Autor: João M. Cabrita
Editora: Palgrave Macmillan, Londres; St. Martin’s Press, Nova Iorque, 2000. / Título: Nyerere and Africa: end of an era
Autor: Godfrey Mwakikagile
Editora: New Africa Press, Pretória/Dar es Salam, 2007
Capítulo 1
Marriage of Convenience / Capítulo 7
The Struggle for Mozambique:
The Founding of FRELIMO in Tanzania *
The formation of Frelimo was announced for the first time in Accra on 29 May 1962 by the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (Udenamo), and the Mozambique African National Union (MANU). / It is interesting that although FRELIMO was formed in Dar es Salaam, its formation was announced for the first time in Accra, Ghana, on May 29, 1962 by UDENAMO and MANU leaders.
For several months, the two organizations of exiled Mozambicans had been holding unity talks in their Tanzania base. / The two organizations had been negotiating for months in Dar es Salaam…
It was more a marriage of convenience imposed on the Mozambicans than a genuine united front against Portuguese colonialism, ultimately contributing to divisions within the colony’s independence movement. / Although the three organizations were united by a common desire to end colonial rule, the compromise they reached to establish FRELIMO was more a marriage of convenience, clearly demonstrated by the continuing ideological differences within the nationalist movement…
Interference by African governments with different agendas for continental issues had been a determining factor in the marriage. / Compounding the problem for the Mozambican nationalists was interference by a number of African governments, each with its own agenda on how to address continental issues including liberation of colonies. Such interference played a critical role in the consummation of this marriage between UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI.
Formed in Rhodesia in November 1960, Udenamo was the first of the three Mozambican independence movements to advocate violence to bring about independence. / The first organization to advocate armed struggle as the only viable means to end Portuguese rule was UDENAMO, formed in Southern Rhodesia in November 1960
Udenamo was influenced by Zimbabwean politics, and its members had a history of involvement with Joshua Nkomo’s National Democratic Party. / The nationalist struggle by in Southern Rhodesia had a major impact on UDENAMO whose members had a working relationship with the National Democratic Party led by Joshua Nkomo…
Adelino Gwambe, a 20-year-old Mozambican from Inhambane, led the organization. / UDENAMO was led by Adelino Gwambe, a 20-year-old from Inhambane, Mozambique.
As a campaign for the independence of Mozambique could not be waged from white-ruled Rhodesia, Gwambe and his followers left for Tanzania, where, in view of its forthcoming independence, Udenamo would be better positioned to wage an armed campaign against the Portuguese. / But he and his colleagues knew that they could not effectively if at all wage an armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique from another white-rule, territory, Southern Rhodesia. They therefore decided to move to Tanzania where they felt they would be welcomed and allowed to establish bases once the country became independent in only a few months.
Once based in Dar es Salaam, Udenamo continued to attract Mozambicans. In April 1961, Udenamo’s vice-president, Fanuel Mahluza, wrote to Eduardo Mondlane, an U.S. educated Mozambican anthropologist working for the UN Trusteeship Council in New York, inviting him to join the organization. / After it established itself in Dar es Salaam, UDENAMO continued to attract more members and supporters… In April 1961, Udenamo’s vice-president, Fanuel Mahluza, wrote to Eduardo Mondlane in New York where he worked for the UN Trusteeship Council and invited him to join the organization.
Mondlane did not accept the invitation. He had his own agenda, which did not conform to Udenamo's. / But Dr. Mondlane did not join the group. He refused to join UDENAMO or any other nationalist organization because he had his own plans for Mozambique.
