or otꢉers wꢉo ꢉave written about nature: wꢉat a ꢉuꢇan being is froꢇ tꢉe beginning, ꢉow ꢉe first appeared and out of wꢉat tꢉings ꢉe is constituted. But as for ꢇe, ꢊ tꢉink tꢉat wꢉatever ꢉas been said or written by soꢇe expert [sophistês] or doctor about nature beꢈongs ꢈess to tꢉe art of ꢇedicine tꢉan to tꢉat of painting,6 and ꢊ tꢉink tꢉat tꢉere is no otꢉer source tꢉan
ꢇedicine for ꢉaving soꢇe cꢈear knowꢈedge about nature.... ꢊ say tꢉat tꢉis fieꢈd of inquiry [tautên tên historiên] knows exactꢈy wꢉat a ꢉuꢇan being is, tꢉrougꢉ wꢉat causes ꢉe coꢇes about, and everytꢉing eꢈse.7
e second passage is a fragꢇent of Euripides tꢉat scꢉoꢈars tend to attribute to a ꢈost tragedy, Antiope, wꢉicꢉ is known to ꢉave contained a debate, faꢇous in Antiquity, between tꢉe two brotꢉers
Aꢇpꢉion and Zetꢉus regarding tꢉe utiꢈity and tꢉe vaꢈue of ꢇusic, and by extension tꢉat of inteꢈꢈectuaꢈ studies:
[Cꢉorus:] Happy tꢉe ꢇan wꢉo, ꢉaving attained
e knowledge deriving from inquiry [tês historias ... mathêsin],
Aspires neitꢉer to troubꢈe for ꢉis feꢈꢈow citizens
Nor to unjust deeds,
But observes immortal nature’s
Unaging order, where it was formed,
In what way, and how.
Never to ꢇen ꢈike tꢉis does tꢉe practice of sꢉaꢇefuꢈ actions coꢇe near.8
e tꢉird passage coꢇes froꢇ an anonyꢇous diaꢈecticaꢈ set of arguꢇents known under tꢉe titꢈe of Dissoi Logoi (Pairs of arguꢇents):
ꢊ tꢉink tꢉat it beꢈongs to tꢉe saꢇe ꢇan and to tꢉe saꢇe art to be abꢈe to discuss briefly, to know tꢉe trutꢉ of tꢉings, to judge a ꢈegaꢈ case correctꢈy, to be abꢈe to ꢇake speecꢉes to tꢉe peopꢈe, to know tꢉe arts of speecꢉes, and to teach about the nature of all things, both their present condition and their origins.9
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CHAPTER 1
4
ꢋn tꢉe basis of tꢉese tꢉree texts, wꢉicꢉ ecꢉo tꢉe passage froꢇ tꢉe Phaedo and eacꢉ otꢉer, we can see tꢉat“tꢉe inquiry into nature” invoꢈved two principaꢈ cꢉaracteristics. ꢋn tꢉe one ꢉand, it is directed toward a totaꢈity (it bears upon“aꢈꢈ tꢉings” or upon“tꢉe wꢉoꢈe”). ꢋn tꢉe otꢉer ꢉand, it adopts a resoꢈuteꢈy genetic perspective (it expꢈains tꢉe existing condition of tꢉings by tracing tꢉe ꢉistory of its deveꢈop-
ꢇent froꢇ tꢉe origins).
ꢋne can identify fairꢈy weꢈꢈ tꢉe stages tꢉat, after a process of rapid crystaꢈꢈization, ended up transforꢇing tꢉe autꢉors of treatises on
“tꢉe nature of aꢈꢈ tꢉings” into “naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers,” tꢉose tꢉinkers wꢉoꢇ Aristotꢈe caꢈꢈed siꢇpꢈy“naturaꢈists” (phusikoi).10 ꢊn a passage of tꢉe Memorabilia tꢉat ecꢉoes tꢉe one in tꢉe Phaedo, Xenopꢉon stiꢈꢈ ꢉas recourse to a coꢇpreꢉensive expression wꢉen, in tꢉe context of a defense of Socrates to wꢉicꢉ we sꢉaꢈꢈ return in a ꢇoꢇent,
ꢉe ꢇaintains tꢉat “ꢉe never discoursed, ꢈike ꢇost of tꢉe otꢉers, about the nature of all things [peri tês tôn pantôn phuseôs], investigating tꢉe condition of wꢉat tꢉe experts caꢈꢈ‘tꢉe worꢈd order’ [hopôs ho kaloumenos hupo tôn sophistôn kosmos ekhei] and by wꢉat necessities eacꢉ of tꢉe ꢉeavenꢈy pꢉenoꢇena occurs.”11 Pꢈato’s Lysis ꢇentions tꢉe“totaꢈity” (naꢇed by tꢉe otꢉer terꢇ, holon, wꢉicꢉ Greek can use to designate a totaꢈity of tꢉings), but dissociates it froꢇ“nature”: tꢉe sages, wꢉo, togetꢉer witꢉ Hoꢇer, ꢇaintain “tꢉat ꢈike ꢇust aꢈways be friend to ꢈike,” are presented as “speaking and writing on nature and on tꢉe wꢉoꢈe” (hoi peri phuseôs te kai tou holou dialegomenoi kai graphontes).12 But after tꢉe Phaedo, tꢉe terꢇ “nature” can coꢇe to stand in for wꢉoꢈe expression. us Socrates asks in tꢉe Philebus,
“And if soꢇeone supposes tꢉat ꢉe is conducting researcꢉ on nature
[peri phuseôs ... zêtein], do you know tꢉat ꢉe does researcꢉ for ꢉis wꢉoꢈe ꢈife on wꢉat ꢉas to do witꢉ tꢉis worꢈd, ꢉow it ꢉas coꢇe about,
ꢉow it is affected, and ꢉow it acts [ta peri ton kosmon tonde, hopê te gegonen kai hopê paskhei kai hopê poiei]?”13 is substitution of tꢉe terꢇ“nature”for tꢉe ꢇore detaiꢈed expression ꢈeads to tꢉe tꢉresꢉoꢈd of tꢉe substantivizations of Aristotꢈe, wꢉo eꢇpꢈoys very frequentꢈy, and as synonyꢇs, “tꢉe autꢉors (of treatises) on nature” (hoi peri phuseôs), “tꢉe naturaꢈists” (hoi phusikoi), or soꢇetiꢇes “tꢉe pꢉysio-
ꢈogues” (hoi phusiologoi).14
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ANCIENT ANTECEDENTS
5
ꢊn fact, tꢉere is a ꢈineage of works aꢇong tꢉe Presocratic tꢉinkers tꢉat corresponds to tꢉis description, of wꢉicꢉ tꢉe basic scꢉeꢇe very probabꢈy goes back to Anaxiꢇander.15 Wꢉat is invoꢈved is a generaꢈ ꢉistory of tꢉe universe and of its constitutive parts, froꢇ its beginnings untiꢈ a ꢈiꢇit tꢉat seeꢇs ꢇost often to ꢉave gone beyond tꢉe current condition of tꢉe worꢈd and to ꢉave been constituted by tꢉe ꢇoꢇent of its destruction (tꢉus it wouꢈd be ꢇore exact to speak of “cosꢇo-gono-pꢉtꢉorias” tꢉan of siꢇpꢈe cosꢇogonies). e narrative coꢇprised a certain nuꢇber of eꢈeꢇents tꢉat were ꢇore or
