Iran, Iraq Exchange Missile Strikes

Issue Date: March 11, 1988

Iran, Iraq Exchange Missile Strikes

• Iraq Provokes New Phase in Conflict
• Teheran Mob Attacks Soviet Embassy
• Iranian Offensive on Hold
• Shipping War Developments
• U.S. Warns Iraq in Talks
• U.N. Developments

Iraq Provokes New Phase in Conflict

Iran and Iraq resumed their "war of the cities" Feb. 29-March 11, with each country firing barrages of missiles into the other's capital, killing hundreds of civilians.

Throughout the seven-year-old Persian Gulf war, both sides had generally avoided indiscriminate aerial attacks on their enemy's urban centers. The original "war of the cities" had lasted for four months in 1985, and a brief relapse had occurred in early 1987. Iran had gotten the worst of those exchanges, with thousands of its citizens killed, due to its limited supply of missiles and warplanes with which to retaliate against Iraqi cities. [See 1987 Iran-Iraq War: Basra Fighting Stalemated; Other Developments, 1985 Iran-Iraq War: Iraq: Kharg Oil Depot 'Demolished'; Other Developments]

Independent observers agreed that the latest outbreak was provoked by Iraq, which was thought to be frustrated over the lack of progress in the United Nations Security Council toward enforcing a U.N. cease-fire resolution with an arms embargo against Iran.

Iraqi jets Feb. 27 bombed Iranian oil refineries, including one near Teheran. Iran responded Feb. 28 with its own air raids in southern Iraq and shelling of the Iraqi city of Basra. The missile strikes began Feb. 29, when Iran fired two of its Soviet-designed Scud B surface-to-surface missiles (apparently obtained from Syria or Libya) into Baghdad. Iraq replied by shooting five missiles into Teheran.

It was the first time Iraq had used missiles, rather than aircraft, to attack Teheran, which was about 300 miles (500 km) from the border. Baghdad was only about 80 miles (130 km) from the border and hence could be hit by Iran's Scuds, which normally had a maximum range of about 190 miles (300 km).

In mid-1987, Iraq had announced that it had tested a missile with a range of 400 miles (650 km), but Western analysts were skeptical. It was now believed that Iraq had extended the reach of the Scuds it had received from the Soviet Union, either by strapping booster rockets on to them or by reducing the weight of their explosive warheads. However, such techniques further reduced the already questionable accuracy of the missiles, making them almost useless as weapons against specific military targets.

Over the next 10 days, Iraq claimed to have fired an average of five missiles daily into Iranian cities. Iran, evidently lacking as large a supply of Scuds as its adversary, retaliated with about half as many missile strikes on Baghdad and other Iraqi centers. By March 10, Iraq had reported launching over 50 missiles, while Iran had replied with at least 27 attacks of its own.

Iraq March 2 extended its barrage to the holy city of Qom, the first time the Shiite Moslem spiritual center had been subjected to missile attack. Teheran radio claimed the strikes caused no casualties. Iran March 5 said it shot down three Iraqi bombers, one in a dogfight and two by ground fire.

Iraq March 10 offered to end the missile duel, provided it was permitted the last shot, as Iran had fired the first one. Iranian U.N. delegate Mohammed Mahallati called Baghdad's condition "ridiculous" but said his government was willing to "halt immediately and unconditionally any attacks, even retaliatory attacks, against civilian targets" if Iraq did the same.

Turkish Premier TurgutOzal, who had recently visited Iran, March 10 said he had negotiated a truce between the two sides.

As arranged, the cease-fire took hold March 11 at 4:00 p.m. But during the day, Iraq reported firing 11 more missiles into Iran (eight at Teheran and three at Qom), while its warplanes also carried out heavy bombing raids over Iranian cities. The last two missiles hit Teheran and Qom only minutes before the deadline. Iran, clearly wearied by the exchange, announced that it was halting its reprisal attacks, despite the fierce Iraqi bombardment.

