12
Maritain and freedom of conscience
William Sweet, St Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, NS
While in exile in the United States during the Second World War, and during his decade-long stay in the US during the 1950s, Jacques Maritain came to love America and many of its traditions. His books, lectures, and essays on political philosophy, written during this time, reflect this. The focus of much of this work is the dignity of human persons, their rights and freedoms, and the responsibilities of government.
During, and shortly after, the war, Maritain developed an account of human rights rooted in (though extending far beyond) principles discussed by St Thomas. Maritain found Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “four freedoms” to be emblematic of these rights—rights and freedoms that accrued to all human beings. Central to those freedoms—and to Maritain’s own writing—was ‘freedom of conscience.’ This is not surprising given Maritain’s ‘personalism’ and his important distinction between the person and the individual. Yet Maritain recognized that human beings were essentially social beings, that they lived in communities and states, and that they had duties to the community and the state. And the state and community have rights as well—for example, the state has a right to defend its existence and a right to educate citizens for citizenship in the community.
What would Maritain say our options are when an individual right to conscience and a social responsibility appear to be in conflict?
In the first part of this paper, I want to present Maritain’s views on freedom of conscience and on our obligations to the community. In a second section, I want to raise the questions: ‘What is the source of these freedoms?’ Why does Maritain rank freedom of conscience where he does? What does Maritain see as the source of the duties and rights of the community—for example, how does he approach what we might call both duties arising out of a contractual arrangement with its citizens (e.g., as in a fiduciary responsibility) and ‘natural duties’?
In a third section, I want to discuss what Maritain would see as the limits imposed by a respect for freedom of conscience—limits on what an institution (such as the community or the state) may do in carrying out its responsibilities. Are these limits affected if the community is a democratic one? a divinely established one? How can persons assess whether the community has violated these limits?
I will conclude that Maritain’s account of freedom of conscience is instructive for debates both within contemporary liberal democracies and within the Catholic Church.
I.
Maritain counts ‘freedom of conscience’ among the most fundamental rights of the human person; in fact, it is “the first of these rights”[1]—or, at most, it follows immediately after the right to existence. It is a right that was, or came to be, fundamental to the many charters or Bills of Rights in the world—documents that constitute the constitutional foundations of many states and international organizations. The “right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” is, for example, declared in Article 18 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). It is implied in the First Amendment to the US Constitution (and appears explicitly in various drafts of that amendment).[2] It is the first of the “fundamental freedoms” articulated in Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982).[3] It is akin to Franklin Roosevelt’s second of his Four Points.[4] And it has been repeatedly reiterated by the Catholic Church, in documents of the Second Vatican Council and particularly by Pope John Paul II (for example, in the Pope’s messages on September 1, 1980--“The Freedom of Conscience and of Religion”--and for the celebration of the World Day of Peace (January 1) in 1991—“For The XXIV World Day Of Peace: "If You Want Peace, Respect The Conscience Of Every Person"), 1998 (“Religious Freedom: Condition for Peace”). And it is a freedom that is reiterated elsewhere, as well.
What does Maritain mean by ‘freedom of conscience’? Maritain refers to it, generally, as “the right of conscience to hearken unto God, and to make its way to Him” (NL 76)—as the right “of the human person to make its way towards its eternal destiny along the path which its conscience has recognized as the path indicated by God” (NL 79)--and more specifically as “the right to personal freedom or to conduct one's own life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible for them before God and the law of the community; the right to the pursuit of the perfection of moral and rational human life; the right to the pursuit of eternal good (without this pursuit there is no true pursuit of happiness)” (NL 77-78)—or again “The right to personal liberty or the right to conduct one’s own life as master of oneself and of one’s acts, responsible for them before God and the law of the community. —The right to the pursuit of the perfection of rational and moral human life. —The right to the pursuit of eternal life along the path which conscience has recognized as the path indicated by God.” (NL 97). In general, we may see it as “the right to believe freely the truth recognized by one’s conscience” ($$$)
Now, for Maritain, this freedom is not (?) the same as freedom of opinion, or of belief, or of speech. The distinction may seem to be a fine one, but it is not an insignificant one. It is not just a freedom to choose, but more like a freedom to commit oneself, and it presumes that one is seeking the truth—how to lead one’s life—and not for some other purpose (e.g., to avoid military service). It is also not just a freedom of opinion or belief; it is a particular kind of belief that it defends—one that has a special place in life. Moreover, it is an exclusively individual right; it is not a collective right.