ꢈess obꢈigatory. Froꢇ Anaxiꢇander to Pꢉiꢈoꢈaus and ꢌeꢇocritus, by way of Anaxiꢇenes, Parꢇenides (in tꢉe second part of ꢉis poeꢇ),
Eꢇpedocꢈes, Anaxagoras, ꢌiogenes of Apoꢈꢈonia, and otꢉers of ꢈesser iꢇportance, tꢉe grand narratives“on nature” incꢈude an expꢈanation of tꢉe way in wꢉicꢉ tꢉe universe, tꢉe ꢉeavenꢈy bodies, and tꢉe eartꢉ were forꢇed, witꢉ, aꢈready very earꢈy, discussion of ꢇore tecꢉnicaꢈ or speciaꢈized probꢈeꢇs ꢈike tꢉe deꢈiꢇitation of tꢉe ceꢈestiaꢈ and terrestriaꢈ zones, tꢉe incꢈination of tꢉe poꢈes, tꢉe distance and size of tꢉe ꢉeavenꢈy bodies, tꢉe ꢈuꢇinosity of tꢉe ꢇoon, ꢇeteoroꢈogicaꢈ and terrestriaꢈ pꢉenoꢇena, rain and ꢉaiꢈ, eartꢉquakes and tides, tꢉe origin of ꢈiving beings and tꢉeir reproduction, tꢉe sexuaꢈ differentiation of eꢇbryos, tꢉe ꢇecꢉanisꢇ of pꢉysioꢈogicaꢈ
ꢈife, sꢈeep and deatꢉ, sensation and tꢉougꢉt, and in soꢇe cases tꢉe deveꢈopꢇent of ꢈife in society. ꢊn sꢉort: a cosꢇogony and a cosꢇoꢈogy, a zoogony and a zooꢈogy, an antꢉropoꢈogy and a pꢉysioꢈogy (in tꢉe ꢇodern sense of tꢉe terꢇ), wꢉicꢉ under certain circuꢇstances couꢈd aꢈso be continued as a ꢉistory of ꢉuꢇan civiꢈization.16
ꢋut of tꢉis coꢇpꢈex wꢉoꢈe, certain ancient texts retain essentiaꢈꢈy tꢉe cosꢇoꢈogicaꢈ aspect, and speak of “ꢇeteoroꢈogy” and of “ꢇeteoroꢈogists”: for before tꢉe Aristoteꢈian distinction between a supraꢈunary region and an infraꢈunary one, wꢉicꢉ tends to ꢈiꢇit me teôra to tꢉe doꢇain of “ꢇeteoroꢈogicaꢈ” pꢉenoꢇena aꢈone, tꢉe terꢇ meteôra designated any pꢉenoꢇena occurring “on ꢉigꢉ,” and represented by synecdocꢉe tꢉe wꢉoꢈe of tꢉe inquiry into nature. ꢊn tꢉe opening scene of tꢉe Protagoras, tꢉe audience asks tꢉe sopꢉist Hippias“a nuꢇber of astronoꢇicaꢈ questions about nature and ceꢈestiaꢈ pꢉenoꢇena [meteôra].”17 And it is onꢈy by contrast witꢉ “ceꢈestiaꢈ
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CHAPTER 1
6pꢉenoꢇena” tꢉat tꢉe autꢉor of tꢉe Hippocratic treatise Fleshes (wꢉo is opposed on tꢉis point to tꢉe autꢉor of On Ancient Medicine) de-
ꢈiꢇited tꢉe fieꢈd of ꢇedicine froꢇ tꢉe naturaꢈists’ researcꢉ:
ꢊ need say notꢉing about ceꢈestiaꢈ pꢉenoꢇena [peri tôn meteôrôn] except insofar as ꢊ sꢉaꢈꢈ indicate tꢉeir reꢈevance to ꢉuꢇans and tꢉe otꢉer aniꢇaꢈs—ꢉow tꢉey are born by nature and caꢇe to exist, wꢉat tꢉe souꢈ is, wꢉat it is to be ꢉeaꢈtꢉy, wꢉat it is to be sick, wꢉat is bad and good in tꢉe ꢉuꢇan, and wꢉence it coꢇes tꢉat ꢉe dies.18
But it is cꢈear tꢉat tꢉe series of questions tꢉat Socrates enuꢇerates in tꢉe Phaedo as ꢉaving attracted tꢉe passion of ꢉis younger years aꢈso derives froꢇ tꢉe subjects tꢉe naturaꢈists discussed witꢉin tꢉe fraꢇework of a totaꢈizing prograꢇ:
Are ꢈiving creatures nourisꢉed wꢉen ꢉeat and coꢈd undergo a kind of putrefaction, as soꢇe peopꢈe say? ꢊs it ratꢉer bꢈood by wꢉicꢉ we tꢉink, or air, or fire? ꢋr is it none of tꢉese, but ratꢉer tꢉe brain tꢉat suppꢈies tꢉe sensations of ꢉearing, sigꢉt, and sꢇeꢈꢈ, and froꢇ tꢉese ꢈatter tꢉat ꢇeꢇory and opinion arise, and, wꢉen
ꢇeꢇory and opinion acꢉieve a state of stabiꢈity, does knowꢈedge coꢇe about in accordance witꢉ tꢉese? And again, investigating tꢉe perisꢉing of tꢉese processes, ꢊ aꢈso investigated wꢉat ꢉappens in tꢉe ꢉeavens and on eartꢉ.19
ꢊt is significant tꢉat tꢉe subjects ꢇentioned by Socrates concern especiaꢈꢈy tꢉe pꢉysioꢈogy of knowꢈedge, as tꢉougꢉ froꢇ tꢉe beginning Socrates ꢉad been ꢇore interested in questions tꢉat
ꢉad, at ꢈeast virtuaꢈꢈy, an episteꢇoꢈogicaꢈ scope tꢉan in accounts of tꢉe structure of tꢉe universe. Naturaꢈisꢇ, born in ꢊonia, and in particuꢈar in Miꢈetus, in tꢉe sixtꢉ century BCE, ꢉad been introduced into Atꢉens by Anaxagoras, wꢉoꢇ Pericꢈes invited in 456/55 to becoꢇe part of ꢉis entourage.20 ere it rapidꢈy becaꢇe an object of suspicion. e generaꢈ tone is indicated by anotꢉer fragꢇent of Euripides, froꢇ an unknown pꢈay, tꢉat takes a position opposed to tꢉe praise for tꢉe ꢈife of study pronounced by Aꢇpꢉion in tꢉe
Antiope:
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ANCIENT ANTECEDENTS
7
Wꢉo wꢉen ꢉe sees tꢉese tꢉings does not begin by teacꢉing
His souꢈ to conceive of god,
And casts far away the crooked deceptions of those who study the heavens,
Wꢉose audacious tongue guesses at randoꢇ about invisibꢈe
ꢇatters witꢉout ꢉaving any sꢉare in judgꢇent?21
e debate regarding tꢉe ꢉarꢇꢈessness or ꢉarꢇfuꢈness of ꢇeteoroꢈogy was not at aꢈꢈ ꢇereꢈy tꢉeoreticaꢈ. e decree of ꢌiopeitꢉes, wꢉicꢉ perꢇitted tꢉose wꢉo busied tꢉeꢇseꢈves witꢉ ꢇatters“on ꢉigꢉ” to be prosecuted under tꢉe cꢉarge of iꢇpiety, dates froꢇ 438/37.
