Mithyatva in Advaitasiddhi

CHAPTER V

MITHYËTVA IN ADVAITASIDDHI

PART II

Among the five definitions of mithy¡tva, the first two which are contributed by Padmap¡da and Prak¡¿¡tman are described in the earlier chapter. Prak¡¿¡tman contributed two definitions of mithy¡tva in Advaita Ved¡nta. This chapter brings out the second definition of Prak¡¿¡tman, the definition of Citsukha and the definition of Ënandabodha are clearly described.

5.1. The third definition of mithy¡tva

This definition is taken from Paµcap¡dik¡vivara¸a of Prak¡¿¡tman. ‘Jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’ That means which is sublated by knowledge that is mithy¡. According to Prak¡¿¡tman sublation (b¡dhyatva) is mithy¡tva.[1] What is meant by this word sublation? If this sublation means to destruction, then the meaning of mithy¡, is destroyed by knowledge. The criticism of ‘abh¡va pratiyogit¡rupamithy¡tva’ is based on the ¿ruti ‘Neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana.’ It implies that the world of multiplicity is eternally negated in Brahman which is the locus of its appearance and as such the world is false.[2] It implies that the world is false in the sense that it is cancelled by the knowledge of Brahman. The definition–mithy¡ is that which is contradicted by knowledge is based on the ¿ruti which is “Vidv¡n n¡mar£p¡dvimuktaÅ.”[3] If the definition the ‘mithy¡tva is that which is ‘contradicted by knowledge’ (jµ¡nanivartyatva) is accepted, then it is ativy¡pti because preceding knowledge (p£rvajµ¡na) is sublated by the succeeding knowledge (uttarajµ¡na). The preceding knowledge, which is sublated by the succeeding knowledge, is destructive, but it is not mithy¡. According to Advaitin the all cognitions are ultimately false. So the preceding cognition that gets cancelled by the succeeding cognition is also considered to be false. That means the special quality of one thing destroyed by the origination of other special quality. So the first cognition is destroyed by the second cognition and the special quality of the second cognition destroyed by the special quality of the third cognition. It cleared with the example-the knowledge of ‘pot’ is replaced by the knowledge of ‘table’ and then the former is destroyed by the later. But the knowledge of ‘pot’ cannot be false. So the definition is in alakÀya, so the defect of ativy¡pti is seen as well as siddhas¡dhanat¡. Advaitins comment that the opponents have misunderstood the implication of this definition. They said all cognitions are ultimately false. So the preceding and succeeding cognitions are also false. So it will be the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡. The presence of the hetu d¤¿yatva etc. are makes the mithy¡tvasiddhi. Then the defects of siddhas¡dhanat¡ occur. The opponents also accept the sublation of cognition in the preceding knowledge. The ativy¡pti can be seen in the broken pot also. The pot which is destructed by the stick, according to the siddh¡nta pakÀa, is also mithy¡. The definition of mithy¡tva is not suitable for destructed pot because it is destructed by a stick and not by knowledge.

To solve this problem Advaitins modified the definition-‘jµ¡natvena jµ¡nanivartyatvam v¡ mithy¡tvam.’ That means something negated by a cognition acting its capacity as cognition. ‘If accept the sense of jµ¡nanivartyatva then this does not happened because it would no longer apply to the preceding cognition getting destroyed by its succeeding cognition. But the succeeding cognition acts as the destroyer of the preceding cognition not in its capacity of being cognition- it destroys the preceding cognition by virtue of its character of being a special quality of the same self and coming just after that cognition. Therefore the preceding cognition is not to be considered as false because of the fact that it is negated by the succeeding cognition.’[4] If the definition is told in this way the obtained meaning is like this-‘jµ¡natv¡vacchinnak¡ra¸at¡nir£pita k¡ryatv¡t tanna sapratiyogitvam.’[5] If this is stressed, ativy¡pti will happen in the destructed pot. The negation of the eternal negation of the gross and the subtle form of an object due to knowledge is false. In the case of a destruction of pot with a stroke of stick, the gross form of the pot is destroyed. The subtle form is destroyed only by the knowledge of Brahman. Like wise the mithy¡tv¡num¡na is s¡dhyavaikalya. S¡dhyavaikalya means the absent of s¡dhya. The knowledge of rajata is sublated by the knowledge of ¿ukti. This type of experience is asiddha. If said like this, the knowledge of Brahman is not the cause of the destruction of the universe.

5.1.1. Asambhava

Then the Advaita definition of falsity would have the defect of asambhava. All superimposed objects which are considered as false. The above mentioned cause is asambhava doÀayukta. How the sublation of the superimposition of aparokÀa happens by the knowledge of parokÀa? In the example of ¿uktirajata, the sublation of knowledge that is the knowledge of rajata obtained by the realization of the locus (adhiÀ¶h¡natatvas¡kÀ¡tk¡ra) that is the knowledge of ¿uktik¡. Here the knowledge is not sublated by knowledge. The mental trace is negated by a cognition acting its capacity of being a variant of cognition (jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharme¸a jµ¡nanivartyatvam) is mithy¡tvam. If it accepts the Advaita definition of falsity from being too wide, it prevents the definition of falsity from being applicable to the preceding cognition which gets cancelled by the succeeding cognition and thus saves it from being too wide. Here also the defect of ativy¡pti can be viewed. The cognition of acting in its capacity of being variant is memory. Sm¤titvar£pa viewed in sublated by knowledge is in mental trace. The memory is developed by mental trace. Later the mental trace which is originated by knowledge is destroyed. So the mental trace is destroyed by memory. The presence of ativy¡pti is in mental trace of mithy¡tva which is destroyed by memory. Memory is sublated by the trace of virtue of its character of being memory. If it is accepted the sublation happens by ‘¡tmavi¿eÀagu¸atvar£pa.’ It will be accepted that icch¡, dveÀa etc. are sublated by mental trace because this is ‘¡tmaviÀeÀagu¸atvar£pa’. The prior absence of the knowledge (Jµ¡napr¡gabh¡va) is not mithy¡ but it is sublated by knowledge ‘vidvan n¡mar£p¡tvimuktaÅ’- through this ¿ruti, the cancellation (niv¤tti) of name and form is stated, but the mithy¡tva which has name and form is not obtained.

The reply of Advaitin is that the sublation of knowledge means ‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nyavirahapratiyogitvam.’ The absolute absence of jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nya is its pratiyogitva. This type of pratiyogitva is mithy¡. The meaning of the word knowledge is the knowledge of the locus. It means that the avasthiti of the knowledge which is adhiÀ¶h¡natattvavy¡pakas¡m¡nya is its absolute absence and its pratiyogitva is mithy¡.[6]

Avasthiti is two types svar£p¡vasthiti and k¡ra¸¡t¡vasthiti- that is s£kÀmar£pa and sth£lar£pa. The k¡ra¸¡vasthiti is samsk¡rar£p¡vasthiti. The word s¡m¡nya is used for understanding the two avasthiti.

To reject the defect of ativy¡pti Advaitins put forward their view. In the definition they accept the absence of avasthitis¡m¡nya. So there is no ativy¡pti in pot which is destroyed by of the stick. By the breaking of the pot by stick or pole, the svar£pa is destroyed, but it exists in k¡ra¸ar£pa. So there is no avasthitis¡m¡nyaviraha.[7] The avasthitis¡m¡nyaviraha of pot uses the knowledge of Brahman (brahmajµ¡naprayukta). If jµ¡naprayukta is not accepted, in above mentioned definition there will exist the ativy¡pti in the hare’s horn. In actual as well as potential state, is in hare’s horn, but it is not entailed by knowledge. So there is no ativy¡pti in a½¢ka.

The opponents said there is no realization of the loss of ¿uktirajata. So ‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nyavirahapratiyogitvam’ is not in ¿uktirajata’ the example is s¡dhyavikala. There is ativy¡pti in this definition. Advaitins did not accept ¿uktirajata as a½¢ka. This is opposite to our experience. áuktirajata is not a½¢ka like hare’s horn. There is no experience for the hare’s horn. The ¿uktikarajata has cognition (prat¢ti), so the pr¡tibh¡sikasatt¡ which is different from a½¢ka is accepted. áuktikarajata is the subject of the knowledge of pratyakÀabhrama, that is the object of anirvacan¢ya which is produced in tatk¡la. It is sublated by the knowledge of sublation that is the realization of shell. The sublation of shell-silver is obtained by experience. So ‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nya-virahapratiyogitvam’ is in the shell silver. So in this definition of mithy¡tva there is no avy¡pti and s¡dhyavaikalya.[8]

