Movement Away from User Fees and Towards Sales Taxes

General

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

1:38 PM

https://stellar.mit.edu/S/course/1/fa09/1.252/courseMaterial/topics/topic16/readings/Wachs_-_Local_Option_Transport_Taxes/Wachs_-_Local_Option_Transport_Taxes.pdf

·  movement away from user fees and towards sales taxes

·  tolls are expensive to collect

·  gas taxes tend to get smaller with inflation and efficiency

Lucas Davis, "The Effect of Driving Restrictions on Air Quality in Mexico City"

conceptually programs that discourage driving go over better if they are sold as a package with improvements to other modes…this may require revenue generation from the discouraging program

trust problem, will they actually get the money?

Licensing

Thursday, November 12, 2009

10:32 PM

Kitamura, A Causal Analysis of car ownership and transit use

http://www.springerlink.com/content/n2759qm814731314/

RYUICHI KITAMURA. "A causal analysis of car ownership and transit use:Introduction Sample characteristics Car ownership and mobility Causal analysis of car ownership and mode use Conclusion Notes References."Transportation (1986-1998) 16,no.2(April1,1989):155. http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.mit.edu/(accessed November 10, 2009).

Problem with cross-sectional data looking at drivers of car use:

·  Does car ownership lead to increased car use? Or does need to travel lead to car ownership and then use?

·  they use panel data to try to get around this problem

·  Is it possible to deter or at least decelerate the increase in car use by improving transit?

·  then improve transit service

·  or is the increase in car use an unavoidable consequence of the increase in car ownership?

·  then improve roads and deter car ownership

·  they find a relatively little impact of ownership on # of trips per day, but a strong relationship with mode choice

·  they find that a change in the number of drivers is the most important factor, which leads to a change in the number of car trips

·  they find that it is unlikely that an increase in car ownership motivates more people to get licenses

·  their most salient result is that a change in car ownership leads to a change in car trips, which in turn affects transit use

Rock (1998), Impact from changes in Illinois drivers license renewal requirements for older drivers

http://mit.worldcat.org/oclc/90211350&referer=brief_results

·  focus on safety rather than driving

The relationship of age and state license renewal policies to driving licensure rates

David T. Levy

Abstract

We employ regression analysis to examine the relationship of state driver's license renewal requirements, population characteristics, and driving conditions to state driving licensure rates. Licensure rates are examined for the years 1985 through 1989. We separately examine all-age and senior licensed drivers. We find that license renewal requirements as well as population characteristics and driving conditions have systematic relationships to licensure rates. In particular, license renewal tests are associated with lower senior driving licensure rates.

Pasted from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V5S-3YF4N1C-11&_user=501045&_coverDate=08%2F31%2F1995&_fmt=abstract&_orig=search&_cdi=5794&view=c&_acct=C000022659&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=501045&md5=119e7f0e347359ee101c92e17ccf7612&ref=full>

(download isn't working right now)

does this mean more restrictive licensing may reduce driving effectively?

at least they have the implication that it's better to control car ownership than driving itself

Congestion Pricing / Tolls

Thursday, November 12, 2009

7:59 PM

·  Giuliano, G.: An assessment of the political acceptability of congestion pricing. Transportation 19.4, 335–358 (1992)

·  Giuliano, G.: Equity and fairness considerations of congestion pricing. In: Curbing Gridlock, pp. 250–279. Transportation Research Board, National Academy Press, Washington, DC (1994)

·  Glazer, A., Niskanen, E.: Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? J. Transport Econ. Pol. 34, 43–54 (2000)

·  Go´mez-Iba´n˜ez, J.A.: The political economy of congestion charges. Transport. Q. 46.3, 343–360 (1992)

·  King, D., Manville, M., Shoup, D.: The political calculus of congestion pricing. Transport Pol. 14, 111–123 (2007)

·  Richardson, H.W., Bae, C.-H.: The equity impacts of road congestion pricing. In: Button, K. Verhoef, E. (eds.) Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion, and the Environment: Issues of Efficiency and Social Feasibility, pp. 247–262. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (1998)

·  Santos, G., Roley, L.: Distributional impacts of road pricing: the truth behind the myth. Transportation 31, 21–42 (2004)

·  Small, K.A.: Unnoticed lessons from London: road pricing and public transit. Access 26, 10–15 (2004)

Gomez-Ibanez, J. "The Political Economy of Highway Tolls and Congestion Pricing.” Transportation Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1992, pp. 343-360

http://stellar.mit.edu/S/course/1/fa09/1.252/courseMaterial/topics/topic12/readings/Gomez-Ibanez_-_Political_---ongestion_Charging/Gomez-Ibanez_-_Political_---ongestion_Charging.pdf

Economists and environmentalists want to use tolls to discourage driving, or at least imbed social costs

Usually they are used for road finance so the goal is different - piecemeal and low price

·  managing demand versus capacity expansion

·  economists more focused on differential pricing to manage congestion while environmentalists more focused on reducing overall auto use

·  US prohibited tolls on the interstates as a result of federal highway funding

·  (fairness implications may be different based on goal of the toll)

·  eg toll for repaying financing on a road might be fair because those who use the road and benefit pay

·  pattern of winners and losers depend on the alternatives for both finance and for roads (would the road exist anyway, how would it be funded otherwise?)

·  toll an existing road:

·  winners:

·  drivers who use the road and have a high value of time would benefit

·  travelers who use bus/hov on the road would benefit from increased speed

·  recipients of the revenue (tax decrease, services, etc)

·  (drivers who shift to the road because times are better now)

·  losers:

·  drivers who would continue to use the road but have a low value of time

·  drivers who shift from the road to another road (a downgrade or they would have used it before, plus it may have increased congestion)

·  users of the competing un-tolled route that gets more congestion

·  motorists who no longer drive because of the toll

·  people who do a shift may benefit or lose…shift from driving to bus, which is now faster

·  depends on how congested the road was…a road with forced flow might handle the same number of cars at 1/3rd the speed…so a very congested road might have more winners

·  forced flow so inefficient that the gains from fixing it are quite large

·  fewer losers if tolls are more comprehensive

·  can you design a credible compensation scheme to compensate the losers

·  payments often made to another jurisdiction than the driver's home

·  toll to build a new road:

·  if revenues are sufficient to finance the road, there should be only winners

·  except for issues such as land takings, community disruption, noise, air pollution…compensation is theoretically possible though

·  perception that the road would not be built without the tolls

Jonas Eliassonaand Lars-Göran Mattsson

Equity effects of congestion pricing: Quantitative methodology and a case study for Stockholm

Several scholars have argued that congestion charges will be regressive, since people with high income have a higher value of time, and hence more often feel that the time gain is worth the charge (Richardson, 1974,Evans, 1992,Arnott et al., 1994andSmall, 1983). Moreover, people with small economic margins will suffer more from congestion charges (Richardson, 1974). In addition, they generally have inferior possibilities to decide their time for work, and thus cannot avoid charges levied during peak hours (Arnott et al., 1994). They are more likely to live far from the city core, and their destination is more often located outside the inner city in areas where public transport is poor (Transek, 2002). Moreover, if road investments are not financed by charges they have to be financed by income taxes, and since those with high incomes pay more tax they would suffer more from that alternative (Arnott et al., 1994).

However, other scholars have argued that those with low incomes would gain the most from congestion pricing. Many of the previous arguments have typically come up in an American context where car is the dominant mode of transport. The situation may be different in typical European cities, where citizens have access to and actually patronise public transport and also “slow modes” in particular during peak hours (Armelius, 2004). When there is a choice between a fast (car) and a slow (public transport) mode, a toll that increases welfare is likely to be on the fast mode. Since those using the fast mode usually are the more affluent travellers, such tolls will be progressive (Glazer and Niskanen, 2000). Since low-income groups more often use public transport, not only will they be less affected by the charges, but they will also profit more from the revenues if they are spent on improving public transport (as is generally proposed for at least part of the revenues) (Evans, 1992). Several studies (in particular European ones) argue that people with high incomes drive more frequently, and more often have their destination in the inner city where congestion is highest (Foster, 1974). They are also more likely to live within or close to the inner city and therefore cannot avoid the charges or choose alternative routes. Again, this argument presupposes a “European” geographical distribution of income groups, with the rich closer to the city centre. Some argue that congestion pricing also slows down the development towards a more car-dependent society, which favours those with low incomes who are less likely to have a car (Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, 1998).

Pasted from <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VG7-4J2M49N-2&_user=501045&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1064975238&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000022659&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=501045&md5=d996190a9df82468e8304ed7d67db1d3>

Small, K.A.: Unnoticed lessons from London: road pricing and public transit. Access 26, 10–15 (2004)

http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~ksmall/Transit%20-%20Access.pdf

·  mass transit isn't the solution to congestion, road pricing is the savior of mass transit

o  road price builds transit patronage

o  decreased congestion speeds up surface level transit

·  increases patronage more since rides are faster

·  cheaper to run transit since higher speeds reduce costs of service each route

o  potentially leads to improvements such as greater frequency, new routes, or reduced fares

o  in turn, this further increases patronage

·  London cut traffic 33% and increased car speeds 14-20%

·  He posits a simple theoretically model to estimate the impact of congestion pricing on a city

o  model predicts a 6% initial increase in transit use, and 16% increase after the feedback effects

o  for avg US cities, the effect is larger, 31%

o  estimates benefits that are quite high, not taking into account benefits to road users or toll revenues

Manville, Shoup, and King, ,“The Political Calculus of Congestion Pricing” Transport Policy 14 (2007) 111–123

·  political feasibility depends on who receives the toll revenue

·  will have the greatest success if the revenue is distributed to cities here it was not, rather going to pay off prior highway debts at the state level

·  economic theory is pretty clear, but the world hasn't followed suit

·  traffic planners and economists see congestion pricing as the best, or perhaps only way to reduce congestion effectively in the long run, but politicians see it as a complicated new charge for something that has always been free

·  benefits and costs are both distributed…tolls are relatively small paid by a lot of drivers, revenues are split, congestion benefits are diffuse

·  need a built in constituency to fight for the tax

o  MA didn't really have one since it was just debt payment

·  set the city up as the beneficiary

Deloitte "Combating Gridlock: How Road Pricing can Ease Congestion"

(saved in folder)

Vickrey, W,Principles of Efficient Congestion Pricing. 1992

(saved in folder)

·  List of principles for efficient congestions pricing

o  Charges reflect marginal social cost of each trip

o  Charges vary smoothly over time

o  Efficient charges need to look at the whole impact of the trip over the congestion period, not just the time the trip is made

o  Can improve efficiency by charging based on road segment rather than passing a point

o  Might be better to determine impact after the fact rather than in advance

o  All vehicles should be charged…no exceptions

o  Cabs need to be charged upfront so it can be passed on to the customer

o  Curb parking should be charged on the basis of clearing the market

o  Can charge using parking cards or vending machines

o  Delivery vehicles could use an on-vehicle meter

o  Political interference and bureaucratic bungling spoil the game

______, Induced Travel Demand

·  expanding road capacity is said to spawn new travel demand

·  causality is unclear…perceived traffic growth could also spur new investments

·  resolution of the analysis - when looking at a single facility, induced demand appears large, but a lot of these trips may be diverted from elsewhere, on the other hand, a wider view also includes new traffic on feeder roads

·  measurement problems:

o  sources - difficulty of measuring sources…are trips generated or redistributed?

·  commuters shift modes, routes, and times of day, but only mode shifts should be considered ideally

·  longer trips, or those that are unleashed by faster flowing traffic

o  spillovers - improvements in one link have impacts on feeder links

o  boundaries - using political boundaries may not conform to travelsheds, so it could induce bias

o  variables - measure dependant variable in terms of VMT

·  does capture elements such as time of day shifts that can deteriorate level of service

·  also measure inputs (lane miles) rather than outputs (travel time savings)

·  control variables - level of transit service

·  also some increases of VMT might be good, as people move around bottlenecks

Glazer, A., Niskanen, E.: Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? J. Transport Econ. Pol. 34, 43–54 (2000)

·  tolls are usually put on the fast mode between two areas…usually highway rather than small roads

·  when revenue from the road is not returned to the users, welfare of the road users may decline (evans 1992)

o  if users vary on their value of time, a toll can increase welfare without returning revenue

o  but this depends on consumers not being able to reassign to another transportation mode

·  toll on the fast mode unambiguously hurts people on the slow mode

·  tolls hurts people on the fast mode who value time the least, as they either pay and get a time improvement they don't care much about, or switch modes (which they could have done before, and are worse off than if they had switched modes before)