Part 1: Who Are the Ottomans and Where Do They Come From?

European World

Term 2, week 5

The Ottoman Empire

Preliminary questions:

What is the position of non-Christian groups in early modern Europe?

Why does it make sense to study Ottoman history?

Part 1: Who are the Ottomans and where do they come from?

-  The Turks don’t come from Turkey… Earliest known written source in Turkic languages from modern-day Mongolia, dating to the 7th century AD (Orkhon inscriptions).

-  The Turks are not “enigmatic barbarians erupting out of the wilderness”… Nomadic people hardly ever are… Turkish states in central Asia known as neighbours and sometimes enemies of the Chinese, Persian and Byzantine Empires in late Antiquity. They are well-documented in the sources of these states. The Huns who overran the Western Roman Empire may have been speakers of a Turkic language. (For more details see Carter Vaughn Findley: The Turks in World History. Oxford 2004).

-  A variety of related, but not always mutually understandable Turkic languages is still spoken from northern Siberia to eastern Europe.

-  By the year 1000 AD, a lot of Turks in central Asia had accepted Islam and parts of the emerging “Islamic mainstream culture” (e. g. the use of the Arabic and Persian languages in diplomacy, science and high literature).

-  Around the year 1050 AD, a new wave of migrating Turks of the Oghuz tribal confederacy enters the Middle East and establishes what became known as the Seljuk empire (after one of their sub-tribes). This empire stretches from the river Syr Darja in what is today Uzbekistan to the Mediterranean.

-  The Seljuk empire disintegrates into several regional principalities (some of which are the opponents of the Christian Crusaders in Palestine) relatively soon, the rest is destroyed by the Mongols around the middle of the 13th century.

-  At the westernmost fringe of the turmoil created by the Mongol invasions into western Asia are several small Turkish principalities in western Asia Minor, bordering the by now much reduced Byzantine Empire. One of them seems to have been ruled by a man called Osman, who appears in the sources around 1300 AD.

-  Why did the small Ottoman principality grow into a mighty empire?? Classical explanation: “Ghazi thesis” (Paul Wittek, 1930s): The Ottomans were motivated by a desire to wage religious warfare (ghaza) against the “infidel” Byzantines. Different theories: The Ottomans fought on the side of the Byzantines as well as against other Muslims; plunder and territorial gain probably were more defining factors in their expansion.

-  Bottom line: Profiting from the weakness of the regional powers, the Byzantine and Serbian empires, the first expansion of the Ottomans is into Europe, what is today western Turkey, northern Greece and Bulgaria. The Ottoman Empire does not become a “Middle Eastern” power (in a territorial sense) until the late 1400s.

Part 2: The Ottoman state

-  The OE has been called a “gunpowder empire” (Marshall Hodgson: The Venture of Islam), meaning a large, aggressively expanding empire based on a military elite. This scheme can be applied to several early modern states of greater Eurasia, such as the Habsburgs, the Mughals of India or the Qing dynasty in China.

-  Originally, the Ottoman state was ruled directly by the prince (usually called “bey” =lord, later “Sultan” from an Arabic term meaning “authority” or “rulership”) helped by his sons and a group of lower ranking tribal chiefs. This system is rather unstable, so the Ottomans developed something better…

-  Beginning in the late 1300s, the Ottoman rulers began to recruit Christian slaves from their Balkan provinces in a system called devshirme (lit. “gathering”). These slaves were taken as small boys, converted to Islam and educated in the palace. The majority served in the army, the most gifted recruits moved on into the administration of the empire, potentially all the way up to being provincial governors or eventually Grand Vizier (something like a prime minister). So, at least in theory, the system was a true meritocracy…

-  The slave soldier system was supposed to ensure absolute loyalty to the state without any ties to tribe, family or place of birth; although in practice many Ottoman notables did not lose their original ties (example of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha).

-  Because of their origin as soldier-slaves, the Ottoman elites thought of themselves as the askerî (military) class, while everyone else was considered re’aya (“the herd”, both in the sense of something that is to be protected and to be milked…..).

-  The Ottoman state took its final (“classical”) shape after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. This event sent shockwaves through Europe (even though no Christian ruler really lifted a finger to help the Byzantines). In terms of realpolitik, it was a sideshow… The often-lamented sacking of the city was not worse than the fate of any other city taken by force in that period.

-  Controlling Constantinople (the city was not officially called “Istanbul” until the 1930s, btw!) gave the Ottomans control over important trade routes as well as –a lot more important! –legitimacy as heirs of the Roman Empire. Sultan Mehmed II (“the Conqueror”) routinely called himself “Caesar” and demanded to be acknowledged as legitimate overlord by the Pope.

-  The monumental architecture of the city reflects the claim of the Ottoman Sultans to be trans-regional rulers by incorporating influences from as far apart as Italy and Central Asia. (See slides)

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Was the Ottoman Empire an Islamic state?

·  Islam was the religion of a large part of the population and of the elite. Being Muslim was the main prerequisite for rising to a position of influence in the state (even thought there were a few exceptions).

·  Ottoman rulers stressed their role as champions of Islam and fighters against the “unbelievers”, although their political decisions were usually pragmatic rather than dogmatic (no Ottoman Sultan had any scruples about fighting other Muslims, for instance).

·  The Ottoman Sultans and other notables of the state emphasised their role as patrons of religious learning, e.g. by financing schools teaching Islamic law and theology.

·  In spite of being overtly Sunni, the Ottoman state did not enforce a specific form of Islam, except for very short and limited episodes (such as when fighting the Shi’ite Persians). For example, the Ottoman state tolerated mystical Islam (Sufism) in various forms; many notables and even Sultans were followers of Sufi brotherhoods.

Was the Ottoman Empire “tolerant” or “pluralistic”?

·  Contemporary western Christian observers often accused the Ottomans as being fanatical Muslims who committed serial genocide against Christians (Martin Luther called “Turk and Pope” the twin enemies of Christendom). This is how the Ottomans are still quite often perceived today (in part due to the nationalist historiography of modern European states).

·  Large non- Muslim minorities lived throughout the Ottoman Empire, in prosperity and largely unmolested.

·  According to the Islamic law of the time, Christians and Jews living under Muslim rule enjoyed protection, religious freedom and communal autonomy under a system known as dhimma (roughly “contractual protection”). In return, these communities had to be loyal to the state and pay a special poll tax (jiziya).

·  The Ottoman state was not “tolerant” in the modern sense, out of a sense of equality or human rights, but largely for pragmatic reasons. The main reason was the –quite sensible –notion that dead people pay no taxes…

·  Restrictions on Christians and Jews in the OE were relatively light compared to the treatment often meted out to non-Christian groups in western Europe. A case in point is the persecution of Muslims and Jews in 16th century Spain. Many Spanish Jews emigrated to the Ottoman Empire after 1492, attracted by vastly superior conditions.

Part 3: The Ottomans and Europe in the “magnificent century”

-  The 16th century in greater Eurasia is marked by a renewed rise of large, expansionist empires: Habsburgs, Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, Ottomans, Safavids (Iran), Mughals (India), Qing or Manchu (China).

-  One important thing to note is that some of these had a good “shot” at becoming a world- leading power, others were of crucial importance regionally. The idea that western European domination of the world was a forgone conclusion (see for example the work of Niall Ferguson if you have a strong stomach) is hard to uphold.

-  The “magnificent century” is marked by conflict between these emerging powers, the Ottomans fought especially bitter conflicts with the Habsburgs to the west and the Safavids to the east.

-  Two big figures: Habsburg emperor (and king of Spain) Charles V. and Ottoman Sultan Süleyman I. (Qanuni or “Lawgiver” to the Ottomans, called “the Magnificent” in the west). Both with ideas of becoming a universal ruler in a time when the Day of Judgment is perceived to be near.

-  However, both had a very clear worldly agenda. Süleyman consolidated Ottoman territorial gains in the Middle East (especially Egypt, conquered by his father in 1517). Ottoman fleets began operating in the Indian Ocean, meeting Portuguese colonial initiatives in India and East Africa (for more on this, see Giancarlo Casale: The Ottoman Age of Exploration. Oxford 2010, an absolutely riveting read!).

