IR 335-010: 4 Credit Hours(CRN: 42426)

Fall 2016 Tu Th 9:20 – 10:35 MG 103

IR 335-010: 4 credit hours(CRN: 42426)

Intervention

Chaim Kaufmann– revised10/16/2016

CourseSite: IR-335-010-FL16

Research guide:

Librarian: Brian Simboli (8-5003)

E-mail: ck07

Office hours (MG 207a): MW 12:45-2:00; Tu10:45-2:00; and by appointment.

Learning Objectives:

States commonly intervene in the politics and economics of other, usually weaker, states (since 1945 the record holder is the United States). This is done both for narrow national security purposes (e.g., counterinsurgency, overt or covert regime change efforts)and for broader humanitarian purposes (e.g., disaster relief, refugee protection, peacekeeping or peace enforcement; some would also count efforts to spread human rights or democracy). Sometimes several rationales are offered for the same intervention, as in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In the United Nations era, however, international legal norms favoring sovereignty mostly bar interventions not requested by the target state, at least theoretically—targets are sometimes coerced to “request” intervention and the Security Council can and has authorized interventions. More recently, theemerging legal doctrine of “responsibility to protect” has weakened the sovereignty norm for at least some humanitarian emergencies.

In addition, effectiveness of and best practices for both counterinsurgency and humanitarian interventions remain much contested.

Students completing this course should be able to:

-Analyze and evaluate scholarly and policy arguments and evidence concerning intervention and social science topics broadly;

-Effectively communicate such evaluations as well as their own arguments verbally and in writing.

-Design and carry out substantial social science research projects on intervention or other international relations or political science subjects.

Prerequisites:

IR 010. One or more intermediate-level core courses is desirable, as are skills in other social science and humanities disciplines and regional or language expertise.

Requirements:

Note that our schedule will not be entirely regular. There are several dates on which we will not meet, and two when we will meet at different times: On Tuesday Sept. 20 we will meet twice, once for an invited lecture by Jacqueline L. Hazelton of the naval War College. On Sunday October 2 we will meet for a simulation that cannot be fit into a regular class slot. Reserve these dates now.

1. There areabout 19 sessions with reading assignments. As our progress may not match the planned schedule, you are responsible for keeping track.

The courseformat is mainly seminar, although depending on special technical or historical issues not fully covered in readings, I may lecture for a minute or several at a time; do interrupt with questions.

You should engage each other, not just me, and can and should seize control of the direction of discussion. Active contribution is part of your responsibility to educate not only yourself but also your colleagues and me.

No electronic devices except laptops (for note-taking or immediate research only).

2. A policy-relevant research paper on an intervention case, maximum length 25 pages, produced in four stages over the course of the semester. See “IR 335 Main Assignment” and detailed charges for each part under ‘Assignments’ on our CourseSite.

3. Foursimulation sessions.

Due Dates:

1st assignment (Proposal)TRAC: 9/8, 4:00 P.M.Instructor: 9/20, in class

2nd assignment (Research Tools)Instructor: 9/15, in class

3rd assignment (Lit. Rev.)TRAC: 10/21, 4:00 P.M.Instructor: 10/31, Noon

4th assignment (Final)TRAC: 12/2, 4:00 P.M.Instructor: 12/21, 4:00 P.M.

Grading:

Seminar 30

Research project

Proposal2

Research Tools3

Literature review20

Final Paper45

Extra credit opportunities: (maximum 5% of course grade).

If you attend a non-course lecture and discussion (at Lehigh or elsewhere) on a topic related to this course, you may submit a reaction paper worth 1% of the final course grade. You are also invited to submit suggestions to improve Lehigh’s library holdings. Memos under ‘Assignments’ provide details for each.

Intellectual Integrity:

The Department of International Relations Policy on Academic Integrity and Plagiarism is hereby incorporated into this syllabus. A copy is posted on the CourseSite.

Accommodation for Students with Disabilities:

Students who have a disability for which you are or may be requesting accommodation should contact both the instructor and the Office of Academic Support Services, University Center 212 (610-758-4152) as early as possible in the semester. You must obtain documentation from Academic Support Services beforeaccommodation can be granted.

Required Textbooks:

1.. Ari Folman and David Polonsky, Waltz with Bashir: A Lebanon War Story (New York: Henry Holt, 2009). Not in the bookstore: I recommend Alibris or Amazon.

2. Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 3rd ed.(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).

3. Nick Turse, Kill Everything That Moves: The Real War in Vietnam (New York: Metropolitan, 2013).

4. Kate L. Turabian et al., A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 8th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013) orModern Language Association, MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 7th ed. (Modern Language Association, 2009).

5. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Schedule and Reading Assignments:

Each session includes questions that you may want to keep in mind while preparing. These are not meant to be exhaustive or to constrainclass discussion.