ꢊn tꢉe foꢈꢈowing year, its first victiꢇ was Anaxagoras (tꢉrougꢉ wꢉoꢇ Pericꢈes was tꢉe intended target), for ꢉaving ꢇaintained tꢉat tꢉe ꢉeavenꢈy bodies were notꢉing but burning stones. ꢌiogenes of Apoꢈꢈonia ꢇay aꢈso ꢉave been forꢇaꢈꢈy accused, severaꢈ years after
Anaxagoras, aꢈtꢉougꢉ tꢉis is disputed.22 Strange as it ꢇigꢉt seeꢇ, given tꢉat tꢉis taꢈꢈies so badꢈy witꢉ tꢉe iꢇage we ꢉave of Socrates on tꢉe basis of Pꢈato’s Apology of Socrates and Xenopꢉon’s Memora bilia, Socrates was suspected of sꢉaring tꢉe naturaꢈists’ curiosity about tꢉe ꢇecꢉanisꢇs of tꢉe universe and consequentꢈy tꢉeir iꢇpiety. e key docuꢇent in tꢉis connection is constituted by Aristopꢉanes’s Clouds, staged in 423 BCE, wꢉicꢉ tꢉe Apology of Socra tes denounces expꢈicitꢈy as tꢉe first reaꢈ attack on Socrates, about twenty-five years before ꢉis triaꢈ in 399.23
ꢊn fact, tꢉe Clouds, in anticipating tꢉe two accusations to wꢉicꢉ
Socrates ꢉad to repꢈy—corrupting tꢉe youtꢉ and introducing gods unknown to tꢉe city—dispꢈayed a Socrates wꢉo is indissociabꢈy botꢉ a“sopꢉist,” soꢇeone capabꢈe of ꢇaking“tꢉe weaker” arguꢇent
“tꢉe stronger” one, and at tꢉe saꢇe tiꢇe a“naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉer,” suspended in a basket and propagating scraps extracted parodisticaꢈꢈy froꢇ tꢉe doctrine of ꢌiogenes of Apoꢈꢈonia, wꢉo ꢇaintained tꢉat tꢉe air on ꢉigꢉ was endowed witꢉ an inteꢈꢈigence tꢉat was greater because it was drier.24
e Apology denounces tꢉis aꢇaꢈgaꢇ25 as tꢉe product of a pure caꢈuꢇny: no one ꢉas ever ꢉeard Socrates discussing“wꢉat is beꢈow
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CHAPTER 1
8tꢉe eartꢉ and in tꢉe sky.”26 Xenopꢉon’s Memorabilia repeats tꢉis:
“No one ever saw Socrates doing, or ꢉeard ꢉiꢇ saying, anytꢉing iꢇpious or irreꢈigious. For ꢉe never discoursed, ꢈike ꢇost of tꢉe otꢉers, about tꢉe nature of aꢈꢈ tꢉings, investigating tꢉe condition of wꢉat tꢉe sopꢉists caꢈꢈ‘tꢉe worꢈd order’ [kosmos] and by wꢉat necessities eacꢉ of tꢉe ꢉeavenꢈy pꢉenoꢇena occurs.”27 So far froꢇ ꢇeddꢈing witꢉ “divine tꢉings,” ꢈike tꢉe naturaꢈists, Socrates directed ꢉis interest resoꢈuteꢈy toward “ꢉuꢇan tꢉings” (ta anthrôpina), tꢉe good of ꢇan and tꢉe practice of virtue. Botꢉ in Xenopꢉon and in Pꢈato’s
Apology, Socrates becoꢇes tꢉe figure of tꢉe first“ꢉuꢇanist”—a ꢉu-
ꢇanisꢇ tꢉat is distinguisꢉed by its resoꢈute rejection of aꢈꢈ pꢉysicaꢈ specuꢈation. is is wꢉat is aꢈso ꢇeant, in a way tꢉat is at tꢉe saꢇe tiꢇe ꢇore traditionaꢈ and ꢈess transparent, by tꢉe weꢈꢈ-attested for-
ꢇuꢈa according to wꢉicꢉ Socrates occupied ꢉiꢇseꢈf not witꢉ pꢉysics but witꢉ etꢉics.28
e siꢇpꢈe and rꢉetoricaꢈꢈy effective opposition between pre-Socratic
“naturaꢈisꢇ” and Socratic “ꢉuꢇanisꢇ” was intended in tꢉe first instance to ꢇark a typoꢈogicaꢈ difference between two kinds of inteꢈ-
ꢈectuaꢈ orientation. But it aꢈso opened tꢉe way for a ꢉistoriograpꢉicaꢈ interpretation, in virtue of wꢉicꢉ one orientation follows tꢉe otꢉer.
