Vayishlach

Vayishlach, 17 Kislev 5773

Presents, Prayer, and Battle – Always?

Harav Yosef Carmel

In the beginning of the parasha, we find that Yaakov employed three types of tactics in anticipation of his encounter with Eisav: presents, prayer, and preparation for battle (see Rashi, Bereishit 32:9). Rabbeinu Bachyei discusses how this three-pronged approach is to be the model throughout history, and that indeed King Chizkiyahu learned this approach from Yaakov. He adds that we (talking to the people of his time and likely beyond) should learn from our patriarch to approach those whom we fear with presents, soft words, and prayer before Hashem. He adds: “but in battle we cannot, as it says: ‘I made you swear, O daughters of Israel …’ (Shir Hashirim 2:7) – that they would not get involved in battle with the nations.”

Rabbeinu Bachyei uses this thesis to solve one of the most difficult questions that face the student of Tanach. In Melachim (II, 18: 13-15), the navi describes Chizkiyahu’s handling of the threat from Sancheriv, the King of Assyria. Chizkiayhu apologized for his lack of loyalty and agreed to pay whatever duty that Sancheriv would place upon him. This turned out to be 30 gold bars and 300 silver ones, which required him to empty out the royal storehouses and those of the Beit Hamikdash. Following that, we see the intimidating rhetoric used by Assyrian officers to the encircled Jews of Jerusalem. This prompted Chizkiyahu to send an urgent request to the prophet Yeshaya to pray on the people’s behalf before Hashem (ibid. 19: 2-4), which he did in a most moving way (ibid. 15-19). Here we see the approaches of presents/appeasement and prayer.

In Diveri Hayamim (II, 32: 3-8), though, we see a very different story. Chizkiyahu entered into strategic discussions with his officers. They decided to divert the water supply for their advantage, build up the fortifications, and rally the people to be brave in defense of the city. This, of course, is a very different picture, of a king not willing to humble himself but who is willing to fight for the life of the city and its inhabitants. According to Rabbeinu Bachyei, there is no contradiction. It was not one approach or the other. Rather, Chizkiyahu followed Yaakov’s lead and used all three tactics.

Let us end off with a question for our readers. Rabbeinu Bachyei said that at his time, the approach of waging battle had to be taken off the table because of the decree that Jews of exile do not wage war. We can ask: nowadays, that we have an independent sovereign state, and there are no superpowers at war with us, from whom we are not naturally able to protect ourselves (as Chizkiyahu had) – should we take the approach of humbling presents/appeasement off the table?

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Kiddush and “Hamotzi” for Those in Need of Gluten-Free Diets

by Rav Daniel Mann

Question: Because some family members are gluten-intolerant, we started baking two kinds of cakes, etc. that look and taste almost identical. Are the “Shehakol” pastries acceptable for the “Mezonot” foods that usually follow Kiddush?

Answer: According to the consensus of poskim and many (not all, and it may depend on the type of sensitivity) health experts, oats can be used as a wheat substitute for gluten-sensitive people, and the halachot are identical to those regarding the other major grains. While you look into the health feasibility, this answer is written for one who cannot eat anything that is Mezonot.

The gemara (Pesachim 101a) says that Kiddush must be done in the place where “a meal” will follow. On the other hand, it refers to “tasting” after Kiddush, implying that a full meal is unnecessary. While some say that this taste must include bread, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 273:5) rules like the Geonim that wine can also be used. While there are opinions in either direction, the consensus is that a revi’it (approximately 3 fl. oz.) is needed and sufficient (see Mishna Berura 273:22, 27).

The Magen Avraham (273:11) reasons that if the Geonim can accept wine in this context, then it is true of anything made from the grains, which is more meal-like than wine (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 291:5 regarding the laws of seuda shlishit). This is the source of the common practice of having cake for the post-Kiddush “meal.” Along these lines, the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 273:11) permits dates for this purpose, based on the halacha that if one mistakenly made Birkat Hamazon on dates, it is valid after the fact, because dates are particularly filling (Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:17). The Tosefet Shabbat argues, and most Acharonim say that one should not normally rely on dates for eating after Kiddush (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 273:42; Yabia Omer VII, OC 63).

