Reading 11. Plato, Euthyphro

Outline with Study Questions

I.Introduction

1.What brings Socrates to the court of the king-archon?

2.What brings Euthyphro to the court?

3.What reason does Socrates give Euthyphro for wanting to become his pupil?

II.Euthyphro’s Definitions of Piety

A.Prosecuting the Wrongdoer

1.According to Socrates, why cannot piety be defined as prosecuting the wrongdoer?

B.What Is Dear to the Gods

1.According to Euthyphro, about what kinds of things do the gods disagree?

2.If the gods disagree, why cannot piety be defined as “what is dear to the gods”?

C.What Is Loved by All the Gods

1.Why is it irrelevant to Socrates’ quest for the definition of piety whether all the gods agree that Euthyphro’s action regarding his father is just?

2.According to Socrates, if the pious is loved by all the gods because it is pious (and not pious because it is loved by all the gods), why cannot piety be defined as what is loved by all the gods?

3.In what way do Euthyphro’s statements resemble Daedalus’ statues?

4.What is Socrates’ response to Euthyphro’s claim that it is Socrates who resembles Daedalus?

D.The Part of Justice Concerned with Care of the Gods

1.Why does Socrates reject the poet’s claim that, in terms of parts and wholes, fear is the part and shame is the whole (“where there is fear there is also shame”)?

2.Using the notion of parts and wholes, what definition of piety does Socrates suggest to Euthyphro?

3.According to Euthyphro, what are the two parts of justice? Which part is piety?

4.Why does Euthyphro reject the idea that care of the gods is similar to the care of animals?

5.What does Euthyphro say he means by “care of the gods”? What question does Socrates ask about this definition?

E.Giving to and Begging from the Gods

1.What problem does Socrates raise regarding the notion of giving to the gods?

2.How does Euthyphro’s explanation of “giving to the gods” bring him back to a definition of piety he had proposed earlier?

III.Conclusion

1.What reason does Euthyphro give for ending his conversation with Socrates?

Questions for Reflection and Discussion

1.What is Socrates trying to accomplish by his questioning of Euthyphro? Does he succeed?

2.Assume that God exists and that God loves pious acts. Are the acts pious because God loves them, or does God love them because they are pious? If the latter, what makes the acts pious?

3.Is Socrates correct to assume that all pious acts have a common element that makes them instances of piety?

4.Is it possible to identify an act as pious, without first knowing what piety is?

5.In his defense speech at his trial, Socrates stated that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” Does the self-examination of our beliefs—such as our beliefs about piety, love, or justice—make life more worthwhile?

6.Can a question-and-answer dialogue help us discover the nature of such things as piety, love, and justice?

For Further Reading

Allen, R. E. Plato’s ‘Euthyphro’ and the Earlier Theory of Forms. New York: Humanities Press, 1970. 171 pp.

This book contains an introduction to the Euthyphro (pp. 1–13), a translation of the dialogue interspersed with commentary (pp. 15–65), and a study of the theory of forms (essences) that underlies Socrates’ search for what makes all pious acts pious (pp. 67–166).

Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the Trial of Socrates. New York: Routledge, 2004. 297 pp.

Chapter 1, “The Euthyphro” (pp. 7–68), gives a detailed analysis of this dialogue.

McPherron, Mark L. The Religion of Socrates. University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1996. 353pp.

See Chapter 2, “Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro” (pp. 29–82), and Chapter 4, “Socratic Reason and Socratic Revelation” (pp. 175–246).

Pitcher, George. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 340pp.

Chapter 9, “The Attack on Essentialism” (pp. 215–28), explains the view of British (Austrian-born) philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) that it is a mistake to believe, as Socrates did, that there are essences (forms).

Vlastos, Gregory. Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. 334 pp.

Chapter 6, “Socratic Piety” (pp. 157–78), examines Socrates’ life and words to see what he himself believed piety to be.