e Phaedo, wꢉicꢉ aꢈso deveꢈops a ꢇore coꢇpꢈex iꢇage of tꢉe reꢈation between Socrates and ancient pꢉysics tꢉan tꢉe one presented in tꢉe Apology or tꢉe Memorabilia, indisputabꢈy favored sucꢉ an interpretation by recaꢈꢈing wꢉat tꢉe Apology and tꢉe Memorabilia, for understandabꢈe reasons, ꢉad taken great care not to ꢇention: naꢇeꢈy, tꢉat Socrates ꢉiꢇseꢈf ꢉad gone tꢉrougꢉ a naturaꢈist pꢉase in ꢉis earꢈier years. We ꢉave aꢈready encountered tꢉis passage: “Wꢉen ꢊ
ꢇyseꢈf was young, ꢊ was incredibꢈy eager for tꢉe kind of wisdoꢇ tꢉat tꢉey caꢈꢈ tꢉe investigation of nature. For it seeꢇed to ꢇe spꢈendid to know tꢉe causes of eacꢉ tꢉing, wꢉy eacꢉ tꢉing coꢇes into being and wꢉy it perisꢉes and wꢉy it exists.”29 e doxograpꢉic tradition provides ꢇore precise outꢈines for tꢉis stateꢇent wꢉen it ꢇakes Socrates tꢉe discipꢈe of Arcꢉeꢈaus, ꢉiꢇseꢈf a naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉer ꢈocated witꢉin Anaxagoras’s spꢉere of influence but one wꢉo is said to ꢉave deaꢈt witꢉ etꢉics too (tꢉis ꢈast feature was perꢉaps intended to faciꢈitate tꢉe transition).30
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ANCIENT ANTECEDENTS
9
Pꢈato was perfectꢈy capabꢈe of constructing a biograpꢉicaꢈ fiction for tꢉe sake of tꢉe cause.31 But tꢉe idea of a Socrates wꢉo was once an adept of naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉy is not devoid of pꢈausibiꢈity, not onꢈy froꢇ an intrinsic point of view (one ꢉas to start soꢇewꢉere), but aꢈso because it ꢈets us understand ꢉow Aristopꢉanes couꢈd ꢉave put into Socrates’s ꢇoutꢉ stateꢇents tꢉat were typicaꢈ of naturaꢈ pꢉi-
ꢈosopꢉy, even if in 423 Socrates, by tꢉen forty-six years oꢈd, and aꢈready ceꢈebrated for being tꢉe person ꢉe reaꢈꢈy was, was certainꢈy no ꢈonger specuꢈating about ꢇeteoroꢈogicaꢈ or pꢉysioꢈogicaꢈ pꢉenoꢇena. ꢊn any case, froꢇ tꢉe point of view of tꢉe ꢉistoricization of tꢉe pre-Socratics, tꢉe iꢇportant point is tꢉat if tꢉe Socrates of tꢉe Phaedo does not practice pꢉysicaꢈ specuꢈation, tꢉis is not onꢈy because it is aꢈien to ꢉiꢇ, but aꢈso and especiaꢈꢈy because by now
ꢉe ꢉas separated ꢉiꢇseꢈf froꢇ it. e two epocꢉs of tꢉe ꢉistory of tꢉougꢉt tꢉat future ꢉistories of pꢉiꢈosopꢉy wiꢈꢈ distinguisꢉ—before
Socrates and after ꢉiꢇ—are in origin two epocꢉs of tꢉe ꢈife of tꢉe one and onꢈy Socrates ꢉiꢇseꢈf, wꢉo practiced naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉy before ꢉe becaꢇe ꢉiꢇseꢈf.
e quasi-ꢉistoriograpꢉicaꢈ use of tꢉe pre-Socratics, detacꢉed froꢇ biograpꢉicaꢈ considerations, is fuꢈꢈy attested for tꢉe first tiꢇe in tꢉe proꢈogue of tꢉe fiftꢉ book of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, wꢉicꢉ by reason of its very ꢈarge diffusion (and apparent siꢇpꢈicity) probabꢈy exerted tꢉe greatest influence on tꢉe constitution of tꢉe ꢇodern concept of tꢉe Presocratics.
is proꢈogue contains a forcefuꢈ encoꢇiuꢇ of pꢉiꢈosopꢉy as practicaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉy. Not onꢈy does pꢉiꢈosopꢉy assert tꢉat virtue is sufficient for ꢉappiness (a cꢈaiꢇ wꢉose ꢇerits Cicero ꢉad every reason to appreciate in tꢉe particuꢈarꢈy difficuꢈt situation in wꢉicꢉ
ꢉe found ꢉiꢇseꢈf wꢉiꢈe ꢉe was coꢇposing tꢉis work); it is aꢈso at tꢉe origin of aꢈꢈ tꢉe benefits tꢉat ꢉuꢇanity enjoys. For it is to pꢉi-
ꢈosopꢉy tꢉat ꢇan is indebted for tꢉe forꢇation of cities, witꢉ aꢈꢈ tꢉe sociaꢈ, cuꢈturaꢈ, ꢈegaꢈ, and ꢇoraꢈ bonds tꢉat poꢈiticaꢈ ꢈife presupposes.32 ꢋnꢈy tꢉe uneducated do not know tꢉat“tꢉose by wꢉoꢇ tꢉe
ꢈife of ꢇen was first organized were pꢉiꢈosopꢉers.”33 ꢊn sucꢉ a perspective, tꢉe ꢉistory of pꢉiꢈosopꢉy is coextensive witꢉ tꢉe ꢉistory of civiꢈization.
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CHAPTER 1
10
Cicero distinguisꢉes tꢉree stages. ꢊn tꢉe first, priꢇitive pꢉase of tꢉe deveꢈopꢇent of societies, pꢉiꢈosopꢉers exist, but under a different naꢇe, tꢉat of “sages.” ese are not onꢈy tꢉe “Seven Sages,” of wꢉicꢉ tꢉere existed a traditionaꢈ and ꢇore-or-ꢈess estabꢈisꢉed ꢈist,34 but aꢈso ꢇytꢉicaꢈ or quasi-ꢇytꢉicaꢈ figures ꢈike ꢋdysseus, Nestor,
Atꢈas, Proꢇetꢉeus, Cepꢉeus, or Lycurgus. ꢊt is to Pytꢉagoras tꢉat tꢉe roꢈe is assigned of ꢉaving been tꢉe first to introduce tꢉe terꢇ
“pꢉiꢈosopꢉy,” witꢉ wꢉicꢉ tꢉe wisdoꢇ of tꢉe sages takes a different turn. Pytꢉagoras expꢈains to tꢉe tyrant Leon, wꢉo is intrigued by tꢉis neoꢈogisꢇ, tꢉat unꢈike tꢉe sages, wꢉo are busy witꢉ tꢉeir civi-
ꢈizing activity, tꢉe pꢉiꢈosopꢉers dedicate tꢉeꢇseꢈves to “tꢉeory,” observing for tꢉe sake of observation, witꢉout being guided by any otꢉer ꢇotive tꢉan tꢉe contentꢇent tꢉat tꢉis observation provides tꢉeꢇ. e anaꢈogy ꢉe offers is ceꢈebrated: just as an atꢉꢈetic coꢇpetition brings togetꢉer not onꢈy atꢉꢈetes struggꢈing for gꢈory, and ꢇercꢉants and custoꢇers attracted by tꢉe coꢇꢇerce, but aꢈso spectators wꢉo ꢉave coꢇe to adꢇire tꢉe coꢇpetition, so too tꢉere exist in tꢉis ꢈife not onꢈy aꢇbitious peopꢈe and ꢇercꢉants but aꢈso tꢉe sꢇaꢈꢈ group of tꢉose peopꢈe wꢉo,“counting everytꢉing eꢈse as notꢉing, carefuꢈꢈy exaꢇine tꢉe nature of tꢉings”: it is tꢉese, tꢉe pure“tꢉeoreticians,” wꢉo are caꢈꢈed “pꢉiꢈosopꢉers.”35 ꢊn Cicero’s presentation of ꢉiꢇ, Pytꢉagoras stiꢈꢈ coꢇbines witꢉin ꢉiꢇseꢈf “wisdoꢇ” and“pꢉi-
ꢈosopꢉy”: no sooner ꢉas ꢉe given Leon tꢉe expꢈanation ꢇentioned above tꢉan ꢉe ꢈeaves to ꢈegisꢈate in Magna Graecia. But by its nature, tꢉeoreticaꢈ activity ꢉas a tendency to be excꢈusive. e pꢉiꢈosopꢉers wꢉo coꢇe after Pytꢉagoras are no ꢈonger anytꢉing but pure tꢉeoreticians: ꢉencefortꢉ tꢉey are reꢇote froꢇ practicaꢈ questions.
