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OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES (OIOS) REFORM
NEG BRIEF + COUNTERPLAN

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

The Negative philosophy in today’s round is based on 3 principles. First, reform of the OIOS is hopeless because there are too many other factors blocking it from succeeding, which are beyond Affirmative’s ability to fix. And the things the Affirmative cited as the problems with OIOS are not necessarily the real issues blocking its success. Thus, every dollar spent on their reform will be wasted. Second, some of their reforms will actually make the OIOS less, not more, effective. Third, there is a better way to improve oversight and accountability at the UN, by rejecting this resolution and adopting our Counterplan. Our Counterplan will specifically solve for the issues that are blocking OIOS success in ways that the Affirmative cannot even begin to solve with their plan. Let’s look at these three principles in more depth:

SOLVENCY: OIOS REFORM IS HOPELESS

1. UN politics blocks accountability reform. Successful UN accountability reform is impossible - the political nature of the UN blocks every effort, and they've been trying for decades.

Analysis: While the Affirmative can "fiat" that their plan takes effect, they cannot fiat that all 192 countries in the UN will suddenly agree on all the political differences that separate them and have perfect cooperation in these investigations. AFF has fiat, not magical power to create utopia.

Morten Skumsrud Andersen and Dr. Ole Jacob Sending 2011. (writing for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Amdersen - Masters degree in International Relations, London School of Economics & Poli. Sci; PhD candidate in Int'l Relations at London Sch. of Econ & Poli Sci at time this article was written; received PhD in Oct 2012. Sending - PhD from the University of Bergen; Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; formerly worked as a Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway.) Accountability in the United Nations (report of the key findings from a study of the role and functioning of the Board of Auditors (BoA), the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)). (Brackets added)

Moreover, there seems to be a loose consensus that, as the OIOS puts it, ‘there is nothing intrinsically deficient with either the design or the mandates of the overall system of oversight in the UN system’ (JIU2006/2). The problem, then, is seen to be mainly with implementation and coordination. And such a problem is a deeply political one, not a technical issue. During the interviews conducted for this report, we repeatedly tried to get UN staff to talk about the technical set-up or technical deficiencies in the current accountability system. However, it proved nearly impossible to touch on these issues, as the interviewees immediately began speaking of the political nature of accountability – even of the most ‘technical’ issues. The system is seen as always being for someone and for some political purpose. There was not much optimism as to the implementation of an accountability system, something that has been in the making for decades. The consensus seemed to be that it would be impossible to establish a well-functioning system of accountability with some degree of autonomy from political influence either from the SG [Secretary General] or other heads of UN entities, or from member states.

2. Lack of trust between member states. Accountability depends on mutual trust, and the member states don't have it. Note that there's no way AFF can solve for this (they would have to remove diverse nations from the UN), but our Counterplan will solve for it, by doing it through a single government.

An effective system for accountability depends on mutual trust, effective cooperation, common objectives, reliable measurements, and associated sanctions and rewards. Lack of trust between member states, between member states and the Secretariat, and also as regards public perceptions within the Secretariat itself, results in a system that may look good on paper, but does not work well in practice. Excessive control and micromanagement and political games do not sit well with delegation of authority and greater powers for the SG and the Secretariat – which are required for the implementation of performance accountability.

3. No unified standards of accountability. Because it's made of 192 diverse countries, there are no unified standards for defining what accountability means within the UN

In the UN system this is more complicated, since the system has not one but 192 principals (member states), and there are no clearly defined, system-level standards that can be used to hold the many different UN entities (agents) to account. Not only do views among member states differ on what accountability means – and also whether it should apply to the UN as an organization – there are also considerable variations, as shown below, among the units set up to perform accountability functions internally within the UN.