Teheran Mob Attacks Soviet Embassy

Iran March 1 delivered a formal protest to the Soviet Union for its alleged role in supplying Iraq with the long-range missiles used in the bombardment. Moscow officially denied the charge March 3.

An angry Iranian mob attacked the Soviet embassy in Teheran March 6 to protest the use of the Soviet-made missiles. The official Soviet news agency Tass said that demonstrators threw rocks and "incendiary devices" as they tried to break into the embassy compound, and that a similar riot took place outside the Soviet consulate in Isfahan. Tass did not report any casualties but said the lives of embassy staff were threatened before order was restored.

Tass said the Soviet foreign ministry issued a strongly worded protest describing the attack on its embassy as an "absolutely inadmissible" event that had caused "serious concern among the Soviet leadership." The news agency said the riots were preceded by "instigatory" reports in the Iranian press, adding that the Teheran government "was earlier informed of our apprehensions and had time to prevent the unlawful actions which took place."

The crisis was a blow to Soviet-Iranian relations, which had been gradually warming over the past year, with high-level discussions of joint economic projects. Through adept diplomacy, the U.S.S.R. appeared to be managing the difficult feat of improving ties with Teheran while remaining the chief arms supplier to Iraq. Western diplomats, in turn, had accused Moscow of stalling on supporting the U.N. Security Council's proposed arms embargo against Iran.

The Soviet U.N. ambassador, AleksanderBelonogov, March 7 asked the Security Council to appoint a special representative to maintain "firm and constant contact" between Iran, Iraq and the U.N. He also proposed a resolution calling for an end to missile attacks on civilians by both sides. Moderating its earlier harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, Iran March 9 welcomed Moscow's proposals.

Soviet spokesman GennadiGerasimov and VsevolodOleandrov, head of the foreign ministry's directorate for international organizations, March 9 acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. had supplied Iraq with Scud missiles as part of previous arms agreements. But Oleandrov said that the missiles' range was "not sufficient for reaching Teheran," and that "no upgrading or modernization" of the weapons was permitted. Gerasimov said, "it's difficult for us to say" whether Iraq's claims that it had developed the missiles itself were true.

Iranian Offensive on Hold

Iran's long-predicted "final offensive" against the southern Iraqi city of Basra had failed to take place, according to reports Jan. 25-Feb. 11. Initially, Iran was said to be delaying its attack to give time for a Syrian diplomatic initiative. Later reports, however, indicated that the Teheran regime had failed to mobilize enough manpower to effectively challenge the formidable Iraqi defenses around Basra. [See 1988 Persian Gulf Crisis: Syria in Mediating Role]

One Western official, cited in the Washington Post Feb. 11, said Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's call for fresh volunteers had produced 80,000 young Iranians for the failed 1987 offensive. "This year they only got 40,000 and you need 100,000 men for the kind of meat grinder they are facing...more if you hope to achieve something you can call a victory," the official said. "The Iranians don't have the cannon fodder for a major offensive this year."

Meanwhile, the Syrian bid to mediate between Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf had failed, according to Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti and United Arab Emirate officials cited in the New York Times Jan. 26. The officials blamed Iran for being evasive and inflexible.

It was reported Feb. 3 that Iraq had blasted Syria's diplomatic role as "treacherous," ending a three-month propaganda truce between Baghdad and Damascus.

Shipping War Developments

Syria claimed to have won a "guarantee" from Iran that it would cease its attacks on oil tankers flying the flags of the Arab gulf states, the Washington Post reported March 7. The purported guarantee would not cover those ships flying Liberian, Panamanian or other flags of convenience, which made up the bulk of those raided by Iranian gunboats.

The Iranian guarantee came after a nearly month-long lull in which neither Iraq nor Iran had claimed any attacks on gulf shipping. The undeclared truce ended March 8, when Iraq said its warplanes had scored a direct hit on a "large naval target," which was how Iraq referred to Iranian tankers that shuttled oil from the Kharg Island terminal down to the bottom of the gulf.

In earlier developments, an Iranian helicopter strafed a Danish supertanker Feb. 12, killing a Danish crewman, and in two separate attacks Jan. 29, Iraqi jets killed two South Korean officers aboard a Cypriot tanker and a British officer and a Filipino engineer aboard a tugboat.

U.S. Warns Iraq in Talks

A high-level U.S. Navy team opened talks Feb. 22 with Iraqi officials in Baghdad on how to prevent inadvertent Iraqi attacks on American warships in the Persian Gulf. U.S. officials were reportedly upset with the failure of Iraqi pilots to follow rules of engagement reached following the May 1987 attack on the U.S.S. Stark, an alleged accident that killed 37 American sailors. [See 1987 U.S.S. Stark Officers Relieved of Duty; House Probe Cites Negligence, 1987 Iraqi Missile Strike Kills 37 U.S. Sailors; Attack on Frigate Termed Inadvertent; Other Developments]

Considered particularly alarming was a Feb. 12 incident in which an Iraqi jet had fired a missile that passed near the destroyer U.S.S. Chandler before veering away to explode on the horizon. The Iraqi pilot had ignored radio warnings and turned away only after the Chandler fired warning flares. The U.S. ship came close to opening fire on the missile and possibly on the plane as well.

Gen. George Crist, commander of the U.S. Central Command, told reporters in the gulf Feb. 28 that the U.S.-Iraqi talks had achieved some progress.

In other developments:

• U.S. reconnaissance helicopters March 6 came under heavy machine-gun fire from an oil platform and several boats, believed to be Iranian, in the central gulf. The helicopters escaped and no casualties were reported. The encounter came 25 hours after a U.S. frigate, on patrol farther north, opened fire after observing radar blips believed to be Iranian speedboats moving toward a U.S. Navy supply barge. Earlier, Iran Feb. 14 said its forces opened fire on U.S. helicopters flying ahead of a tanker convoy after they refused to heed warnings. There was no U.S. confirmation of the incident.
• The U.S. Defense Department Feb. 16 said it was trimming some elements of the Navy's Persian Gulf task force. The battleship U.S.S. Iowa had departed and the helicopter carrier Okinawa was due to leave shortly with its Sea Stallion minesweeping helicopters. The U.S. fleet had been cut to 28 warships, down from a peak of 33 in November 1987, with further redeployments possibly cutting the total to 25. The main reasons for the reductions, according to the Pentagon, were the reduced risk of mine-laying by Iran and the presence in the gulf of minesweeping ships from several European navies.
• The commander of France's flotilla in the gulf Jan. 20 said that French warships would fire on Iranian gunboats that refused to stop attacks on non-French neutral merchant ships once French ships arrived on the scene in response to calls for "humanitarian" aid. The policy change came several days after a French warship intervened to halt an Iranian attack on a Liberian-registered tanker.

U.N. Developments

An Iranian diplomat had privately handed an unsigned statement to the U.N. Security Council saying Teheran accepted the cease-fire resolution passed by council in July 1987, the New York Times reported March 5.

The move, by Iranian U.N. ambassador Mohammed Mahallati, had sown confusion as to Iran's true position on ending the Persian Gulf war. Previously, Iranian leaders had strongly criticized Resolution 598 but had refused to reject it outright.

U.S. officials said they believed the statement was an effort to stop the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. from reaching a compromise arrangement under which the Security Council would impose an arms embargo against Iran for refusing to accept the resolution. Under the proposed compromise, Moscow would vote with the council to impose the embargo, but any implementation of the sanctions would be delayed 30 to 60 days while the U.N. once more tried to negotiate an end to the war. (China had also recently expressed qualified support for the embargo. [See 1988 China: Foreign Minister Sees Reagan, Shultz])

A document drafted by the U.K. (and backed by the U.S. and France) called for a two-year embargo against Iran, it was reported Jan. 28-Feb. 5.