#3-189

Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State [Welles]

May 10, 1942 [Washington, D.C.]

Secret

Subject: Situation in Northeastern Brazil1

The situation in the Recife-Natal-Fortaleza region as to the development of an effective Air force for the protection of our line of communications is growing more and more serious. We have placed in that region, for the Brazilians, the following planes:

10 P-36s (pursuit)

6 P-40s (modern pursuit)

2 B-18s (2-engine old medium bombers)

2 B-25s (2-engine highly modern bombers)

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Hall, Air Corps, is our senior Air officer there charged with training Brazilians in the operation of these planes. To give you a first-hand picture of the existing conditions I am quoting from a personal letter of Colonel Hall to one of his friends in the War Department, which has accidentally come to my attention.

"The troubles are the following: no 100-octane gasoline, and we have not flown for a week. Another is lack of pilots—there are only three who have taken instruction on the B-18s, and about five actually flying the old P-36s.

"Colonel Macedo has requested more pilots and no action has been taken. No thought has yet been given to such a thing as training bombardiers or navigators, or even co-pilots.

"The B-25s (medium bomber) have been here almost a week and Macedo has been the only officer even to look at them. Even Macedo has not wanted to fly.

"The worst thing is over the matter of where the units will be stationed; that is as much in the air as when you left and it prevents us from taking any steps towards the establishment of the gunnery range or the bombing range, or to make any revetments, etc. Our people who came down here full of vim and vigor and ready to set the world on fire are about to give up after sitting around in this place doing nothing. It is a shame and it makes one sick to see that fine equipment lying idle, but there has never been stronger proof of our stand.

"The lack of organization, equipment and pilots makes the airplanes useless. As far as I can determine, nothing is being done about it either. The lack of enthusiasm of the Brazilians to fly the planes is the thing which surprises me most."

It seems evident from the foregoing that we can expect practically no patrol protection in support of our Navy over the Brazilian waters off the coast of Northeastern Brazil. With the present submarine menace this is a very serious matter involving both heavy losses of tonnage and the repercussions of Latin America due to our failure to protect shipping.2 There is also the deadly hazard of sudden Fifth Column events in that area, to cut off our air communications with the Near and Far East and to menace the Panama Canal.

With reference to the last comment, we consider it of great military importance to have an immediate aerial reconnaissance of the Amazon above Manaos in the Rio Branco-Rio Negros area. Our proposal was that we would fly the planes with Brazilian co-pilots and a partial Brazilian crew to make this reconnaissance. The Air Minister agreed. General Gomes canceled this agreement and stated that Brazil would make the reconnaissance for us in four days.3 Actually this reconnaissance would require 28 days of flying 10 hours daily, using 8 airplanes having a 1600-mile range, and operating from Manaos. The "four-days" reply really stated an absurdity. The region referred to is a vast natural landing ground from which an attack on vital installations of the Panama Canal could be launched.

These matters are growing so deadly serious that, as Chief of Staff, I feel that something must be done immediately or we must frankly accept the possibility of a disastrous development in the Panama-Brazilian theater.

The War Department has made real sacrifices in many directions to satisfy Brazilian requirements in military equipment in support of the position taken by the State Department that a definite betterment of the situation in Northeast Brazil would result. We have relieved officers at the request of our Ambassador—officers of superior qualifications. I have changed the assignments of officers in the War Department concerned with the Brazilian situation because they had become so convinced that our failure to secure the necessary precautionary measures would result in a disaster in that region that their feelings were too intense to facilitate negotiations.

It becomes increasingly apparent that the Brazilians are not seriously cooperating with us to secure that vital area, sea and land, against Axis aggression. I, therefore, request that you instruct our Ambassador in Rio to present again to the Brazilian Air Ministry the urgent necessity for utilizing to the maximum advantage the American planes and instructors now in Brazil. Specifically, he should secure agreements for the use of both American and Brazilian pilots and crews for the immediate detailed and effective reconnaissance of the Amazon area. Also, arrangements should be made to undertake without further delay the training of Brazilian pilots and crews in the use of the 24 American planes, using American personnel as instructors. It is especially important that during the training period, the materiel and personnel (American pilots and bombardiers) involved, should be utilized in extending patrol activities off the Brazilian coast. I suggest that General Eduardo Gomes should be included, if possible, in any conferences held on the matter.

Faithfully yours,

Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.

Document Format: Typed memorandum.

1. This document is printed in Foreign Relations, 1942, 5: 659–61.

2. The German submarine threat to the Caribbean and North Brazil persisted until June, halting shipments of munitions destined for Rio de Janeiro. (Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 319.)

3. General Eduardo Gomes was the commanding general of air units in northern Brazil.

Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 3, “The Right Man for the Job,” December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 193–195.