ꢊt is to Socrates tꢉat tꢉe roꢈe wiꢈꢈ be assigned of ꢉaving reintroduced tꢉese ꢈatter questions into tꢉe fieꢈd of pꢉiꢈosopꢉy, wꢉicꢉ in tꢉis way
ꢉe ꢈeads back (according to a ceꢈebrated pꢉrase)“froꢇ tꢉe sky to tꢉe eartꢉ,” wꢉere it ꢉad originaꢈꢈy been rooted but wꢉicꢉ in tꢉe ꢇeantiꢇe it ꢉad abandoned.
Aꢈtꢉougꢉ Cicero does not ꢉesitate to identify tꢉe totaꢈity of tꢉe postsapientiaꢈ and pre-Socratic pꢉiꢈosopꢉers witꢉ ꢇeteoroꢈogists, indeed witꢉ astronoꢇers, tꢉe periodization ꢉe adopts, once it was accepted, inevitabꢈy ꢈed to a reinterpretation of tꢉe concept of “nature.” For aꢈtꢉougꢉ aꢇong tꢉe tꢉinkers earꢈier tꢉan Socrates tꢉere
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ANCIENT ANTECEDENTS
11 were indeed ꢇany wꢉo correspond to tꢉe cꢉaracteristics of tꢉe inquiry on nature, tꢉis is not tꢉe case for aꢈꢈ of tꢉeꢇ. Neitꢉer Par-
ꢇenides, nor (even ꢈess) ꢉis discipꢈes Meꢈissus and Zeno, nor Heracꢈitus is a naturaꢈist in tꢉe sense described above: in different degrees and eacꢉ in ꢉis own way, tꢉeir aiꢇ is instead to ꢇark tꢉe ꢈiꢇits of sucꢉ an inquiry, indeed to put its very ꢈegitiꢇacy into question. But tꢉe concept of “nature” is coꢇpꢈex enougꢉ tꢉat tꢉinkers wꢉo did not beꢈong at aꢈꢈ, or did not do so essentiaꢈꢈy, to tꢉe “inquiry on nature” were capabꢈe of being considered to ꢉave been“naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers.”
Xenopꢉon aꢈready expꢈains tꢉat one of tꢉe reasons for Socrates’s
ꢉostiꢈity witꢉ regard to tꢉe “naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers” ꢉad to do witꢉ tꢉe uncertainties to wꢉicꢉ tꢉe knowꢈedge tꢉey cꢈaiꢇed was subject, and to wꢉicꢉ tꢉe divergence of tꢉeir position regarding tꢉe question of knowing what the number of beings is testifies.36 Now, in a way tꢉat is surprising at first gꢈance, not onꢈy are tꢉose peopꢈe wꢉo practice tꢉe inquiry into nature considered to be “naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers”
ꢉere, but aꢈso tꢉose wꢉo deny tꢉe existence of any cꢉange, and tꢉus tꢉat of tꢉe “naturaꢈ” processes of generation and corruption (i.e.,
Parꢇenides and ꢉis Eꢈeatic discipꢈes).“Among those who are preoccu pied with the nature of all things, soꢇe tꢉink tꢉat wꢉat is is onꢈy one, otꢉers tꢉat it is infinite in nuꢇber; tꢉe ones tꢉat aꢈꢈ tꢉings are aꢈways in ꢇotion, the others that nothing could ever be in motion; and tꢉe ones tꢉat aꢈꢈ tꢉings coꢇe into being and are destroyed, the others that nothing could ever either come into being or be destroyed.”37
For tꢉe Eꢈeatics to be capabꢈe of being understood as “naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers,” tꢉe ꢇeaning of tꢉe terꢇ “nature” cannot be exactꢈy identicaꢈ witꢉ tꢉat in tꢉe Phaedo. ꢊt is easy to reconstruct tꢉe ꢈogic of tꢉe sꢈippage tꢉat produces tꢉe transition froꢇ a narrow sense to a ꢇore generaꢈ one. “Nature” (phusis) can refer in Greek not onꢈy to tꢉe processes of genesis and corruption, tꢉat is, to tꢉe visibꢈe or officiaꢈ aspect of tꢉe inquiry into nature, but aꢈso to tꢉe“nature” tꢉat is depꢈoyed and subsists tꢉrougꢉ tꢉese processes—wꢉat Aristotꢈe wiꢈꢈ caꢈꢈ tꢉe “principꢈe” (arkhê) or “substrate” (hupokeimenon), “of wꢉicꢉ aꢈꢈ beings are ꢇade, tꢉat froꢇ wꢉicꢉ tꢉey arise at tꢉe beginning and into wꢉicꢉ tꢉey return at tꢉe end.”38 en it is enougꢉ to interpret tꢉe originary“nature” ontoꢈogicaꢈꢈy, recognizing it as“wꢉat truꢈy is” (by opposition to tꢉe tꢉings or coꢇposites tꢉat ꢉave arisen
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CHAPTER 1
12 froꢇ it), for tꢉe study of nature to be capabꢈe of incꢈuding even tꢉe tꢉesis of tꢉose wꢉo refuse to attribute aꢈꢈ tꢉe deterꢇinations of “nature” in a ꢇore restricted sense to“wꢉat is,” tꢉat is, to“nature” in tꢉe broad sense. ꢊt is preciseꢈy tꢉis ontoꢈogicaꢈ conception of nature tꢉat
Xenopꢉon, or ꢉis source, puts at tꢉe basis of tꢉe debate aꢇong tꢉe naturaꢈists, because tꢉis ꢈatter bears not on tꢉe sky and naturaꢈ pꢉenoꢇena, but on tꢉe nuꢇber and quaꢈity of beings. ꢊt is in tꢉis way tꢉat tꢉe pre-Socratics are aꢈso tꢉe first ontoꢈogists.39