4. Clueless management. OIOS managers admit they have no idea how to fix their mistakes.

Dr. Michel Girodo 2007. (PhD; served as Director of Doctoral Programs in Professional Psychology at the University of Ottawa, and the Chief Behavioural Science consultant for the RCMP for 25 year. For two years he occupied the first Visiting Professor post at the Federal Bureau of Investigations in the training academy in Quantico. He served as the academic representative on the Interpol Group of Experts on Corruption for 12 years ) A Culture Review of the Investigations Division of OIOS, Consultant’s Report Submitted to: Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Under-Secretary General Office of Internal Oversight Services

Managers were asked for their opinion about what went wrong in some peacekeeping missions and what could be done to avoid problems in the future. They replied, “You know, we haven’t figured that one out yet. We made mistakes and picked the wrong people. We need to find the right people for these missions but we don’t really know what that is.” This candid admission may be appreciated but not once was the question of better preparation of supervisory staff ever advanced as an option. A not uncommon approach to managing human resources when one is short on knowledge is to use trial and error. When asked about any plans in the works for finding new managers, I was told, “We have people temporarily promoted to higher responsibilities to help assess promotional opportunities.”

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lack of Secretary-General involvement

Link: Aff cuts the OIOS off from the SG and gives all power to the OIOS director. It's in their mandates.

Impact: Lack of Sec. General acceptance reduces OIOS mission effectiveness. This happens because they need the SG to be involved in follow-up and implementation of their findings, but if the SG wasn't involved in the process, he doesn't care much about what they do.

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is an internal oversight body, ‘operationally independent’ under the authority of the SG. It is mandated to perform monitoring, internal audits, inspections, investigations and evaluations, and can initiate, carry out and report incidents that it considers to fall within its purview. It exists to enhance monitoring and evaluation within the Secretariat and to support the SG as Chief Administrative Officer for internal oversight of the Secretariat and the UN regular budget. The Office is generally viewed as delivering high-quality reports, but, owing to strained relations with the Secretariat, there is a lack of follow-up and sustained attention to its recommendations. For example, OIOS work on techniques for risk assessment, to form part of more comprehensive management reform, has not been fully implemented. The tensions displayed between the SG and USG Ahlenius over the proper role of the Office indicate an unresolved issue over the degree of its operational independence from the SG.

2. Too Much Independence. See the harm response below how OIOS has no problem with not being independent enough. In fact, it may be too independent. If Affirmative increases its independence, that’s a bad thing, not a good thing.

3. Wasted money. Every dollar spent on the Affirmative’s plan is wasted if OIOS reform is useless. Since there are too many other factors involved blocking OIOS success, the Affirmative’s plan may make you feel better, but it will not actually accomplish anything. Thus, every dollar spent on it will be wasted.

WE OFFER A COUNTERPLAN, to be implemented exclusively instead of the Affirmative’s OIOS reforms.

Agency: The government of Norway, in consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations:Transparency International, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group.

Mandates:
A) Establish an oversight body external to the UN
B) Investigate and publish reports using “Naming and Shaming” to apply political pressure for reform

Funding: General Revenues of the Norwegian government

Timeline: To begin on the same date mentioned in the Affirmative’s plan

Negative reserves the right to clarify the Counterplan as needed in future speeches. Note that this alternative meets the requirements of a good Counterplan in several ways:

1. A clear alternative. We give you specific reasons NOT to do the Affirmative’s plan, since it will make things worse. “Do both plans” is not a good option in today’s debate round because of the disadvantages to the Affirmative’s plan and the absence of any disadvantages to our Counterplan
2. We deny the resolution. We oppose reforming the UN, so we are clearly Negating this resolution. Our Counterplan could not be offered as an Affirmative case in this year’s resolution because it is being implemented OUTSIDE the structure of the UN. There are no UN employees in our plan and the owner of our plan is the government of Norway, not any agency of the UN. While the benefit of our plan is that it will have the EFFECT of improving the UN, the Counterplan itself is not a reform of any part of the UN and is thus non-topical.