Madhus£dana the author of Advaitasiddhi the definition of ‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nyavirahapratiyogitvam mithy¡tvam’ states the destruction which is the effect itself (k¡ryasvar£pa) and the cause itself (k¡ra¸ar£pa). The expression of V¡rtikak¡ra and Vivara¸ak¡ra by rational thinkers is stressed by him states as follows-‘ajµ¡nasya svak¡rye¸a vartam¡nena pravi¢inena v¡ saha jµ¡nena nivartirbhadhaÅ.’[9] The word jµ¡nena means jµ¡navy¡paka. Niv¤tti means absolute absence or destruction, the sublation through knowledge (Jµ¡nena niv¤tti) means jµ¡navy¡pakena niv¤tti. The origin of knowledge leads to the sublation of ignorance (ajµ¡na). So the meaning jµ¡navy¡paka is obtained when knowledge origins, the sublation of ignorance takes place. This rule does not exist. There is no defect regarding the sublation of ignorance which is based on knowledge. At the time of the origin of pot, the sublation of the prior absence of the pot happens. The causes the sublation of the prior absence of pot is based on pot. As the sublation of the prior absence of the pot is gha¶asvar£pa, the origin of pot is samak¡l¢na. So as the origin is based on the samak¡l¢na of the object no defect can be stated.[10]

The opinion of ajµ¡nav¡d¢ Advaitins is that the ignorance is the only one. They do not accept the different type of ignorance in different things. They say that the ignorance is one. Ignorance and the effect of ignorance are sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. The sublation of pr¡tibh¡sika objects like shell silver does not happen through the shell realization. It is so because ignorance is one and so through ignorance all knowledge is sublated. Like this through the realization of shell, the mokÀa is obtained. Like this in the definition of mithy¡tva, this example is not suitable.[11]

Advaitins takes for granted the difference of subject in ignorance. In ¿uktirajata, with the help of the knowledge of ¿ukti the m£laniv¤tti of ignorance will not occur. It is so because the ignorance which is the subject of ¿ukti exists in s£kÀmar£pa or k¡ra¸ar£pa. The s¡m¡nyaviraha of the state of complete ignorance is the cause of the knowledge of Brahman.

According to Madhus£dana ‘jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharme¸a jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’ This definition is faultless.[12] According to this interpretation the false is what is negated by cognition in its capacity of being a variant form of cognition. The opinion of opponents the preceding knowledge is sublated by the succeeding knowledge. If this happens there will occur ativy¡pti. This is so because the sublation of preceding knowledge by succeeding knowledge is not the sublation of knowledge in jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharma jµ¡na in its own uttarotpanna ¡tmavi¿eÀajµ¡natva. That means its application to the preceding cognition getting destroyed by the succeeding cognition. The preceding cognition is taken to be real by the opponent. The Advaitin, of course, considers it to be false. But he does not consider it to be false in the sense that it gets destroyed by the succeeding cognition. According to Advaitin all objects are false and the cognitions being objects are also false. If the sublation of jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharmar£pa is accepted the sublation of knowledge will not take place according to ones desire of succeeding knowledge. This knowledge which existed earlier should be in succeeding knowledge. Only then the above said sublation will happen. Desire is not the jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharmavi¿iÀ¶a. So the sublation of desire will not take place through k¤ti. Knowledge, desire etc. is destructible by ¡tmavi¿iÀ¶ajµ¡nagu¸a.[13] This happens when there is ‘svottaravarti ¡tmavi¿eÀagu¸atva.’

The definition refutes, the sublation of preceding knowledge by succeeding knowledge, leading to the defect of ativy¡pti. The mental trace which is memory does not have nivartaka avacchedaka dharma. So there are the defects of siddhas¡dhanat¡ and ativy¡pti. There is no evidence for the memory which is destroyed by the mental trace. But it is b¡dhakapram¡¸a. The mental trace is not ruined by the origin of memory. Even though, through memory and jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharma, the mental trace is destroyed, not to sakÀ¡tk¡rar£pa. On the other hand it becomes rigid. This type of experience is experienced. The opponents said by the origination of the corresponding memory mental trace get destroyed. A mental trace gets destroyed by the origination of corresponding memory: Therefore the mental trace is sublated by cognition in the sense that it is negated by cognition in its capacity of being varient of cognition. In that way memory and mental trace is also sublated by knowledge. Memory is a variant of cognition. When the mental trace destroys the causes of memory, then it said to memory as memory. It does not say that memory destroys its mental trace. Anyone agree that.

