Paper presented at the ESA 8th Conference,
3rd-6th September, 2007
Glasgow Caledonian & Strathclyde University
Understanding Class in Contemporary Societies
Abstract:
In this paper, I argue that claims about the death of class and the coming of the classless society are premature. Such claims are seldom genuinely empirical, and the theoretical argument often refers to a simple and therefore easily dismissible concept of class. By rejecting the concept of class altogether, sociological theory runs the risk of loosing the capacity for analysing stratification and vertical differentiation of power and freedom, which in late modernity seem to be a of continuing importance. Hence, I argue that although class analysis faces a number of serious challenges, it is possible to reinvent class analysis. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu in many ways introduces an appropriate paradigm, and the paper therefore critically discusses Bourdieu’s concept of class. Since the “Bourdieuan” class concept is primarily epistemological, i.e. a research strategy more than a theory, empirical examples from a recent study of class and politics in Denmark will be provided. Here emphasis will be placed upon the ways in which the Bourdieuan class concept can help overcome some of the problems of previous class concepts.
By Gitte Sommer Harrits, Ph D, Post.doc.
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark
e-mail:
NB: Please note change of affiliation compared to conference programme
Understanding class and the effects of class
As noted by Erik Olin Wright, the field of class analysis can be seen as an “independent variable specialty” (Wright, 1997: 1). This means that class analysis typically focuses on the effects of a single independent variable, much like the field of e.g. endocrinology, where the various effects of the hormone system are explored. Doing class analysis, we are interested in finding out, whether or not class has an effect on different areas of life. We do not intend to fully explain these social phenomena, and we do not claim that class can be seen as the only variable of importance. Perhaps we include other variables or mechanisms interacting with class, but the main purpose is to discover – or to rule out – the effects of class.
However, class analysis is also interested in uncovering (aspects of) the social order. Put simply, the traditional Marxist as well as Weberian concepts of class are deeply intertwined with the sociological understanding of society, or at least with the structural levels of society. For Marx, classes were constituted by the social division of labour and the social relations of ownership and control in a society, whereas for Weber classes were an aspect of the distribution of resources of value on a market as well as an aspect of the distribution of power in a society. Thus, the traditional conceptions of class had a descriptive as well as an explanatory component.
Further, class analysis has typically puzzled with the relations between structure and agency, or with the relations between the objective and subjective forms of class. Hence, the question of how to understand structural effects or constraints on individual action, and how to understand the relations between structures of class and processes of class formation has been discussed within the different approaches to class analysis. So, although Wright is right in suggesting that class analysis is an “independent variable specialty”, one should not ignore the aspects of class analysis that are deeply rooted in some of the most basic questions of sociology, namely the question of what society looks like, and the question of how society and individual action are related.
Today, class analysis seems to be gasping for breath. On the one hand, defenders of class analysis seem to be reluctant to take up discussions of social order and action, focusing in stead on the modelling of empirical effects. In light of decades of abstract and often fruitless theoretical debates within some traditions of class analysis, this refuge of empirical data analysis and “muddling through with somewhat less certain concepts” (Wright, 1997: xxix) may be understandable. However, it is also unfortunate, since the lack of understanding of the concept (and phenomenon) of class hinders the understanding of its effects. Put differently, it may be interesting to measure the effects of class on different aspects of political behaviour, but if we do not understand, what we have measured, perhaps the results are of somewhat less use.
On the other hand, a consensus seems to be forming, that class analysis is outdated, and therefore not worth exploring, neither theoretically nor empirically. Thus, different sociologists have claimed the death of class, pointing out that in late modernity either class structures are gone, or they do no longer have any effects. However, by rejecting the concept of class altogether, sociological theory runs the risk of loosing the capacity for analysing stratification, distributions of power and conflict, which even in late modernity seems to be important dimensions.