-  Süleyman’s next move was against his rival for imperial greatness, Charles V. The casus belli was the question of control over the Kingdom of Hungary. The Hungarian monarchy had been greatly weakened since the death of Matthias Corvinus in 1490, and both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs were having ambitions towards the south (or north, respectively). Süleyman invaded Hungary in the summer of 1526 and dealt a crushing defeat to the Hungarians in the battle of Mohacs. The conflict would however go on for several decades, culminating in the first Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1529.

-  Was this “Holy War”? Both sides extensively used religious imagery to justify their actions. The Ottomans stressed their old role as champions of Islam, the Holy Roman Empire used anti-Ottoman propaganda to rally Christian vassals (like the ever-unruly German princes) to its cause. Yet, on the ground, things were a lot more complicated. Thus, the Ottomans sided with Hungarian Protestants who had been persecuted under Catholic rule. The Habsburgs, on the other hand, attempted to forge an alliance with the Safavid dynasty of Iran against the Ottomans. Another enemy of Charles V., the King of France, also became a trusted European ally of the Ottomans (in 1542, and that although the French monarchy is known as “the oldest daughter of the Church”…). In practice, a lot of the clash was about control of the Mediterranean and the important resources (grain, minerals) of Hungary, and in that kind of conflict, the enemy of your enemy is your friend…

-  Whereas the Ottomans had the upper hand in Hungary and the Mediterranean for a long time, the continuous struggle (including a war on two fronts) and long lines of supply overstretched Ottoman resources. By the time of Süleyman’s death (1566, actually on campaign in Hungary), Ottoman expansion against western Europe seems to have reached its natural limit. However, the Ottoman expansionist drive was strong enough to threaten the Habsburgs’ eastern frontier until the 1690s.

Part 4: Ottoman “decline” or: Changing patterns of interaction

-  Until very recently, most scholars would have confidently declared that the Ottoman Empire was in slow, but steady decline by the year 1700 at the latest (for a prominent proponent of this notion, see the work of Bernard Lewis, especially his The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford and New York 1961, several later editions).

-  From the end of the 16th century onwards, the Ottomans started losing wars. The main reasons for this are: 1) Weakening of the Ottoman central state, leading to instability in the provinces and decline in tax revenue. 2) The “small Ice Age” hitting agricultural production, causing famine and supply shortages. 3) Western armies overtaking the Ottomans in terms of military innovation (the “military revolution”). Several moments in history were celebrated in the West as “when the tide turned”, such as the battle of Lepanto in 1571 (an early example) or the aborted second siege of Vienna in 1683.

-  In spite of such difficulties, however, the Ottoman state did not collapse and could hold on to the bulk of its territory. Epic moments like Lepanto were relatively unimportant in the greater scheme of things… Historians have attributed this resilience to a) the ongoing functioning of the state bureaucracy, even though the Sultans were weaker and b) local notables in the provinces striking “live and let live” alliances with the state (for details, see Baki Tezcan: The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World. Cambridge 2010).

-  Faced with all these pressures, the Ottomans increasingly have to abandon the rhetoric of constant expansion (in which peace is merely a temporary suspension of hostilities to regroup) and accept peace settlements. The treaty of Karlowitz of 1699, for instance, fixed a clear border between the Ottoman and Habsburg domains, replacing earlier fluid “frontier zones” (the text of the treaty is available online, for example on www.archive.org).

-  Increasingly, economic exchanges began to dominate relationships between the Ottomans and their western neighbours. In this, the Ottomans initially acted from a position of strength, granting mutually beneficial trading privileges (“capitulations”) to French, Dutch and English merchants. Western traders exported agricultural products like wine, olive oil and fruit (ever wondered why sultanas are called sultanas?) as well as luxury goods like carpets. The Ottomans imported western European woollen cloth, timber and metals, but were mainly interested in the cash brought by these contacts (a similar mechanism can be seen in the early modern trade between China and the West).