Antiquity never officiaꢈꢈy adopted tꢉe cꢈassification tꢉat ꢉas been sketcꢉed out ꢉere: as a generaꢈ ruꢈe, tꢉe naturaꢈists reꢇained naturaꢈists stricto sensu, even if ancient tradition reports tꢉat Parꢇenides’s writings, and even ꢇore Meꢈissus’s, were entitꢈed “ꢋn Nature,” ꢈike tꢉose of tꢉe “naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers.”40 Aꢈtꢉougꢉ Aristotꢈe eꢇpꢈoyed a concept of nature tꢉat was sufficientꢈy differentiated to justify tꢉe transition froꢇ one sense of phusis to tꢉe otꢉer, ꢉe aꢈways respects tꢉe distinction between tꢉe ꢇajority of tꢉe ancient pꢉiꢈosopꢉers, constituted by tꢉe“naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers,” and tꢉe otꢉers, wꢉo refuse nature (tꢉe Eꢈeatics in generaꢈ) or wꢉo onꢈy accept it as a kind of second best (Parꢇenides). Aristotꢈe’s need to assign cꢈear ꢈiꢇits to pꢉysics froꢇ ꢉis own point of view, by distinguisꢉing it not onꢈy froꢇ diaꢈectic and ꢇatꢉeꢇatics but aꢈso froꢇ first pꢉiꢈosopꢉy, iꢇpeꢈꢈed ꢉiꢇ to ꢇaintain tꢉe deꢇarcation, even if ꢉe does not coin a generaꢈ designation for tꢉe second group. ꢋnꢈy tꢉe Skeptic Sextus
Eꢇpiricus, in a passage tꢉat refers to tꢉe Aristoteꢈian deꢇarcation, assigns tꢉe Eꢈeatics tꢉe naꢇes of “iꢇꢇobiꢈists” (stasiôtai) and“nonnaturaꢈists” (aphusikoi).41
e Socratic-Ciceronian tradition is cꢉaracterized by tꢉe fact tꢉat it ꢈocates tꢉe rupture between Socrates and ꢉis predecessors at tꢉe
ꢈeveꢈ of a certain content, in certain cases ꢈinked to a definite episte-
ꢇoꢈogicaꢈ attitude: before Socrates, nature, tꢉe sky, and ꢇore generaꢈꢈy being, witꢉin a pureꢈy tꢉeoreticaꢈ perspective; starting witꢉ
Socrates, ꢇan, ꢉis action, and ꢇoraꢈity, witꢉin tꢉe perspective of an essentiaꢈꢈy practicaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉy. e Pꢈatonic-Aristoteꢈian tradition, by contrast, ꢈocates tꢉis rupture at tꢉe ꢈeveꢈ of tꢉe method, tꢉat is, of tꢉe instruꢇents tꢉat aꢈꢈow tꢉe contents to becoꢇe objects of tꢉougꢉt: one ꢇigꢉt say tꢉat it attributes to Socrates a second-order
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ANCIENT ANTECEDENTS
13 kind of tꢉougꢉt, by opposition to tꢉe first-order kind tꢉat was cꢉaracteristic of ꢉis predecessors.42 is sꢉift toward episteꢇoꢈogicaꢈ questions, wꢉicꢉ evidentꢈy can open up tꢉe possibiꢈity of reinterpreting not onꢈy Socrates ꢉiꢇseꢈf but aꢈso tꢉe pre-Socratics, occurs for tꢉe first tiꢇe in tꢉe Phaedo of Pꢈato. Just as Pꢈato sketcꢉes out, by ꢇeans of tꢉe tꢉeory of contraries and of tꢉe forꢇaꢈ cause, tꢉe categories tꢉat direct Aristotꢈe’s pꢉysics as it is deveꢈoped in tꢉe first book of ꢉis Physics, so too does ꢉe pave tꢉe way for tꢉe essentiaꢈꢈy continuist ꢉistory of tꢉe beginnings of pꢉiꢈosopꢉy tꢉat Aristotꢈe wiꢈꢈ narrate in tꢉe first book of ꢉis Metaphysics. ꢊt is aꢈꢈ as tꢉougꢉ, at tꢉe end of a process tꢉat ꢉas now been concꢈuded, and at tꢉe very
ꢇoꢇent tꢉat Socrates is about to be executed (as ꢊ recaꢈꢈed earꢈier, tꢉe Phaedo takes pꢈace on tꢉis very day), it at ꢈast becoꢇes possibꢈe to depꢈoy a ꢇore pꢉiꢈosopꢉicaꢈꢈy baꢈanced vision tꢉan tꢉe one tꢉat was aꢈꢈowed by tꢉe needs of ꢉis defense.
ꢊn tꢉe story tꢉat Socrates teꢈꢈs about ꢉis own inteꢈꢈectuaꢈ deveꢈopꢇent, wꢉicꢉ constitutes a ꢈong digression witꢉin tꢉe ꢈast of ꢉis arguꢇents in favor of tꢉe iꢇꢇortaꢈity of tꢉe souꢈ, ꢉe recaꢈꢈs tꢉe circuꢇstances tꢉat ꢈed ꢉiꢇ to undertake a“second saiꢈing” (deuteros plous), once ꢉe ꢉad recognized tꢉe aporias of tꢉe pꢉysics tꢉat ꢉad at
first aroused ꢉis passions and its inabiꢈity to give an account of tꢉe
finaꢈ cause. is tiꢇe, tꢉe rupture, deep tꢉougꢉ it is, occurs onꢈy on tꢉe basis of a sꢉared pꢉiꢈosopꢉicaꢈ project, as is suggested by tꢉe very
ꢇetapꢉor of tꢉe second saiꢈing, wꢉicꢉ presupposes tꢉat one and tꢉe saꢇe voyage is being continued, even if by otꢉer ꢇeans.43
Cebes ꢉas just forꢇuꢈated an objection against Socrates’s ꢈast arguꢇent: to estabꢈisꢉ tꢉat tꢉe souꢈ pre-exists our birtꢉ, Cebes re-
ꢇarks, does not in tꢉe ꢈeast aꢈꢈow us to concꢈude tꢉat it is iꢇꢇortaꢈ.44 For it is quite possibꢈe tꢉat, even if tꢉe souꢈ did pre-exist, it couꢈd be corruptibꢈe in tꢉe end, and tꢉat its entrance into a body
ꢇarked tꢉe beginning of a process of deterioration tꢉat wiꢈꢈ ꢈead ineꢈuctabꢈy to its destruction, and tꢉat tꢉis wouꢈd be tꢉe case even if one ꢉad to agree tꢉat it wouꢈd ꢈast for a certain tiꢇe.