Mondlane… had just completed a tour of Mozambique, where he saw that nationalist sentiment was strong… he now wanted the United States to give him funds to operate a nationalist organization that would seek a non-violent solution in Mozambique. / He had recently visited Mozambique on behalf of the United Nations and saw that nationalist feelings were widespread, but preferred a non-violent approach towards independence, as opposed to UDENAMO
Mondlane was concerned over the possibility of a war being waged from Tanzania because, as he put it in a report on his Mozambique tour given to U.S. Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, "one shudders at the consequences of such an eventuality, judging by Portugal's reaction to a similar situation in Angola." (a)
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(a)No livro de João Cabrita, esta citação continua na frase seguinte e cuja fonte o autor identifica na nota 5 do Capítulo 1 (Marriage of Convenience). / Mondlane was concerned over the possibility of a war being waged from Tanganyika because, as he put it in a report on his Mozambique tour given to United States Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, "one shudders at the consequences of such an eventuality, judging by Portugal's reaction to a similar situation in Angola."3
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3. Eduardo Mondlane in his report to Chester Bowles / pdfs/0333920015.pdf
Mondlane suggested in his report that the
"United States should be in a position to encourage Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination for the African peoples under her control; set target dates and take steps towards self-government and independence by 1965; and help formulate and finance policies of economic, educational, and political development for the people of Portuguese Africa and to prepare them for an independence with responsibility."5
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5. Eduardo Mondlane, ‘Present Conditions in Mozambique’ 1 May 1961, pp. 10a, 12 from the Immanuel Wallerstein Collection of Political Ephemera, Real Number 4, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University. / Mondlane went on to say in his report:
"United States should be in a position to encourage Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination for the African peoples under her control; set target dates and take steps towards self-government and independence by 1965; and help formulate and finance policies of economic, educational, and political development for the people of Portuguese Africa and to prepare them for an independence with responsibility."4
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4. Ibid.
Marcelino dos Santos…. moved to Morocco, becoming involved in the preparations for the founding of CONCP. In that capacity, he invited Gwambe to represent Udenamo at the CONCP's founding conference. / When the conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Territories was held in Casablanca in April 1961, Marcelino dos Santos was already living there and became involved in organizing the conference. It was in that capacity that he invited UDENAMO’s president, Adelino Gwambe to attend the conference and represent the organization.
Gwambe's decision to appoint Marcelino dos Santos there and then as Udenamo's deputy secretary general, undoubtedly provided the organization with its most capable intellectual and organizer, but also a dedicated Stalinist. / Gwambe made a momentous decision and appointed Marcelino dos Santos as UDENAMO's secretary general when Dos Santos invited him to attend the Casablanca conference, providing the organization with its most capable and articulate intellectual and organizer.
It was Marcelino dos Santos who drafted Udenamo's constitution, structuring it under the principles of "democratic centralism". / It was Marcelino dos Santos who drafted UDENAMO's constitution based on democratic centralism.
As Udenamo expanded its links further afield, its leaders saw signs of uneasiness on the part of their hosts. / As UDENAMO continue to grow and establish international ties with an increasing number of groups and individuals, including some governments, strains began to show in its relationship with Tanganyikan leaders, its hosts.
Tanzanian’s Julius Nyerere government was concerned over the organization’s links with Ghana, established through the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs when Udenamo operated from Rhodesia. / Tanganyikan officials were concerned over UDENAMO’s ties to Ghana, established through the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs when Udenamo was based in Southern Rhodesia.
Ghana, the first country to financially assist Udenamo, extended regular invitations for the organization’s senior officials to visit Accra. It funded Gwambe's visits to Conakry and Helsinki, and provided an office for the Udenamo representative in Accra. / Ghana, the first African country to win independence in 1957, was also the first country to provide financial assistance and invited UDENAMO’s main leaders to visit Accra, Ghana’s capital, on a regular basis. The Ghanaian government also paid for Adelino Gwambe's visits to Conakry, Guinea, and to Helsinki, Finland, and provided an office for Udenamo representatives in Accra.
