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Gilmore Commission - MinutesPanel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response
to Terrorist Acts Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, September 22, 1999
Present:
Honorable James Gilmore, Chairman
L. Paul (Jerry) Bremer
James Clapper
Ray Downey
George Foresman
William Garrison
Ellen Gordon
James Greenleaf
William Jenaway
Dallas Jones
Paul Maniscalco
Kathleen O'Brien
Patrick Ralstonv William Reno
Ken Shine
Governor James Gilmore (Chairman) (opening remarks): I've been dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane Floyd. Natural disasters like hurricanes create similar chaos to other sorts of crises, and give good insight into how EMS might respond to WMD crises. There are many parallels. I'd like to welcome Ambassador Paul "Jerry" Bremer to the panel. He is also heading a terrorism panel of his own commissioned by Congress (National Commission on Terrorism), Mr. Dallas Jones and General Reno, who are all attending their first panel meeting. I note that we have a Report to the President and the Congress coming due in December, and we will discuss that in more detail later in the meeting. I ask all Panel members for their input on the issues that I mentioned in my recent letter.
Approval of Minutes: A motion was made and seconded that the minutes of the Panel meeting of 9 June 1999 be approved as written. The motion was adopted unanimously.
Bruce Hoffman: Donald Rumsfeld, James Q. Wilson have resigned from the panel. I am stepping down as project leader of the RAND analytical support effort. Mike Wermuth will be replacing me. A copy of Mike's biographical sketch has been provided to each panel member (attached as Appendix 1).
Chairman: It is my pleasure to introduce Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) the sponsor of the legislation that established our Panel. Congressman Weldon has graciously consented to provide some insight from his perspective on the tasks ahead.
Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) addressed the Panel:
There are three key threats in the 21st century that the U.S. must deal with aggressively. They are:
- Missile proliferation--India, Pakistan, and China etc.
- Cyber-terrorism
- Weapons of mass destruction--the Intelligence Community says it is not a question of "if" but "when" an attack of this nature will occur.
We need to ensure that we do not just watch the biggest cities. An attack could come anywhere. I'm not talking about nationalizing response teams, but we need to pay attention to the needs of the first responders in training and equipment. Most Federal money is going to agencies at the Federal level. This does not help the first responders. Will states fund the first responders instead? Most are volunteers and are not paid at all, nor are they well-trained. The Department of Defense is not positioned nor is it trained to be a first responder and therefore cannot make up the difference.
This panel needs to assess if we're doing the right thing for the first responders, and its goal might be to become their advocates. That assessment should be based on the question: Are we doing the right thing for first responders in terms of training and equipment? We might want to improve their training, give them more equipment, and fund them their ability to integrate with all forces. We need to make sure the first responders have a knowledge-base of where to get specialized equipment, expertise, and common integrated communication systems so that all responders will be able to talk to each other. This panel needs to become advocates for first responders.
The big question is of federal vs. state vs. local government personnel. There are huge discrepancies in the capabilities between law-enforcement and the first responders, most of whom are still just volunteers. We need to determine what resources we already have that can be brought to bear.
When there was a WMD threat in WashingtonD.C. last year the fire department was the first responder, not the military. The military does a great job preparing for WMD environments, but they only train and get little or no actual experience in WMD environments. Emergency medical services deal with hazardous material environments all the time. They are far better prepared for that same environment.
Technology is improving in lots of areas that can help in this issue. I introduced legislation eight years ago to conduct an inventory of Federal resources that could be used to address the problem. As of today, that inventory has still not been completed. As one example, thermal imagers (a Navy asset) can be used for finding victims in wreckage is only one such area. We need to look at what we can give the on-scene commander, everything from structural engineers to communications--there is an almost total lack of integrated communications between Federal, State and local agencies. We are providing some training from the Federal level to first responders, but what good is training if they don't have resources, equipment communications, etc. There is currently a bill in Congress to allocate $1 billion for emergency fire and medial services. Currently only $20 million has been earmarked for WMD first responders. We may need a national low-interest loan program for equipment, or perhaps provide tax incentives for volunteer EMS and fire personnel. Tax funded fire departments are buying some equipment but the volunteer departments do not have the wherewithal.