* = reading item on CourseSiteunder ‘Course Documents;’ others in textbooks (films on reserve in the Media Center). Contact me promptly if you discover a corrupt file or any other problem.

Films are on reserve at Fairchild; you can watch them solo or in groups.

I: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

1. Tues. August 30: Social Science Research[26]

• Is Walt right that efforts at building theory in I.R. should focus on policy relevance?
• Should policy be guided by theory?
• Why have efforts at policy-relevant theory had relatively little impact on actual policy?
• How should we categorize types of intervention? Is there a bright line between different types of intervention, especially between counterinsurgency and humanitarian intervention?
• How should we categorize tools of intervention? Is there a bright line between military and non-military tools? Between unilateral and multilateral?
• How should we assess ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of interventions?

*This syllabus; main course assignment;first three assignments (Proposal, Research Tools, Literature Review); look through other memos under ‘Assignments.’

*Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations”, Annual Review of Political Science 8(2005), 23-48.

Also of interest (not assigned):

Will Strunk, Jr., The Elements of Style (New York: Tribeca, 2012) or earlier edition (Strunk & White).

2. Thurs.September 1: Qualitative Research Methods [61]

• What does SVE mean by “antecedent conditions” (9-10)?
• Of SVE’s features of a good theory (17-21) which seem most importantand why?
• What is the relationship between a theory and an explanation?
• We can’t conduct controlled experiments (28). What do we do about that?
• Which of controlled comparison vs. process tracing (55ff.) should we prefer?
• Of the suggested case selection criteria (77ff.), the most useful to you are likely to be #s 3, 4, 5, and 7.(Note that what Van Evera calls within-case variation (#3) I usually call “independent observations” or simply “cases.”)
• Your paper will be of type 2, 4 (evaluative), 5, or 6 (88-95) since our charge rules out the others. To what extent are these types really distinct?

Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7-21, 27-30, 40-67, 77-88, 89-93. Keep p. 88 close as you work.

Also of Interest (not assigned):

David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” World Politics 49:1 (October 1996), 56-91.

Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7 (Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137.

Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," Political Analysis 2:1 (1990), 131-50.

Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8:2 (Autumn 1977), 281-313.

Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," International Organization 37:1 (Winter 1983), 73-91.

Robert A. Pape, Bombingto Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 38-55, 87-136.

David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security 29:1 (Summer 2004), 49-91. 24 cases; borderline between comparative case study and quantitative.

Bruce E. Moon, “Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq,” International Security 33:4 (Spring 2009), 111-48.

Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” International Security 33:4 (Spring 2009), 9-51.

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25:3 (Winter, 2000-2001), 5-53. See also correspondence in the Spring 2002 issue.

Miriam Fendius Elman, “Finland in World War II: Alliances, SmallStates, and the Democratic Peace,” in Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 191-232. Can a case be critical if its historical importance is low?

Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). British policy towards Egypt.

John S. Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

Chaim Kaufmann,"Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 38:4 (December 1994), 557-86. Are qualitative and quantitative methods fundamentally different?

3.Tues. Sept. 6: Research Tools Meeting with Brian Simboli (FM 292, in computing center under Maginnes)

*Chaim Kaufmann, “‘Chaining’ Sources in Social Science Research” (September 6, 2012).

*Familiarize yourself with the course research guide.

Do not be absent.

September 8: First assignment (Proposal) due to TRAC Fellow 4:00 P.M.

4. Thurs. September 8: How to Prepare a Literature Review [57]

• What issues should a literature review cover? Do these do their tasks adequately?
• Come in ready to discuss the main issues that your literature review should cover.
• What is the difference between a literature review (MacDonald’s chapter) and a review essay (Brownlee’s article)? In objectives? In style?
• Although your paper will include a literature review, it will be a research paper, not a review essay; what does that mean for ways in which you should and should not follow Brownlee’s structure or style?

*Third Assignment (Literature Review).

*Douglas MacDonald, Adventures in Chaos (Harvard University Press, 1992), chapter 3, 44-73.

*Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?” World Politics 59:2 (January 2007), 314–40.

Also of interest (not assigned):

Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21:3 (Winter, 1996-97), 54-86; and Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18:4 (Spring, 1994), 66-107.

Stephen Walt, “Revolution and War,” World Politics 44:3 (April 1992), 321-68.

Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991),21-65.

Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44:2 (Spring 1990), 137-68.

Robert A. Pape, Bombingto Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12-38.

John Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” International Relations 23:2 (June 2009), 241-56.

Jack Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” World Politics 36:1 (October 1983), 76-99; and Levy, “Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40:1 (October1987), 82-107. These are “review essays:” entire articles devoted to describing—and assessing—the state of a field.

II: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

5. Tues. September 13: What is Civil War? [59]

• What are the main types of civil wars?
• What conditions promote the rise of insurgencies?
• Is insurgency inherently a rural phenomenon? Can it succeed in moderately or highly urbanized societies?
• Economic models centered on individual motives of greed and survival, in which politics and identity play little role, have gained currency recently. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such models? If they leave out a lot, why might they be gaining?
• Why would a foreign state intervene for or against an insurgency? What are the main means of intervention?

*Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 990-1992(London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992),part of chapter 3, 68 (bottom)-70.

*Chaim Kaufmann,“Intervention in Ethnic and in Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be Done and the Other Can’t,”Security Studies 6:1 (Autumn 1996), 62-100.

*Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October 21, 2001), 1-17.

Also of interest (not assigned):

Robert Taber, War of the Flea (Dulles, Va.: Potomac, 2002; originally 1965).

Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambidge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006). It’s mainly local score-settling.

Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 2 vols.(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005). Collection of case studies; preface partially retracts the earlier Collier and Hoeffler claims.

John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’,” International Security, 25:1 (Summer 2000), 42-70; and Anna Simons and John Mueller, Correspondence: The Dynamics of Internal Conflict, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), 187-92.

September 15: Second assignment (Research Tools) due to instructor 9:20 A.M.

6. Thurs. September 15: Ethics and Law of Counterinsurgency [71]

• Is intervention based on political or strategic interest justifiable? On an interest in governance? On humanitarian grounds, even if that is not the intervener’s only motive?
• Can counterinsurgents maintain a level of discipline that avoids large-scale collateral damage and/or war crimes? If not, does that delegitimate the entire enterprise?
• If counterinsurgency necessarily requires use of terror, does that delegitimate it entirely?
• Does the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort depend on what conditions the interveners leave behind?

*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed.(New York: Basic Books, 4th ed., 2006), ch. 11 and parts of chs. 9 and 19, 151-159, 176-96, 306-322.

*Edward Luttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Harpers Magazine 314 (February 2007), 33-42.

*Rebecca Johnson, “Jus Post Bellum and Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Military Ethics, 7:3 (2008), 215-30.

Also of interest (not assigned):

Walzer chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 19.

Alex P. Bellamy, “The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War,” Review of International Studies 34:4 (October 2008), 601-625.

Sergio Koc-Menard, “Just War Tradition, Liberalism, and Civil War,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 11:2 (Fall/Winter 2004), 57-64.

September 15: First assignment (Proposal) due to instructor 9:20 A.M.

7. Tues. September 20: Counterinsurgency[74]

Guest seminar leader: Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Naval War College

• Although Nagl, Kaufmann,Hazelton, and most others identify two main approaches to COIN, they don’t alwayscall them by the same names. Can you match them?
• What is the logic of each approach?
• Kaufmann argues that the most important determinants of outcomes vary by conflict type. Nagel argues that military ‘learning’ is always the most critical factor. To what extent does Hazelton agree or disagree with either?
• How much of what Race describes fits one or another of these approaches and what doesn’t?
• If Engelbert and Tull’s diagnosis is correct, how much of the mainstream COIN theory is still relevant and what are beside the point?

*Kaufmann,“Intervention in Ethnic and in Ideological Civil Wars,” is relevant again here.

*Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 55 (last para)-63 (2nd para), 67- (2nd para)-73 (3rd para).

*Jacqueline L. Hazelton, “Governing by Violence: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,”September 2016, unpub.

*John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 169-81.

*David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, December 2006). Nagl is said to have been the main intellectual force. No fixed assignment—as much as you are willing to stand. Good to read together with friends.

*Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about FailedStates,” International Security, 32:4 (Spring 2008), 106-139.

Also of interest (not assigned):

John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, rest of book.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2006; originally published 1964).

Julian Paget, Counter-insurgency Campaigning (London, Faber, 1967).

Bard E. O’ Neill, from Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency and Terrorism, 2nd. ed., revised(Dulles, Va.: Potomac, 2005).

David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); also Counterinsurgency (Oxford, 2010), intended as a manual.

Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Richard Clutterbuck,Riot and Revolution in Malaya and Singapore (London: Faber & Faber, 1973).

Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communication in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1958).

Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1966).

Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962.

Matthew J. Connolly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era (New York: Free Press, 1977).

Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: the U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia with a new final chapter (New York: Penguin, 2009).

Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan with a new afterword (New York: Norton, 2010).

8. Tues. September 20, 4:10 P.M., MG 113

Lecture and Q&A on her own research by Jacqueline Hazelton.

9. Thurs. September 22: Vietnam, I: War Comes to Long An [c. 88]

• What grievances motivated formation of the Viet Cong or made them attractive to South Vietnamese?
• What were the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Cong in Long An?
• What were the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the government forces in Long An?
• What were the important decisions of each side, and how much were these influenced for good or ill by higher authority or outside forces?
• Can you name other factors that seem to have mattered?
• What factors were decisive in the trajectory of the contest in Long An up to the early 1960s?

*Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), maps; setting, 1-2; part of chapter 3, 120-140; chapter 4, 141-209. The rest of chapters 2 and 3 will also repay, although you can skip most of the administrative details and correspondence.