Commissars on the market
Jussi Lassila
Commissars on the market:
Discursive commodities of the youth movement NASHI
Introduction
Since the beginning of the presidency of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the reappearance of a variety of youth organisations in Russia has been remarkable. In this article my aim is to show how the language use of the well known Russian youth movement Nashi can be conceptualized by using the methodological framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA).[1] Using this case, my aim is to apply concept of commodification of discourse in contemporary Russia. In theories of CDA[2] the commodification of discourse has been seen as a world wide phenomenon of neo-liberalism and new capitalism in a critical sense. In this paper the dimensions of critical social theory concerning the globalisation of language use[3] are present as well but the focus is how the commodification of discourse is projected onto Russian local practises, i.e. in texts of Nashi. My data consists of twelve examples in total, published mainly on the internet site of the movement and in Russian printed media (mainly in Komsomol’skaia Pravda). In addition to these, a few other examples are used which have a clear connection to Nashi or Nashi’s language use. The limited amount of data used is due to my previous knowledge of the texts of the Nashi. By using the concept of commodification of discourse my aim is to show that performative aspects of language use along with constative ones have a special role in discourses of Nashi as a part of its social action. I argue that by emphasizing the idea of commodification of discourse in the broader sociocultural context of the movement it is possible to track a preliminary connection between local and global discursive practises in globalizing Russia.
Nashi and the Russian political youth movements
According to Tatiana Stanovaia there are four types of youth movements in Russia which can be divided into two categories politically. She calls the first category Loyal to Kremlin, and that consists of those youth movements which work and act in line within the political power. She places the movement Nashi (’Our’) in this category, along such movements as Molodaia Gvardiia (‘The Young Guards’) and Rossiia Molodaia (‘Young Russia’). Stanovaia argues that along with these three movements, there are organisations which act more or less in line with the interests of the Kremlin but whose ideology is openly nationalistic or leftist, such as Evraziia (Eurasia) and The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). A second category according to Stanovaia is made up by the opposition. This includes patriots and liberals who can be either left or right. The leftist opposition includes movements like Za Rodinu (‘For the Motherland’) which is partly loyal to Kremlin, The Communist Youth Union (SКМ), The Avantgard of Red Youth (АКМ) and The National Bolshevik Party (NBP) which is partly liberal (or “right”) in Stanovaia’s categorisation. She points out that liberal opposition such as My (‘We’), Da! (‘Yes!’), Pora (‘Time Is Up’), and Ia dumaju (‘I Think’) work mostly virtually without any concrete actions. The movement Oborona (‘Defence’), however, as a main youth organisation of liberal opposition often acts as the main opponent to Nashi.
In brief, what we see here is that Stanovaia orders the political role of contemporary Russian youth movements according to two factors: on the one hand, by the relationship of a movement to the current political rulers, i.e. to Kremlin; and, on the other, by movement’s political colour, e.g. the position of a movement at the left-right axis.[4] I suspect that the use of Western political terms, such as left and right, do not carry especially substantial information in Russian contexts because these political actors and their positions are rarely stable and definite but constantly overlapping. However, these categorizations elaborate, or perhaps I should say pre-contextualizes, the political position of the movement Nashi for further analysis.
Today, in 2007, I share Stanovaia’s view when she argues that the most influential and visible of all these organisations is Nashi, established at the beginning of 2005. Although the story of the birth of this new “Putin Jugend” implied also by Stanovaia carries features which too evidently passivizes the role of Nashi as a “political rubber stamp”, it offers an important framing perspective of Nashi in Russian public discourses. According to this, the main reason for the creation of Nashi by the Kremlin was to develop a new version for the previous “official” youth movement Walking Together. (Indeed, the former leader of Walking Together, Vassili Iakemenko, is the leader of Nashi). The re-organisation of Walking Together was needed because they “went too far”. They began to appear to the public as too radical and marginal. At the same the political processes in Ukraine in 2004, as well as the assumption of political apathy among the Russian youth gave the impact to Kremlin to re-establish its new youth movement. As Stanovaia argues, from the Kremlin’s perspective, the problem was in the ongoing process of the apolitization of the Russian youth and in the potential consequence of this apolitization. For the Kremlin this apolitization appeared as the potential of dangerous politization of the youth, for example, such political activities which are at variance with the interests of Kremlin. Stanovaia notes that in this scenario of the Kremlin the role of Nashi is to work as a “motivation system” for the Russian youth, according to the official youth policy, and, this system must be in symbiosis with such political interests that support the current power. According to Stanovaia the most crucial challenge for this motivation system is college and university students due to their scepticism towards the system. Only few of them actually can identify with it and most of them think that movements like Nashi work only as instruments of political manipulation. Moreover, this scepticism has led to counter-formations of local youth movements in Russian institutions of higher education[5].
In the context of discourse studies or one could say in the field of anthropological interest which gives special importance to the “mundane trivialities” of its research object, the illustration of Stanovaia above raises problems. On the one hand, it indeed relevantly contextualizes the object, i.e. it regards Nashi as a political youth movement in the Russian political context. However, on the other hand, this contextualization works to discourses which place Nashi as a more or less passive agent mastered by some organiser from above, i.e. by the Kremlin. In this paper I try to give at least preliminary picture of the importance of discourse in an analysis of such sociocultural actors as Nashi, not leaving it only as “a passive agent of political commands.”
