Lesson at IJmuiden (cont)Richard Hudson

WWII – 4070.001 (Lewis)

Richard Hudson

4712 Bristol Trace Trl

Keller, Texas 76248

(817) 428-2214

The Lesson at Ijmuiden. The Tragedy at Arzfeld.

How Operational Doctrine Changes and Why It is Important.

“Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

General Carl von Clausewitz

“The only real mistake is the one from which we learn nothing.”

John Powell

On May 17, 1943, eleven Allied B-26 Marauders in their second ever European Theater mission skimmed across the English Channel for IJmuiden and Haarlem, port and industrial cities in Holland. Their assignment was to knock out German torpedo boats based in Ijmuiden and the generating station that powered industrial facilities in the twin cities critical to Germany’s war efforts.

What began in heady confidence ended in disaster! Mechanical failure spared one Marauder, forcing it to abort the mission and return to England. The remaining ten with five-man crews were destroyed by Luftwaffe fighters and flak from German anti-aircraft batteries. Low-level operations by Marauders over Europe stopped dead in its tracks with this disaster. The top brassof the Eighth Air Force to whom the B-26 was assigned had to rethink the operational doctrine passed on to them from the Pacific Theater for this airplane.

The Marauder (Exhibit A) was first dispatched to the Pacific Theater with the 22nd Bombardment Group. The plane was built to Army Air Force specifications as a medium attack bomber. From their first bomb run atten to twelve thousand feet on Japanese facilities at Rabaul 5 April 1942, the Marauders performed with distinction gaining a reputation for speed and ruggedness. Based on their continued performance their operational doctrine began to take on a broader scope which included low-level bombing and strafing attacks.

Marauders flew without fighter escort in small groups of two to six planes and their armament handily opposed Japanese Zero fighters that tried to stop them. By May 24th, eighty unescorted raids, including low-level runs a hundred to three hundred feet above ground, were flown against Rabaul without the loss of a bomber. As the medium attack bomber’s role expanded successfully throughout the Pacific Theater, the Army Air Force took note and made the decision to employ the B-26 Marauder in the European Theater using the operational doctrine it had acquired in the Pacific.

The Marauder’s operational doctrine from a medium altitude bomber to include low-level strafing in the Pacific demanded re-evaluation for the European Theater. Island hopping and flying over vast stretches of water did not subject the Marauder toextended land-based anti-aircraft fire as in the European Theater where enemy flak was continuous, heavy and accurate. Nor was contact with enemy fighters as prevalent in the Pacific as in Europe where land mass allowed for numerous airfields from which German fighters could launch. Ijmuiden forced the Eighth Air Force to remove low-level attacks from the Marauder’s European operational doctrine and to confinethe aircraft to bombing from medium altitudes of 10,000 to 14,000 feet.

The Marauder’s maximum speed of 287 mph and armament still made it a formidable foe to Luftwaffe fighters just as it did for Japanese Zeros. Incorporating tighter flying formations in the Marauder’s operational doctrine ensured not only a closer pattern of bombs on target, it also increased protection against fighter attack due to the aircraft’s frightful configuration of defensive firepower. With adjustments made to the Marauder’s operational doctrine, the Eighth Air Force redeployed thebomber in July 1943. The aircraft proved itself to be successful in its new role of medium altitude bombing for the remainder of the war.

The medium bomber did not remain in the Eighth Air Force as it did not fit into the new strategic doctrine assigned to the Eighth. The Marauder did not have the range, the altitude, or the bomb capacity of the B-17 and the B-24 four-engine bombers the Eighth would fly from English air bases to bomb German targets. The newly organized Ninth Air Force began to take possession of the Eighth’s Marauders.

The Ninth Air Forcewith General Brereton in command was given responsibility for tactical operations in Europe. This required fighters and light and medium bombers to secure air superiority, support troops, and interdict enemy supply lines as directed by Operation “Point Blank,” a new air operational doctrine created by American and British air commanders at the January 1943 Casablanca Conference in Morocco. The doctrine established the need for American air power to take control of the air from the Germans. It was based on a Clausewitz corollary on war that “the military power must be destroyed, that is, reduced to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the war.” (Clausewitz, 123)

Brereton sought to reinstall low-level bombing and strafing into the operational doctrine of the medium bombers the Ninth had acquired from the Eighth. But Brereton encountered unexpected opposition from a junior officer, Brig. Gen. Samuel Anderson, who had directed medium bombardment attacks over Utah Beach on D-Day.

Anderson knew the bombers strengths and weaknesses. He knew that the real challenge facing the medium bombers in Europe in 1944 was choosing the most effective tactics for their use. The memory of the IJmuiden fiasco still fresh on his mind, he did not want to see it repeated. Anderson contended that writing low-level missions back into the medium bombers’ operational doctrine would expose the mediums and their crews to catastrophic failure. (Parker, Winter Sky, p. 476-7)

Anderson was so upset about the formations Brereton was advocating for his mediums that he convened a meeting with Generals Weyland, Nugent, and Quesada and the Ninth Air force commander. Brereton wanted him to try other tactics that Anderson believed were flawed. ‘General,’ he explained, ‘I have tried those things and I know they don’t work. I lost aircraft and crews.’ The argument ended in a Mexican stand-off. Anderson expected to find that he was fired. But instead, it was Brereton who was sent off; Hoyt Vandenberg took over the Ninth Air force(8 August 1944) and Anderson was promoted to Major General. Anderson explained his views on tactics to Vandenberg. But to be sure of his ideas, Anderson flew a mission in the lead B-26, then another in the tail plane to assess the new tactics. During the summer in France, the fortunes of Sam Anderson’s B-26s flourished with the medium bombers opening the bomb bays from medium altitude. (Parker, Winter Sky, p. 477)

Retrospection

Military author and lecturer, Dr. Adrian Lewis, during a lecture in a University of North Texas World War II class on 22 February 2008, asked the question, “What is doctrine?” After several students ventured guesses, Lewis answered his own question with,” It is a guide toward achieving an objective.”

Doctrine, as Lewis emphasized, can be applied to operations, strategy, tactics, logistics, or technology. Without doctrine there is no plan, no framework, and no step-by-step process by which one may consistently execute successfully – be it strategy, technology, or war on a grand scale. Whether Clausewitz couched it specifically in words or not, his precepts on war appear to guide Dr. Lewis’ thesis regarding doctrine.

In the big picture of war, planning or a grand strategy (formulating doctrine) before military engagement is essential to prepare and guide one to victory. With technology, as exemplified by the Marauder medium bomber, operational doctrine seems to evolve in parts, but always from a tactical perspective – a part rooted historically in pre-development experience, another in theory,and yet another inpost-development experience. The parts are not always necessarily equal but may work together as a kind of friction to develop the whole of a technology and its proposed manner of use.

The Army Air Corps in the late 1930’s saw the need for an attack-bomber of medium range to support Allied ground troops and to interdict supply lines in enemy territory. The mediumswould fill the niche between the heavy, high altitude strategic bombers like the B-17s and B-24sthat struck deep behind enemy lines and the nimble fighters that provided troops with close ground support.Creation of the Marauder grew from this need. The Army theorized operational doctrine for ground troop air support on perceived tactical trends in war, then wrote specifications for the aircraft. The immediacy of war with Germany pushed the aircraft into production and into the theaters of war before the Army could test whether the medium bomber met its operational doctrine.

The urgency of Pearl Harbor demanded the bomber’s deployment first in the Pacific where the evolution of its operational doctrine under battle conditions began. As this doctrine changed due to the external influences of battle on the Marauder, it came to define the tactical operational doctrine for a class of medium attack-bombers – one, the Douglas A-20 Havoc (Exhibit B), co-existent with the Marauder (Exhibit A); and two, the Douglas A-26 Invader (Exhibit C), which replaced the A-20 during the war in December of 1944 and the Marauder following the war in late 1945.

Effect of Battle and Tragedy

Battle effects change in operational doctrine. In the case of the Marauder the tragedy at IJmuiden in Holland drove home to Allied air commanders the point that operational doctrine in one theater of war may be inconsistent with the demands of another theater of war. Whereas the Pacific Theater supported low-level bombing and strafing missions, conditions in the European Theater did not.

Operational changes to the Marauder in the European Theater excluded the low-level bomb and strafing run that had been effective in the Pacific. It put the Marauders back to bombing from altitudes of twelve to fifteen thousand feet where they were safer from lively and accurate German flak and ack-ack guns. For a while the Marauder received some fighter protection until it was realized that by flying in a tight six plane formation in order to improve bombing accuracy also provided for a concentration of firepower that kept Luftwaffe fighters at a respectful distance.

The ultimate result of these changes made the mediums more effective and, as long as they operated within the framework of the doctrine written for them they experienced fewer losses while turning in excellent performances. By the end of the war the Army Air Force lost fewer Marauders than any other bomber due to these changes in operation.

But as Clausewitz observed, a great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory (Clausewitz, 162)and “ordinary men who follow the suggestions of others become… generally undecided, (thinking) that they have found circumstances different from what they had experienced.” (Clausewitz, 163) In war this can presenthuge problems for maintainingconsistency in operational doctrine, which, in the heat of engagement, can induce tactical errors in applied technology that can and often does lead to disasters of men and machines.

Slaughter at Arzfeld: 23rd January 1945

In the summer of 1944 the question of how to use medium attack-bombers created a rift in the Ninth Air Force high command. The Ninth’s commanding general, Brereton, had ideas for the Marauder that Brig. Gen. Samuel Anderson, who headed up the Ninth’s bomber command, believed exposed plane and crew to unnecessary risks.