The Tanzanians viewed Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah as too radical a leader for their taste. They resented what they believed to be Nkrumah's blatant effort to bring the Mozambican nationalists under his sphere of influence. Fearing that he could in fact pose a threat to Nyerere's desire to become the champion of southern Africa's nationalist cause, the Tanzanians took action. / But the idea that Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah was trying to set the agenda for Mozambique and dominate – not just help – the nationalist organizations fighting for independence in that colony was unsettling to government officials in what was then Tanganyika. “Fearing that he could in fact pose a threat to Nyerere's desire to become the champion of southern Africa's nationalist cause, the Tanzanians took action.” 5
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5. / pdfs/0333920015.pdf
Esta é a única citação que Godfrey Mwakikagile extraiu do texto de João Cabrita que se encontra entre aspas.
The Nyerere government opted for MANU, essentially an organization of Makonde tribesmen with roots in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, bordering Tanzania. Some of its members had been born and reared in Tanzania. Others in Zanzibar and Kenya. In the early 1960s, there were an estimated 250 000 Mozambicans, notably Makonde, living in Tanzania. They worked primarily in plantations, but were also involved in trade union and political activities. / Tanganyika threw its weight behind MANU as a counter-weight to Ghana’s support of UDENAMO. […] Geographically, MANU was a northern organization drawing its largest membership from the Makonde tribe found in both Tanganyika and Mozambique. And many of its members, including some of its leaders , were born and brought up in Tanganyika. In fact, in the early sixties, about 250,000 Mozambicans, mainly Makonde, were living in Tanganyika which united with Zanzibar in 1964 to form Tanzania. And many of them were involved in trade union and political activities.
In January 1961, the MAA branches in Dar es Salaam, Mombassa and Zanzibar, led respectively by Matthew Mmole, Samuly Diankali and Ali Madebe, merged as MANU. The presidency and vice-presidency of the new party were given to Mmole and Lawrence Malinga Millinga, both born in Tanzania. The similarities between MANU and TANU were not only in the name. Some in MANU aimed at the unification of Cabo Delgado with Tanzania for a greater Makonde homeland. / In January 1961, the Makonde African Association (MAA) branches in Dar es Salaam (Tanganyika), Mombasa (Kenya) and Zanzibar merged to form MANU. The Tanganyikan branch was led by Matthew Mmole; the Kenyan and Zanzibari branches by Samuly Diankali and Ali Madebe, respectively. Matthew Mmole became MANU’s president, and Lawrence Malinga Millinga its vice-president. Both were born in Tanganyika. Many MANU members, if not the majority, also wanted to unite Cabo Delgado Province with Tanganyika in order to establish a Greater Makonde homeland.
Udenamo felt that the prospects of an armed struggle looked grim. The Tanzanian government discontinued food supplies and other assistance that it had been giving Udenamo. Tanzania declared Adelino Gwambe persona non grata for stating in a news conference on the eve of that country’s independence that arrangements had been made for Udenamo to start the armed struggle in Mozambique. He had to leave for Accra, but was allowed to return to Tanzania soon afterwards. When Ghana invited Udenamo to attend the May-June 1962 African Freedom Fighters Conference in Accra, the Tanzanians refused to issue travel documents to the Udenamo delegation. These had to be organized by the Ghanaian High Commission in Dar es Salaam. / UDENAMO, one of the other two Mozambican nationalist organizations, was still committed to armed struggle to free Mozambique, but felt that prospects for such a campaign were not good. The government of Tanzania cut off all assistance to Udenamo and declared Adelino Gwambe, UDENAMO’s president, persona non grata for announcing at a news conference just before Tanganyika won independence that arrangements had been made for Udenamo to launch a guerrilla campaign in Mozambique. Because of his status as an undesirable alien in Tanganyika, he had to leave for Accra, Ghana, but was allowed to return to Tanganyika soon. But when Ghana invited UDENAMO to attend the African Freedom Fighters Conference in Accra in May-June 1962, the government of Tanganyika refused to issue travel documents to UDENAMO delegates for them to go to Ghana. Instead, the Ghanaian High Commission in Dar es Salaam had to make the necessary provisions to enable its delegates to travel to Ghana and attend the conference.
It was not only the Tanzanian government that had grown distrustful of Nkrumah. Marcelino dos Santos was not at all impressed with Nkrumah for not regarding him as truly representative of the black people of Mozambique since he was a mulatto. / Tanganyika leaders were not the only ones who were suspicious of Nkrumah’s intentions in supporting UDENAMO and for trying to intervene in Mozambique and southern Africa in general. Marcelino dos Santos […] was deeply offended by Nkrumah who did not see him as truly representative of the black people of Mozambique because he was a mulatto.
To prevent a worsening of relations with Tanzania, and bearing in mind the strategic importance of that country for the attainment of Mozambique's independence, Marcelino dos Santos advised his fellow leaders to merge with MANU. Gwambe outrightly rejected the idea, to which Marcelino dos Santos reacted by threatening to leave Udenamo and join MANU. / And being aware of Tanganyika’s strategic position as a rear base critical to the liberation of Mozambique, he advised his colleagues in UDENAMO to unite with MANU and form a single organization. UDENAMO’s president, Adelino Gwambe, dismissed the idea and refused to compromise. Marcelino dos Santos responded by threatening to leave UDENAMO and join MANU.
But at several meetings of Udenamo's Executive Committee held throughout October 1961, it was decided that in order to overcome the prevailing situation, Udenamo and MANU should unite. In order to gain MANU's sympathy, Udenamo officials made use of their financial resources to virtually bribe members of the Makonde organization to join them. In another move, Udenamo included MANU leaders in its delegation to the African Freedom Fighters Conference in Accra. / So, throughout October 1961, UDENAMO's Executive Committee held several meetings to evaluate the entire situation and agreed to unite with MANU.
But they also used money to achieve this goal. In order to get MANU’s support for the merger,UDENAMO leaders used their financial resources to virtually bribe members of the Makonde organization to join them and form one nationalist organization embracing all Mozambicans. To entice them even more, UDENAMO also include MANU leaders in its delegation to the African Freedom Fighters Conference in Accra.
At a ceremony held under the auspices of the Tanzanian government in Dar es Salaam on 24 May 1962, Udenamo and MANU finally "decided to bring unity of all patriotic forces of Mozambique by means of forming a common front," pending the return of the respective leaders from.11 Much to the irritation of the Tanzanians, Gwambe told a news conference in Accra five days later that the decision to merge was in response to Nkrumah's call for the closing of ranks for the liberation of Africa.12 As proposed by Mahluza, the front was to be known as the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique.
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11. Udenamo and MANU statement, Dar es Salaam, 25 May 1962.
12. Evening News,. Op. cit. Esta nota do livro de João Cabrita deve ser conjugada com a nota 3 do Capítulo 1: ‘Mozambique Parties Answer Osagyefo’s “Close Ranks Call”’ , Evening News, Accra, 6 June 1962, pp. 1,2. / On 24 May, 1962, at a ceremony held in Dar es Salaam under the auspices of the Tanganyikan government in Dar es Salaam, UDENAMO and MANU announced that they had decided to bring unity of all patriotic forces of Mozambique by means of forming a common front”,pending the return of the respective leaders from Accra.[…] Adelino Gwambe – in a move that amounted to a slap in the face of the Tanganyikan leaders – announced at a news conference in Accra five days after the merger that the decision to unite the two organizations was in response to Nkrumah’s call for the closing of ranks for the liberation of Africa.[…] As proposed by Fanhuel [sic] Mahluza, the new organization came to be known Frente de Libertação de Moçambique.
With unity talks between Udenamo and MANU under way, José Baltazar da Costa Chagonga, the leader of Unami, arrived in Dar es Salaam. In 1959, Chagonga had founded the Associação Nacional Africana de Moatize, ostensibly a cultural association of Moatize coal mineworkers as well as Mozambican migrants in Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia. In reality, the association promoted nationalist ideals among its members. An advocate of peaceful change, Chagonga had been petitioning the Portuguese to review unsavoury labour practices in the colony. This resulted in his detention. Upon his release, Chagonga fled to Malawi where in May 1960 he renamed his organization Unami. / While negotiations were going on between UDENAMO and MANU to unite the two organizations, Josea [sic] Baltazar da Costa Chagonga arrived in Dar es Salaam where the talks were being held. In 1959, Chagonga formed the Associaceao [sic] Nacional Africana de Moatize, ostensibly a cultural association of Moatize coal mine workers and Mozambican migrants in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Nyasaland Malawi and Southern Rhodesia Rhodesia (renamed Zimbabwe). But the organization was really nothing but an incubator of nationalism and propaganda nationalist ideals among its members who now had a mediumthrough which to articulate their nationalist aspirations.
Chagonga advocated peaceful change and tried to ask the Portuguese colonial authorities in Mozambique to improve the working conditions which were becoming increasingly intolerable to African miners, labourers and other workers. He was detained for that and, after he was released, fled to Nyasaland where in May 1961 he renamed his organization UNAMI…
To counter Gwambe's financial clout, on his way to Syracuse Mondlane planned to stop over in Cairo, Tunis, Geneva and London and raise funds. "As soon as he reaches the United States," reported Byrne, "Mr. Mondlane plans to get in touch with Deputy Assistant Secretary [of State for African Affairs] Wayne Fredericks."15
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15. Ibid. [Esta nota do Capítulo 1 do livro de Cabrita deve ser conjugada com a nota no. “14. FOIA: Foreign Dispatch, American Embassy, Dar es Salaam, 19 June 1962.”
FOIA significa Freedom of Information Act, ou Lei da Liberdade da Informação.Foi ao abrigo desta Lei que Cabrita obteve documentação avulsa do Departamento de Estado e da CIA, reveladora das relações entre o Dr. Eduardo Mondlane e os Estados Unidos. De acordo com o livro de Cabrita, Thomas Byrne era na altura o encarregado de negócios, em exercício, da Embaixada dos Estados em Dar es Salaam. / In an attempt to neutralize Gwambe’s financial control over UDENAMO and MANU members, Dr. Mondlane on his way back to Syracuse University from Dar es Salaam planned to visit Cairo, Tunis, Geneva and London to get financial support through fund raising. The Senior American diplomat in Tanganyika during that time, Thomas Byrne, stated, "Mr. Mondlane plans to get in touch with Deputy Assistant Secretary [of State for African Affairs] Wayne Fredericks."6
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6. Thomas Byrne, ibid.
"Dr. Mondlane's position as leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front," commented Byrne in a cable to the Department of State,
“appears at the moment to be strong. His future prospects will depend to a great extent upon how successful he is in obtaining money to carry on the party's activities here. Another as yet unclear factor is the sincerity of Kambona's assurance of support. If Ghana is now shifting its support from Gwambe to Mondlane, the latter's position should be secure."19
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19.Ibid.
Tal como na nota anterior, a nota 19 deve ser conjugada com a nota 18. FOIA: Confidential Airgram, American Embassy, Dar es Salaam, 10 July 1962.” / As Byrne commented in a cable to the US State Department in Washington, DC:
"Dr. Mondlane's position as leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front, appears at the moment to be strong. His future prospects will depend to a great extent upon how successful he is in obtaining money to carry on the party's activities here. Another as yet unclear factor is the sincerity of Kambona's assurance of support. If Ghana is now shifting its support from Gwambe to Mondlane, the latter's position should be secure."7
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7. Thomas Byrne, ibid.
* Foram apenas extraídos alguns trechos do livro de Godfrey Mwakikagile, havendo ainda outras partes,do mesmo capítulo, em que o autor se serviu do livro de João Cabrita.