SAREX Greenland Sea 2013

Enclosure 2.

Section 1.

LESSONS IDENTIFIED

SAREX 2012 / SAREX 2013 / STATUS
Para / Title / Lessons Identified / Para / Title / Observation/Lessons Identified / Tasks / Lessons Learned / Action
6.1.1 / Means and methods of communication / When initiating a SAR operation, the SMC should use all available communication systems to alert all units in the area of the operation in order to get as many units/vessels as possible to assist and in order to alert the wider SAR organization to the operation being initiated. / 6.1.1 / Means and methods of communication / The SMC need all available comms systems to alert all units in the area of the operation in order to get as many units/vessels as possible to assist, and to alert the wider SAR organization to the operation being initiated. / Investigate if the SAR authorities in Greenland are setup to utilize all available distress communication systems, and if they have the necessary distress communication equipment to conduct SAR operations. Follow up on the question in the Arctic Contact Group to SAR in Greenland. / PARTLY / JACMD
6.1.3 / Use of common log system / It is recommended to develop a locally persistent software platform for the system that is not reliant on a web browser and a constant Internet connection. It is further recommended to develop an SOP for the use of the common log system and distribute this, with logins to all Arctic RCCs and relevant civilian authorities (i.e. police, air traffic control etc.) Further analysis and testing is needed to ascertain who needs to be able to enter data and who needs to simply have read access, as well as how to partition data to avoid information overload. This work should be completed prior to taking the system into full operational use. / 6.1.2 / Use of common log system (The C3 SAR Log) / During SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 the common internet log proved extremely effective as both a SAR log and as a SAR information tool for higher Commands and strategic coordination forums. The common log has been updated with all SAREX Greenland Sea 2012 recommendations, including an off-line backup if the internet connectivity is lost. During SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 and in the aftermath at the Post Exercise Discussions (PXD) it was concluded and recommended that only entities directly involved in the SAR operation should have writing access to the C3 SAR Log, and that other Commands and coordination forums carefully should be identified and only have reading access. Terms for access should clearly be stated in the Standing Operational Procedure (SOP). / It was recommended to update the log with a read/write module differentiation.
Furthermore it was recommended to build
a common international log system to be used by all SAR organizations in the Arctic region. / PARTLY / JACM
ALL
6.1.3 / Search for life rafts from ships / Long distances and rough weather are making direct guidance of rescue units extremely important to save lives in the Arctic. Fixed wing search craft will normally be the first in the operation area and probably be appointed as OSC directing other SAR assets directly to the target. This scenario was trained during SAREX 2012 and 2013 and proved highly effective. Having a fixed wing search craft on SAR alert throughout the Arctic summer season in Greenland’s Search and Rescue Region (SRR) is recommended. / Consider having a fixed wing search craft on SAR alert in Greenland throughout the summer season. / NO / JACMD/
CHOD DEN
6.1.4 / JACMD capability as SMC / The manning at JACMD was observed inadequate in case of a short notice emergency like the SAREX Greenland Sea 2013. It was generally recommended to strengthen JACMD manning on the operational side like Air and the logistical with no or very little redundancy. Furthermore, it was recommended to establish a plan for an immediate augmentation of JACMD HQ in case of emergencies and states of higher alert. Finally, it was concluded to avoid having JACMD as OSE/OCE as MRCC in future SAREXs. The priority should be having JACMD/MRCC Nuuk as PTA. / Consider strengthen the JACMD manning on the Air and the Logistical side.
Establish a plan for immediate augmentation of JACMD HQ in case of emergencies
Avoid having JACMD as both OSE/OCE and PTA. / NO / JACMD/
CHOD DEN
6.1.6. / Hierarchy of the SMC, OSC and ACO / The distribution of labor and responsibility between OSC and ACO should ideally be decided and clearly stated by the SMC, to avoid confusion. When handover of the OSC and/or the ACO duty occurs, a proper handover procedure must take place and notification of the fact that a new OSC/ACO has taken over the duty should be disseminated as widely as possible. / During SAREX2013 ACO duties and responsibilities were clear.
MRCC did not receive a notification of the fact that a new OSC/ACO had taken over. / Observe in future exercises that notifications of changing OSC/ACO are send out. / PARTLY / All
6.2.2 / Criminal Investigations / During the PXD it was concluded that the OSC – in close cooperation with the Police – should plan for encountering criminal investigation. Naturally, saving lives have the highest priority, but it is important to plan for criminal investigation and interrogation in order to follow international standard procedures and regulations. The decision is recommended included and tested in future exercises. / Consider planning for criminal investigation and interrogation in order to follow international standard procedures and regulations in future exercises. / NO / All
6.2.3 / Rescue Teams / When a cruise ship is in distress and the captain has sent a mayday, the appointed OSC is responsible for the rescue operation in total, not the cruise ship captain. This was the conclusion from the PXD. The PXD forum also agreed on that the OSC primary task is to coordinate the rescue and the evacuation in close cooperation with all units and their rescue teams, and strive to include and coordinate with the cruise ship captain. The PXD found it very important that the OSC and the cruise ship captain are coordinating to plan and prepare the rescue and the evacuation as effective as possible. / Observe that the OSC is using the captain on board the ship in distress as a key for information and coordination in future exercises. / NO / All
6.2.4 / Safety / During the execution of SAREX13 an observation stated that the safety precautions related to the parachuting jumps were not given sufficient priority. During the PXD safety was discussed and the conclusion was that safety at all times is a national responsibility, however, safety related to parachuting jumps should have been included and clearly stated in both the EXPLAN and in the Exercise script.
It was recommended that national representatives actively should submit national safety regulations to the Core Planning Team during the Planning Conferences, and acknowledge that national safety is included in the EXPLAN’s Safety Annex according the national regulations. / National representatives are responsible for that national safety is included in exercise safety annexes as well as safety precautions. / NO / All
6.2.4. / Communications technology / It is recommended to investigate if any of the Arctic Nations (including national agencies outside the SAR community, such as Army or civilian agencies) have a communications relay capability that might be used to enhance on-scene communications in an operation in the high Arctic Fiords and include this capability in future exercises and operations. It is further recommended to facilitate information sharing between the Arctic Nations about their platforms’ capabilities and to establish a common asset database, so RCCs planning or executing an operation can be aware of the capabilities of assigned or available assets. / 6.2.1 / Communications / During the planning conferences for SAREX2013 it was investigated if possible to bring in and test communications relay capacities without any luck. The idea of including airborne internet coverage in future SAREXs should be continued.
The idea of establishing a Database with assigned Arctic capabilities is forwarded to the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable for discussion and possibilities.
Consider testing a simple and self sustained satellite internet transceiver solution, easy put on a mountain top, capable of covering at least 10 Nm, is recommended as the interim solution until internet SATCOM coverage in the fiord systems and above 72N is available.
Such systems are recommended to be tested and implemented immediately. If an area is covered with internet the Tetra-Flex system can link-up and Tetra-Flex data be exchanged. Otherwise, it must be investigated if it is possible to deploy larger generators or attached fuel tanks for the Tetra-Flex relay stations which was tested and failed during SAREX 2013.
As an alternative to internet SATCOM and Tetra-Flex the Greenlandic Police used HF making the lines of communication long and the risk of losing information higher. Another alternative could be the newest Iridium phones. It is possible to share data “raw text messages” using the newest Iridium pilot data connection (like the ATW-690 and the ICESAR solution) used on Ella Island and Mestersvig. The system could be useful for all actors as an alternative until having full internet coverage and Tetra-Flex running.
During the PXD in Nuuk it was concluded that the EXPLAN had all the necessary Training Audience contact and communication information needed for SAREX 2013. It was also concluded that the participating units in general should have prepared better for the exercise by developing internal communication plans and contact information as supplement. Units could easily have established their own overview and distributed it internally as well as externally. However, it was recommended to investigate if frequencies have to be classified or if it is possible for JACMD to plan an exercise using non-classified frequencies.
The Telegraph Regiment should be invited to participate in future SAREX planning conferences if they are to support the exercise with equipment like the Tetra-Flex relay stations (not recommended). / Investigate possibilities of including airborne internet coverage in future SAREXs.
Follow-up on the idea of establishing a Db with assigned capacities ready for SAR response in the Arctic region.
Consider testing satellite internet transceivers easy to place on mountain tops by helicopters.
Test if Tetra-Flex is capable of connecting to any hot-spot internet solutions.
Consider testing the newest Iridium Phones/Pilots as back-up for internet as an interim solution for units in the Arctic.
Investigate if possible to have an unclassified frequencies package for future exercises.
Invite the Danish Telegraph Regiment for future planning conferences if Tetra-Flex relay stations are to be re-tested (not recommended) / PARTLY / All
All
CHOD DEN
CHOD DEN
CHOD DEN
JACMD
CHOD DEN
6.3.1. / Lack of an Evacuation Plan / RCCs should develop and keep evacuation contingency plans for different areas of their AOR, in order to have a skeleton from which to quickly build an evacuation plan. Exercise planning should allow for the RCC developing it’s own evacuation plan. / 6.3.1 / Casualty assembly at Ella Island / Responsible for the evacuation, the Police developed the Evacuation Plan in English.
The conclusion from the PXD was that after a chaotic start at Ella Island things got well-organized and the evacuation was executed according to the Evacuation Plan.
As a supplement to the Evacuation Plan it was recommended to establish a local emergency plan delineating responsibilities between all the engaged units e.g. to prevent the casualties from getting cold and to plan for special care. / Consider developing a Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) for local roles and responsibilities including emergency responsibilities (see SAREX2012 para 6.4.1). / PARTLY / All
6.4.1. / Personnel resources / Consider establishing one or more Incident Command Posts to effectively marshal and employ medical assets as they arrive in the area, in coordination with the SMC and OSC. The IAMSAR manual gives guidance on the Incident Command System and the roles and duties of the Incident Commander. / Running an international operation it is important to use international procedures. During SAREX2013 the Police established two Command Posts. One at Mestersvig Airstrip and one at Ella Island.
The Police used IAMSAR roles, duties and procedures as Command Post Incident Commander. An observation indicated the need for a SOP delineating roles and responsibilities more detailed. (see SAREX2013 para 6.3.1.) / See SAREX2013 para 6.3.1. / PARTLY / All
6.4.1 / Coordination at higher level. / Lack of communication and coordination between Denmark-Greenland and Iceland had a negative effect on Iceland’s preparedness for receiving the casualties coming from Greenland. The nations should prioritize a formal cooperation agreement on situations like SAREX Greenland Sea 2013 in order to identify situations, priorities and responsibilities.
It was recommended to work out a bi-lateral cooperation agreement between Denmark-Greenland and Iceland identifying situations, priorities and responsibilities and to establish a contingency plan with defined roles and responsibilities and processes for communication between involved authorities and agencies in each country. / Consider working out bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation agreements between Denmark/Greenland and Iceland identifying situations, priorities and responsibilities between the countries.
When the cooperation agreements are established develop a contingency plan with defined roles and responsibilities accordingly. / NO
5.1. / Use of Air for Medical Evacuation / At the PXD it was concluded that the use of Air for Medical Evacuation all in all was well planned and well executed. The PXD forum agreed that the decision of selecting naval units for minor injured casualties and air for severe injured casualties were right. The PXD also concluded that if a similar operation should take place in a more isolated area far from an airstrip, there is a need for more helicopters and Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft to enable transportation of casualties to the nearest airstrip, for further Medical Evacuation by large fixed wing transportation aircraft. It was also concluded and recommended to consider logistical aspects and the architecture of an Air Task Organization (ATO) for handling a large number of aircraft as a part of JACMD contingency plans. / Consider having more helicopters and STOL aircraft at short notice response in case of emergencies in isolated areas in the high Arctic with none or few airstrips. / NO
6.6.1. / Crisis communication at the OP/TAC level / More personnel resources are required at the MRCC to administer the influx of inquires from the media, individuals affected by the incident, and the general public. It must also be clear at all times who acts as media spokespersons on board operational units in the AO, and there should be frequent contact between these spokespersons and the MRCC. The capability to initiate a more structured visitation system at MRCC to handle media enquiries is also recommended. Similarly, strengthened media monitoring at MRCC, as a support function, is recommended. / 6.6. / Media and Press Management / Day 2, the first day with Media role-play, showed that especially JACMD was not prepared and manned to handle the Media and the Press and suffered from not having a communication plan for handling the situation. JACMD Lessons Identified from Day 2 was efficiently in-cooperated on Day 3 and the Media and Press handling was improved compared to Day 2. It was also noticed that the internet was used more effectively to inform relatives and the public. Becoming more internally focused and effective, the extern communication and the coordination between the authorities in Nuuk, like who is responsible for informing the Media and Press in which areas, were never observed effective. External coordination between the stakeholders in Nuuk should be taken to future exercises for examine to become a Lessons Learned. / JACMD Media and Press handling to be tested in future exercises.
Consider including external Media and Press coordination between the stakeholders in Nuuk as a part of future exercises to examine if Media and Press coordination have be improved. / PARTLY / JACMD
All
SAREX12 / Main Findings
7.1. / Contingency planning / ISCOMGREENLAND has indentified a need to review and update contingency plans for disaster response. This work should be undertaken by the new Joint Arctic Command following its establishment in Greenland´s capital Nuuk. (Note: By the establishment of the Arctic Command the MRCC Groennedal will be renamed MRCC Nuuk, retaining unchanged responsibility for Search and Rescue Region Greenland by 01 November 2012). / JACMD used the developed contingency plan during SAREX2013. The plan needs further analysis and development before issued as JACMD contingency plan for ship catastrophes. / Further ship catastrophes contingency plan analysis and development. / PARTLY / JACMD
7.6. / IAMSAR compliance training / ISCOMGREENLAND has identified a need for additional training and familiarization with the IAMSAR manuals for personnel at the RCC and unit level, in order to ensure a common understanding and framework for multinational SAR operations. This could take the form of an annual refresher course with a proficiency check or tabletop exercises focusing on IAMSAR procedures. / IAMSAR procedures were used during SAREX2013. However, it is important to underline that IAMSAR procedures take priority from national procedures when running an international operation. / IAMSAR procedures will remain as a Lessons Identified reminding all to study and consider IAMSAR when developing national Emergency Plans and SOPs / PARTLY / All

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