This is, then, a right to a ‘fully individualized conscience’ because there is also a moral conscience of men
II.
What is the source of this freedom? Broadly speaking, for Maritain, the source is “the conception of man and of natural law established by centuries of Christian philosophy” (NL 79)—and in fact the reference to centuries of Christian philosophy is unnecessary. And so we may say that it is freedom rooted in human beings as beings of dignity. But there is more here than just this. For it is, after all, a freedom of conscience and (though Maritain does not say this explicitly) such a freedom clearly bears on something rooted about the ‘conscience’ itself. And so, in order to see why freedom of conscience is so important, we must say something about conscience.
Now it may seem that there is an equivocation here—that the conscience that is involved in human moral action is not what is referred to in ‘freedom of conscience.’ I think that this is not so—largely because of the misunderstanding in what conscience is.
Now, as we know, in common conversation, ‘conscience’ means “the sense or consciousness of the moral goodness or blameworthiness of one's own conduct, intentions, or character together with a feeling of obligation to do right or be good b : a faculty, power, or principle enjoining good acts c : the part of the superego in psychoanalysis that transmits commands and admonitions to the ego” Thus, the Runes Dictionary of Philosophy defines ‘conscience’ as “Any emotionally-toned experience in which a tendency to act is inhibited by a recognition, socially conditioned, that suffering evil consequences is likely to result from acting on the impulse to act.” And some would see it. Maritain writes, as “no more than the result of social pressures or customary rules of society which have become a part of our mental habits”—and that “the fundamental sense of moral obligation can be explained by social pressure and collective perceptions” (Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy, pp. 13-14; see Moral Philosophy, Ch 14, sect. 12)
But this is not the sense in which Maritain would understand it. For Maritain would see ‘conscience’ as a characteristic of the “practical intellect—in the intellect inasmuch as it considers right and wrong in conduct” (Catholic Encyclopedia [1913]).[5] Concretely, then, one’s (practical) reason issues a judgement of conscience. “The judgement of conscience is a speculativo-practical judgement” (Loi naturelle ou loi non-ecrite, p. 68)[6]
But for the practical reason to arrive at such a judgment, there must also be the presence of the natural law—that “Natural Law has to be interiorized or internalized, in order for my practical reason to exercise its function of measuring my will and my acts, on other terms, in order for my reason to issue a judgement of conscience, et de conscience droite” (___)
So it is clear that ‘conscience’ is not just ‘thought’ or ‘opinion.’ And recall that in Charters and Bills of Rights, ‘freedom of conscience’ is generally associated with ‘freedom of religion’—but frequently distinguished from ‘freedom of thought and opinion.’
But conscience is not just something one ‘finds’; it grows and progresses, and this is why we need freedom.
Moral conscience is something that progresses; Maritain talks of a “Progressive awareness of the Law” at both an individual and a cultural level. Thus, he refers to (past) cultures where there is a “Twilight state of moral conscience” where “N.L. roughly or rudimentarily known”—and then a “Daylight state of moral conscience” where “NL better known” (Loi naturelle, ‘tableau’ pp. 196-7); similarly, he refers to “the crucial moment of the awakening of the moral conscience” that takes place at “the end of childhood” (Introduction, p. 121)[7]
And, of course, conscience can be corrupted—that “c.) Conscience can be clear and right with a quite defective knowledge of natural law. [195] Of course deviations and warpings due to error and hardening of conscience yielding to passions and perverted habits are also possible”
Conscience can also be corrupted by “social pressure and collective perceptions” (Introduction, p. 14)
And Maritain adds that conscience is not its own master—that “my conscience has perhaps been deflected or obscured by my own fault” (Loi naturelle, p. 70)
Since conscience develops (for good or ill) and needs experience to do so, freedom is not only relevant, but necessary. It is not just that we need (metaphysical) freedom in order to act morally, but we need political freedom—a political right to conscience—because ‘conscience’ is a necessary characteristic of a free, fully-human, agent.
Thus, the nature and value of ‘conscience’ is the source of freedom of conscience.
a) The act of Conscience is the most human act.
When I act from conscience, it engages me in the action
It is the basis of my dignity –or, at least, characteristic of my dignity [Thus, Pope John Paul II writes that "To obey it [i.e., conscience] is the very dignity of man" (John Paul II, Message for the XXIV World Day of Peace (1991), section 1; cf Gaudium et spes, section 16) John Paul II also writes “To deny an individual complete freedom of conscience — and in particular the freedom to seek the truth — or to attempt to impose a particular way of seeing the truth, constitutes a violation of that individual's most personal rights.” (Message for the XXIV World Day of Peace (1991), section 1)]
b) Freedom of conscience is necessary for the integral development of the person—first, because it is the pursuit of the truth as one sees it, and the activities necessary to it, that makes people who they are, and, second, because the development of conscience is necessary to one’s action as a fully developed person [Maritain writes: “I have to introduce in the world something unique and new for which I alone am responsible, and the rightness of which is my own business, for which I have to know the law, and to appraise circumstances, yes, but also to commit all what is good in my own subjectivity. Judgement of prudence, or judgement of fully individualized conscience, is absolutely necessary” (Loi naturelle, p. 75)] [Similarly, John Paul II writes that “freedom of conscience finds its justification, inasmuch as it is a necessary condition for seeking the truth worthy of man, and for adhering to that truth once it is sufficiently known.” (Message for the XXIV World Day of Peace (1991), section 1).]
c) It is also fair to say that this freedom is important because the violation of conscience or religion or belief seldom occurs in isolation; it is indicative of a number of other related beliefs, such as freedom of association, freedom of speech, ___, and so on.
d) Freedom of conscience is also necessary for peace; it is by assuring this freedom, particularly for minorities in states, that toleration and peace can be achieved. [John Paul II writes “It is essential that the right to express one's own religious convictions publicly and in all domains of civil life be ensured if human beings are to live together in peace. (Message for the XXIV World Day of Peace (1991), section 1; cf. his message of 1988)
e) Nevertheless, while fundamental, Maritain does not suggest that freedom of conscience is unique—it is just one of the rights of the human person. But it is still fair to say that, of these rights, it is to be counted among the most basic.
III
But what are the limits of freedom of conscience? It might seem that this freedom is broad and, arguably, absolute. Maritain notes “the right of conscience to hearken unto God, and to make its way to Him—all these things, in the natural as in the supernatural order, cannot be tampered with by the State nor fall into its clutches. […] the State has not the authority to make me reform the judgment of my conscience, any more than it has the power of imposing upon intellects its own judgment of good and evil, or of legislating on divine matters, or of imposing any religious faith whatsoever.” (NL 76) Maritain also writes, for example, that “with respect to the State, to the temporal community and to the temporal power, [the person] is free to choose his religious path at his own risk,[8] his freedom of conscience is a natural, inviolable right.” (NL 79) [9] [According to John Paul II, “No human authority has the right to interfere with a person's conscience. Conscience bears witness to the transcendence of the person, also in regard to society at large, and, as such, is inviolable.” (Message for the XXIV World Day of Peace (1991), section 1) And the Catholic Catechism states at # 1782 that “Man has the right to act in conscience and in freedom so as personally to make moral decisions. "He must not be forced to act contrary to his conscience. Nor must he be prevented from acting according to his conscience, especially in religious matters." [DH 3 § 2]”]