While according to the spirit of the law, there may seem to be little difference between the Shehakol and Mezonot pastries, the former do not fit the halachic parameters for the eating after Kiddush. As we have seen, there are other alternatives. For cases where there are not viable alternatives, we mention two fringe leniencies. There is an opinion that in a case of need, any food can be used (Chayei Adam 6:22). There is also an opinion that Kiddush works for all assembled if one person eats the requisite amount (see B’tzel Hachochma IV:2). If one must rely on one of those opinions, it is proper for him to eat something that fulfills the spirit of the law.

We will now discuss a related context where the spirit of the law is important (and might fit the letter of the law also) – the full meal. One needs to have two loaves of bread/challa, eat a k’zayit, and recite Birkat Hamazon at the end of the meal, and these require halachic grain. It would be regrettable for a gluten-sensitive person to consider himself as incapable of fulfilling the mitzva of seuda, prompting some to do whatever they feel like. It is proper (we cannot create an outright obligation) to have two nice loaves of bread, of whatever flour one can use. There actually is halachic precedent of bread that is not subject to Hamotzi and Birkat Hamazon. The halacha is that an eiruv chatzeirot must consist of bread, but the bread can be from rice or lentils(Shulchan Aruch, OC 366:8), because that is considered legitimate bread (Mishna Berura ad loc. 47). Notice also that the concept of loaves of bread is learned from the manna in the desert, and that was not made from normal grain. What is important is that this was their bread (see overlapping idea in Minchat Yitzchak III:113). For the gluten-intolerant, these are their breads. While we would not suggest such an approach if one has the opportunity to follow the regular rules (including using oat challa), one who is in such a situation should view his meal as a seudat Shabbat.

It is also worthwhile to drink enough wine, or eat dates or another relevant food, to enable the recitation of a long Beracha Acharona, which contains the basics of Birkat Hamazon and mentions Shabbat.

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Spiritual Dangers and Saving Graces

(condensed from Ein Ayah, Berachot 9:207-209)

Gemara: It is better to walk after a lion than after a woman; [better] after a woman than after idol worship; [better] after idol worship than after a shul at a time people are praying. [The problem of walking outside a shul] is only when there is not another entrance, but if there is another entrance, it is not a problem. And it is only a problem when he is not riding on a donkey, or carrying a load, or wearing tefillin, for if he is doing one of these, it is not [a problem].

Ein Ayah: [The simple understanding of the gemara is that walking outside a shul and not going in is a sign that he rejects the prayer going on, unless it appears that he does not go in because he is busy, or he shows allegiance to the ideals of Torah through tefillin. We will now see Rav Kook’s allegorical explanation.]

There are four categories of danger that a person has to be careful about. Three relate to him personally: physical damage, moral damage, and intellectual damage. The final one relates to possible danger to the community, and this critical danger must be avoided at all costs.

The lion hints at physical dangers, walking behind a woman hints at moral ones (immodest thoughts), and idol worship relates to intellectual deterioration, which can destroy every house to its foundation.

The matter of walking outside a shul is that one shows disdain for that which is holy in Israel even as he is in close proximity to Jews who are involved in service of Hashem. It destroys the foundations of the nation and that which is holy within it. We have, in our sins, many who fall into this latter category, and it causes great pain and loss in Israel as a nation when people separate themselves from the community and choose their own separate approaches. This causes hatred and animosity in Israel, harms our children’s fear of Hashem, and distorts matters.