Generals O.P. Weyland and Pete Quesada, who commanded fighter groups under Brereton, came to Anderson’s support.They opposed Brereton’s proposed operational doctrine for the Marauder. Anderson had tried using the medium bombers as Brereton proposed and found that they were most effective for interdiction work at higher altitudes and extremely vulnerable to flak and ground fire at lower levels. Brereton and Anderson could not reach agreement which led Anderson to fear for his military career.

The conflict between the Ninth Air Force commander, Brereton, and Anderson ended with Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg replacing Brereton as commanding officer of the Ninth.Anderson who now had Vandenberg’s ear regarding medium bomber operational doctrine received a promotion to Major General and retained control of the Ninth Bomber Command under Vandenberg. The medium bomber program flourished under Anderson’s command.

As the smaller A-20 Havocs and A-26 Invaders were introduced into the Ninth Bomber Command, Anderson evaluated carefully whether these lighter, faster attack-bombers withmore forward firepower than the Marauders were capable of carrying out low-level attacks. Because they were fasterand more nimble than the Marauders the group commanders and pilots under Anderson talked widely about using them for low-level bombing and strafing runs.

Especially the sexy, sleek, armed-to-the-teethA-26 Invader which began replacing the A-20 Havoc in December of 1944. The Invader sported up to sixteen forward firing 50 cal. machine guns, which included remote operated top and bottom twin turret guns, and two forward firing 20-mm cannons. The attack-bomber looked like it could take on a whole German armored division single-handedly. When the first Invader landed on the Britigney, France, airfield in December of 1944, for delivery to the 409th bombardment group, gunner Jack Cartwright said, “She was damn beautiful and a kick-ass flying machine. Every pilot and gunner on base when it arrived swarmed the plane.” (Interview 2002, John Cartwright, Frisco, Tx)

Again the question surfaced among pilots and gunners as to whether low-level ground attacks could be successfully executed with this new attack-bomber. It was faster and better armed than the B-26. Two powerful 2000-hp Pratt & Whitney radial piston engines drove the Invader with 6,000-lb bomb loads at speeds up to 355 mph. It looked nimble and maneuverable, like a fighter. The pilots were excited as a plane like this could put them closer to the action like their fighter-pilot brethren.Hearing this chatter among the bomber pilots about the Invader’s low-level potential forced Anderson to take a closer look at the plane.

At Anderson’s request, Lt. Col. Leo C. Moon, the commanding officer of the 404th Fighter Group had gone to the A-26 Group located at Britigney to look into the matter. But before Moon arrived, the group had already been sent on a low-level mission at 1,500 feet. The entire formation had been riddled by flak. Col. Moon staged simulated dogfights with the A-26s and in some of the practice trials he had them fly on the deck and attempt to pinpoint targets called out from P-47s orbiting above. Based on these experiences, Moon ventured that the A-26 did have a low level speed exceeding the P47s and also had equal climbing ability. However, steep dives and sharp pullouts exerted too much stress on the wings and visibility at low altitude was not nearly as great as a P-47. Col. Moon concluded that the A-26, while maneuverable, was not as nimble as a fighter and was very vulnerable to flak. Moreover, the ammunition load of the A-26 was comparatively small, so that the most effective use of the aircraft was as a medium bomber. (Parker, Winter Sky, 478)

As far as Anderson was concerned that put the issue at rest. Standard medium bomber operational doctrine also applied to these new light attack-bombers being introduced into the Ninth Bomber Command. And that’s the way it remained until 23 January 1945.

The Turkey Shoot

The Germans were in full retreat following a failed offensive in the Ardennes begun about the time the A-26 Invader arrived at Britigney in December 1944. There was lots of snow, a deep freeze of a winter unlike Northern Europe had experienced in over 30 years. Blasts of frigid, snow laden winter air assaulted the Ardennes region inflicting misery on Allies and Germans alike.

Air fields were socked in. Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force anxiously waited for the winter sky’s to clear so they could put planes up in the air to help American and British troops push the Wehrmacht back into Germany. Then the skies cleared. Anderson’s medium bombers were primed and ready.

22 January 1945, O.P. Weyland’s XIX recon planes on dicing missions over the Ardennes photographed two complete motorized German divisions bunched together in a traffic jam near Dasburg. Weyland described the German’s predicament to Vandenberg as a veritable “turkey shoot” for his fighter-bombers. So when the order came down to attack, Anderson’s mediums stood down while Weyland’s P-47 fighter-bombersachieved their glory by decimating thousands of motor transports, tanks, armored vehicles, gun positions, trains, and even horse drawn wagons. According to Weyland, over 80% of Gen. Bayerlein’s Panzer Lehr Division had been totally destroyed in the American’s aerial feeding frenzy on the retreating Germans. (Parker, Winter Sky, 482-3)