ADA 1
Round 1
1ac
Plan: The Department of Defense should initiate power-purchase agreements of Small Modular Reactorsin the United States.
Contention [ ]: Hegemony {2:30}
First is the grid-
SMR’s “island” military bases from the grid- blackouts inevitable- this independently jacks space systems
Loudermilk ‘11(Micah J. Loudermilk, Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, “Small Nuclear Reactors: Enabling Energy Security for Warfighters”, March 27, 2011, LEQ)
Last month, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University released a report entitled Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications. Authored by Dr. Richard Andres of the National War College and Hanna Breetz from Harvard University, the paper analyzes the potential for the Department of Defense to incorporate small reactor technology on its domestic military bases and in forward operating locations. According to Andres and Breetz, the reactors have the ability to solve two critical vulnerabilities in the military's mission: the dependence of domestic bases on the civilian electrical grid and the challenge of supplying ample fuel to troops in the field. Though considerable obstacles would accompany such a move -- which the authors openly admit -- the benefits are significant enough to make the idea merit serious consideration. At its heart, a discussion about military uses of small nuclear reactors is really a conversation about securing the nation's warfighting capabilities. Although the point that energy security IS national security has become almost redundant -- quoted endlessly in government reports, think tank papers, and the like -- it is repeated for good reason. Especially on the domestic front, the need for energy security on military bases is often overlooked. There is no hostile territory in the United States, no need for fuel convoys to constantly supply bases with fuel, and no enemy combatants. However, while bases and energy supplies are not directly vulnerable, the civilian electrical grid on which they depend for 99% of their energy use is -- and that makes domestic installations highly insecure. The U.S.grid,though a technological marvel,is extremely old, brittle, and susceptible to a wide variety of problems that can result inpoweroutages -- the 2003 blackout throughout the Northeast United States is a prime example of this. In the past, these issues were largely limited to accidents including natural disasters or malfunctions, however today, intentionalthreats such as cyber attacks represent a very real and growing threat to the grid.Advances in U.S. military technology have further increased the risk that a grid blackout poses to the nation's military assets. As pointed out by the Defense Science Board, critical missionsincluding national strategic awareness and national command authorities depend on thenational transmissiongrid. Additionally, capabilities vital to troops in the field -- including drones and satellite intelligence/reconnaissance -- are lodged at baseswithin the United States andtheir loss due to a blackoutwould impair the ability of troops to operate in forward operating areas.Recognition of these facts led the Defense Science Board to recommend "islanding" U.S. military installations to mitigate the electrical grid's vulnerabilities. Although DOD has undertaken a wide array of energy efficiency programs and sought to constructrenewable energyfacilities on bases, theseendeavors will fall far shortof the desired goalsand stillleave basesunable to function inthe event of long-termoutages.As the NDU report argues though, small nuclear reactorshave the potential to alleviate domestic base grid vulnerabilities. With a capacity of anywhere between 25 and 300 megawatts, small reactors possesssufficientgeneration capabilities to power anymilitaryinstallation, andmost likely somecritical services in the areas surroundingbases, should a blackout occur. Moreover, making bases resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to disrupt the grid in the event of a conflict as military capabilities would be unaffected. Military bases are also secure locations, reducing the associated fears that would surely arise from the distribution of reactors across the country.
Second is oil-
SMR’s solve in-theatre military oil dependency
Andres and Breetz ‘11(Richard B. Andres is professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications”, February 16, 2011, LEQ)
Operational Vulnerability.Operational energy use represents a second serious vulnerability forthe U.S. military. In recent years, the military has become significantly more effective by making greater use of technology in the field. The price of this improvement has been a vast increase in energy use. Over the last 10 years, for instance, the Marine Corps has more than tripled its operational use of energy. Energy and water now make up 70 percent of the logistics burden for troops operating in forward locations in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This burden represents a severe vulnerability and is costing lives. In 2006, troop losses from logistics convoys became so serious that Marine Corps Major General Rich- ard Zilmer sent the Pentagon a “Priority 1” request for renewable energy backup.11 This unprecedented request put fuel convoy issues on the national security agenda, triggering several high-level studies and leading to the establishment of the Power Surety Task Force, which fast-tracked energy innovations such as mobile power stations and super-insulating spray foam. Currently, the Marine Corps is considering a goal of producing all non- vehicle energy used at forward bases organically and substantially increasing the fuel efficiency of vehicles used in forward areas. Nevertheless, attempts to solvethe current energy use problem with efficiency measures and renewable sources are unlikely to fully address this vulnerability. Wind, solar, and hydrogeneration along with tailored cuts of energy use in the field can reduce the number of convoys needed to supply troops, but these measures will quickly reach limits and have their own challenges, such asvisibility, open exposure, and intermittency. Deploying vehicles with greater fuel efficiency will further reduce convoy vulnerability but will not solve the problem.A strong consensus has been buildingwithin planning circlesthat small reactors have the potentialto significantly reduce liquid fuel use and, consequently, the need for convoys to supply power at forward locations. Just over 30 percent of operational fuel used in Afghanistan today goes to generating electricity. Small reactors could easily generate all electricity needed to run large forward operating bases. This innovation would, for in- stance, allow the Marine Corps to meet its goal of self- sufficient bases. Mobilereactorsalso have the potential tomaketheCorps significantly lighter and more mobile by reducing its logistics tail. Another way that small reactors could potentially be used in the field is to power hydrogen electrolysis units to generate hydrogen for vehicles.12 At forward locations, ground vehicles currently use around 22 percent imported fuel. Many ground transport vehicles can be converted to run on hydrogen, considerably reducing the need for fuel convoys. If the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are indicative of future operations, and fuel convoys remain a target for enemy action, using small reactors at forward locations has the potential to save hundreds or thousands of U.S. lives.
Dependency on oil collapses the military
Voth ‘12(Jeffrey M. Voth is the president of Herren Associates leading a team of consultants advising the federal government on issues of national security, energy and environment, health care and critical information technology infrastructure, George Washing University Homeland Security Policy Institute, “In Defense of Energy – A Call to Action”, April 11, 2012, LEQ)
Last month, the Pentagon released its widely anticipated roadmap to transform operational energy security. As published in a World Politics Review briefing, energy security has become a strategic as well as an operationalimperative forU.S. national security.As tensionscontinue toescalatewith Iranin the Straitof Hormuz, it hasbecome clear that the U.S. military urgently requires new approaches and innovativetechnologies to improve fuel efficiency, increase endurance, enhance operational flexibility and support a forward presence for allied forces while reducingthevulnerability inherent in a long supply-line tether.Assured access toreliable and sustainable supplies ofenergy is central to the military’s ability to meet operational requirements globally, whether keeping the seas safe of pirates operating off the coast of Africa, providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters in the Pacific or supporting counterterrorism missions in the Middle East. From both a strategic and an operational perspective, the call to action is clear. Rapid employment of energy-efficient technologies and smarter systems will be required to transform the military’s energy-security posture while meeting the increasing electric-power demands required for enhanced combat capability. As recently outlined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey, “Without improving our energy security, we are not merely standing still as a military or as a nation, we are falling behind.”
Independently- fuel cost wrecks the DOD’s budget - spills over
Freed ‘12 (Josh Freed, Vice President for Clean Energy, Third Way, “Improving capability, protecting 'budget”, May 21, 2012, LEQ)
As Third Way explains in a digest being released this week by our National Security Program, the Pentagon’sefforts to reduce energy demand and find alternative energy sourcescould keeprising fuelcosts from encroaching on the budgets of other important defense programs. And the payoff could be massive. The Air Force has already been able to implement behavioral and technology changes that will reduce its fuel costs by $500 million over the next five years. The Army has invested in better energy distribution systems at several bases in Afghanistan, which will save roughly $100 million each year. And, using less than 10% of its energy improvement funds, the Department has begun testing advanced biofuels for ships and planes. This relatively small investment could eventually provide the services with a cost-effective alternative to the increasingly expensive and volatile oil markets. These actions are critical tothe Pentagon’s ability to focus on its defense priorities. As Secretary Panetta recently pointed out, he’s facing a $3 billion budget shortfall caused by “higher-than-expected fuel costs.” The Department’s energycosts could rise even furtherif action isn’t taken. DOD expects to spend $16 billion on fuel next year. TheEnergy InformationAdministration predictsthe price ofoil will rise 23% by 2016,without a major disruption in oil supplies, like the natural disasters, wars, and political upheaval the oil producing states have seen during the last dozen years. Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s planned budget, which will remain flat for the foreseeable future, will require significant adjustment to the Department’s pay-any-price mindset, even if sequestration does not go into effect. Unless energy costs are curbed, they could begin to eat into other budget priorities for DOD.In addition, the Pentagon’s own Defense Science Board acknowledges that using energy more efficiently makes our forces more flexible and resilient in military operations, and can provide them with greater endurance during missions. Also, by reducing energy demand in the field, DOD can minimize the number of fuel convoys that must travel through active combat zones, reducing the chances of attack to avoiding casualties and destruction of material. At our domestic bases, DOD is employing energy conservation, on-site clean energy generation, and smart grid technology to prevent disruptions to vital activities in case the civilian grid is damaged by an attack or natural disaster. The bottom line is, developing methods and technologies to reduce our Armed Forces’ use of fossil fuels and increase the availability of alternative energy makes our military stronger. That’s why the Pentagon has decided to invest in these efforts. End of story.
Now the impacts-
Boom goes security- new hotness
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)
A core premise of deep engagement is that it preventstheemergence of a far more dangerousglobalsecurityenvironment. For one thing, as noted above, theUnited States’ overseaspresence gives ittheleverage to restrain partners fromtakingprovocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter stateswith aspirations to regional hegemonyfrom contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens thebalefuleffects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China.