March 2009

PHI 3131 Pre-Qín Daoism 先秦道家哲學

Tutorial 5: Discussion Questions

Christian Wenzel, “Ethics and Zhuangzi: Awareness, Freedom, and Autonomy.”

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30.1 (2003): 115–26.

  1. What criticism does Wenzel raise concerning both Hansen’s “skeptical, relativistic” interpretation and Wong’s view that the Zhuāngzǐ supports a kind of tolerance and “an enlarged view of what is of value”? (pp. 115–16)
  2. What feature does Wenzel find is shared by both the relativist and tolerance interpretations? How does he think this feature might be connected to morality? (p. 117)
  3. Some interpreters suggest that the “skill stories” illustrate the best way to live, according to the Zhuāngzǐ. What problem or limitation does this interpretation face, according to Wenzel? How are the tasks in these stories different from moral issues? (pp. 119–20)
  4. What important differences does Wenzel identify between the “objects” we deal with in morality and those we deal with in skills such as chopping oxen or carving wood? He suggests that persons are not material objects. Do you agree? How would you distinguish the “objects” of morality from those of these other skills? (p. 120)
  5. What problem does Wenzel identify with the mirror metaphor in Zhuāngzǐ? (pp. 120–21)
  6. Wenzel points out that in skills we need to be aware not just of “the object as it is by itself” but many other things (pp. 121–22). What does he suggest it involves? How does “interpretation” fit into this awareness?
  7. Wenzel suggests that freedom in the Zhuāngzǐ is mainly negative freedom—freedom from desire, ambition, and other things (p. 120). He points out that there is also a positive sense of freedom, such as freedom to choose or to create. Might the Zhuāngzǐ also emphasize such a positive sense of freedom? Can you give examples?
  8. “Awareness and autonomy go well together” (p. 123). Explain what Wenzel means by this. Do you agree? (And what does he mean by “autonomy”?) How might this idea relate to the Zhuangist idea of “emptiness” (虛)?
  9. Wenzel’s discussion emphasizes “awareness,” an idea he borrows from A. C. Graham (p. 117). However, as he acknowledges (fn. 20), there is no one word in the Chinese text that expresses the concept of “awareness.” Do you agree that “awareness” is a key concept in the Zhuāngzǐ? Graham seems to be referring to Cook Dīng 庖丁, who “follows the natural patterns, strikes the main gaps, steers by the major hollows, responding to what’s really so” (依乎天理，批大郤，導大窾，因其固然). Discuss the key points in this description. Can you suggest how it might relate to morality?
  10. Wenzel suggests, rather vaguely, that both Kant and the Zhuāngzǐ rely on a kind of “trust” in a good will or what is good (p. 123). Do you agree that Zhuangist ethics must rely on trust in people’s having a good will? Might it instead rely on an understanding of value or responsiveness to “what’s really so”? Might it rely on identification with Dào? How does Wenzel’s point here relate to his earlier criticism of the mirror metaphor? (pp. 120–21)