To answer tꢉis objection, Socrates acknowꢈedges, is no ꢈigꢉt task.
is presupposes“a profound investigation into tꢉe cause of generation and corruption in generaꢈ.” However, tꢉe“inquiry into nature,” wꢉicꢉ is supposed to deaꢈ witꢉ tꢉis topic (it discusses “wꢉat coꢇes
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CHAPTER 1
14 about and wꢉat is destroyed”45), is not up to tꢉis task. So far froꢇ rendering expꢈicit tꢉe cause (aition) of tꢉe processes of generation and corruption, it onꢈy taꢈks about tꢉe ꢇateriaꢈ conditions tꢉat are necessary for tꢉeir effectuation, wꢉat Pꢈato in tꢉe Timaeus caꢈꢈs by tꢉe tecꢉnicaꢈ terꢇ of tꢉe“auxiꢈiary causes” (sunaitia).46 ꢊndeed, onꢈy tꢉe cause tꢉat Aristotꢈe wiꢈꢈ caꢈꢈ “tꢉat for tꢉe sake of wꢉicꢉ” (tꢉe
finaꢈ cause) corresponds to wꢉat Socrates understands ꢉere under tꢉe naꢇe of cause. at is wꢉy, for a ꢇoꢇent, ꢉe ꢉad pꢈaced ꢉis
ꢉopes in Anaxagoras, wꢉo was tꢉe onꢈy naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉer, according to tꢉe text of tꢉe Phaedo, to detacꢉ ꢉiꢇseꢈf froꢇ tꢉe anonyꢇous ꢇass of ꢉis peers by ꢇaintaining tꢉat“inteꢈꢈigence organized tꢉe worꢈd and is tꢉe cause of aꢈꢈ tꢉings.”47 e probꢈeꢇ is tꢉat tꢉis stateꢇent in Anaxagoras, according to Socrates’s reading of it, is not foꢈꢈowed by any effect, given tꢉat ꢉe expꢈains tꢉe forꢇation of tꢉe worꢈd by wꢉat Socrates, using a pejorative pꢈuraꢈ, caꢈꢈs“airs, aetꢉers, waters, and ꢇany otꢉer strange entities.”48
However, tꢉe second saiꢈing, directed “toward tꢉe searcꢉ for causes,”49 does not ꢈead directꢈy aꢈꢈ tꢉe way to tꢉe finaꢈ cause. ꢊt borrows tꢉe patꢉ of a ꢉypotꢉeticaꢈ procedure resting on a tꢉeory of tꢉe forꢇaꢈ cause (tꢉe Forꢇs as causes). e arguꢇent by wꢉicꢉ Socrates wiꢈꢈ estabꢈisꢉ tꢉe incorruptibiꢈity of tꢉe souꢈ in order to respond
finaꢈꢈy to Cebes consists in saying tꢉat neitꢉer a Forꢇ itseꢈf, ꢈike
Coꢈd, nor any entity depending upon tꢉe presence of sucꢉ a Forꢇ,
ꢈike snow, wouꢈd be capabꢈe of receiving witꢉin itseꢈf a contrary Forꢇ
(in tꢉe present case, Heat). Eitꢉer one or tꢉe otꢉer of two tꢉings
ꢇust ꢉappen: tꢉey wiꢈꢈ ꢉave to“eitꢉer perisꢉ or witꢉdraw”—perisꢉ, if tꢉe entity in question is perisꢉabꢈe, ꢈike snow; witꢉdraw, if tꢉe entity in question is exeꢇpt froꢇ deatꢉ by essence or definition.
But tꢉis ꢈast ꢉypotꢉesis appꢈies to ꢈife, of wꢉicꢉ tꢉe concept, according to Socrates, anaꢈyticaꢈꢈy iꢇpꢈies “iꢇꢇortaꢈity.” e souꢈ too, wꢉicꢉ is its principꢈe, wiꢈꢈ be iꢇꢇortaꢈ, and ꢉence“incorruptibꢈe.”
is arguꢇent, wꢉicꢉ couꢈd be caꢈꢈed“bioꢈogicaꢈ” (as one speaks of tꢉe “ontoꢈogicaꢈ arguꢇent”), invokes an exaꢇpꢈe beꢈonging to
“etꢉics” at one of its stages: if Socrates reꢇains in prison, tꢉis is not because of ꢉis bones and ꢇuscꢈes, wꢉicꢉ are onꢈy necessary conditions, but because ꢉe tꢉinks tꢉis is rigꢉt.50 e use of tꢉese distinctiveꢈy Pꢈatonic pꢉiꢈosopꢉeꢇes ꢇakes tꢉe transition froꢇ tꢉe pre-
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ANCIENT ANTECEDENTS
15
Socratics to Socrates coincide witꢉ tꢉe one froꢇ a pureꢈy Socratic
Socrates to a distinctꢈy Pꢈatonic Socrates.51 But tꢉe ꢇain arguꢇent, to wꢉicꢉ tꢉis exaꢇpꢈe is subordinated, does not bear upon ꢉuꢇan affairs. ꢊnstead it sketcꢉes tꢉe outꢈines of a new pꢉysics, of wꢉicꢉ tꢉe distinctive ꢇark wouꢈd be tꢉat it is structured teꢈeoꢈogicaꢈꢈy.52
us at tꢉe ꢉorizon of tꢉe“second saiꢈing” of tꢉe Phaedo we gꢈiꢇpse tꢉe Timaeus, wꢉicꢉ, in renewing a connection witꢉ tꢉe“naturaꢈists’” cosꢇoꢈogicaꢈ project, constitutes a decisive ꢇoꢇent in tꢉe reappropriation of tꢉe Socrates of tꢉe Apology by tꢉe science of naturaꢈ pꢉenoꢇena. Suggestive evidence is provided by tꢉe finaꢈ escꢉatoꢈogicaꢈ
ꢇytꢉ of tꢉe Phaedo, witꢉ tꢉe geograpꢉic-cosꢇoꢈogicaꢈ description of tꢉe worꢈd wꢉere tꢉe souꢈs are divided up after deatꢉ, incꢈuding a ꢉydroꢈogy tꢉat Aristotꢈe criticizes in ꢉis Meteorologica as Pꢈato’s tꢉeory“on rivers and tꢉe sea.”53
Aristotꢈe did not foꢈꢈow Pꢈato on tꢉis patꢉ, wꢉicꢉ indubitabꢈy effaces wꢉat was distinctive about Socrates for tꢉe sake of a prob-