I like to refer shortly to some sociological points concerning youth, youth values and policies in contemporary Russia in order to deepen the picture of Nashi’s “political motivations”. For example, in the book Goriachaia Russkaia Molodezh (‘Hot Russian Youth’) Markov points out that the main political shift of the 1990’s was “communists to liberals” and this shift is also present in the ideals and goals of the 1990’s generation: individual life with money, career and night clubs. On the contrary, the generation of 2000’s is against these ideals and this becomes apparent in the way of political activism.[6] Interestingly, in the same Hot Russian Youth, Petukhov, a sociologist, notes that 47 % of Russians (52–55 % in the age group of 18–44) in 2004 considered their main idols rock and pop stars and people of “the golden youth” (zolotaia molodezh).[7] In this light, it seems that many features of the 1990’s generation which one could fairly define as the markers and ideals of a western individual lifestyle are still in favour. Hence, the claim of difference between the generations stated by Markov seems a contradictory one, although it is fairly true that the youth of today in Russia is more nationally oriented than the generation of the 1990’s. From discursive point of view I would argue that contradiction is partially explained by discourses of different domains, both carrying own “core values” but which are more and more connected with each other.
The background of discourses concerning the social role of the youth can be found in youth policies of the 1990’s which, as I argue, are not only discourses of the top but also commonly shared and used by young activists themselves. According to Yuri Korguniuk the interest of political power towards the youth occurred in the twofold attitudes in political speeches in the 1990’s. The first attitude can be defined as typically bureaucratic while it regards youth only as a category of the population located at one of the lowest levels of social hierarchy. According to this attitude, however, youth has capability to improve its social status rather fast. Thus it is extremely important that there is preparedness in society to control youth, not least because of its potential threat to upper social hierarchies. The second attitude Korguniuk calls as intellectual. Here youth is seen as part of a horizontal evaluation of society rather than vertically as in the first case. This underlines the equality between social groups: youth has the same rights and responsibilities as any other social group has. The speciality and importance of youth is defined by its potential to lead society in the future, not only by routine reproduction and maintenance of different social practises of society[8].
What is the role of Nashi then in the context of 1990’s youth policy? First of all, I would argue that the attitudes mentioned by Korguniuk are present in the language use of Nashi itself. Secondly a rather clear connection between Nashi and the Kremlin, a connection between Nashi’s criticism against orange fascists, as they occasionally name their opponents and the “coldness” of Kremlin towards the new leaders of Ukraine and Georgia, are each good indicators of Korguniuk’s vertical attitude: Nashi’s idea is that the majority of the Russian youth must be mobilized to prevent corresponding events in Russia as were seen in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004. Horizontal aspects are present as well. This is especially when Nashi regards itself as a revolutionary movement. An example of this is found in an article of Komsomol’skaia Pravda (hence KP), an interview of Nashi’s leader Vassili Yakemenko:
(1) The future is for those who are at now 16–20 years old. They don’t know what is the geopolitical defeat. We teach them to win. We produce them according to the system ‘patriot, leader, specialist.’ We collect the best guys from streets and teach them in our institutes. The best specialists are dealing with them. After few years we’ll have couple of tens of thousands of guys who will think in another way than those who are in power at now[9].
Yakemenko’s claim concerning the ignorance of recent history among those aged 16–20 is partly true, at least according to some sociological studies. Svynarenko, for example, points out that the perestroika generation in particular (today approximately 30 years old) is far more pessimistic about the future of Russia than the younger generation, aged between 18–22 years. This younger generation has similar values with older generations, both highlighting national and patriotic values including also variety of xenophobic nuances.[10] As a representative of contemporary youth, real and constructed, Nashi is not an exception in this respect, at least by its multiple patriotic messages. However, alongside the patriotic and national values it spreads, Nashi classifies itself as democratic antifascist youth movement and rather loudly judges ethnic crimes and murders which have alarmingly grown in recent years.[11] This stridency against fascism, however, evidently carries political interests as well, as we see in the next two fragments:
(2) That is National-Bolshevist party (NBP), partly the Party ‘Homeland’, although they are rather nationalists […] Tactics (of) NBP – that’s hijacking and hooliganic actions. Slogans (of) NBP: Russia (is) everything and what’s left – nothing. I can endlessly give you examples of that they work as fascists. If you want to, I can talk about his sexual fantasies written in the book ‘It’s me, Edichka’ but do we have anything to talk about then? Maybe it works for certain audience.’ (Vassili Yakemenko’s answer to the question ‘who are fascists in Russia’)[12].
(3) Well, for example, the leader of democratic party ‘Iabloko’ in Petersburg (think about – democratic), Reznik not only has the fascist flag in his office but also announced there are common goals of democrats with the fascists of NBP. […] Belykh of SPS (The Union of Right Forces) not only permitted the participation of fascists in the forum but although he had apologized to the governor, he did not also understand what is so horrible to participate with fascists. […] Khakamada supported Limonov and NBP in public. And Limonov has in his book “Anatomy of hero” page 205, the following: “I’m a fascist. I have a great pleasure and delight to announce that I’m a fascist” (A part of Yakemenko’s answer to the question concerning boycotting fascist organisations in Russia, press release at the internet site of Nashi (17.2.2006)[13].
Towards global and local discourses
One of the main interests of critical discourse analysis (CDA) in recent years has been in how certain words, expressions and styles, originally used in discourses of Anglo-American originated economics and business, are appearing today in other discourses such as politics and education.[14] In other words, it studies how these “economic imperatives” impact in different sociocultural contexts globally. The next quote, a part of an interview between Nashi’s commissar Mikhail Kulikov and the Russian information agency Regnum shows this tendency is present in Russia as well: