States of Concern, 1
POLS 4460 TR 10:55 am-1:40 pm
Memorandum 2- States of Concern
By: Weston Maffit, Miracle L. Jones, Timothy Raimey, and Nina Shelat
Introduction:
The United States Council on Failed and Rogue States (USCFRS) proposes what it believes to be the three vital national security interests going into the 21st century:
- The survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its people secure – which includes:
A.Deterring any aggression that could threaten the security of the of the United States and its allies and – should deterrence fail – repel or defeat the military attack and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies – which includes:
- The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to states hostile to the United States and its values.
- To promote a strong, prosperous, and competitive U.S. economy – which includes:
A.Ensuring access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.
B.Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- To strengthen the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual freedoms.
As the USCFRS is concerned in this memorandum, the main threats to the above-mentioned national interests are the rogue states of Iran and North Korea. Moreover, Pakistan also poses concern to the national interests defined by the USCFRS due to its unpredictable nature as an unstable state. Finally, grouped with these threats to the United States’ national interests is the failed state of Somalia.
In order for the reader to have a clearer understanding of the issues at hand, it is this memorandum’s responsibility to properly define what rogue, failed, and unstable states are. The rogue state, as this council is concerned, is appropriately defined as a state that does not respect other states in its international actions. A failed state, on the other hand, is a dysfunctional state that also has multiple competing political factions in conflict within its borders or has no functioning governance above the local level. Lastly, this council defines an unstable state as one in which there are pressures inside that state from non-democratic regimes with the goal of bringing down that state’s seemingly peaceful governing structure.
It shall be this memorandum’s duty, first, to give a brief history of the states of concern and to properly reason why they belong in their respected categories. Secondly, this memorandum will demonstrate to the reader why these states, properly categorized, pose threats to the national interests that were spelled out earlier in this piece. Thirdly, once a better understanding of why these states pose threats to the national interest of the United States is acknowledged, this memorandum will look to past strategies in dealings with them and evaluate their success. Finally, once the past strategies and their effectiveness have properly been laid out, this memorandum will prescribe what it believes to be the best course of action in dealing with these nations in the future.
Iran
History:
If one were to point to a single point in which Iran started on its path to becoming a rogue nation, they would have to look no further than April 1, 1979. On that date, the Iranian Revolution got under way and Ayatollah Khomeini declared Iran to be an Islamic Republic after a referendum was passed by a majority of the Iranian people.[1] However, it is not the teachings of Islam that define Iran as a rogue state, but it is the radical leaders of that state using the religion as a tool to persuade its citizenry in order to allow the rogue actions that have come to define the state. The first of these rogue actions came on November 4, 1979 when hundreds of Iranian students of Islam overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took sixty-three members of the staff hostage, which was a clear violation of international law.[2] If the leaders of Iran did not want it to be considered a rogue state at that time, Khomeini could have shunned the students for their actions and declared them criminals under the newly Islamic Republic. Instead, Khomeini did the exact opposite as he praised the students for their violation of international law and labeled the acts as being state sponsored. Furthermore, Khomeini only intensified the situation by adding demands for the release of the U.S. officials; one such demand was apologizing for the support the United States had given the Shah during his reign.[3] Instead of giving into international pressure through the immediate release of the illegally seized hostages, Iran continued on its rogue path by keeping captive fifty-two men and two women for more than a year (444 days of captivity); they were released as soon as Ronald Reagan replaced Jimmy Carter as president on his inauguration on January 21, 1981.
One can clearly see from a very brief three-year history (1979-1981) of Iran that it indeed is deserving of the title ‘rogue state’. First, the Islamic Republic sponsored an act that was (and still is) widely held to be a declaration of war: the violent overthrow of another state’s embassy. Second, once it accomplished its previously mentioned goal, it refused to back down in spite of international pressure for more than 444 days. Hence, from Iran’s beginning as an Islamic Republic it has placed itself into the category of being a rogue state, as it not only broke international law, but it continued to defy it in the face of international pressures.
However, the evidence for Iran’s rogue nature does not stop at its revolution. Despite international pressure, Iran has done such things as siding with terrorist organizations. As Posen pointed out in his piece We Can Live with a Nuclear Armed Iran, “Iran has sided with such terrorist organizations as Hezbollah in Lebanon.”[4] Furthermore, Iranian officials, such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have often denounced Israel’s right to exist. As Luttwak asserts in his article Three Reasons Not to Bomb Iran – Yet, “Ahmadinejad tries to elicit national support at home by provoking hostile reaction abroad, through his calls for the destruction of Israel, and his clumsy version of Holocaust denial.”[5] Hence, through the belligerence of the nation’s top officials and its previous terrorist alliances, one can clearly see that the nation has not only held a rogue character in its actions, but also in its rhetoric.
How the state currently poses a threat to the national interest currently held by the United State:
Iran poses a threat to the national interests defined above by this memorandum for one main reason: its desire for nuclear capabilities. While the Iranian government over the years has denied their want of nuclear capabilities for war-like purposes, it is this memorandum’s assertion that letting this state acquire any reliable nuclear capabilities holds the potential to prove disastrous. The reader may be wondering how a state barely modern enough to hold a peaceful nuclear infrastructure could possibly pose a threat to the interest of the United States, as the production of a nuclear bomb is currently unlikely given its technological hurdles Iran has yet to over come. The answer is simple: dirty bombs. Dirty bombs contain radioactive material that the user can utilize to spread deadly radiation throughout an area devoid of a nuclear blast. Even a state that only has reached a point of modernization to only run peaceful nuclear activities can use the nuclear waste from such activities as to create a dirty bomb. Hence, even if Iran were truly only seeking nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, these purposes could turn war-like at the drop of a hat regardless of armament.
Regardless of the nature of the bomb, Iran must not be allowed to acquire nuclear capabilities. If Iran were to become nuclear capable, Principle One of the above-mentioned national interests of the United States would be in jeopardy. Regardless of the type (nuclear or dirty), a radioactive bomb could very easily reach the soil of the United States if Iran acquires nuclear capabilities. They could accomplish such a goal through performing some sort of covert operation that would bring in Iranian soldiers to America equipped with some sort of briefcase bomb. Moreover, if the Iranian government would not want its fingerprints all over the attack, they could turn to their allies in Hezbollah who would surely accomplish such a feat. Hence, if the rogue nation of Iran were to acquire any sort of nuclear capabilities, Principle One of the above-mentioned national interests of the United States would be put at risk.
The U.S. economy could also suffer if Iran were to acquire nuclear capabilities. The reasoning behind this is that a nuclear-armed Iran (even in the form of a dirty bomb) would indeed be a more influential state within its region; one need only to look at China, India, and Pakistan for examples. However, as Iran is a nation that is centered in the highest oil-producing region in the world, to allow such a rogue nation more say as to the economic dealings that go on within it would be economic suicide for the United States, as the U.S. is also one of the highest oil-consuming states in the world. Hence, to allow Iran nuclear capabilities is to concede Principle Two of the national interests of the United States.
Lastly, if the United States were to allow Iran to acquire nuclear capabilities, then Principle Three of the above mentioned national interests of the United States would be put at risk as well. As Luttwak asserts above, “Ahmadinejad tries to elicit national support at home by provoking hostile reaction abroad, through his calls for the destruction of Israel.”[6] As Israel is clearly an ally of the United States, to let a regime hostile to it and its democratic government acquire nuclear capabilities would surely be against the wishes of the United States. Hence, allowing the state of Iran to acquire nuclear capabilities would harm Principle Three of the above-mentioned national interests of the United States.
Past Strategies in Dealing with the Rogue State of Iran:
During the Iranian hostage crisis of the 1980s, President Jimmy Carter’s strategy to bring about a more rational Iran involved a couple factors. First, On November 11, 1979 Carter embargoed Iranian oil.[7] Second, Carter tried to build pressure on Iran through economic sanctions and froze its assets in the United States. Last, “Carter had Secretary of State Cyrus Vance lead the official diplomatic effort.”[8] However, when monetary stressors and diplomatic pressures were leading him nowhere, Carter decided to roll the dice on a covert military operation dubbed “Desert One”.[9] However, Desert One turned out to be a disaster as Carter pulled the plug on the operation as soon as three helicopters started malfunctioning during a sand storm. While the American public was not satisfied with the Carter Administration’s strategy on ending the Iranian hostage crisis, the strategy did prove to weaken the Iranian economy to such a point that led to the release of the hostages. Also, while the hostages were released minutes after President Ronald Reagan’s inaugural speech, it was the previous sanctions and economic stressors of Jimmy Carter that did the job of breaking down the Iranian government’s spirits and ultimately led to their release.
Possible Future Strategies in dealing with the Rogue State of Iran:
While President Carter’s strategy lost favor with the United States’ public due to its lack of immediate action, it is this memorandum’s assertion that this strategy of sanctions and economic stressors would work well towards the current problem of Iranian proliferation. First, a crippled Iranian economy could in no way support the infrastructure needed to sustain a nuclear framework even for the purposes of energy. Second, through a crippling the Iranian economy, the leaders of Iran may sober up to see that nuclear proliferation is not indeed in their best interest. However, if it is found that the Iranian government is truly seeking nuclear capabilities for energy purposes only, it is this memorandum’s assertion that this task could be done so long as a United States presence is felt in and around such a nuclear facility. This previously asserted plan would give the Iranians the nuclear power they so desperately claim they need. Also, with an American presence in the region, one would not expect any sort of nuclear waste or technologies to slip into wrong hands. Last, this plan would also bring about a more diplomatic Iranian government, as they would be working with the U.S. towards a common goal and not against it.
Pakistan
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is an unstable nation because of the imminent threat of its sovereignty by Taliban insurgents, and at present it possesses an unknown amount of nuclear weapons, which very well could fall into these insurgents’ hands. This nation of around 176.24 million people is extremely vital to the national security of the United States of America.
Currently;
Pakistan’s military is conducting combat missions against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants in the country’s northwest region. Most of the fighting is concentrated between the Swat Valley and the Peshawar region in the northwest frontier province of Pakistan. The Khyber Pass is located near Peshawar. The pass has been used for centuries as a route for moving goods between the lands now called Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Arabian Sea. Currently, the pass is being used as a means of transporting militants, weapons, supplies, and poppy into Pakistan. The Taliban have gained a stronghold on this region due to support form local tribesmen and inaction by the Pakistani government.
The United States’ national security is threatened by the Taliban insurgency into Pakistan in two major ways. First off, and most importantly, Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state. The U.S. cannot allow Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to fall into the Taliban’s control. The ramifications of such an act will cause a clear nuclear threat to the U.S. and its allies. If the Taliban were to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal there is no doubt they would immediately use such weapons on the U.S. or its allies. Second, the Afghan-Pakistan border serves as a safe-haven for Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. This has a direct detrimental effect on the U.S.’s war on terrorism. The U.S. military’s serge into Afghanistan to defeat Taliban and al-Qaeda militants will be futile if the militants are free to retreat into Pakistan and regroup.
Past United States National Security Policy towards Pakistan:
The United States and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1947. The U.S. agreed to provide economic and military to Pakistan in the Baghdad Pact. The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, in which the U.S. suspended aid to Pakistan, created a mistrust between the U.S. in Pakistan. In 1975, U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan resumed, until 1979 when the U.S. once again suspended all military and economic aid as a result of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions.
December of 1979 saw the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. In 1981 the U.S. and Pakistan agreed on a $3.2 billion aid plan to Pakistan for military and economic support in the face of a threatening Soviet Union. From 1986 to 1993 the U.S. gave Pakistan another $4 billion in economic and military aid until the Pressler amendment required that the President certify annually that Pakistan “does not posses a nuclear explosion device.” The period between 1975 and the present has seen numerous terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens working in Pakistan under U.S. government authority and other NGO capacities. The attacks coupled with Pakistan’s decision to test nuclear weapons in 1998 pretty much limited U.S.-Pakistan relations to refugee and counter-narcotics aid to Pakistan.[10]
The United State’s war on terror brought about a dramatic change in U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan agreed to be an ally in the worldwide fight against terrorism. Pakistan expressed the want to combat the imminent threat the Taliban posed to their national security. In 2005 President Bush promised $3 billion in military aid to Pakistan over the next five years. 2009 the Kerry-Lugar bill was approved; the bill gives Pakistan $1.5 billion annually over the next five years for military aid.
Present Policy Options:
The United States can continue to provide economic aid to Pakistan’s military and hope they are able to combat the advancing Taliban forces. The U.S. can also call on the UN Security Council to aid in Pakistan’s war with the Taliban, by means of providing UN forces and economic aid. The U.S. does not have the option of idly standing by and hoping Pakistan will be victorious in their efforts to combat the Taliban forces in the northwest province.
Recommended Policy Actions:
The USCFRS contends the United States must continue to pledge aid to the Pakistani military under certain conditions: