Korea Aff Michigan Institutes ‘10
1/2327 Week Juniors
Korea Aff - 7 Week
Plan – 1ac
***Korean War ADV
Korean War Adv – 1ac
Economy Impact – 2ac
Economy Extensions
CBW Impact – 1ac/2ac
North Korea Will Use CBWs
Smallpox / Anthrax Impacts
U.S. Doesn’t Have Defenses Against CBWs
N. Korean Instability = CBW Transfer to Terrorists
U.S.-China War Impact – 2ac
U.S.-China War Extensions
War Now – 2ac
War Now – 1ac/2ac
Most Probable – 1ac/2ac
Will Go Nuclear – 2ac
Korean War => WMD Use
Escalation Possible
Miscalculation Possible
Accidental War Possible
Brinkmanship => Miscalc & Escalation
Kim Jong-il is Irrational
U.S. Presence => Belligerence
U.S. Presence => Miscalc and Escalation ***
U.S. Presence => Escalation
Withdrawal Prevents U.S. Draw In
A2: North’s Military is Weak
Withdrawal => Chinese Influence in Korea
Chinese Involvement Solves ***
China Key to Reform and Denuclearization
A2: China Won’t Pressure North Korea
Chinese Action => Soft Power
Expanded Soft Power Key to China’s Leadership
A2: China Won’t Use Soft Power / Influence
A2: China Uses Soft Power to Undermine U.S. Heg
***Reunification Adv
Reunification Inevitable
Withdrawal => Re-unification
Withdrawal => Chinese Involvement in Reunification
Withdrawal => Reduced Chinese Control
Chinese Control of Reunified Korea Bad
***Succession ADV
Succession Adv – 1ac
Succession = Conflicts
Succession = More Belligerence
Regime on Brink of Collapse
Regime Collapse is Inevitable
Succession Will be Unstable
A2: Next Leader Will Change Policies
Failed Succession => Civil War
Regime Collapse => U.S.-China War
Regime Collapse => Econ Collapse, Terrorism & Miscalc
***REGIONALISM ADV
Regionalism Adv – 1ac
Regionalism => Post Withdrawal Stability
Regionalism Necessary / U.S. Not Sustainable
Withdrawal => Regionalism
Withdrawal => Regional Balance of Power
Withdrawal => Japan Regional Stabilization
Withdrawal => ROK Regional Stabilization
Withdrawal => ROK Conventional Modernization
A2: Asian Regionalism Now
***CHINA Adv
China Adv – 1ac
China Rise Inevitable – U.S. Policy Key
China’s Course Undetermined – U.S. Policy Key
China’s Rise => Threat
A2: Chinese Containment Turns
***SOUTH Korean Modernization Adv
South Korean Modernization Adv – 1ac
Withdrawal => Sustainable ROK Military Force
Withdrawal => Empirical ROK Modernization
ROK Can Develop Its Military
***Withdrawal INEVITABLE
Anti-Americanism Now
ROK Supports Withdrawal
***Overstretch / War on Terror ADV
Withdrawal => Resources for WOT ***
Withdrawal => Resources for WOT
Plan Solves Overstretch
Troops Will be Redeployed
Troops Will be Redeployed to Afghanistan
A2: Troops Will be Relocated to Japan
***SOLVENCY
Phased Withdrawal Solvency
Withdrawal Ground Forces Solvency
Withdrawal All but 3-5k Ground Forces
Reducing Presence Stops Pressure to Disengage
Withdrawal => Offshore Balancing
Withdrawal => Equal Relationship with S. Korea
Withdrawal => End of Mutual Defense Treaty
Withdrawal => Prioritize Diplomacy
***DISAD Answers
A2: N. Korean Invasion – 2ac
A2: N. Korean Invasion – ROK Can Defend Itself
A2: N. Korean Invasion – ROK Will Buildup
A2: N. Korean Invasion – DPRK Military Declining
A2: N. Korean Invasion – South will Win
A2: N. Korean Invasion – Deter with Other Means
A2: Deterrence – 2ac
A2: Deterrence – U.S. Heg / Influence Declining
A2: Deterrence – W/drawal Won’t Hurt Influence / Heg
A2: Deterrence – Ground Forces Not Key
A2: Deterrence – Residual Forces are Enough
A2: Deterrence – Air Force / Navy Solves
A2: Deterrence – Transition to Stryker Force Best
A2: Deterrence – Navy Solves
A2: Deterrence – China Ans
A2: Deterrence – Terrorism Ans
A2: Troops Key to Deter China / Taiwan
A2: Troops Key to Deter India
A2: Troops Key to Deter Other Conflicts
A2: Troops Key to Deter Other Asian Conflicts
A2: Troops Key to Solve Local Conflicts / Civil Wars
A2: Troops Key to Solve Diseases / Piracy / Terrorism
A2: Troops Key to Reunification
A2: Troops Key to Economy
A2: ROK Forces Key to Iraq / War on Terror
A2: ROK Prolif – 2ac
A2: U.S.-ROK Relations – 2ac
A2: Relations / Prolif – Cultural & Economic Ties Sustain Relations
A2: Japan Prolif – No Link
A2: Japan Prolif – Regional Prolif Better than U.S. Draw In
A2: Japan Prolif – No Impact
A2: Japan Prolif – Technical Barriers
A2: Japan Prolif – Can’t Test / Deploy Weapons
A2: Japan Prolif – Political & Econ Relations Sustain Deterrence
A2: Japan Prolif – Shift in Attitude Now
A2: U.S.-ROK Alliance DA – Burdensharing Turn
A2: U.S.-ROK Trade / Investment DA
A2: ROK Investment DA
A2: ROK Defense Spending DA
A2: Reverse Defense Spending (Revenue Recycling) DA
A2: Spending DA
A2: Obama Good – Public Support Turn
A2: Obama Good – Congress & Pentagon Supports
A2: Obama Bad – Withdrawal Will Crush Political Capital
A2: Obama Bad – Doesn’t Support Plan
***Counterplan ANSWERS
A2: CP – Conditions (Short)
A2: CP – Conditions (Long)
A2: CP – Conditions on NK – Kim Jong-il DA 2ac
A2: CP – Conditions on NK – Won’t Solve
A2: CP – Condition on NK Denuclearization
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Coop => SK Derailment
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Coop – Chinese Influence NB Ans
A2: CP – Consult South Korea – Regionalism Good Turn
A2: CP – Consult Russia
A2: CP – Russian Engagement / Security Guarantee
A2: CP – Exclude Air Forces
A2: CP – Immediate Withdrawal
A2: CP – Sanction North Korea
A2: CP – Remove Sanctions on North Korea
A2: CP – Engagement – Can’t Solve Nuclearization
A2: CP – Engagement / Sign “X” Agreement With N. Korea
A2: CP – Regime Change
A2: CP – Pressure / Attack North Korea
A2: CP – Attack NK – Laundry List 2ac
A2: CP – Attack NK – ROK won’t Support
A2: CP – Attack NK – Economy Turn
A2: CP – Attack NK – Hegemony Turn
A2: CP – Attack NK – Causes Retaliation
A2: CP – Attack NK – Undermines Relations With China & Japan
A2: CP – Attack NK – Undermines Relations With ROK
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Won’t Solve
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to NB
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to Deterrence
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to ROK Relations
A2: CP – Realignment / SQ Solves
Plan – 1ac
The United States federal government should implement a phased withdrawal of its ground troops in the Republic of Korea.
***Korean War ADV
Korean War Adv – 1ac
Advantage _____ is Korean War
The sinking of the South Korea’s ship makes conflict inevitable– retaliation will spark an escalatory war and failure to respond will only cause more North Korean provocations.
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,” JMP)
It has been weeks since the South Korean ship Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea near the disputed boundary between South and North Korea. As yet the cause is unknown--some government critics suspect a cover-up--but after raising the wreck South Korean officials said the explosion appeared to be external. Which implicates Pyongyang.
If the cause was a mine, a North-South confrontation still could be avoided. The mine might have been left over from the Korean War. Or if of more modern vintage it could have broken loose from its moorings.
If a torpedo was used, however, the threat of conflict rises. TheRepublic of Korea could not easily ignore a North Korean submarine stalking and sinking one of its vessels.
Seoul has promised "a firm response," though, argues Han Sung-joo, a former ROK foreign minister and U.S. ambassador, "that doesn't mean a military reaction or an eye-for-eye response." In fact, the South did not retaliate after earlier provocations, such as the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner and assassination attempt against former president Chun Doo-hwan which killed 16 ROK officials.
A military reprisal then could have triggered a full-scale war. Responding in kind this time also could spark a dangerous escalatory spiral with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
However, Seoul has spent the last decade attempting to pacify the DPRK, providing aid, allowing investment, and hosting summits. To do nothing would seem to be abject appeasement, undermining ROK credibility and encouraging the North to act even more recklessly in the future. If the word "firm" has any meaning, the South Korean government would have to do more than protest.
Still, the decision, though difficult, shouldn't concern the U.S. The South has gone from an authoritarian economic wreck to a democratic economic powerhouse. With a vastly bigger and more sophisticated economy, larger population, and greater access to international markets and support than the North, Seoul long has been able to defend itself. Pyongyang retains a numerical military edge, but its weapons are old, troops are undertrained, and industrial base is shrinking.
Thus, the South should be able to decide on the action that best advances its security. However, Seoul long chose to emphasize economic development over military preparedness. As a result, the ROK remains dependent on America.
Some 27,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in the South. The U.S. retains formal command of all forces, American and South Korean, during a war. Seoul expects substantial U.S. air and naval support and ground reinforcement in the event of war.
Which means that ROK retaliation against the DPRK would draw the U.S. into any conflict. So Washington cannot help but pressure South Korean decision-makers to act in accord with American as well as ROK interests. In fact, that's what happened in 1983, when the U.S. insisted that Seoul not retaliate militarily after the bombing attack on President Chun.
The current situation also means that the destiny of America is essentially controlled by the North's Kim Jong-il. Ordering an attack on a South Korean ship could end up forcing Washington to go to war.Although the bilateral U.S.-South Korean defense treaty does not make American intervention automatic, it is unimaginable that an American administration would stand aside in a conflict.
This is a ludicrous position for both the U.S. and South Korea, six decades after Washington saved a far weaker ROK from a North Korean invasion in the midst of the Cold War. Neither country is well-served by Seoul's continuing defense dependency on America.
Unfortunately, the policy incongruities only are likely to worsen. The ROK desires to wield increasing influence beyond its own shores. While relying on American military forces to defend its homeland, the South Korean government is crafting its navy for more distant contingencies and deploying ground personnel in the Middle East and Central Asia. Yet Seoul found that when the enemy struck at home, assuming the Cheonan was sunk by the North, the South Korean military was ill-prepared to defend its own personnel.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
The status quo is fundamentally different than the past – the chance of a major miscalculation and global escalation is possible now in five different ways
Sanger, 10 (5/28/10, David E. Sanger, NY Times, “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War,”
JMP)
USUALLY, there is a familiar cycle to Korea crises.
Like a street gang showing off its power to run amok in a well-heeled neighborhood, the North Koreans launch a missile over Japan or set off a nuclear test or stage an attack — as strong evidence indicates they did in March, when a South Korean warship was torpedoed. Expressions of outrage follow. So do vows that this time, the North Koreans will pay a steep price.
In time, though, the United States and North Korea’s neighbors — China, Japan, South Korea and Russia — remind one another that they have nothing to gain from a prolonged confrontation, much less a war. Gradually, sanctions get watered down. Negotiations reconvene. Soon the North hints it can be enticed or bribed into giving up a slice of its nuclear program. Eventually, the cycle repeats.
The White House betting is that the latest crisis, stemming from the March attack, will also abate without much escalation. But there is more than a tinge of doubt. The big risk, as always, is what happens if the North Koreans make a major miscalculation. (It wouldn’t be their first. Sixty years ago, Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Il-sung, thought the West wouldn’t fight when he invaded the South. The result was the Korean War.)
What’s more, the dynamic does feel different from recent crises. The South has a hardline government whose first instinct was to cut off aid to the North, not offer it new bribes. At the same time, the North is going through a murky, ill-understood succession crisis.