I appreciate the work that the Panel is doing, and I offer the assistance of my Committee staff in your efforts.
Chairman: The federal budget is huge--the money for improvements is there and just needs to be used better; perhaps pre-positioning equipment at various sites. I'm intrigued by thermal imagers. How much do they cost?
Weldon: Each thermal imager costs $20,000. They recently have been improved to be helmet mounted. This is only one example of how technology is improving in the defense realm. The Army is digitizing to be able to find soldiers in any environment. They receive funding for all sorts of areas that could be of use to first responders. It is one example of how our priorities for the military and for emergency medical services are totally different. Over 100 emergency medical service personnel die each year in the line of duty and the public accepts it. If one soldier dies in a year in a deployment, it's a national issue. Priorities need to be reshaped.
Dallas Jones: What should be the role of states? Which state takes the threat the most seriously?
Weldon: States and localities have the primary jurisdiction for incidents of this type. California is a leader in setting responsibilities, but many states are taking the threat less seriously.
Ray Downey: As first responders, we have had training with WMD environments, but not on how to interact or operate with others, in terms of equipment, communications and other resources.
George Foresman: Authorization and funding should come from Congress. How can direction for integration and coordination come from Congress?
Weldon: It is a question of jurisdictional issues, which should start in Congress. There are forty congressional committees with jurisdiction over agencies that are in some way involved. All want to boost their agencies. The organizations that have the influence get the money. The problem is the first responders have no influence. The first responder groups are made up of volunteers. Therefore they get the scraps when it comes to funding. This Panel may want to look at ways to recommend how the Congress deals with this issue.One possible recommendation would be to have bipartisan Congressional commission or a Presidential Task Force on integrating the players, and this would improve coordination. However, just identifying the major players to integrate is a challenge.
Jones: Is Congress on top of this problem?
Weldon: We're still looking at it, figuring out how to address the problem and develop solutions. We are considering a CINC for national defense.
Hoffman: I would now like to introduce Floyd Horn from the Department of Agriculture, who will bring the Panel up on the threat of bioterrorism for American agriculture and livestock.
Floyd Horn: Our role is assessing threats to U.S. agriculture. The New York Times on September 21st did a front page article on the threat to U.S. crops from biological or chemical weapons. Two years ago the Defense Intelligence Agency found disease on crops in Uzbekistan. They required help from the Department of Agriculture to identify it. Agriculture discovered that the disease had been genetically enhanced. The Department of Agriculture is valuable, but is overlooked in critical infrastructure legislation. USDA is not included in the Presidential Decisions Directive that address this issue.
Any attack on U.S. agriculture is not about destroying the American food supply, but would most likely aim at creating fear and disruption, economic, social, and political pressure. Any such attack could be carried out from afar, and would be difficult if not impossible to trace. Furthermore, the terror group might never claim responsibility, giving the disease long time periods to incubate and reach full effectiveness.
Any offensive biological weapons program focuses on the pathogen. Any defensive program focuses on the host, such as the carriers of disease that might be smuggled into the U.S.
The Department of Agriculture needs to be included in any anti-terrorism effort. The U.S. is vulnerable to threats to our agriculture. Transmission of diseases through agricultural products is very real. Learning to grow pathogens is easy.
Russia may still be developing biological agents. The former states of the Soviet Union and other neo-proliferators are risks as well.
The Department of Agriculture uses special techniques and new technology. Aerial spraying is used without restrictions. Farmers now use scorpion venom in pesticides to kill pests. That venom is now genetically enhanced as well. That kind of genetic engineering that is used in pesticides can also be used against us in biological weapons.
Introduction of biological weapons is very hard to detect. We're unprepared, and the U.S. would be overwhelmed by a biological attack against the agricultural industry.
What is the motivation? U.S. agriculture futures market is vulnerable: an adversary could attack for financial gain if they have invested in agriculture futures.
Livestock production is centered in concentrated feed lots in the US. Two percent of the feed lots supply 70 percent of the cattle. These cattle represent 50 percent of the U.S. agriculture industry. Hogs are concentrated in the Midwest. Cattle are in the South Midwest: especially in the Texas pan handle. Introducing a pathogen into a concentrated area could cripple the U.S. agriculture industry.
Foot and mouth disease is one of the biggest risk diseases. Foot and mouth disease can be spread over distances of 150 miles by wind. Any animal can carry foot mouth disease, which does not kill the animal but makes it useless as food. To prevent the spread of the disease, the animals must be destroyed and burned.
The United States started to attack the disease from the years 1946 until 1952, spending $200 million. The biggest threat of disease came from Mexico. Sixteen Americans died in Mexico trying to inspect beef and destroy any animals infected with the disease.
Vaccines can be generated for foot and mouth disease but the disease is hard to detect, and it is hard to distinguish between an animal that has been vaccinated, and an animal with the disease. Therefore vaccinated animals would still need to be destroyed. There are 70 different strains of the disease. Furthermore there is no facility that manufactures the vaccine. There is no market for it.
Another threat comes from African Swine Fever. This disease has been weaponized. It is hemorrhagic in nature, like ebola. The disease primarily targets swine. We might be able to develop a vaccine. The disease is carried by ticks and transferred to swine herds. This virus can also be manipulated genetically. Outbreaks have occurred in Brazil and West Europe. The disease could come to the U.S.\. Mortality approaches 100 percent.
There is a wide range of crops that are threatened by disease. The worst diseases threaten crops when they are close to harvest or right after they have been harvested. Potato blight once had been defeated, but a new strain has come out. This is the same disease that caused the great potato famine in Ireland. The disease only attacks potatoes after they are harvested. Furthermore the disease can be genetically altered as well. Other pathogens of concern: karnal bunt, stem rusts, leaf rust.
The current mission of United States Department of Agriculture is to control domestic contaminants, and identify pathogens. This is done by testing plants and livestock. The motto is prevent, detect, and respond. To accomplish this, the Department of Agricultural has set up specialized labs.
USDA Bio-Safety Lab-3 Facilities
Plum Island, New York
Ames, Iowa
Athens, GA
Laramie, Wyoming
Plum island is an offshore USDA BSL-3 facility. It contains a facility for animal disease research and diagnostic facilities. Renovations are under way, but most funds are not yet authorized by Congress.
These labs are adequate for dealing with pathogens, and are designed to help prevent microorganisms from escaping. The USDA does not have any BSL-4 facilities but BSL-3 facilities are designed to prevent any contact between pathogens and people.
In 1999 the USDA discovered the Nipah virus in Singapore and Malaysia. The disease attacks humans and swine. Fifty percent of the infections were lethal to humans. Over 100 humans died. Hundreds of thousands of swine were killed. The Centers for Disease Control is studying the virus.
Chairman: What is the difference between the Centers for Disease Control and PlumIsland?
Horn: They have different functions and missions. The Center for Disease Control mostly deals with diseases that effect humans.
Chairman: You say agricultural attacks against the U.S. would not be about destroying the American food supply. If terrorists attack on many fronts could they threaten the U.S. food supply?
Horn: No, but the economic damage would be huge.
Chairman: Is it true that the risk of biological attack is not high because dispensing pathogens is not easy?
Horn: Aum Shinrikiyo was capable of developing agents, but delivering the agent is hard. However, a non-state actor could develop an agent and give it to a few animals to spread, or to infected insects to spread over an even wider area.
Jerry Bremer: I'm not persuaded that this is a big threat. What motive would terrorists have? Peter Chalk of the RAND staff argues in the paper he prepared for the Panel that such an attack is feasible because the group could carry it out and inflict economic disruption without losing support.
A terrorist attack against agriculture would not cause real economic harm because agriculture is a small part of the U.S. GDP. The US could replace the lost supply just by buying food from other countries, but such an attack would damage real support for the terrorist group, contrary to the Chalk paper. If such an attack could inflict economic havoc without causing a loss of support, it would have happened by now. But no attack has happened until now except for the one case of Aum Shinrikiyo.
Horn: The dollar costs of such an attack do not include the effect on U.S. trade to foreign countries. Any biological attack against U.S. agriculture destroys all possibilities for export. If the impact is small, why did Russia, according to Ken Alibek--a former Russian BW engineer who now works in the U.S.--employ 30,000 personnel to work on this problem?