In the following, I take up the theoretical discussion of how we can understand class in our contemporary societies, i.e. how we can insist on understanding class in its sociological context of social order and individual action as well as group formation. First, I briefly discuss (some of) the claims of the coming of a classless society and some of the problems of traditional class concepts. Second I discuss the main lines of the Bourdieuian class concept, along with an empirical example of class analysis. Finally I conclude by discussing the merits and continuing problems of a Bourdieuian class analysis.
The death of class?
Under this intentionally provocative heading, Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters (1996a) have argued that the whole tradition of class analysis is “passé”. Their argument touches upon several aspects; however the main argument is that today the concept of class no longer captures the important dimensions of conflict, stratification and inequality. Here, I discuss their argument in somewhat detail, since it presents (and summarizes) the arguments presented by many critics of class analysis (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, Beck 1992, Pahl 1989)
The point of departure for Pakulski and Waters is a class concept fairly close to the Marxist tradition. Thus class is defined as referring to “a specific social location and causality, a specific pattern of groupness, and a specific form of identification”, and it is underlined that class is “primarily about economic-productive location and determination” (Pakulski & Waters, 1996a: 2). From this point of departure, it is argued that class theory and the broader and more multidimensional tradition of class analysis faces a number of theoretical problems. These are 1) the problem of economism, i.e. the claim that the economic structures of society are fundamental to the structure of society and the structuring of actions; 2) the problem of groupness, i.e. the claim that classes are distinct from each other and hence constitute real groups and not just theoretical categories; 3) the problem of identity (and causality), claiming that classes do have effects beyond the area of economics, determining cultural and individual identities; and 4) the problem of collective action and transformative capacities, i.e. the claim that classes can be seen as instigating social change (Pakulski & Waters, 1996a: 8-15).
With the outline of these four theoretical problems, the main structure of Pakulski and Waters’ empirical argument is also presented. Thus, in the remaining parts of the book, different kinds of empirical evidence are put forward, showing how class analysis is not only theoretically problematic but also empirically wrong. Thus, for instance, it is argued that economic structures are not empirically fundamental to patterns of inequality or formations of groups and identity. Further, it is argued that economic structures have changed dramatically (due to e.g. state intervention and new forms of production and organization), with the result that the basic Marxist conception of the distribution of ownership and control is simply not in line with reality. Also, Pakulski and Waters discusses the empirical bearings of the claim of groupness and identity, drawing on the great amount of research that shows how class can be seen as only one element (and typically an element of declining importance) in these processes.
I do not wish to argue with this. Pakulski and Waters do point toward important theoretical problems within the traditional Marxist conception of class, and these problems may even be present in other traditions as well. The problem is, though, that taking this point of departure, they limit their critique towards a class concept that is on the one hand very simple, i.e. only including production structures, and on the other hand very demanding, i.e. claiming a causal model including both group formation, identity and transformative capacities. And in light of this concept, the empirical evidence is fairly straightforward.
As an alternative to class analysis, Pakulski and Waters present a “status-conventional theory”, arguing also empirically that societies are changing from a phase of class societies towards a “culturalist or status-conventionalist phase” (Pakulski & Waters, 1996a: 152-158). This change (theoretically as well as empirically) involves several claims: First it is argued, that stratification is primarily cultural, i.e. organized around differences of lifestyles, aesthetics, consumption etc. Second, it is argued that differences of “statuses” are fragmented, presenting a complex and overlapping web of shifting positions and identities, which furthermore must be seen as fluid and constantly negotiated and changing. Finally it is argued that statuses are increasingly created within autonomous areas of society, meaning that the formation of identities and conflicts increasingly follows distinct and different logics within e.g. religion, culture and politics. These argument are consistent with developments within sociology, pointing towards functional differentiation (e.g. Luhman, 1997), as well as reflexivity and fluidity as basic aspects of late modernity (e.g.Giddens, 1991).
However, suggesting this status-oriented approach to the study of inequality and conflict clearly departs from the basic intentions of class analysis, i.e. the problem of the social order, and instead introduces the concept of identity formation as the key aspect. Of course the analysis of formations of identity and statuses in late modernity is interesting and important. However, it misses the basic aspects of structurally founded distributions and conflicts of power and resources. Further, the change of approach and focus is not supported by the critique of the class concept, and it is not supported by the empirical evidence put forward by Pakulski and Waters. Thus, it may be that traditional class concepts do not have much success in explaining the formation of groups and identity. But this does not necessarily mean that there are no structural patterns to be found within these cultural processes, or that structural inequalities have withered away.