And President Obama has made it clear he intends to break the old cycle. “We’re out of the inducements game,” one senior administration official, who would not discuss internal policy discussions on the record, said last week. “For 15 years at least, the North Koreans have been in the extortion business, and the U.S. has largely played along. That’s over.”
That may change the North’s behavior, but it could backfire. “There’s an argument that in these circumstances, the North Koreans may perceive that their best strategy is to escalate,” says Joel Wit, a former State Department official who now runs a Web site that follows North Korean diplomacy.
The encouraging thought is the history of cooler heads prevailing in every crisis since the Korean War. There was no retaliation after a 1968 raid on South Korea’s presidential palace; or when the North seized the American spy ship Pueblo days later; or in 1983 when much of the South Korean cabinet was killed in a bomb explosion in Rangoon, Burma; or in 1987 when a South Korean airliner was blown up by North Korean agents, killing all 115 people on board.
So what if this time is different? Here are five situations in which good sense might not prevail.
An Incident at Sea
Ever since an armistice ended the Korean War, the two sides have argued over — and from time to time skirmished over — the precise location of the “Northern Limit Line,” which divides their territorial waters. That was where the naval patrol ship Cheonan was sunk in March. So first on the Obama administration’s list of concerns is another incident at sea that might turn into a prolonged firefight. Any heavy engagement could draw in theUnited States, South Korea’s chief ally, which is responsible for taking command if a major conflict breaks out.
What worries some officials is the chance of an intelligence failure in which the West misreads North Korea’s willingness and ability to escalate. The failure would not be unprecedented. Until a five-nation investigation concluded that the Cheonan had been torpedoed, South Korea and its allies did not think the North’s mini-submarine fleet was powerful enough to sink a fully armed South Korean warship.
Shelling the DMZ
American and South Korean war planners still work each day to refine how they would react if North Korea’s 1.2 million-man army poured over the Demilitarized Zone, 1950s-style. Few really expect that to happen — the South Koreans build and sell expensive condos between Seoul and the DMZ — but that doesn’t mean the planning is unjustified.
In one retaliatory measure last week, South Korea threatened to resume propaganda broadcasts from loudspeakers at the DMZ. In past years, such blaring denunciations, of Kim Jong-il’s economic failures, were heard only by North Korean guards and the wildlife that now occupies the no-man’s land. Still, the threat was enough to drive the North’s leadership to threaten to shell the loudspeakers. That, in turn, could lead to tit-for-tat exchanges of fire, and to a threat from the North to fire on Seoul, which is within easy reach of mortars. If that happened, thousands could die in frenzied flight from the city, and investors in South Korea’s economy would almost certainly panic.
American officials believe the South is now rethinking the wisdom of turning on the loudspeakers.
A Power Struggle or Coup
Ask American intelligence analysts what could escalate this or a future crisis, and they name a 27-year-old Kim Jong-un, the youngest of Kim Jong-il’s three sons, and the father’s choice to succeed him. Little is known about him, but his main qualifications for the job may be that he is considered less corrupt or despised than his two older brothers.
[CONTINUED]
Korean War Adv – 1ac
[CONTINUED]
One senior American intelligence official described the succession crisis this way: “We can’t think of a bigger nightmare than a third generation of the Kim family” running the country with an iron hand, throwing opponents into the country’s gulags, and mismanaging an economy that leaves millions starving.
It is possible that on the issue of succession, many in the North Korean elite, including in the military, agree with the American intelligence official. According to some reports, they view Kim Jong-un as untested, and perhaps unworthy.
“We’re seeing considerable signs of stress inside the North Korean system,” another official reported.
And that raises the possibility of more provocations — and potential miscalculations — ahead.
One line of analysis is that the younger Kim has to put a few notches in his belt by ordering some attacks on the South, the way his father once built up a little credibility. Another possibility is that internal fighting over the succession could bring wide-scale violence inside North Korea, tempting outside powers to intervene to stop the bloodshed.
Curiously, when Kim Jong-il took the train to China a few weeks ago, his heir apparent did not travel with him. Some experts read that as a sign that the Kim dynasty might fear a coup if both were out of the country — or that it might not be wise to put father and son on the same track at the same time, because accidents do happen.