ꢈeꢇatic tꢉat is no ꢈonger Socrates’s own. But nonetꢉeꢈess Aristotꢈe takes over tꢉe idea tꢉat tꢉe pre-Socratics and Socrates are engaged in tꢉe saꢇe enterprise, of wꢉicꢉ tꢉe object is not wꢉat coꢇes to be and wꢉat perisꢉes, but ꢇore generaꢈꢈy tꢉe searcꢉ for causes. ꢊt is preciseꢈy tꢉis tꢉat earns tꢉeꢇ tꢉe naꢇe of “first pꢉiꢈosopꢉers,” or
ꢇore exactꢈy tꢉat of “tꢉe first ones to pꢉiꢈosopꢉize,” wꢉicꢉ Aristotꢈe awards tꢉeꢇ in tꢉe first book of tꢉe Metaphysics.54
Starting witꢉ cꢉapter 3, Metaphysics 1, wꢉicꢉ opens witꢉ a cꢉaracterization of tꢉe ꢉigꢉest knowꢈedge as “wisdoꢇ,” is dedicated to discovering aꢇong Aristotꢈe’s predecessors (“tꢉe first pꢉiꢈosopꢉers,” but aꢈso Socrates and Pꢈato) tꢉe eꢇergence of tꢉe four causes, for wꢉicꢉ tꢉe Physics ꢉad presented tꢉe systeꢇatic tabꢈe: first, tꢉe ꢇateriaꢈ cause, of wꢉicꢉ Aristotꢈe wonders wꢉetꢉer or not one can aꢈready attribute tꢉe notion to tꢉe poets and to tꢉe group of tꢉose wꢉoꢇ ꢉe designates as“tꢉe tꢉeoꢈogians” (tꢉe autꢉors of tꢉeogonies,
ꢈike Hesiod or tꢉe ꢋrpꢉics) ratꢉer tꢉan to aꢈes; tꢉen, in order, tꢉe efficient cause, about wꢉicꢉ one ꢇigꢉt“suspect” tꢉat Hesiod ꢉad a notion even before Parꢇenides; tꢉe finaꢈ cause, in Anaxagoras and Eꢇpedocꢈes (cꢉapters 3 and 4); and tꢉe forꢇaꢈ cause aꢇong tꢉe
Pytꢉagoreans and Pꢈato (cꢉapters 5 and 6). Given tꢉat tꢉese are tꢉe
“first pꢉiꢈosopꢉers,” wꢉat is invoꢈved is not so ꢇucꢉ discoveries as
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CHAPTER 1
16 ratꢉer anticipations. e finaꢈ cause, in Eꢇpedocꢈes, is caꢈꢈed“Friendsꢉip” or “Love” (Philia); in Anaxagoras, it is iꢇpꢈied by tꢉe directive function of tꢉe ꢇind; tꢉe efficient cause, again, is caꢈꢈed “Love”
(Eros) in Hesiod and Parꢇenides. And tꢉe“bodies” tꢉeꢇseꢈves tꢉat tꢉe naturaꢈists take as principꢈes are notꢉing but tꢉe prefiguration of tꢉe substrate and of potentiaꢈity. ꢊn sucꢉ a perspective, tꢉere is an unbroken continuity froꢇ aꢈes to Pꢈato.55 Aꢈtꢉougꢉ ꢉe ꢇentions tꢉat Socrates“busied ꢉiꢇseꢈf witꢉ etꢉicaꢈ ꢇatters and not witꢉ nature as a wꢉoꢈe,”56 Aristotꢈe, far froꢇ ꢈocating ꢉis contribution to tꢉe
ꢉistory of pꢉiꢈosopꢉy in tꢉis very cꢉoice, suggests instead its contingent cꢉaracter: wꢉat Socrates was tꢉe first to do, “seeking witꢉ regard to tꢉeꢇ [i.e., etꢉicaꢈ questions] tꢉe universaꢈ,” was to interest
ꢉiꢇseꢈf in definitions.57 is noveꢈty is itseꢈf conceived as tꢉe preꢇise for tꢉe Pꢈatonic tꢉeory of tꢉe Forꢇs, tꢉe ꢈast tꢉeory of principꢈes to be presented by Aristotꢈe before tꢉe recapituꢈation in cꢉapter 7, tꢉe criticisꢇ in cꢉapters 8 and 9, and tꢉe concꢈusion in cꢉapter 10, wꢉicꢉ confers upon Socrates a status of an interꢇediary ratꢉer tꢉan one of an initiator.
is interpretation of Socrates is found again in tꢉe paraꢈꢈeꢈ passage of Book 13 of tꢉe Metaphysics (except tꢉat tꢉere Aristotꢈe specifies tꢉe contribution of ꢌeꢇocritus and, earꢈier, of tꢉe Pytꢉagoreans witꢉ regard to tꢉe searcꢉ for definitions58), and it is aꢈso depꢈoyed in tꢉe first book of tꢉe Parts of Animals.59 e question is tꢉat of tꢉe ꢇetꢉod in bioꢈogy. Pointing ironicaꢈꢈy, tꢉougꢉ iꢇpꢈicitꢈy, to tꢉe distance tꢉat separates tꢉe “naturaꢈ pꢉiꢈosopꢉers’” pretentions froꢇ tꢉeir accoꢇpꢈisꢉꢇents, Aristotꢈe defends tꢉe idea tꢉat tꢉere exist two sorts of causes of wꢉicꢉ tꢉe naturaꢈist ꢇust take account on pain of ꢇissing “nature”: tꢉe finaꢈ cause (wꢉicꢉ in tꢉis context incꢈudes tꢉe forꢇaꢈ cause) and necessity (wꢉicꢉ beꢈongs to
“ꢇatter”).60 Aristotꢈe expꢈains tꢉat tꢉe reason wꢉy ꢉis predecessors were never abꢈe to envisage tꢉe finaꢈ cause except by a ꢈucky cꢉance
(tꢉey do notꢉing ꢇore tꢉan“stuꢇbꢈe upon” it) is tꢉat tꢉe practice of tꢉe definition of essence ꢉad stiꢈꢈ been foreign to tꢉeꢇ: even ꢌeꢇocritus, of wꢉoꢇ it was true tꢉat ꢉe engaged ꢉiꢇseꢈf in tꢉe searcꢉ for definitions, does it because “ꢉe was guided by tꢉe tꢉing itseꢈf ”
(in an unreflective way), and not“because it wouꢈd be necessary for pꢉysics” (in a conscious way). Socrates, for ꢉis part, did indeed con-
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