While joining in with the community is important, there are exceptions to the rule. Sometimes a great man separates himself from the masses with proper intentions. This is hinted at by having a different entranceway, i.e., another way of getting to high levels of sanctity. He might not be able to pray with the community because his prayers take too long, because he spends all day on Torah study, or due to other important things. Under such circumstances, he cannot be considered one who separates himself from the community.

When referring to those who separate themselves from the ways of the community, we are referring only to the more severe offenders. After all, the gemara says that he is worse than one who follows idol worship. Such a person is likely to be so consumed with his physical desires that he separates himself from the community and its spiritual practices so that he can do that which his heart desires without inhibitions. However, if he is riding on top of a chamra (literally, a donkey, but a hint at the physicality of animalistic behavior), i.e., he is above the most offensive behavior. Then, even if he has mainly left the fold, there is hope he will return to the community.

The metaphor of carrying a load hints at one who is still involved in the needs of the community. While he seems to shun the community’s service of Hashem, he has a spark of sanctity and Jewish connection that can return to life when conditions are ripe; he is not totally lost. Certainly, if he is wearing tefillin, which contain the pasuk, “…so that the words of Hashem will be in your mouth,” then he must have hope. If a person has even one of these, a mitzva will lead to another mitzva, and there is hope that he or his offspring will return. He is considered part of the nation, with all the privilege that this brings.

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Claims of a Lawyer’s Negligence

(from Hemdat Mishpat, rulings of the Eretz Hemdah-Gazit Rabbinical Courts)

Case: The plaintiffs (=pl) sold an apartment, using the defendant’s (=def) legal services to draw up a contract, for which pl paid def 2,900 shekels. Def sent the contract to pl shortly before the closing of the sale. Pl claim that they sent requested modifications for the contract, but the contract was not resubmitted to them and there was too much rush at the signing to study its contents. Pl claim that the fact that the contract was written in terms of dollars instead of shekels caused a loss of 11,948 shekels, which was a matter of negligence for which def is responsible. Therefore, def should return his lawyer’s fee. The shoddy quality of def’s work can be seen, among other things, in such mistakes as paragraph 31 being a repeat of paragraph 30. Def responds that it had always been agreed that the sale would be on the basis of dollars. Def counterclaims that pl bad-mouthed him, which caused significant professional losses, as prior to this altercation, def received an average of three clients a month through real estate agents, and in the two years since then he did not receive even one client in this manner.

Ruling: The buyer’s lawyer testified that the entire time, the plan had been for the price to be in dollars. This is also apparent from several clauses in the contract, including the payment table upon which pl signed separately. In general, the halacha is that one is not believed to say that he signed something that he did not read (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 45:3). The fact that there were incidental mistakes in the contract does not prove otherwise. Therefore, pl’s complaints are rejected.

Regarding def’s professional losses,there are some cases where one has to pay due to damage he caused through speech. The classic case is when one’s false testimony was responsible for a litigant having to pay (ibid. 29:2), and this is based on the laws of garmi (semi-direct damage). The Shulchan Aruch Harav (CM, Nizkei Mamon 1) says that even when one is exempt from paying for his speech based on the strict law, he may have an “obligation from the laws of the Heaven” to pay.

However, there are reasons to exempt pl. Firstly, one who prevents someone from earning money is obligated only when there is a near-certainty that he otherwise would have profited. Another reason is that the damage may be considered gerama (indirect). The difference can be that according to the reason of gerama, there is a moral obligation to pay, in which case, beit din is empowered to require some payment, according to the arbitration agreement.

The Terumat Hadeshen (307) discusses one about whom false reports were spread and was subsequently fired. He rules that the culprit does not have to pay because it is gerama and because it is uncommon for someone to be fired based on one person’s account alone. Yet, the Terumat Hadeshen says that if beit din feels it is appropriate, they can create an obligation to put an end to such types of slander.

In our case, while pl overstepped the proper bounds of speech, we do not find justification to obligate him to pay, given that there were other, grounded complaints that played a role in his loss of clientele.

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