The only argument presented for not trying to reformulate class analysis is that this would amount to stretching the theoretical concept too far. Pakulski and Waters (1996a: 150-151) argue ironically, that the reaction to critique from traditional class analysis is one of three: Either, researchers just keep on claiming that classes exist, despite evidence to the contrary. Or researcher keep moving the target, arguing that classes do exist, although they may not be exactly classes, or may not be exactly founded within economic structures, or may not be that important etc. Or, researcher lower their level of explanatory ambition, defining class almost solely as occupational categories, thereby loosing the theoretical value of doing class analysis.
However, even though this is an amusing argument, it is not sound. On the contrary, it points to the basis of the whole argumentation, namely the theoretical choice (or assumption) that classes are “primarily about economic-productive location and determination”. This rules out the possibility of conceptualizing class as having to do with different structurally founded resources, and it constructs an artificial theoretical choice between either economic and structural class analysis or multidimensional and symbolic or cultural analysis of status and identity. But, as I will argue in the remaining parts of this paper, this is a false choice, and it is indeed possible to present a multidimensional but structurally founded concept of class.
Defending class analysis
Before we turn to the discussion of the Bourdieuian class concept, some of the other defenders of class analysis will be briefly discussed, focusing on the above mentioned problems suggested by Pakulski and Waters. These defenders are Erik Olin Wright (a neo-Marxist approach), John Goldthorpe (a neo-Weberian approach, although he does not himself use this category) and David Grusky (a neo-Durkheimian approach). (See also Wright, 2005, for the further discussion of different approaches).
The most comprehensive discussion and attempt to renew the neo-Marxist tradition is presented by Wright (e.g. Wright 1985; Wright, Becker, Brenner et al. 1989; Wright 1997, Wright, 2005). For Wright, the main problem has been to formulate an adequate conception of the middle class, and hence a class schema relevant for the analysis of modern class relations. Wright argues for the continuing foundation of class analysis upon the Marxian concept of modes of production (Wright, 1985, 1997), but also that in concrete societies, different social relations may exist, making the social relations of class more complex. Further, Wright insists on the concept of exploitation as central to the understanding of class relations (Wright, 1997: 10). This means that social relations of economic ownership, control and conflict are the basic element of class.
On the basis of this understanding, different class locations or categories can be discerned, allowing for empirical analysis. In the concrete analyses, Wright has presented a rather complex scheme of class locations, taking into consideration social relations of education and organization as well as of production and ownership (see e.g. Wright, 1997). Finally, Wright also insists on the analysis of individual and collective behaviour connected to class, assuming that the link between structure and agency (or between macro and micro-levels of analysis) is facilitated by the constitution of material interest (Wright, 1997, 2005).
No doubt, Wright’s suggestions for class analysis are consistent, but in light of the above criticism it still contains some basic problems. First, Wright insists on defining class exclusively in relation to economic structures. Thus, although he includes educational and organizational assets, these are seen as relevant only in so far as they are important on the labour market. Further, the sociological understanding of the social order (or late modernity), and hence the theoretical argument for including precisely educational and organizational assets, is rather weak, and there seems to be no concrete attempt to consider other structurally founded assets as relevant for class relations. Further, Wright maintains a concept of material interest, linked to concepts such as class formation and class agency, resulting in the empirical focus of the effects of class being a specific political consciousness (socialism) for specific groups (workers). In light of the empirical developments of the political agendas and political cleavages in the western societies this seems unfounded. Indeed, Wright also presents interesting empirical analyses of class effects. However – as also suggested by Pakulski (2005) and Crompton (1998) – the stringent theoretical conceptualization fades somewhat into the background here, resulting in the class concept being very similar to a concept of occupational groups.