ADVANTAGES OF THE COUNTERPLAN

ADVANTAGE 1. Solves political barriers. Norwegian watchdog bypasses the internal UN political obstacles

ADVANTAGE 2. Fixes UN problems. Naming & Shaming motivates UN accountability and improvement. These both come from:

A strategic answer to this challenge is to institutionalize watchdog functions outside rather than inside the UN. The past two decades have seen a strong growth in non-governmental agencies producing authoritative investigations, analyses and ratings of the performance of firms, states and also international organizations. Such an external and informal watchdog function can bypass the political obstacles to reform inside the organization. Transparency International, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group are among the organizations that have had great success in their naming and shaming tactics to facilitate political change. Norway could consider the establishment of a watchdog function outside of the UN to help ensure public accountability. The rationale could be that there is no system-wide system for keeping track of existing mechanisms or the rate of compliance by Secretariat and member states with the UN’s own regulations and professed rules and objectives. In the long term, naming and shaming based on in-depth analyses and credible facts can be effective as a tool for building up political support for much-needed reforms.

ADDITIONAL COUNTERPLAN EVIDENCE

Norway can afford it: They have budget surpluses thanks to oil revenues

Norwegian Royal Ministry of Finance, 2012. “National Budget 2013” (ethical disclosure about the date: The article is undated, but contains internal references to events indicating it was written in 2012. For example, it cites completed year data for 2011 and estimates for 2012.)

In addition to the fiscal budget and the Government Pension Fund, the general government includes other central government and national insurance accounts and local government administrations. General government net lending is the surplus concept of the national accounts and is computed in a way that enables meaningful comparisons of public sector figures across countries. Since the mid-1990s, petroleum revenues have contributed a substantial surplus to general government finances in Norway, whereas the euro zone and industrialised countries as a whole have generally posted deficits, cf. Figure 3.2A.

2N EVIDENCE

HARMS

“OIOS Independence compromised” – Response: Swiss Peer Review Study shows - OIOS independence is not a problem

Turn: Too much independence is bad

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 2009. (an agency of the Swiss federal government. Paper was written by: Gerhard Siegfried (Chair, SDC), Anne Bichsel (SDC), Rachel Sauvinet-Bedouin (FAO), Vibecke Dixon (Norad), Belén Sanz Luque (UNIFEM), Stein Hansen (NCG), Urs Zollinger (King Zollinger)) Peer Panel Review of the Evaluation Function of the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the United Nations (OIOS) (brackets added)

Independence The Panel sees no serious concerns regarding the independence of OIOS/IED [Inspection and Evaluation Division UN OIOS] along the independence dimensions that have been peer reviewed, i.e. (a) IED’s location relative to other management functions, (b) independence to select evaluation topics, (c) budgetary independence, (d) access to information and informants, (e) discretion in submitting its reports, (f) independence to track follow-up of management’s response to evaluations, (g) independence of the IED head and evaluators. No evidence of infringement of independence was uncovered. However, the strong emphasis on independence may partly isolate IED and may to a certain extent hinder the dialogue with its evaluands.

INHERENCY

IAAC is resolving budget conflicts for OIOS

US Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2011. GAO report GAO-11-871 'UN Internal Oversight: Progress Made on Independence and Staffing Issues, but Further Actions Are Needed' 20 Oct 2011 (brackets in original)

The UN General Assembly has supported OIOS's independence in audits of organizations within the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions by creating the Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC), which reviews OIOS's audit plans and budget requests, and compares them to the Secretary-General's proposed budgets for oversight to ensure that they reflect the resources OIOS needs to audit identified risks. In a July 2006 report to the General Assembly, OIOS noted that a main obstacle to the independence of its audits was that it was responsible for auditing departments in the Secretariat, such as the Department of Management, which reviews its budget.[Footnote 28] While OIOS did not report any specific examples of budget restrictions that had been imposed, the IAAC mitigates the potential impairment to OIOS's independence caused by its dependence on funding from entities it audits by makingrecommendations that would ensure that OIOS has sufficient resources, and keeping the General Assembly apprised of issues related to OIOS's operational independence. The IAAC became operational in 2008 and serves some of the functions of an independent audit committee, which the IIA considers critical to ensuring strong and effective processes related to independence, internal control, risk management, compliance, ethics, and financial disclosure.