Madhus£dana said that Ved¡ntins does not agree that the memory destroys the corresponding mental trace. Advaitins says that it cannot be a rule that the vy¡p¡ra of a cause get destroyed by the effect of that cause. Here sense perception it finds that the sense organ is the instrumental cause which produces the perception through sense object contact which is the vy¡p¡ra of the sense organ. Finally Madhus£dana-‘s¡kÀ¡tk¡ratvena jµ¡nani-vartyatvam mithy¡tvam’ states this as the definition of mithy¡tva. By not stating it as jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharme¸a, he states it as ‘s¡kÀ¡tk¡re¸a jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’ Mental trace is ruined sm¤titvar£pa and jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharma and not by s¡kÀ¡tk¡rar£pa. This type is absent because mithy¡tva is ‘s¡kÀ¡tk¡ratvadharme¸a jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’

5.2. Fourth definition of mithy¡tva.

This definition is taken from Tattvaprad¢pika of Citsukha. He considered the definition of mithy¡tva as that ¿loka-

‘sarveÀ¡mapi bh¡v¡n¡m¡¿rayatvena summate

Pratiyogitvamatyant¡bh¡vam prati m¤À¡tamat¡.’[14]

That means mithy¡tva is being the counter correlate of the absolute negation existing in the locus where it appears to be. Madhus£dana presented this definition as- ‘sv¡¿rayaniÀ¶ha atyant¡bh¡vapratiyogitvam v¡ mithy¡tvam.’[15] That means falsity of a thing consists in its being absolutely negated in the very locus in which it presents itself. When its object is absent, there the cognition of that object exists and this is mithy¡. The existence of effect (k¡ryasatt¡) is presented in the cause. The absence of the existence of effect is in cause is specific so it is mithy¡.

‘The Naiy¡yikas do not recognize that the locus of a thing as also the locus of its eternal negation. So the author Ved¡ntaparibh¡À¡ has added the word ‘abhimata’ (assumed) when he interprets this definition of falsity. So the word ‘thing’ in a phrase ‘locus of a thing’ should be taken to mean the thing as assumed.’[16]

The opponents questioned that if the mithy¡tva is obtained by the depending objects, then atoms and ¡k¡¿a is not dependent. That means this contention of the Advaitin is not justified. If it accepts, it has to conclude that all super senses things do not become a½¢ka. These things through objects of indirect cognitions are never objects of direct cognitions. There fore the hare’s horn is an object of cognition, is an indirect one, and it is eternally non-existent every where, it must be considered as mithy¡. Then this definition is inapplicable. The nityaparam¡¸u and nitya ¡k¡¿a do not depend on anything. So this definition does not suit every where in the universe. According to Advaitin all the objects different from Brahman is dependent. How the rajatas are based in the ¿uktik¡ likewise all the universe is based on Brahman. Brahman is the only one which is non-dependent.[17] So in this definition there is no ativy¡pti. Brahman is not dependent. Even though Brahman has t¡d¡tmy¡dhy¡sa towards pot, Brahman is not dependent. Like this pot etc. are in superimposition which Brahmar£pakalpita is in cause.

5.2.1. Arth¡ntara

The opinion of the opponent is that, according to Ny¡y¡m¤ta there is avy¡pyav¤tti in conjunction (samyoga) etc. One part of an object is conjunction and the other part is not. Then it is said that there will be no absence of conjunction in the locus of conjunction. Like this the mithy¡tva is in conjunction. So there is the defect of arth¡ntara. If the same locus is accepted in existence and absence in universe, then conjunction and its absence is in same locus. Eventually the opposite is seen in the universe. The virodha of gotva and asvatva etc. is bh¡v¡bh¡vaprayukta virodha. Gotva and the absence of gotva are different from each other. There is difference in the gotv¡bh¡vavy¡pya asatva. When the existence and absence is in one thing and equal, then that part is not seen where it happens. That means in the branch of a tree there is the conjunction of monkey and in the root there is not. The locus and vi¿eÀaprayukta are different because the dharma of characteristic is different. The contact of monkey and the tree is the characteristic of the branch is visible and the absence of the contact of monkey is in the root is invisible. So there is no avy¡pti. Originally Advaitins do not accept avy¡pyav¤tti. Contact etc. are vy¡pyav¤tti. In the branch of the tree there is the contact of monkey and there is the locus of contact also. To accept the avy¡pyav¤ttit¡ of contact etc. there is anavasth¡ in the avacchedakaparampar¡. If the avy¡pyav¤tti of contact etc. is agreed there is no arth¡ntara. Then the interpretation of definition should be thus where a particular thing is in a particular characteristic in a particular contact, there is pratiyogit¡ of absolute absence of that thing, the characteristic of that thing is mithy¡[18] or the absolute absence of a part of mithy¡tva can be given the avacchinnav¤ttika absolute absence. In the contact of monkey, the arth¡ntara is mentioned. In that place there is no absolute absence of niravacchinnav¤ttika because absence of contact is in the characteristic of root. So there is no arth¡ntara.